CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE KESHIG

Michael Hope

The formation of the Yeke Monggol Ulus (Great Mongol State) saw the Mongols shift from a centrifugal power structure to a patrimonial state. Chinggis Khan achieved this transformation in no small part through the institution of the keshig, which served not only as his personal bodyguard and household staff, but also as the chief organ through which executive power was to be exercised. The intimacy and trust shared by the khan and his guardsmen (keshigten) meant that they could be counted upon to loyally perform the most sensitive jobs across the empire, including commanding the Mongol armies, serving as envoys, overseeing government bureaus, and even recording the dynastic history of the Chinggisids. Outside of the imperial family, the keshigten were among the most influential and powerful people in the Mongol Empire until the death of Möngke Qa’an in 1259. Thereafter, the division of the Mongol Empire into several autonomous uluses and the increasing influence of Persian and Chinese bureaucrats significantly altered the function of the keshig, though detracting little from their potency. Indeed, the keshigten families outlived the Chinggisids throughout much of the Mongol Empire, and from the fourteenth century many of them established their own independent dynasties across Eurasia.

FORMATION OF THE KESHIG

Christopher Beckwith has noted that it was common for most Eurasian dynasties to build their power through a comitatus, a band of companions who swore to protect their leader to the death. Chinggis Khan was, therefore, certainly not the first Inner Asian ruler to build a personal guard, with the closest parallel being the Khitan-Liao ‘head and belly guard’ made up of 10,000 to 20,000 representatives of the most senior households in the empire.¹ This precedent was then copied by the warring states that succeeded the Khitan-Liao in the Mongolian Plateau and Inner Mongolia in the twelfth century. The guard (turghaq) of the Kereit khans was one of the more prominent examples, not only providing protection for the ruler but also serving as the khan’s most trusted troops, taking up position at the heart of the Kereit army to bolster the morale of the regular soldiers.² Both the function and the nomenclature
of Chinggis Khan’s later guard unit seem to have been borrowed from the Kereit and their neighbours to the west, the Naiman. Yet he also imbued his guard with his unique genius, making regular modifications to the size, duties, and make-up of his keshig, which remained a highly supple organization, both during his lifetime and after his death.

The first steps toward constituting a guard unit were taken after Chinggis, then known as Temüjin, was appointed as the khan of the Mongols by senior members of the Qiyat lineage. As his allies vowed fealty to Chinggis, the new khan singled out some of his sworn companions (nököd) to serve as quiver-bearers (qorchin), stewards (ba'urchin), chamberlains (cherbin), sword-bearers (üldüchin), equerries (aqtachin), and managers of carts and tents (yurtchin). This troop of household servants and guardsmen were drawn from among Chinggis Khan’s earliest and most trusted supporters, whose loyalty was exemplified by their two commanders, Jelme and Bo’orchu. Jelme was a hereditary servant of Chinggis’s household who had grown up beside the future khan. When Chinggis’s family was abandoned by their former allies and suffered attack from the Merkit, Jelme remained loyal and even accompanied Chinggis in his subsequent flight to Mount Burqan Qaldun. Years later, when Chinggis was wounded and left for dead in a battle with his former confederate Jamuqa, Jelme stayed to nurse his wounds and even risked going behind enemy lines to find him food. Jelme’s partner, Bo’orchu, was a childhood friend of Chinggis Khan. The pair had met on the steppe when Chinggis suffered the loss of his family’s herd to rustlers. Whilst in pursuit of these thieves, Chinggis encountered Bo’orchu milking his father’s mares. With barely more than a word, Bo’orchu provided Chinggis with a fresh horse and abandoned his work to help retrieve the herd. He was one of the few people who joined Chinggis when the latter entered the service of Ong Khan of the Kereit, and he would later go on to save Chinggis’s son Ögödei when he was wounded in battle. Jelme and Bo’orchu’s loyalty was beyond question, and their fellow guardsmen were cut from the same cloth.

