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Major processes and structures of conflict management and global governance

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When threats to international peace arose in the 19th and early 20th centuries, states were largely left to self-help mechanisms to ensure their own security. If threats were serious enough, collective action by the major powers (e.g., Concert of Europe) might occur, albeit rarely. After the two World Wars, however, there was an explosion in the number and types of international structures to deal with international crises and the situations that portended them. Central to these efforts was the United Nations (UN), whose Charter (Chapters VI and VII) provided for a series of mechanisms by which the international community could manage threats to international peace. Over time, regional organizations (ROs) such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States, among others, carved out similar conflict management roles.

With the end of the Cold War, threats to international peace changed, as did norms on state sovereignty. International civil conflicts (i.e., intra-state conflicts with an international component) replaced purely inter-state disputes as the most common forms of violence in the international system (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). These necessitated new or adaptive conflict management responses, as cross-border violence, refugees, and human rights problems were intimately tied to such conflicts. Moreover, changes in global governance and international intervention norms altered the constraints under which conflict management occurs. Whereas previous conceptions of state sovereignty dictated that whatever a state did within its borders was its own prerogative, states now envisioned roles for the international community when civil conflict produced significant fatalities and human rights violations. This, too, led to some adaptations in conflict management approaches and a dramatic increase in their use.

This chapter reviews many of the most prominent conflict management options employed by international actors, including mediation, sanctions, legal mechanisms, and peace operations. For each of these approaches, we examine which actors, agents, or structures are available and likely to take action, the roles and strategies involved, the factors affecting the decision to act, and a summary of the overall effectiveness of each option.

**Mediation**

Mediation is a consent-based form of non-binding, third-party conflict management. By requiring consent among the conflicting parties, mediation shares similarities with bilateral
negotiations; the disputants choose when to hold talks, how long to participate, and whether to reach agreement. Moreover, mediators take many forms — e.g., single states, IOs, ad hoc coalitions of states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or individuals — but the disputants also decide who can or will mediate. Thus, all mediators are not alike to disputants, a fact underscored by the various third parties who have established a niche for themselves as mediators to a wide variety of inter-state and intra-state conflicts (e.g., Norway, former US President Jimmy Carter, the Catholic Church, or Quakers).

The mediation process itself also takes many forms, depending on the exact role played by the mediator. Touval and Zartman (1985) conceptualize these roles through a typology that distinguishes between communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive mediation. In communication-facilitation mediation, a third party seeks to increase the information flow between disputants. This role provides the mediator with the least control over the mediation process and substance, and produces the lowest success rate among the various mediator roles (Bercovitch & Regan, 2004). Nonetheless, because disputants have incentives to withhold information from one another, third parties who obtain and provide unbiased information can potentially be effective mediators. They also may play a “catalytic” function (Meyer, 1960), whereby their presence in talks alters the relationship between the disputants.

In procedural mediation, the third party broadens its level of control over the talks by playing an important role in arranging the location, format, and structure of the talks, and taking active steps to sustain negotiations. A mediator might, for example, offer a face-saving mechanism for disputants by initiating talks, protecting disputants from the “bargainer’s paradox” — in which disputants avoid initiating talks for fear of appearing weak — and providing political cover for concessions that might be problematic to constituents (Carnevale & Choi, 2000).

In directive mediation, the mediator’s role increases further still — to one in which mediators actively move disputants toward a settlement. They often, for example, act as solution innovators, identifying settlements that would otherwise go unrecognized. Moreover, these mediators frequently induce a settlement by offering rewards for settlement or threats of punishment that increase the costs of non-settlement (Beardsley et al., 2006). Each makes an otherwise unacceptable agreement more palatable (Crocker et al., 1999). Finally, mediators may act as guarantors of agreements reached at the bargaining table, reassuring disputants that all parties will abide by the terms of any settlement obtained.

Despite the virtues of mediation, a majority of mediation efforts fail (Greig & Diehl, 2012), for numerous reasons. The acceptance of mediation, for example, ideally signifies disputants’ sincere desire for a settlement. Yet parties in conflict may join mediation for other reasons, such as enhancing their public image or buying time to rearm and improve their strategic position in the conflict (Richmond, 1998). Mediation failure may also result from a mediator’s shortcomings, as when the mediator adopts an unsuitable strategy, lacks sufficient expertise or skill to navigate the difficulties inherent to a peace process, or cannot garner the disputants’ trust.

