13
KNOWLEDGE AS SKILL

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13.1 A methodological point

Answering the question ‘What is it to know that \( p \)?’ (for some proposition ‘\( p \)’) can lead us along methodologically disparate paths. Many epistemologists seek a conceptual analysis, aiming to describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of a (or ‘the’) concept of knowledge. But that familiar path is not the only possible one to follow. We could instead be more metaphysical in thinking about knowledge.\(^1\) This chapter describes a model that is explanatory first and foremost about what we can \textit{do} with knowledge. The result is an interpretation both of knowledge’s presence and the correlative potential for action.

This approach is motivated partly by a specific reason to not always reach for ‘what we (intuitively) would say’ about actual or imagined knowledge-attributions. They might not take us to the heart of what knowledge is.\(^2\) More explanatorily fundamental data might be available. Those linguistic or conceptual reactions amount, even collectively, to one species within a more generic kind—the category of knowledge-related actions. So, even at best, those linguistic or conceptual reactions might be reflective of, or revelatory about, only part of what it is to know. I will attend to that potentially wider range of knowledge-related actions.

13.2 A distinction

Consider someone gazing, in normal conditions, at an eagle. She knows that she is seeing an eagle. She also has accompanying skills that we may think of as cases of knowledge-\textit{how}. She knows how to distinguish an eagle from a hawk: she can do this by sight and by sound. \textit{A fortiori}, she knows how to distinguish, by sight and by sound, an eagle from other kinds of bird. This skill of hers is not an expert’s—all-but-infallible. Still, it is generally accurate. It could be manifested in several ways. Suppose that she knows how to answer many related questions in a variety of circumstances, and/or knows how to draw some eagle-distinguishing features, and/or knows how to picture to herself an eagle. She has a complex skill—complex knowledge-\textit{how}—composed of further skills (further instances of knowledge-\textit{how}). There are further such sub-skills that she might have had, but that she lacks. Nonetheless, she has enough to constitute the relevant knowledge-\textit{how}. 

168
Now, we expect her knowledge-that (‘That’s an eagle’) and her accompanying knowledge-how (her general eagle-identifying skills) to be inter-related in what they ‘say’ about her, and about what she might be at this and other moments. How are they inter-related, though? To what does ‘accompanying’ amount in this setting?

Here, we need to reflect upon knowledge and action. Many actions that this person could perform would reflect her knowledge-that (‘That’s an eagle’) even while manifesting her associated knowledge-how. She might write down some of the bird’s identifying characteristics; she might explain to someone else what makes an eagle an eagle; she might form and retain an image of this eagle; she might seek suitable food for the bird; she might muse on its survival prospects; etc. Each such action would manifest or express what are at least this-knowledge-related skills—skills related to, or attendant upon, this knowledge-that. But, again, what is the nature of that relation? Are these knowledge-related skills, and actions expressing them, merely accompanying the person’s knowledge that she is seeing an eagle? Or is there a metaphysically closer relationship between the knowledge-how—those skills—and the knowledge-that?

Here is an epistemologically unorthodox answer. Perhaps those actions reflect and express the knowledge; perhaps this is because ‘the knowledge’ is at once the skills (the knowledge-how) and the knowledge-that; and perhaps this is because the skills are, collectively, the knowledge-that. This interpretation will be defended in what follows.

Imagine that interpretation’s being false; and suppose that the person’s relevant knowledge-how—her complex skill comprising those sub-skills—merely accompanies her knowledge-that. In that case, while those actual or potential actions would be inherently expressive of the knowledge-how (which is the knowledge how to perform such actions), they would not be inherently expressive of the knowledge-that. On the contrary, though, we should insist that those actions do express and manifest the knowledge-that. Such actions are distinguishable from other actions in terms that share content (e.g. ‘That’s an eagle’) with how we would distinguish this knowledge-that from other knowledge-that. If we see this as just a happening-to-share, we have an ‘occasionalist’ model of the joint presence of those actions and the knowledge-that. Could we find a stronger model—whereby the actions are deeply, because metaphysically, linked to the knowledge?