Yet this household staff was still a relatively small proportion of Chinggis’s army, and it was not until 1203, after his victory over the Kereit, that Chinggis Khan is first mentioned introducing a schedule of shifts, from which the guard unit takes its name. Chinggis introduced rosters for the quiver-bearers, day-guards, stewards, door-keepers, and grooms which required keshigten to serve shifts lasting for three days and three nights before being replaced by the next division (keshig). Eighty men were appointed as night guards (kebte’ül), and a further 70 were recruited to serve as day-guards (turghaq). This allocation was intended to coincide with the organization of Chinggis’s forces into decimal units of 10, 100, and 1,000 in preparation for an assault on the Naiman near the Altai Mountains. The new recruits were drawn from the children of commanders of 1,000 (minqan) and 100 (ja’un), amongst others, who were expected to serve as hostages, guaranteeing the loyalty of their parents. This basic structure would remain largely unchanged for over a century.

The keshig underwent a dramatic expansion only three years later, when Chinggis Khan was crowned ruler of all those who dwelled in felt tents. At this point, Chinggis increased the number of keshigten to 10,000, following the allocation of new armies and the appointment of further commanders. The number of night guards increased to 2,000, while the number of day-guards increased to 8,000. These additional troops
were drawn predominantly from the commanders of 1,000 and 100 in the regular army, who were expected to send a son along with mounts and other equipment to be levied from their own military unit. In addition, each commander of 1,000 was to send a further 10 companions to serve with their children, whilst commanders of 100 were to send a further five. These keshigten were then divided into four shifts and placed under the command of elders (öögüs) promoted from within the keshig.6

Chinggis simultaneously made it clear that his keshig was to be distinct from regular units of the Mongol army. Service in the keshig was a privilege for the elites of the empire, with Chinggis Khan stating that ‘my guards are of higher standing than the outside commanders of a thousand; the attendants of my guards are of higher standing than the outside commanders of a hundred and ten.’7 Service in the guard was certainly a fast track to winning senior positions in other parts of the empire. The career of Boroqul is highly instructive in this regard. He began life as a foundling, adopted by Chinggis’s mother Hö’elün after the defeat of the Jürkin. He was raised in her household prior to being appointed as a bökä’ül (food taster), then a ba’urchi (steward), and then commanding one of the four guard units before finally being named the sitükisini (deputy commander) of the entire Right Wing of the Mongol army. He was described by Chinggis Khan as being ‘lower than a khan and higher than amirs and qarachu (commoners).’8 Few guardsmen would achieve the status of Boroqul, but they were still singled out for special favour, as suggested by the fact that the majority of senior officials listed in Rashid al-Din’s Shu’ab-i Panjganah were guardsmen at one time or another.9

The guards’ prestige was derived from their intimacy with the khan. The night-guard, for example, were to remain in the khan’s camp even when not on duty. They were to lie around him during the night to prevent any possible assassination and would only engage in battle when the khan himself took part.10 There were few people outside the khan’s family who could have boasted of such close proximity to him, and this allowed the keshig to play an influential role in the broader empire. This influence was most often exercised through the advice that they gave to the khan. As the keshig were constantly in attendance on the khan, they were often the first to voice their opinions on current events, as was the case when Chinggis Khan learned of the insubordination of the Xi Xia during his campaign against the Khwarazmshah Empire (1219–1224). He immediately received advice on how to handle the threat to his empire from Tolun Cherbi, one of the chamberlains appointed in 1203.11 Another cherbi, Dödei, was on hand to give Chinggis advice on how to arrange his camp and his army during his campaign against the Naiman in 1205, and Chinggis Khan personally singled out members of his guard for ‘enjoining him to do what was right’ during his coronation in 1206.12 The trust and proximity afforded to the keshig meant that their opinions often guided the policy of the khans.