Mediation efforts initiated by the conflict parties — a signal of motivation to settle — are more likely to succeed (Greig, 2001). Similarly, the timing of mediation in the life cycle of a conflict also affects mediation outcomes, with mediation more likely to succeed both early and late in a conflict (Greig, 2001). Early mediation benefits from intervention before the parties build up high levels of hostility toward one another, while the success of later mediation results from mounting conflict costs and pain over time. Zartman (2000) connects the latter to the development of a “mutual hurting stalemate” between the disputants — where a continuing conflict produces accumulating costs that eventually become unbearable to both sides and demonstrates that neither side can win on the battlefield. The combination of this mutual hurting stalemate and
disputants’ perception of a “way out” – an alternative, diplomatic path for settlement – creates “ripeness” for mediation, that is, particularly opportune times for successful mediation to occur.

Sanctions

Sanctions are a non-consent-based, coercive conflict management tool, in which an actor imposes economic costs on a target to encourage that target to change an existing policy or yield to a demand (Morgan & Schwebach, 1997). Thus, there are two actor groups: senders (i.e., the sanctioner) and receivers (i.e., the targets). Senders typically include individual states, ad hoc coalitions of states, and international organizations (IOs), while state governments are most often the receivers – although sanctions can also be aimed at sub-state actors, such as rebel groups. To induce a receiver to adjust policy or acquiesce to a demand, the sender most often relies on the pain-producing effect of sanctions – that is, raising costs. Nonetheless, sanctions can also force policy change by foreclosing options for the target (Hovi et al., 2011). A civil war arms embargo, for example, aims to force both governments and rebels to the negotiating table by undermining their ability to fight one another.

Relative to other, more invasive conflict management approaches, the chief benefit of sanctions rests with their lower costs. Although providing a greater means of punishing another actor than mediation, sanctions carry neither the risks nor the costs of military intervention. This is not to say that sanctions come without sender costs. For a sender to impose sanctions on a target state, there must first be some trade connection between the two to disrupt. The subsequent disruption of this trade via sanctions therefore costs the sanctioning state something in foregone trade.

The effectiveness of sanctions is a source of considerable debate. On one hand, when they impose unacceptable costs upon parties, sanctions bring the possibility of forcing policy change among otherwise recalcitrant actors. Hufbauer et al. (1990), for example, provide among the more positive empirical evaluations of the overall effectiveness of sanctions, arguing that they are effective about a quarter of the time, particularly when sanctions have limited goals and impose high costs upon the target but minimal costs on the sender. Morgan and Schwebach (1997) offer a similarly positive, but less sanguine, assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions, arguing that – although sanctions often do not work – they can have a limited impact when the costs imposed by sanctions on a target are substantially higher than the costs of the demanded policy change. Finally, Marinov (2005) finds that sanctions are a destabilizing force for leaders of targeted states, increasing these leaders’ likelihood of losing office by 28 percent for each year that sanctions remain in force. This not only highlights the political costs sanctions bring to target states, but also demonstrates one potential avenue of policy change: leadership turnover.

Other scholars are skeptical about the ability of sanctions to force behavioral change. Pape (1997), for example, argues that the punishments that economic sanctions bring are rarely sufficient to overcome the resistance of targets to change their policies. Even when high costs can be imposed, targets often have the ability to shift the sanction costs onto others – for example, domestic political opponents and politically weak groups (Pape, 1997). Nevertheless, because actors threatened with sanctions may acquiesce to sender demands before sanctions are imposed, and therefore because sanctions only tend to be imposed on actors that are most likely to resist their effects, the actual effectiveness of sanctions may be higher than it initially appears (Drezner, 2003).

Given the mixed support for the effectiveness of sanctions, why are sanctions so commonly employed? Beyond their lower cost than other conflict management approaches, sanctions bring with them important symbolic benefits for the actors that employ them. When political leaders face situations in which there are few viable policy options, sanctions can provide the appearance
to constituents of “doing something” without the need to make tough policy decisions that carry high costs. This is often the reason why states choose to apply sanctions when responding to foreign humanitarian emergencies, what Weiss (1999, p. 500) refers to as “collective spinelessness.” At the same time, although sanctions bring costs for the sending side, they can also sometimes bring economic benefits as well. When sanctions close off access for foreign goods to a domestic market, they can serve as a protectionist tool benefitting import-competing sectors within the state imposing sanctions (Cox & Drury, 2006).