### 13.3 Introducing knowledge-practicalism

Let us meet a practicalist model of knowledge’s nature.³ This knowledge-practicalism is built around the distinction made in section 13.2 between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Ryle (1949, 1971/1946), most famously, directed philosophers’ attention to that distinction. He argued that it marks the existence of two forms of knowledge.

Knowledge-how is knowledge-how-to—knowledge how to perform some action or kind(s) of action (and not knowledge of how to perform it). Philosophers often call this practical knowledge, which is why I use the term ‘practicalism’. Knowledge-practicalism seeks to elide Ryle’s distinction, by regarding all knowledge-that as knowledge-how. Hence, if knowledge is only ever knowledge-that or knowledge-how, practicalism implies that all knowledge is knowledge-how. Practicalism is a form of pragmatism.³ It aims to understand knowledge’s nature by reflecting on what knowledge can do. Its focus is on knowledge’s actual or possible uses in action—actions that are or would be expressing or manifesting the knowledge-how that (according to practicalism) is the knowledge-that.

With the example discussed in section 13.2, of someone’s knowing that there is an eagle in front of her, we noted some associated actions that she might perform. We may now distinguish
Stephen Hetherington

a _causally_ constitutive relation between the knowledge and those actions, from a _metaphysically_ constitutive relation between them:

* Causally constitutive. Knowing can *give* one various skills. By knowing that the bird is an eagle, one is enabled—as it happens, perhaps reliably—to perform some or all of those and other actions.

* Metaphysically constitutive. Knowing can *include* various skills. In knowing that the bird is an eagle, one is enabled—inherently, with no further circumstances needing to cooperate—to perform some or all of those and other actions.

The former links the knowing and the skills in a metaphysically *accidental* or *external* way. The latter links them in a metaphysically *necessary* or *internal* way. The latter is what practicalism advocates. ⁶

The practicalist idea is that to know a particular truth is to have related skills, natural expressions of which are various actions. Practicalism treats knowledge—that as a kind of knowledge—how. Contrast practicalism with the traditional view that, as a (causal) *result* of having specific knowledge, one might gain such skills yet not inherently, not as an ‘internal’ part of the knowing. On that traditional approach, although knowing can be a means, even a reliable means, to having related skills, and thereby to acting or being able to act, this is not metaphysically guaranteed. Possessing those cognitive and behavioural skills would be metaphysically extrinsic to possessing the knowledge. In contrast, practicalism regards knowing as *already and always*—intrinsically—the possessing of such skills.

‘Knowledge is power’: this beguiling aphorism is generally proffered as a political, pedagogical, and/or social thesis. Still, it remains a causal thesis: possessing knowledge is said (all else being equal) to lead to being able to perform socially relevant actions, for example. But when practicalism says ‘Knowledge is power’, the immediate import is metaphysically constitutive, not causally so: possessing knowledge is *already and always, in itself*, one’s being able to perform various actions. These actions might be socially significant, politically and/or pedagogically potent. This depends upon the knowledge’s content, for a start. Your knowing that there is an eagle in front of you will rarely, if ever, result in socially significant actions. What would be gained by adopting the causal interpretation—hence by not regarding knowledge as in itself a skill? We would lose some explanatory power. We would be saying only ‘Knowledge *can give* power’, in the sense of knowledge’s possibly, even reliably, bestowing power. Whereupon we would struggle to justifiably interpret that use of ‘*can give*’ so as (i) to do justice to knowledge’s potential for generating related actions (this seems to be a datum about why we ever *value* knowledge), while (ii) not also letting knowledge be simply that potential (with which move, we would be returning to knowledge-practicalism). The counter-practicalist’s need to satisfy (ii), developing a causally constitutive rather than metaphysically constitutive interpretation, threatens to leave us with a less ‘intimate’ link between knowledge and action. Knowledge-practicalism’s availability enables us to regard the knowledge-action link in metaphysically stronger terms.