**THE KESHIG AT COURT**

This influence stretched beyond the khan to his court as well. The keshig established a protective cordon extending for two bowshots around the khan’s residence. Those summoned to an audience with the khan would accordingly need to dismount upon reaching this demarcation, which the Papal envoy, Giovanni di Plano Carpini describes as a palisade surrounding the royal encampment. At this point,
they would be questioned, searched, and informed of the protocol to be expected of those entering the presence of the khan. Members of the guard would then escort the guests to the khan’s presence. Visitors coming after dark were scrutinised more heavily and were rarely given audiences. For the most part, they were simply obliged to present their notices to the night-guards, who would then relate them to the khan. The keshig were, therefore, quite literally gatekeepers, regulating access to the khan. This granted them the ability to manipulate the balance of power at court. Louis IX’s unofficial envoy, William of Rubruck, relayed one instance in which the keshig sought to limit the number of people seeking to attend a small chapel located within the khan’s residence because it was becoming difficult to adequately frisk and check the large crowds attending mass. A rather bellicose monk threatened to complain to Möngke if they interfered, so the keshig got in first and slandered him to the khan. On his next visit to the court, Möngke scolded the monk for showing a lack of humility and for seeking worldly power above spiritual salvation. Rubruck himself suffered similar difficulties when a group of Muslims affiliated with the khan’s ‘cup-bearer’ informed Möngke that Rubruck had called him an ‘idolater.’ Möngke was apparently willing to overlook this allegation, though Rubruck was hardly in a position to repair the damage if he had not. As a new arrival at court, Rubruck had yet to build a strong rapport with members of Möngke’s guard who might have challenged the rumours peddled by the cup-bearer. Indeed, both Carpini and Rubruck report that their interactions with the khan were always mediated by the khan’s guards. The khan sat upon a raised dais above his guests and never spoke directly to them. Instead he would address his chamberlains and translators, who would then relay what had been said to those present. The same mediation can perhaps be seen in the correspondence and decrees of the khan, which required the seal of the four keshig commanders in order to be validated. Virtually all interactions between the khan and his subjects were moderated by the guard, and this afforded them tremendous power.

The space that the keshig filled between the khan and his court was undoubtedly as much for political theatre as it was for maintaining the security of the khan. In many cases, the pageantry of the guard unit pre-dated the Mongol keshig, but it appears to have been extended under Chinggis’s immediate successors. Möngke Qa’an is known to have delegated responsibility for his court ceremonies to Menggeser Noyan, one of his keshig elders. This included managing the protocol for accepting tribute, memorialising the throne, and all imperial audiences. The keshig were also expected to attend rituals associated with the ancestral cult of the Chinggisids as well as ‘divinations and invocations.’ Moreover, the guardsmen were undoubtedly present during the coronation rituals of the Chinggisids. At first, their presence was hardly noticed, but within the space of a few decades, the keshig became prominent players in the quriltais that nominated new khans. The coronation of Ögödei in 1229, for example, was dominated by his Chinggisid relatives, yet only three and a half decades later the same ritual in the Ilkhanate was almost entirely taken over by the keshig of Hulegu. Following the collapse of the Mongol Empire in the fourteenth century, several Chinggisid successor states in Central Eurasia gave the families of the former guard units the role of elevating newly crowned Chinggisid princes on felt rugs as part of their coronation ritual, thereby highlighting the importance of the guard on such occasions.
Records of these ceremonies and even the history of the Chinggisids were preserved by the *keshig*, which included a sizeable number of secretaries, known as *bichigchi*. A great number of these *bichigchis* were drawn from the Kereit, though Muslims and Khitans were also employed in the guards of Chinggis's successors. Rashid al-Din observed that they would sit attentively with pens at the ready, diligently recording the *biligs* (wisdom) uttered by the princes in their meetings. Both Ögödei and Chaghadai employed dedicated *bichigchi*, giving the impression that each prince had his own staff. Rubruck also recalled that his words were recorded by *bichigchis*, who attended not only the Mongol princes, but also the chamberlains. These *biligs* were often recited by later generations at public gatherings (*quriltai*) to legitimate policy and to demonstrate their links to earlier Chinggisid political traditions. The *biligs* were also likely to have served as a source for court histories, with the *Yuan shi* reporting that ‘writing the annals’ was among the duties given to the *keshig*. Perhaps the most famous of these histories was the *Tarikh-i Mubarak* of Rashid al-Din, who served as a steward under Gaykhatu before joining the *keshig* of Ghazan. Under normal circumstances Rashid al-Din claimed that the Mongol princes would jealously guard their annals from outsiders, yet his proximity to the khan gave him access to information not disclosed to others. Indeed, he relied heavily on the information provided by another guardsman, Bolad Aqa, for the early history of the Mongol Empire.