One common benefit typically ascribed to sanctions is that they are a more humane strategy for imposing costs on another state than military force. In spite of this, sanctions can bring significant harm to the most vulnerable elements of a target state’s civilian populace (Weiss, 1999). When sanctions reduce civilian access to pharmaceuticals or food, for example, they can produce high levels of human suffering. Targets of sanctions often seek to exacerbate the effects of sanctions on civilians in order to shore up their own political support by scapegoating the sanction imposer for a broad cross-section of problems that may or may not be a consequence of the sanctions themselves.

**Legal approaches**

On occasion, disputants relinquish full control over their dispute’s outcome to a third party. This typically occurs when disputants feel they have exhausted other diplomatic options and cannot successfully use force to achieve their goal. Continued bilateral negotiations therefore seem futile, and the assistance of mediators – even when accompanied by rewards or punishments – lack the ability to generate the concessions needed to reach a resolution. Instead, disputants seek a third party to inform itself about the issues under dispute, consider relevant principles and precedents, and issue a decision that resolves the dispute with a sense of finality. These characteristics define the legal approaches to conflict management, and there exist two broad variants: adjudication and arbitration.

In adjudication, disputants refer their conflict to a standing or ad hoc court, which then follows set rules and procedures to resolve the conflict on the basis of existing law (e.g., treaties or common practice). This implies that states must establish a court with the competence to hear cases. Because a court’s establishment usually precedes the conflict cases it addresses, international courts are purposively designed by states – a feature that leads some to question their independent effect and causes each court’s operation to differ slightly, affecting everything from the composition and tenure of its judges to who can apply to the court for redress. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, accepts applications only from UN (state) members, while the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) permits individuals to petition the court as well.

Jurisdictional questions offer one of the most significant complications to the operation of international courts, particularly in inter-state disputes. An international court must first determine whether states have given it permission to hear the case appearing before it. This can be time-consuming, as the respondent state often wants to have the case removed from the court. Indeed, a non-trivial number of ICJ cases (26.87 percent) are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction – a matter that requires approximately three years for the court to determine (Mitchell & Owsiak, 2017).

Should the court decide that it possesses jurisdiction to hear the case, it next assesses the merits of the case, usually requesting written and oral arguments, as well as responses, from each party. This process can also be time consuming, as states research, construct, and respond to legal arguments. As an illustration, from application to judgment on the merits, ICJ cases take
an average of 3.92 years (Mitchell & Owsiak, 2017). Many disputants, however, do not simply wait for the ICJ to act; rather, they continue negotiating while the ICJ hears their case and frequently resolve the case successfully themselves. In 18.66 percent of ICJ cases, the participants request their case be removed from the court’s docket, almost always because they reached an agreement while the court was considering their case (Mitchell & Owsiak, 2017). More than likely, the credible threat of an unpopular court ruling incentivizes out-of-court concessions.

Arbitration constitutes a second legal approach, in which disputants select a mutually acceptable third party to review and decide their claims, and agree to abide by its decision. Arbitration is similar to adjudication in that the third party’s decision is binding on the disputants. Nevertheless, it offers disputants much more control over the settlement process than adjudication. Besides permitting the disputants to select any third party, arbitration also requires a compromise, in which the disputants outline the issues under dispute, the process by which arbitration should proceed, and what principles the third party should apply when making its decision (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). In effect, disputants constrain the autonomy of the arbiter while giving up control over the final decision reached.

Given that states cede substantial control when agreeing to legal approaches, why would they use them? The most common answer involves “political cover” (Allee & Huth, 2006). Legal approaches place responsibility for a dispute’s settlement terms entirely with a third party. Leaders can therefore be absolved of the final concessions demanded to reach a settlement – and are therefore shielded from constituents’ potential backlash. In addition, certain issues lend themselves to particular conflict management approaches. The desire for control over a dispute’s outcome ultimately intersects with other states’ interests, encouraging states to institutionalize conflict management by issue-area to reduce transaction costs (Owsiak & Mitchell, 2017).