How have epistemologists recently struggled to justify, in non-practicalist terms, a suitable knowledge-action link? Williamson (2000: ch. 11) has argued that knowing that p is necessary for the normative aptness of asserting that p. In the same spirit, Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) treat knowing as a normative condition for acting. But such talk of normative aptness or normative conditions is less clear than talking, in practicalist terms, of knowledge as a skill at performing related actions. This practicalist option describes a metaphysically shorter path,
Knowledge as skill

for knowledge’s being ‘translated’ into action. This need not amount to an empirically shorter path from knowledge to action. The difference reflects what we do conceptually in moving from describing knowledge to describing an associated action.

Care is needed, even once we make that conceptual move. Would we—in claiming to lessen that metaphysical distance between knowledge and action—not be doing justice to what knowledge is? How should practicalism conceive of the metaphysical relationships between knowledge and its supposedly major components—belief, justification, truth? The rest of this chapter answers that question.

13.4 Knowledge and belief

Plato introduced into philosophy what have remained the two main models of the constitutiveness relation between knowledge and belief (doxa—opinion). His Meno (97e–98a) uses the idea that any instance of knowledge is a belief (with epistemically salient characteristics). But in his Republic (475b–480), it is argued, knowledge and belief are incompatible states, with categorically different objects (contents): knowledge is of what is eternal and unchanging, of what is a fit object only for pure thought; belief is directed at what is transient and contingent, at what is a fit object only for observation.

Contemporary epistemologists standardly describe knowledge as a kind of belief. This portrays the belief as being what it is ‘within’ or about a person that is her knowledge. This treats any instance of knowledge analogously to how a ‘concrete’ individual might be metaphysically portrayed—as a substance with attributes. The belief is the substance that is, or is within, the individual instance of knowledge. The belief’s being true and epistemically justified (such as by good evidence), along with any additionally needed features, are attributes of that substance, insofar as it is an instance of knowledge.

But that metaphysical analogy should prompt us to broaden that standard epistemological thinking. It is a matter of metaphysical contention whether substance-attribute models are correct. For example, are individuals bundles of attributes, rather than substances to which attributes adhere? A similar question arises about instances of knowledge, once we acknowledge the conceptual availability of knowledge-practicalism. After all, on practicalism, any instance of knowledge is, in effect, a bundle. It is a bundle without a privileged ‘centre’ or ‘core’ that is categorically different to whatever features ‘attach’ to it in constituting an instance of knowledge. It is a bundle of (sub-)skills, amounting to a complex (even if variegated) super-skill that can be expressed or manifested, through the expressing or manifesting—with various actions—of one or more of those sub-skills. On a bundle theory of individuals, no substance is needed as the individual’s metaphysical core, being that to which the individual’s attributes attach. By analogy, practicalism dispenses with the presumption that each instance of knowledge depends on there being a belief that is the knowledge’s metaphysical core, to which the knowledge’s epistemic attributes attach. On practicalism, there is no such metaphysical core to an instance of knowledge.

This is not to say that practicalism leaves no conceptual room for belief within knowledge. Practicalism does allow belief to be a part of knowledge, at least sometimes, perhaps even—but not necessarily—always. But practicalism does not require belief always to be part of knowledge. Whether each instance of knowing includes a belief is a contingent matter.

How does practicalism accommodate that idea? Simple: a belief can be one of those (sub-) skills, all or some of which are constituting some instance of knowledge. In one respect, that view is not far removed from epistemological orthodoxy anyway. Many epistemologists think of belief as dispositional; and a disposition can be more, or less, reliably expressible or manifestable.
Stephen Hetherington

This can itself be thought of as a more, or a less, reliable skill. Consider again a belief that one is seeing an eagle. On the present story, this belief could be a more, or a less, reliable skill in representing and/or responding with ‘That’s an eagle’ in appropriate circumstances. We may say ‘a more, or a less, reliable skill’ because one can believe that one is seeing an eagle, even while being somewhat unreliable in manifesting that belief (in verbal responses). Having a particular belief is compatible with the possibility that sometimes, even in an appropriate circumstance, no suitable representation or response (‘That’s an eagle’) arises. This would not entail the person’s lacking the belief. But it would entail something about the belief’s nature: the belief would have a quality akin to fallibility.

