The Mongol World

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Daughters, Consort Families and the Military

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The Chinggisid confederation was a large extended family formed by Chinggis Khan and his female kin, largely through marriage alliances between Chinggisid women and vassal rulers or military commanders. Most of the key women in the formative days of the confederation were Chinggis Khan’s daughters from his senior wife, Börte, and from additional wives, but other women who played a role included his mother, Hö’elün, and his secondary wife, Ibaqa. The Chinggisid confederation occupied an intermediate military and administrative level between the two best-known of Chinggis Khan’s military structures: the imperial guard and the atomized army. The confederation overlapped the army but not completely; furthermore, although it was dominated by sons-in-law, it also contained men who were not married to Chinggisids and earned their privileges without the benefits of an in-law connection. The confederation was thus a unique phenomenon in the Mongol Empire.

Chinggis Khan’s atomized army arose in response to existing nomadic military customs, in which rulers from particular lineages led their subjects in raids or war. When multiple rulers and their followers cooperated, they could form a larger confederation, often supported by marriage ties, which might then attract additional rulers and their followers. But after Chinggis Khan conquered his nomadic neighbors in Mongolia between 1201 and 1206, he reorganized them into an army of 95 units of a thousand, in which the subjects belonging to a given lineage were atomized, that is, scattered among his own troops, rather than staying together. In this way, any remaining members of ruling lineages and their nomadic subjects were prevented from forming resistance to Mongol rule. Once he had atomized his army, Chinggis Khan then adopted iron discipline to keep everyone in place. The Chinggisid confederation provided an important exception to these rules.

Meanwhile and in contrast to the army, Chinggis Khan also created an imperial guard, which had reached 10,000 by 1206. Members were designated either as night or day guards and also worked as shepherds and other animal handlers, stewards and cooks, and household staff in the imperial camps of Chinggis Khan’s wives. Some guardsmen were chosen to lead special military assignments, such as the imperial
divisions of 1,000 in the army. Unlike the army, the guard had little or no overlap with the Chinggisid confederation.

The most important sons-in-law (güregen) in the Chinggisid confederation were vassal rulers who married into the Chinggisid family. Others included military commanders who already worked for Chinggis Khan, but these were sometimes lower in status than the vassals. In general, joining the Chinggisid confederation could confer significant benefits on all parties. When a ruler married (or married his son) into the imperial family, he and his subjects were peacefully incorporated into the expanding Mongol polity, rather than suffering violent conquest. A vassal son-in-law thus kept his position as ruler (or heir), albeit now with a Chinggisid wife in position as a general manager of personnel, property and resources; a political advisor and a direct representative of the imperial family.

Militarily, sons-in-law gained particular privileges. The most prominent vassal sons-in-law commanded military units ranging between 2,000 and 5,000 men, which were larger than the army norm of 1,000. Furthermore, the soldiers of sons-in-law were often drawn from the vassals' subjects, rather than being an atomized mixture of individuals, as in the standard army units. The command of these homogenous, oversized units was then inherited by their sons – usually those from the Chinggisid wife – over generations. It should be noted that some vassal sons-in-law commanded outsized units within the structure of the army, while others commanded auxiliary units that functioned outside the atomized forces. The differences seem to derive from the timing of a vassal's entry into the Chinggisid confederation: those who joined during the army reorganization (roughly 1204–09) were often incorporated into the regular ranks despite the size of the units, while sons-in-law who joined after the reorganization tended to do so as auxiliaries. Also within the army were units of the lesser sons-in-law, who were usually military commanders married to junior princesses (i.e., princesses from a mother other than Börte) and whose units were often standard in size and atomized like regular units. The army also housed the few units controlled by special servants of Chinggis Khan, whose privileges resembled those of the sons-in-law but who were not themselves married to Chinggisids (see below).

All members of the Chinggisid confederation were required to participate personally in the campaigns of conquest, which gave them opportunities to work directly for or with Chinggis Khan and acquire wealth and renown. Since the Mongol armies often used a dual command system, with two or more officers working together to lead a particular maneuver or campaign, the sons-in-law formed a special pool of high-level personnel from which Chinggis Khan could draw, in addition to his regular commanders and guardsmen. Later, sons-in-law and princesses sent their children on other campaigns like the invasions of Central Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe (1236–42) or the Iran campaign of the 1250s.