Two perennial debates persist about legal approaches to conflict management. First, do they resolve disputes as they were intended to do? Bercovitch and Jackson (2009, p. 56), for example, occupy the pessimistic end of the spectrum, concluding that the ICJ “has only a moderate record in conflict resolution and has been involved in none of the most serious conflicts of the twentieth century.” The same data, however, point Mitchell and Owsiak (2017) in an optimistic direction. Although the ICJ hears few cases (134 total cases from 1946–2015), those heard often concern highly contentious issues – namely, disagreements over sovereign rights to territory, river, or maritime space. Moreover, major states participate in ICJ cases as respondents, even though they themselves do not often submit applications to the court. This suggests that even the most powerful states see the importance of legal approaches.

Another way to assess international courts’ effectiveness is to look beyond the cases these courts hear. This can be difficult, for it is not always clear how one identifies cases that did not go to court. One might study policy changes that, if not enacted, would result in similar court cases. Helfer and Voeten (2014), for example, find that rulings by the ECHR prompt policy changes to minority rights in non-respondent states, thereby demonstrating that the court alters behavior in out-of-court actors. Through an investigation of territorial claims, Gent and Shannon (2010) find that legal approaches increase the likelihood that territorial claims end, while the alternatives do not. The implicit assumption underlying their analysis is that any territorial claim can produce a legal case, which allows them to demonstrate the value of legal approaches relative to alternatives.

The second debate concerns compliance: do actors abide by the legal rulings they receive? The answer is affirmative, although there are disagreements over the reasons why. Legal approaches render it almost certain that a resolution will be reached – a low bar, as the legal actor can produce this resolution without the disputants. Compliance with arbitral and adjudicative resolutions, however, is over two to three times greater than with agreements resulting from bilateral negotiations.
Simmons (2002) proposes that these high compliance rates result from the reputational costs associated with non-compliance. Others argue that compliance rates might result from more subtle factors, such as legal actors’ ability to help disputants select from among multiple possible solutions to a conflict (Ginsburg & McAdams, 2004) or connections to other disputes (Prorok & Huth, 2015). A final set of scholars contend that compliance occurs because states only give legal actors cases whose rulings they intend to respect, rather than because legal actors constrain state behavior (Posner & Yoo, 2005).

**Peace operations**

Although international actors can engage in coercive military operations, these are rare in practice. Political disagreements at the UN, for example, hamper its ability to authorize such operations. ROs likewise generally lack the political will or military capacity to impose peace. In this gap, the UN and other IOs developed an alternative approach: peacekeeping. Over time, this expanded into peacebuilding. These two types of operations are not always distinct; frequently, operations combine elements of both types – what might generically be labeled “peace operations.” By some estimates, there have been almost 200 such operations since the end of World War II (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

**Traditional peacekeeping**

In its traditional form, peacekeeping involves the stationing of a small number of lightly armed troops or observers to separate combatants – generally following a ceasefire, but before an agreement that resolves the underlying disputed issues. These operations are based on the so-called “holy trinity”: host state consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force (Bellamy et al., 2010). Primary objectives include separating disputants, monitoring ceasefires, and reporting on violations – as a way to build space for a comprehensive agreement to be found (Diehl & Druckman, 2018). The separation of combatants, for example, helps detect ceasefire violations to discourage cheating on the agreements, offers early warning of a military attack, and decreases any tactical advantages that stem from a surprise attack. Moreover, the international reputation costs and possible sanctions that result from violating a ceasefire, combined with the decreased likelihood of quick success, are expected to deter violence, creating space for productive negotiations (Fortna, 2008).

The UN deployed the first traditional peacekeeping operation in 1948 after the first Arab– Israeli war. Over the next 40 years, the UN remained the predominant, traditional peacekeeping agent. ROs had yet to be formed or were relatively weak in their delegated powers or material capabilities. This, and the number of operations, changed dramatically starting in the late 1980s and into the 21st century. The UN still carries out a significant proportion of missions (over 40 percent), but now, ROs organize a plurality of operations (about 48 percent). Most involved in the latter are the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/AU respectively. Multinational operations, those carried out by ad hoc collections of states, constitute the remaining operations (just over 10 percent).