The *keshig*’s ceremonial and secretarial functions hint at the much broader role they played in running the khan’s *ordo* (court). The *Yuan shi* summarises their rather extensive duties thusly: ‘the duties of headgear and garments, bows and arrows, food, drink, writings and annals, vehicles and horses, tents, treasuries and depositions, medicines and herbs, and divinations and invocations; all [these duties] were held hereditarily.’ In addition, the *keshigten* were regularly required to perform extra-ordinary or one-off jobs, such as serving as envoys to foreign courts. These tasks often evolved in complexity as the empire began to grow. The management of food and drink is a case in point. This duty was assigned by Chinggis to his chamberlains Önggür and Boroqul when he first set up his household staff, saying, ‘distribute food to the right and left sides. Do not let it fall short for those who stand or sit on the right side; do not let it fall short for those who are placed in a row or who are not on the left side [of the *ordo*].’ Yet their mandate seems to have included not only supplying food to the khan’s household but also the army, as he ordered them to ‘ride off and distribute food to the multitude.’ Such a major task would have required the guard to involve themselves in procurement as well as the management of the treasury. This is suggested by the fact that Chinggis appointed the same chamberlain, Önggür, to receive the surrender of the Jin capital, Zhongdu, and register the contents of the city’s treasury nearly 10 years later. Chinggis’s successors made management of the treasury an explicit part of the *keshig*’s duties in the new capital at Qaraqorum, with Môngke ordering them to ‘garrison and guard the palace gates and treasuries/storehouses of Qaraqorum.’

Overseeing the protection of the khan and the management of his court meant that the *keshig* had to regularly interact with other members of the Chinggisid household, most especially the khan’s wives. This was, as Anne F. Broadbridge has noted, often a product of their roles intersecting. The same camps (*ordo*) that the *keshig* guarded were regularly entrusted to khatuns, and so it is not unusual that their jobs...
overlapped. As noted earlier, the *keshig* were expected to perform a number of seemingly menial jobs within the khan’s household, which ranged from working as stewards and food tasters to disposing of left-overs at the back of the tent. Others guarded the entrances to the tents of the khan’s family, and the *Secret History* explicitly states that the management of the female servants of the household was one of the duties of the *keshig*, a function that no doubt fell upon the khatuns as well. In some cases, this overlap meant that members of the *keshig* were directly assigned to the imperial queens. Yesün To’a aqtachi (the groom) is simultaneously described as the commander of 100 groomsmen under Chinggis’s *keshig* whilst also belonging to the *ordo* of Chinggis’s senior wife, Börte. Similarly, Rashid al-Din’s *Shu‘ab-i Panjganah* lists Elăngär Noyan as being both a *ba‘urchi* (steward) in command of 100 of Chinggis’s personal troops and an *etvoghlan* (household servant) of Börte. Whether this means that Chinggis permanently assigned these officers to guard and serve his senior wife or whether the khatuns played a supervisory role administering the functions of the *keshig* is unclear. In any case, the patrimonial nature of the early Mongol Empire makes it very difficult to disentangle the *keshig* from the other members of the khan’s household.