This akin-to-fallibility quality is what I have elsewhere (Hetherington 1999, 2001: ch. 2, 2016a: ch. 7) called failability. The idea of failability generalises a standard idea of fallibility. The latter envisages there being at least one accessible possible world, say, where a particular belief retains the justification supporting it in this world, yet is not true.8 We can generalise that conception, to be talking of epistemic states in general. Here is that ‘conception of epistemic failability in general’ (Hetherington 2016a: 209):

\[ E_{\text{Fail}} \text{ You are failably in an epistemic state } ES, \text{ if and only if (i) you are in } ES \text{ but (ii) there is at least one accessible possible world where (even with all else being equal) you are not in } ES—\text{because within that world there is at least one component of being in } ES \text{ that you fail to satisfy.} \]

We could then talk of failable knowledge, by conceiving of possible worlds where someone almost retains that knowledge—only to lack it by failing just one of the conditions jointly constituting her having the knowledge within this world. One way to know failably is to know fallibly. When someone knows fallibly that p, the truth condition is the particular ‘just one of the conditions’ being failed within another possible world: in at least one accessible world, the person continues satisfying whatever conditions jointly constitute her having the knowledge that p within this world—except for its not being true that p within that other world.

Now apply \( E_{\text{Fail}} \) to the epistemic state of believing. On a dispositional conception, having a belief that p is constituted, for a start, by a range of actual or possible circumstances where one answers appropriately (with ‘p’). On that conception, even a person’s answering appropriately could be her manifesting or expressing her belief only failably, for there could be appropriate occasions where (with all else being equal) she fails to manifest or express the belief.

This description coheres well with the idea, introduced above, that belief is a belief-skill—one that can be more, or less, reliable in how it is manifested or expressed. Failability admits of degrees or grades: with all else being equal, there being more and closer worlds where the failability is realised (such as worlds where the belief is false, or where it is not generating an appropriate response) either is or models the presence of stronger failability. A particular belief could thus be a more, or a less, failable belief-skill.

And on a given occasion it might contribute correlative to the nature of one’s knowing, since a belief-skill can also be regarded as a knowledge-skill: we may conceive of the belief-skill as one of the sub-skills that might be present as part of knowing on a particular occasion. Practicalism also allows us to regard the belief as just one of those available sub-skills—without requiring that, from among that potentially wide range of available sub-skills, it is always present when the knowledge is present. Practicalism allows that on a specific occasion an instance of knowledge might happen not to include that particular sub-skill.
This account also helps to explain a recent argument, by Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013), for knowledge’s not having to be accompanied by belief. They call upon some experimental philosophy studies: ‘the unconfident examinee’, ‘the absent-minded driver’, ‘the prejudiced professor’, ‘the freaked-out movie-watcher’, and ‘the self-deceived husband’. For each case, respondents were asked to say whether the person being described had knowledge and whether she had belief.

The first case imagines an examinee, Kate, being asked (when the exam period is about to end) the question ‘In what year did Queen Elizabeth I die?’ Although she has studied, upon hearing the teacher say that the exam’s end is imminent Kate starts panicking; she attempts to remember the answer consciously; she fails; whereupon she writes an answer anyway; which happens to be correct; yet she lacks all confidence in its being correct. Is her answer knowledge? Does it reflect belief? A large proportion of respondents surveyed by Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel attributed knowledge, but not belief, to Kate. For argument’s sake, let us treat this as someone’s having knowledge without belief.

Practicalism can accommodate that interpretation. If Kate was also to believe her answer, this would make further possible actions available to her as expressions or manifestations of the belief. But they would be expressing or manifesting the knowledge, too. Moreover, this increased range of potential expressions or manifestations would correlative strengthen or ‘expand’ her knowledge (that 1603 was when Queen Elizabeth I died). It would give the knowledge behaviourally increased power. For example, Kate would be more confident, within a wider range of circumstances (including ones where her answering is not forced upon her), about answering this question concerning Queen Elizabeth I, and thereby about communicating this belief—which would also constitute her communicating the knowledge. Yet even this does not entail that the belief’s presence was essential to the knowledge’s presence. Kate’s knowledge could be present today as a somewhat extensive range of sub-skills. Tomorrow, it might be present as a more extensive range—thanks to her coming to believe tomorrow what today she knows without believing.