Last, but not least, sons-in-law gained important political privileges along with the military ones. Princesses and their husbands could attend quriltai to determine matters of importance within the Empire and the khanates, including succession. Consorts and princesses also gained the right to wed their offspring at the highest levels, meaning into other branches of the wife’s Chinggisid family through the exchange marriage model, which encouraged wives to marry some children “back” to the offspring of their brothers. This policy helped ensure the continuation of
favored lineages in consort families for generations. The benefits of strategic marriages for the princess wives could include status, wealth, the control of potentially significant resources and even the occasional, irregular opportunity for rule as regents in their own territories. Although the children of Chinggisid princesses were never candidates to govern the Empire, they could be favored to rule the vassal territories by virtue of their mother’s position. In one striking example on the Korean peninsula, a king of Koryo asked the Chinggisids in China (the Yuan dynasty) for three different princess brides to bear sons to inherit after him, even though some of his other, non-Chinggisid women had already borne sons.³

THE SPECIAL UNITS, THEIR COMMANDERS AND THE WIVES: SENIOR PRINCESSES

The Chinggisid confederation began with Temüjin’s only sister, Temülün, and then became dominated by Börte’s five daughters, or the senior princesses: Qojin, Chechiyegen, Alaqa, Temülün and Al Altan. Temülün inaugurated the confederation by wedding an important follower of her brother, Butu of the Ikires, in perhaps the 1180s. The Ikires military unit was most likely the earliest unit controlled by a consort and later became part of the army. But Temülün herself soon vanished from historical view for unknown reasons, possibly illness or complications from pregnancy. Sometime later Butu married the eldest senior princess, Qojin, who was Börte’s first child. As befitted a son-in-law, Butu commanded a unit composed of Ikires subjects rather than atomized troops, which was numbered at 2,000, i.e., twice the size of a standard army unit. Thereafter the offspring of Butu and Qojin, and perhaps Butu’s children with other women, intermarried with the Chinggisids in typical exchange fashion. Butu himself played important roles in Chinggis Khan’s conquests. He is likely to have participated in the first campaign against the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia (1209–10) and the invasion of northern China (1211–15). He is known to have been present for the campaign in northern China led by the general Muqali (1217–23). Butu also participated in the final attack on Xi Xia in 1226–27. Qojin herself held lands in northern China, while descendants from her and Butu went on to play important roles in the Yuan military with the help of the inherited Ikires troops.⁴

Meanwhile Börte’s second daughter, Princess Chechiyegen, joined the Oirat ruling family in the forested region west of Lake Baikal. The Oirats’ ruler, Qutuqa Beki, had previously been allied with several of Chinggis Khan’s enemies and now needed a way to build a positive relationship with Chinggis Khan. His successful strategy was to help the Mongols chase Merkit enemies through Oirat territory. He also submitted politically to Chinggis Khan, which earned him the privilege of making his children into Chinggisid consorts in 1207–08 through a constellation of weddings: Chechiyegen married one of Qutuqa Beki’s sons, her niece (Jochi’s daughter) married the other and Prince Tolui married Qutuqa Beki’s daughter. The Oirat military unit was numbered at 4,000 and was composed of Qutuqa Beki’s subjects, not atomized troops. Unlike the unit led by Butu of the Ikires, however, it functioned as an auxiliary to the main army, rather than a regular unit within it. Oirat military support to the Chinggisids remained steady: Qutuqa Beki helped the Mongols in additional campaigns in his region, while Chechiyegen and her husband later sent Oirat troops to Central Asia and Russia (1236–42) and Iran (1250s).⁵ The Oirat consorts under
Chechiyegen appear to have supported the coup that elevated the Toluid usurper Möngke (r. 1251–59) in 1251. Some Oirat troops then accompanied Möngke’s brother Hülegü to Iran in 1253, under the leadership of one of Chechiyegen’s sons. Additional Oirat troops sided with Möngke’s brother Arik Böke (Chechiyegen’s son-in-law) during the civil war of 1260–64.

Most visibly of all the princesses, Chechiyegen employed the exchange marriage strategy of weddings her children back into her own family, since six of her seven children formed unions with the offspring of her brothers. Thus Chechiyegen’s four daughters married into the Toluid, Chaghadaid and Jochid houses as senior wives: Elchiqmish married the Toluid Arik Böke while her sister, Güyük (not to be confused with the Great Khan), married his brother, Hülegü. Another sister, Köchü (?), wedded the Jochid prince Toqoqan and bore two sons who later ruled in Jochid territory: Möngke-Temür (r. 1267–80) and Töde-Möngke (r. 1280–87). The fourth sister, Orqina, became the wife of Qara-Hülegü, Chaghadaï’s grandson and heir, then ruled the Chaghadaï territory herself as an independent regent for their son for at least a decade in the 1250s–60s. Furthermore, two of Chechiyegen’s three sons married Chinggisid princesses. Further vigorous policies of intermarriage continued for generations after this creation of strong links between the Oirat consorts and branches of the Chinggisid houses.

Another strategic link between the Chinggisids and their vassals was established by the marriage of Børte’s third daughter, Princess Alaqa, into the Önggüt ruling family, which held a border territory for the Jin Emperors in northern China. Alaqa initially married into this house, then was widowed several times and remarried subsequent Önggüt rulers through the levirate. The exact list of her husbands is not clear, but it may include any or all of the following: the Önggüt ruler, Alaquš; his elder son, Buyan-Siban, and younger son, Boyoaq; and Alaquš’s nephew, Jingüe. The weddings may have taken place in 1207, 1211, 1212 or 1225. Regardless of the marital details, the Önggüt military unit enjoyed in-law privileges of size and homogeneity: it contained between 4,000 and 5,000 men, who were drawn from the Önggüt’s own subjects. These functioned in the Mongol army as a regular unit, not an auxiliary.