Peace operations deploy not to all conflicts, but rather to a small subset. Organizations, for example, are more likely to authorize and deploy operations in high-severity and protracted conflicts (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003), suggesting that the international community uses peace operations to address the biggest threats to international peace and security. Nevertheless, this also means that peace operations may struggle to succeed, as they are deployed to contexts
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with the least prospects for success. In contrast, operations are less likely when the target state
is allied with or is itself a major power (Mullenbach, 2005), although several peace oper-
tions in the Middle East are exceptions. Finally, no evidence indicates that missions are more
likely in secessionist conflicts, non-democracies, former colonies of UN Security Council
members, or states with high primary commodity exports (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003), as
conventional wisdom might suggest.

The length of peace operations varies tremendously. The mean operation length is 5.69 years—
ranging from a few months to more than 65 years. Post-Cold War peacekeeping has tended
to involve multiple and consecutive operations sent to the same conflict – each of which is of
limited duration – rather than a single operation that stays in place for an extended time. The
multiple operations sent to Haiti and the former Yugoslavia exhibit this characteristic.

There is clear evidence that peacekeeping works. It prevents the renewal of violent conflict,
reducing the renewal of inter-state and intra-state war by 30–95 percent (Fortna, 2008) and
over 70 percent respectively (Mason et al., 2011). Moreover, it can limit the spread of conflict.
Without peacekeepers, a substantial risk exists that the conflict will spread to a neighbouring,
rival state (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). In addition, peacekeeping can reduce civilian casual-
ties. Although peacekeepers are not necessarily deployed to sites associated with civilian casualties
(Reeder et al., 2015), there is clear evidence that fewer civilian casualties result when especially
the size of the peacekeeping force grows (Hultman et al., 2013).

Peacebuilding

Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations have increasingly incorporated mission
objectives beyond the supervision of ceasefires. These have been subsumed under the label
of “peacebuilding” and possess several essential elements. First and foremost, the purpose of
peacebuilding is (minimally) to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Rather than simply halt
violence, however, some peacebuilding activities are predicated on a long-term conflict man-
agement strategy that addresses the root causes of conflict – for example, by creating peaceful,
as opposed to violent, conflict management mechanisms. Facilitating and monitoring elec-
tions, repatriating refugees, providing humanitarian assistance, and strengthening government
institutions – including assistance with local security and law enforcement – constitute activi-
ties consistent with this goal, although they might also serve other goals, such as the promo-
tion of liberal values (Diehl & Druckman, 2018). Other activities not formally connected
with the operation, such as economic development and building civil society institutions,
may also be employed. Second, most conceptions of peacebuilding envision its activities to
occur following some type of peace settlement between warring parties, rather than in the
post-ceasefire/pre-settlement phase typical of traditional peacekeeping’s deployment. Finally,
peacebuilding is employed in a civil context, following an intra-state war, significant ethnic
conflict, or even within a failed state.

One major difference between traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding is the number and
variety of actors involved in carrying out missions. In the former, soldiers exclusively or primarily
carry out the duty of monitoring ceasefires. In contrast, other actors supplement or supplant sol-
diers in many peacebuilding activities (e.g., other agencies of the UN or ROs). For example, the
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs coordinates humanitarian assistance. The World Bank
provides loans to promote economic development, whereas the International Monetary Fund
assists post-conflict states with short-term financial adjustments. Moreover, NGOs are critically
important to peacebuilding efforts. Many have been in place in the country prior to and during the
civil conflict there. In the conflict’s aftermath, they work with and independently of other actors.
The factors promoting success in peacebuilding tasks beyond limiting violence can be difficult to discern. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, and it is challenging to identify correlates of success for a process that is still incomplete in most cases. Nonetheless, a few general principles emerge. First, divided societies pose a difficult context for peacebuilding, and success in such cases likely requires opportunity for reconciliation and stability (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Second, there must exist some local capacity, defined in terms of local economic health and resources (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Post-conflict recovery is greater under conditions of economic health. Yet one can assume that the conflict produced some economic dislocation and problems. At the extreme, this might involve the destruction of infrastructure or industry, the disruption of agriculture, or the dislocation of large segments of the population. This local capacity must be restored or supplemented. Third, peacekeepers must develop working relationships with the local population. A cultural cleavage – for example, military/civilian – may exist between the cultures and norms of the peacekeepers (who themselves vary) and the local behaviors (Autesserre, 2014). Success requires building partnerships across this cleavage. Finally, objectives must not be rushed. Some, for example, are critical of the way in which peacebuilding strategies have been implemented, specifically attempts to build democracy and stability too quickly and without adequate resources (e.g., holding democratic elections too soon; Paris, 2004).