13.5 Knowledge and justification

Section 13.4 asked how we might move beyond the thesis that any instance of knowledge must be a belief. What now of knowledge and (epistemic) justification—the latter being another essential element within any instance of knowledge, according to traditional epistemology?

That traditional view—justificationism—is (like the view of knowledge’s always being a kind of belief) often traced back to Plato’s *Meno* (97e–98a).\(^{10}\) Justificationism says that any instance of knowledge that \(p\) must include something somehow sufficiently generative and/or indicative of \(p\)’s being true. Many epistemologists (e.g., Conee and Feldman 2004) understand this as requiring the person to have good *evidence* of its being true that \(p\). Alternatively (e.g., Goldman 1979, 1986), we might say that she needs to have formed the belief that \(p\) in a truth-conditionally *reliable* way.

Yet practicalism can discard that traditional view, similarly to how section 13.4 dispensed with knowledge’s having to include belief. Practicalism allows (as it did, *mutatis mutandis*, for knowledge and belief) that knowledge *can*, but *need not*, include justification. We can conceive of any justification present within some knowledge as *just another* from the range of available sub-skills that might be jointly constituting the complex skill that is a given instance of knowledge. On this practicalist proposal, justification within knowledge is a justification-skil— and so the justification can contribute as a sub-skill within the knowledge, where the latter is a complex skill that might also include belief-skills.
Let us examine that idea more fully. Practicalism allows that knowing can include the presence of evidentially supportive skills, or (reliabilist-approved) skills of acquisition. Someone who views knowledge more traditionally might strengthen that ‘can’ to a ‘must’, a move not discussed here. This section defends only the practicalist thesis that, insofar as knowledge does, can, or must include justification, what it would include is a skill. Here is a crucial step in that defence:

The point of requiring evidence, say, within knowledge was never simply that such evidence be present. Nor was the aim just to specify an ideal location for the evidence to be present (such as ‘it is in the mind of the believer’). The deeper point to this traditional requirement on knowing’s nature was action-oriented.

The underlying point of expecting a knower to have evidence was that it can be used by her in appropriate ways. For example, we might think that, by being in a believer’s mind, evidence is able to be used by her (perhaps because it is relevantly accessible to her) as would be apt if it was to contribute to her knowing. What are those ‘appropriate ways’ for evidence to be used, as part of having knowledge? The main idea is that, insofar as knowledge is present (partly by including evidence), the evidence is ready and able to be used as continuing support for holding the belief, such as if the person’s claim to know is questioned, or if she is wondering whether to retain the belief. The evidence’s importance within knowledge is not simply its being present, but rather its being present, whenever it is, as one from a range of skills that are, could, or must be present—skills for actually or at least possibly using the belief during its continued life. The evidence is available as a potential for knowledge-generating or -maintaining action—not merely as an ‘item’, statically in place. So, having evidence is not enough. Nor is one’s having used evidence. What matters is that there exists an associated evidential skill. Having used the evidence to form the belief in such a way that the belief is knowledge is one’s having expressed or manifested just such an evidential skill. And once the evidence is present, as part of the resulting knowledge, this is significant only insofar as one is able to call on it, if required by circumstances, in actively supporting the belief, so that the belief is maintained as knowledge. We can parse this in practicalist terms:

Why we should ever value evidence’s presence within knowledge (even if we are not always requiring its presence there) is that possible actions, expressive of related skills, are thereby available, as ways to use and/or maintain the knowledge.

Those comments have been about evidence-within-knowledge. Their point persists, mutatis mutandis, when one’s epistemic support for a belief is reliabilist-approved instead—one’s having acquired the true belief in a truth-conditionally reliable way. If one has formed a belief reliably, this might be a skilful genesis for the belief. That is less clearly so if the reliable formation occurred at a sub-personal level, such as for a simple perceptual belief, formed via an everyday ‘act’ of perception. Even here, though, a practicalist may say that, if the belief has been formed skilfully, not only is this a result of action by the believer, but there could remain in place a skilful potential for the belief’s future use—being maintained, being defended from doubts, etc. The latter possibility pertains, too, if the belief has been formed reliably but not skilfully (such as sub-personally).