**CONTINUITY OF THE KESHIG**

Chinggis Khan regarded his *keshig* as his own personal property, and he ordered his sons to maintain them in good condition as a keepsake after his death. It is therefore generally believed that Chinggis expected his successors to recruit their own *keshig* units when they came to the throne, albeit most other forms of personal property (*emchü*) were transmitted on a hereditary basis, so it would be curious if the *keshig* were not passed on as well. Indeed, Chinggis appointed senior commanders to oversee the troops given to his sons from among his own *keshig*, so the lines between past and current guard units could often be blurred. Chinggis’s first heir, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241), recruited a predominantly new *keshig* when he came to power, but he still incorporated his father’s quiver-bearers into his own guard. His son and heir, Güyük (r. 1246–1247), likewise recruited half of his guard from among his father’s former servitors and introduced the other half from his own household, providing a measure of continuity from one generation to the next. This continuity was also promoted through the hereditary transmission of offices within the different *keshig* units. Thomas Allsen has attributed the Mongols’ fondness for the hereditary principle to the realization that skills and technical knowledge passed from generation to generation within family units. In any event, both the *Yuan shi* and Rashid al-Din make it clear that both the leadership and the rank-and-file members of the guard were recruited from the families of existing members. The elders of the guard (*ötögiü*) were ostensibly recruited from among the descendants of some of the earliest *keshig* captains: Boroqul, Bo’orchu, Muqali, and Chila’un. This principle was begun during Chinggis’s lifetime, when he appointed *kesbigten* from among the children of his senior commanders, many of whom were former guardsmen themselves. The former elder Jelme, for instance, was succeeded by his son Yisun Te’e, who was placed in charge of his own division (*kesbig*) of dayguards. Likewise, Ögele Cherbi, a relative of Bo’orchu, was appointed over his own division of the guard. Bo’orchu’s nephew, Boraldai, took his place during the
reign of Ögödei, before his son, El Temür, took his place under Qubilai. Keeping these descendants as hostages ensured that their parents remained loyal once they had been promoted to positions outside of the guard. Hence, even if a new khan recruited his own guard, their members were predominantly taken from amongst the families of existing guardsmen.

Those who were not redeployed into a new guard unit maintained their former status as guardsmen and even continued to identify themselves by their job in the guard (e.g. cherbi, ba’urchi, etc.). In most cases, former guardsmen were employed by new khans in senior administrative and military positions. Former keshigten could most frequently be found serving as jaruchis (judges), ruling on violations of the jasaq (the law attributed to Chinggis Khan) – a role their former job recording the bilig and jasaq of the khans made them eminently qualified to perform. Former keshigten also remained prominent in the Mongol army, where they dominated senior positions. Outside of the keshig, the Mongol army was divided into three divisions: the Right Wing, Left Wing, and Centre. These were then divided into smaller units, nominally numbering 10, 100, and 1,000, albeit the true strength of these divisions was often much lower. During Chinggis Khan’s lifetime, the leadership of the three military wings was entrusted to three of his guardsmen; Bo’orchu was charged with command of the Right Wing up to the Altai Mountains, Muqali was given command of the Left Wing, while Naya’a was placed in charge of the Centre. The commanders of 1,000 were also drawn extensively from the keshigten and their children, ensuring that the keshig played a controlling role over the Mongol army. The keshig unit would never participate in battle without the khan, under whose direction they would typically occupy the centre of the battle-line, but individual keshigten were often deputised by the khan to lead important campaigns. The most senior commanders in Ögödei’s army were drawn from amongst Chinggis’s former guardsmen, with the campaigns launched against the remnants of the Jin Empire in northern China (1231–1235), the Khwarazmshah Empire in Iran (1231), and the invasion of the Pontic Steppe and Eastern Europe (1236–1241) being led by members of Chinggis’ former guard, Sübedei and Chormaqan. Similarly, Güyük appointed an elder from his father’s guard, Eljigidei, to lead a campaign against Iraq in 1246. Former guardsmen could also expect to enjoy gifts and stipends long after their khans had died. By the start of the fourteenth century, the growing number of former guardsmen drawing gifts from the qa’an’s treasury accounted for more than 10% of the state’s revenues and was clearly becoming burdensome.