Conflict management trajectories

Each of the conflict management approaches discussed above can be used in isolation, but they most often occur in combination with one another. Within inter-state disputes that become militarized, for example, nearly 85 percent of all conflict management attempts occur as part of a package – coordinated or not – of multiple conflict management attempts (Owsiak, 2014). This suggests that managing an inter-state conflict requires a constellation of tools that can be used in sequence or alongside one another to help disputants reach a resolution. The key, then, is to know which tools work well together and the conditions under which they do so.

We can theorize about the relationship between conflict management approaches in three ways. First, repeated usage of the same conflict management approach may be valuable, and these actions may be interdependent. Disputants, for example, might need to become comfortable with a mediator and the process before progress can be made on disputed issues (Moore, 1996). Indeed, states that experience mediation are more likely to try it again (Greig & Diehl, 2006). Thus, conflict management might best be conceptualized as a “softening” process, whereby disputants familiarize themselves over time with the process and prepare themselves for difficult concessions (Greig & Diehl, 2006). In this process, earlier mediations fail before later ones succeed.

Second, pairs of different approaches might be valuable for broader conflict management efforts, although some combinations will make more theoretical sense than others. Two approaches theoretically work together when each contributes something unique and they together produce a sum greater than the individual parts. Proponents of peace operations, for example, originally envisioned it acting as an umbrella – sustaining a non-violent environment – under which conflict management would both occur and succeed. This suggests that peace operations should be used in combination with other conflict management strategies (e.g., mediation or negotiation) that move the disputants toward a resolution, while peacekeepers freeze the military status quo. Empirical research, however, finds the opposite: that a peacekeeping mission renders mediation less likely to occur, and makes mediation or negotiation less likely to succeed, than if the mission had been absent (Greig & Diehl, 2005).

Finally, within each conflict, various third parties use a mix of approaches over time – sometimes in sequence, sometimes simultaneously – to promote peaceful inter-state relations within a
given conflict. These third parties are aware of one another’s activities, even if every detail of their efforts is not fully known (e.g., some mediation conversations occur in private). A third party accounts for the approaches previously used by other third parties in the conflict when deciding what approach to employ themselves, with more recent efforts yielding more useful information, as a conflict evolves over time. Successive conflict management efforts therefore connect to one another, much like links in a chain, and the chain itself constitutes a path of conflict management or conflict management trajectory (Owsiak, 2014).

These trajectories have common “shapes” to them, making it possible to discern patterns of conflict management. The shapes result from organizing the full menu of conflict management approaches along a cost continuum, ranging from low-cost (e.g., appeals for a ceasefire and fact-finding missions) through medium-cost (e.g., mediation and adjudication) to high-cost (e.g., peace operations) approaches. Each third party selects an approach from this continuum, and when those cost-organized decisions are then ordered chronologically for a given conflict, a “wave-like” picture emerges, with the exact shape of the wave dependent on the number and type of approaches employed. Owsiak (2014) develops and uses this approach to identify eight trajectory shapes in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2001.

Owsiak (2014) briefly suggests a few possible models to account for different trajectory shapes. A learning model, for example, proposes that a third party employs an approach to manage a conflict, and other third parties observe. If this approach succeeds – however defined – then the next third party tries that same approach again, following a “softening” logic (Greig & Diehl, 2006). If the initial approach fails, the next third party instead switches to a different approach. The trajectory shape then results from the success and failure of proximately employed approaches. In contrast, a cost model argues that third parties want peace for the lowest possible price. They therefore start with a low-cost approach and employ successively more costly approaches as less costly ones fail. Although theoretically plausible, empirical work still needs to fully explore such ideas.

References