Imagine lacking such skills while retaining the evidence, the reliable genesis, and the belief. What would be the point, as a would-be knower, of having this evidence? Practicalism suggests that there is none. Insisting on some such evidence being present would amount to requiring evidence only for the mere appearance of having knowledge.
13.6 Knowledge and truth

Non-practicalists might object that, once practicalism ceases requiring knowledge to include belief, we face the possibility of cases of knowledge failing to include that which is true. The metaphysical substance of knowing would have been thrown away. In which case, does practicalism take us too far away from our quest to understand knowledge?

The worry is misplaced. Practicalism can retain a factivity requirement on knowing. But it does this not merely by requiring that the fact obtain. If there is to be knowledge, what practicalism requires is actual or potential interaction between the (known) fact and one or more of the sub-skills constituting the knowledge. For example, the fact that p might play a suitable role in the manifestation or expression of the various sub-skills constituting a given (super-)skill that is the knowledge that p for a particular person at a particular time. Different such sub-skills could involve differently the fact that p. Nonetheless, we may continue insisting that knowledge is somehow answerable to a fact. Practicalism can allow this answerability to take different forms, even for a single instance of knowledge, with each of these involving more than merely the fact’s obtaining. The answerability is constituted partly by whatever sub-skills are constituting the instance of knowing. There could be skilful representing of the fact, skilful discussing of it, skilful use of one’s body in ways that accommodate the fact, etc. In such ways, the fact that p remains implicated in the knowing that p. It plays a part in literally constituting the knowing.

13.7 Hyman’s narrower knowledge-practicalism

It is rare within contemporary epistemology to encounter knowledge-practicalism. But Hyman (2015: chs. 7, 8) has an elegant version. It embraces the thesis that knowing is not always a form of belief—because knowledge is always an ability or skill. However, Hyman’s account is built around an idea that should be seen by practicalists as needlessly restrictive in its conception of knowing.

Hyman conceives of knowledge that p as the ability to be guided by the fact that p when acting congruently (in ways expressing that ability). But is that a sufficiently flexible conception? For example, someone’s knowing that p could include her being able to assess detachedly whether p obtains. She might thereby know that p in a questioning way. She could still be respecting her evidence for p, and leaning appropriately toward p’s obtaining—even while retaining the ability not to be in thrall to that evidence, able to question p’s obtaining while knowing that p. Is she being led by the fact that p? This is not clear. One can be led by an interest in whether p obtains, rather than by the fact that p. One might be led toward p without being led by p.

These are gestural comments, as are Hyman’s. He does talk of the impossibility of being led by a guide whom one cannot see. This picture is intended to reinforce his claim that one cannot know that p without always holding in sight—and thus being led by—the fact that p. Yet his picture reinforces the narrowness of his account. Even while holding in sight and following a guide, one might wonder whether to continue doing so: one could be engaging with questions, even doubts, about whether to continue being led by the guide. In which case, it is not clear that one is still being guided by her in the trusting way that Hyman apparently has in mind.

13.8 Conclusion

Traditional views of knowledge’s nature, this chapter has argued, lack something substantial that is gained by adopting a knowledge-practicalism. They lack something metaphysical. They
allow there to be knowledge with no inherent link to action—to actual or possible uses of the knowledge. Knowledge has long been conceived of by epistemologists in ways that leave it in danger of being useless, in that metaphysical sense—of not being inherently linked to the world of agency and action.

But practicalism deems no knowledge to be inherently useless, in that same sense of being categorically removed from the world of agency and action. Perhaps a given case of knowing is socially useless, or admits only of personally unimportant actions. Even this does not imply that no possible actions could express or manifest that knowledge. Maybe no such actions will occur, for that knowledge and that person; this does not entail that none were possible. Actions need not be publicly observable (as opposed to being ‘inner’ acts of thought), if they are to satisfy the practicalist conception; nor need they be ‘whole body’ actions. Practicalism is more generous than that in its conception of knowledge-expressive ways of acting.