Nevertheless, the keshig saw its function change as the khans drew more of the conquered population into their court. During the first decades of the Mongol Empire these conquered people were often incorporated directly into the keshig, which continued to host hostages from the families of senior commanders and vassal rulers. The Uyghurs of Qocha, members of the Sakyapa order in Tibet, and the Koryo dynasty in the Korean Peninsula all sent their sons to serve in the khan’s keshig, in some cases for more than one term. King Ch’ungson (r. 1298 and 1308–1313) of the Koryo completed his initial keshig duty in the second half of the thirteenth century before returning to assume the Koryo throne in 1298. He was soon deposed by a faction aligned with his Chinggisid wife and returned to serve in the keshig of Ayurbarwada (r. 1311–1320), with whom he had struck up a friendship during his initial period of service.
KESHIG TENSIONS

Yet the expansion of the Mongol Empire put strains on the patrimonial style of government exemplified by the keshig. This tension was evident as early as the reign of Ögödei, when Yelü Chucai advocated the need for a professional bureaucracy to oversee the collection of census data and the implementation of a fixed tax. These reforms saw the creation of the Central Secretariat, then branch secretariats, which were tasked chiefly with the collection of revenues. Although the Central Secretariat assumed responsibility for revenue collection, the keshig managed to maintain some of its influence in the new bureau, which was staffed by a mix of former keshigten and a poly-ethnic class of scribes, merchants, and dependents until the rule of Qubilai. Under the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) the power of the keshig was further diluted by the formation of the Privy Council and the Censorate as well as a new guard unit, the wei. The wei unit was much larger than the keshig and seems to have been created partly out of Qubilai’s suspicions towards the keshig of his brother Möngke, which had largely supported the claims of his rival Ariq Böke. The wei was also used to offset the power of provincial governors and commanders, whose large armies could potentially be turned inward against the khan. The creation of these new bureaus and institutions saw the guard sharing a lot of its former responsibilities, but it continued to remain powerful. Members of the keshig were often appointed to head these new divisions of government, even those that seemed to be ostensibly Chinese, such as the Hanlin Academy, which boasted no fewer than 11 bichigchi. Moreover, although the new wei divisions significantly outnumbered the keshigten, they were also subordinate to the Yuan Privy Council, to which the four keshig elders could nominate their own representatives. Throughout these changes, the keshig never lost their proximity to the qa’an, which allowed them to continue to influence government at the very highest level from behind the scenes.

Similar changes were seen in the Mongolian successor states in West Asia, where the Islamic diwan system was introduced to help administer the Ilkhanate (1258–1335). Yet here too the Ilkhan keshigten succeeded in retaining their influence and were regularly partnered with the ostensibly Persian diwan governors and accountants sent to oversee tax-collection. Indeed, there was often very little distinction between the keshig and other branches of government, as the Ilkhans regularly granted control of both the diwan and the army to a court favourite, known as the na’ib. In some cases, the head of the diwan (sahib diwan) was himself drawn from the ranks of the keshig and the khans’ household staff, as was the case during the rule of Arghun Khan (1284–1291), Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304), and his successor Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316). The close connections between Persian and Mongol officials at the Ilkhan court meant that the diwan was largely assimilated into the patrimonial style of government characteristic of the early Mongol Empire.

The degree of power exercised by these commanders became extremely problematic in the second half of the thirteenth century. The hereditary principle for transmitting office in the Mongol Empire allowed the families of Chinggis Khan’s keshig to entrench themselves at the top of the Ilkhan state in the same way that the mamluk contingents recruited by deceased sultans in Egypt and Syria often posed a problem to newly enthroned monarchs there. The most senior officials during the reign of Abaqa – Ahmad Tegüder, Gaykhatu, and Baidu – were drawn from the
Keshig (and in some cases keshig families) of former khans. This situation was only briefly arrested by Ghazan Khan before the same families returned to dominate the Ilkhanate up to its disintegration in 1335. The enthrenchment of these non-Chinggisid commanders was also evident in the Middle Empire and the Jochid Ulus beginning in the fourteenth century. Though there are far fewer sources on the keshig in these two Mongol successor states, it is clear that from the second half of the fourteenth century, the Jochid Khanate and its successors in the Crimea and Volga River basin were dominated by a small clique of families, often described as aqarachu beg (commoner commanders), whose ceremonial functions mirrored those of the keshig, the most obvious parallel being that the four aqarachu beg counter-signed the orders decreed by the khan. Yet they also expanded these functions to include the appointment and removal of the khan as well as being active in foreign diplomacy. Elsewhere, in the lands ruled by the Chaghadaids, descendants from the four commanders given to Chinggis’ second son Chaghadai effectively seized control of Mawarannahr before Amir Timur, himself a descendant of a keshig family, set up his own dynasty in Central Eurasia.