And the metaphysical ramifications do not end there. Practicalism promises to render knowing more inherently an aspect of being a person. If knowledge is power (in the sense described by practicalism), having knowledge is expressive of being inherently a thing with powers—expressive of person-powers, we might say. In contrast, on more traditional views whereby knowledge is not inherently tied metaphysically to action, in principle there could be knowledge within someone possessing no related powers. Do those traditional theories of knowledge allow that in theory a person might come into existence and later go out of existence, never possessing powers, while nevertheless having knowledge? Seemingly so. But seemingly not so, on knowledge-practicalism. In principle, practicalism conceives of knowledge as inherently—not extrinsically, accidentally, or contingently—a bridge between states of being and actions.16 This is accomplished by the central practicalist move: we need only conceive of knowledge from the outset as being a power.17

Notes

1 Another option involves being less metaphysical in thinking about knowledge. See, for example, Williamson’s (2000) ‘knowledge-first’ research programme.
2 For a case study in applying this thought, see Hetherington (2016a: ch. 6).
3 Superficially, it is a view with precedent. Hartland-Swann (1958: 10–14) claimed to argue that knowing is a kind of skill. But he meant only that claims to knowledge—the actions of making such claims—are skilful. He was not arguing that underlying states of knowing are skills. That thesis, however, will be this chapter’s. For a fuller defence, see Hetherington (e.g., 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2015, 2018a, 2019). It has also been defended by Hyman (2015: chs. 7, 8); see section 13.7.
4 Knowledge—that is often called theoretical or contemplative knowledge (even though it need not be contemplative in mood of mind or theoretical in content).
5 It is to be contrasted with intellectualism, which implies that all knowledge—including knowledge—how—is knowledge—that. For defences of intellectualism, see Stanley and Williamson (2001), Stanley (2011), and Pavese (2015a, 2015b, 2017). For anti-intellectualist arguments, see Fridland (2012, 2013). For further critical discussion, see Carter and Poston (2018: ch. 2).
6 The former—the accidentalist interpretation—should not be read as saying that the knowing is linked with the skills only luckily. ‘Accidental’ is being contrasted with ‘essential’. The point here is metaphysical, using this traditional pair of ideas.
7 Well, it depends on where you are. See the 2016 Kazakh-language documentary The Eagle Huntress, about traditional hunting practices with eagles in part of Mongolia.
9 It is inspired by Radford’s (1966) famous case.
10 For discussion of this linking, see Hetherington (2020a).
12 The same is true, as we will see, about requiring a belief to be formed reliably if it is to be knowledge.
Knowledge as skill

13 For more on this—amounting, respectively, to an active-internalism and an active-externalism about justification—see Hetherington (2020c).
14 ‘What about how the belief ever arrived? Epistemologists devote much energy to understanding how a belief has been formed, usually aiming to tell us why it is knowledge only if it was formed appropriately (such as by not being formed too luckily).’ Up to a point, that is fine. Elsewhere (Hetherington 2020b), I show how knowledge-practicalism can accommodate the idea of a belief’s arriving in an appropriate way. But elsewhere (Hetherington 2016a: ch. 3) I describe a limitation upon the explanatory power of talking of a belief’s not being formed too luckily.
15 For more on how knowledge can literally include questioning of itself as knowledge, see Hetherington (2008, forthcoming).
16 Does practicalism thereby become a virtue epistemology? Potentially, there is overlap between the two approaches, as I discuss elsewhere (Hetherington 2017: secs. 1, 10), focusing on some of Sosa’s recent work (e.g., 2011, 2015, 2016). For him, knowing is an epistemic performance, and so can be judged on virtue-theoretic criteria. I have elsewhere (Hetherington 2011b) distinguished, in practicalist terms, between knowledge and knowing. But Sosa’s discussions seem not to include that distinction; in which case, presumably he also treats knowledge—in virtue of his talk of knowing—as an epistemic performance. I allow that knowing can be an epistemic performance—without the knowledge as such (able to be manifested in that action of knowing) being so. The knowledge itself remains a skill, able to be manifested in epistemic performances. Some of these are what I have elsewhere (Hetherington 2013) termed knowing actions.
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for very thoughtful comments on a draft of this chapter.

References
Stephen Hetherington