**CONCLUSION**

The overweening powers of the keshig in West Asia were a long way from what Chinggis Khan had initially intended when he built up a household staff comprised of his most trusted companions. Yet the hereditary principle ensured that the same keshig families continued to enjoy access to the khan and the power that this afforded, which gradually saw them assume direct political control over much of the former Mongol Empire. Qubilai’s creation of a second guard force as well as a number of separate administrative bureaus ensured that the keshig families were never able to assume as much power in East Asia. Nevertheless, the presence of keshigten in many of these bureaus meant that they continued to be a potent force in the politics of the Yuan until the fall of the dynasty in 1368.

**NOTES**

1 Beckwith 2009, 13; EMME, 297. See Biran 2005, 109 for the huwei guard of the Qarakhitan.
2 Munkh-Erdene 2016, 646; Togan 1998, 75; EMME, 297.
3 SHM §124; Hsiao 1978, 35.
4 For the word ‘keshig’ see SHM, 1, 344; Atwood 2006, 143.
5 SHM §191–2; Hsiao 1978, 40–41; Atwood 2006, 151.
6 SHM §191; Atwood 2006, 144.
7 SHM §228.
8 RDRM, 170.
9 SP, f. 104–105.
10 SHM §229 & 233.
11 SHM §265.
12 SHM §193 & 205.
13 TMM, 61.
14 SHM §229.
15 Rubruck, 205.
16 Rubruck, 229.
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17 TMM, 67; Rubruck, 174.
18 Atwood 2006, 146; Cleaves 1951, 511; Allsen 1986, 515.
19 Allsen 1986, 504.
20 Hsiao 1978, 37.
21 Hope 2016, 49 & 115.
22 Schamiloglu 1984, 68; Sela 2003, 38.
23 RDRM, 115 & 123.
24 RDRM, 774.
25 Rubruck, 228–229.
26 Hsiao 1978, 94.
27 Kamola 2019, 42.
28 Hsiao 1978, 94.
29 SHM §213.
30 SHM §252.
31 Allsen 1987, 504 & 513; Allsen 2019, 39.
32 Broadbridge 2018, 21 & 104.
33 SHM §234.
34 SHM §232.
35 RDRM, 89.
36 RDRM, 115.
37 SHM §231.
38 EMME, 152; Abramowski 1976, 152.
39 Allsen 2019, 43.
40 Hsiao 1978, 36; Atwood 2006, 145.
41 SHM §225; 154.
42 SHM §226; RDRM, 173 & 594.
43 SP 158–9; Allsen 1986, 504.
44 SHM §205–6 & 151; May 2007, 32.
45 EMME, 297.
46 Hsiao 1978, 43.
47 Choi 2018, 1112.
48 De Rachewiltz 1966, 137; Allsen 1986, 507.
49 Hsiao 1978, 34.
50 Hsiao 1978, 34.
51 Melville 2012, 142; Hsiao 1978, 40.
52 Hsiao 1978, 40; Melville 2012, 142.
54 RDK, 808 & 918.
56 Hope 2016.
58 EMME, 298. On the continuation of keshig offices under the Timurids, see Manz 1989, 172.

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*EMME*, See List of Abbreviations.


*RDK*, See List of Abbreviations.

*RDRM*, See List of Abbreviations.

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SHM, See List of Abbreviations.
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