The Önggüt were essential to Chinggis Khan’s invasion of the Jin Empire (1211–15). When the Mongol armies arrived at the border region in June 1211 with Alaqa already wed (or at least promised), the Önggüt not only let them through but provided additional men to fight on the Mongol side. Later Alaqa herself helped her father’s general, Muqali, in a second campaign against the Jin (1217–23). She personally hosted Muqali in her territory in 1221, and Önggüt troops formed an important consort unit within Muqali’s armies in 1217 and 1222. Thereafter Önggüt units remained prominent in the Yuan forces. In addition to creating a useful strategic and military connection for her parents, Alaqa became a powerful person in her own right: she eventually ruled independently as a regent for her son, controlled military troops, decided criminal cases, set policy and patronized religion extensively.

Easily the most prominent and powerful of all the consort houses was that of the Qonggirat, which is no surprise given that Chinggis Khan’s senior wife Börte hailed from them. Her brother, Alchi, was made commander over the Qonggirat consort unit, an oversized regular unit in the army that contained between 3,000 and 5,000 men and was, as usual, not atomized. Alchi’s son Chigü, whom some scholars
think was adopted from another line of Qonggirats, commanded another special Qonggirat unit; this latter may have functioned more as an auxiliary. Chigü was also married to Princess Temülün, Börte’s fourth daughter, while Börte’s sons, princes Jochi and Chaghadai, similarly married their mother’s relatives. Alchi and Chigü participated actively in both Chinggis Khan’s and Muqa’i’s campaigns against the Jin. This family went on to supply sons-in-law and military commanders for generations across the empire and in the successor khanates.

In addition to the favored lineage of Börte herself, other Qonggirat military commanders became consorts by marrying junior Chinggisid princesses, which established junior Qonggirat lineages. The first among these were the commanders Toquchar and Qadai, whose wives were Chinggisids of unknown name. Both men played roles during the Jin campaign: Toquchar held Mongolia in the armies’ absence, while Qadai captured key positions in China that allowed the main forces to advance. Subsequently Toquchar fought in the Western Campaign against the Khwarazmshah Empire (1218–23). Later, Qonggirat military commanders rose in the successor khanates to establish additional consort lines by marrying Chinggisid princesses in return for military service in those regions.

Börte’s fifth daughter was her youngest child, Princess Al Altan, who married the Turkic Barchuq, the idiqut (or ruler) of the prosperous and sophisticated Uyghurs. In 1209, Barchuq responded favorably to ambassadors from Chinggis Khan and also helped the Mongols track some of their Merkit enemies, who had tried to enter his realm. These services, plus the payment of a large gift, allowed him to enter the ranks of Chinggis Khan’s sons-in-law through marriage to Al Altan in 1211. Barchuq was the first of several Turkic sons-in-law hailing from the dominions of the Qara-Khitai Empire, the others being the Qarluqs Arslan Khan and Ozar (see the subsequent text). All of their territories lay to the west or southwest of Mongol lands, and all three contributed to Chinggis Khan’s Western Campaign.

It should be noted that details of Al Altan and Barchuq’s union have been excised or obscured in some historical sources, notably the Persian-language ones, and the princess is alleged to have either married into her grandmother Hö’elün’s family (the Olqunu’uts) or been promised to the Uyghurs as late as the 1230s (when she was in her 30s, an advanced age for a first marriage) but then died before any wedding could take place. The reason for this confusion seems to have been political trouble in the 1240s, which influenced some of the histories composed thereafter. The trouble began in 1241 with the death of Al Altan’s brother, Ögödei Qa’an (r. 1229–41). Although the cause of death was most likely heart failure or complications from excessive alcohol consumption, Al Altan was accused of murdering him with poison. Immediately after the coronation of Ögödei’s son Güyük (r. 1246–48), Al Altan was executed secretly for her “crime,” and the execution was covered up. At about the same time in a further purge, the Uyghur ruler (Kesmes) was killed mysteriously and replaced with a relative (Salindi), whom the Ögödeids selected. But thereafter in 1251, when the Ögödeid house was itself overthrown by a coalition between the Jochids and Toluids, Salindi was purged by the victors, and another man from the Uyghur royal house was installed as vassal ruler. In addition to the political troubles these several executions reveal, further problems seem to have stemmed from the question of resources. It appears that Ögödei and Güyük may have increasingly and improperly encroached upon the territories, inhabitants and wealth of Uyghuristan.
This could help explain the complex politics of the 1240s and the obfuscation in the histories, since the lands belonging to a vassal ruler and his imperial princess wife should not have been subject to unusual impositions.\textsuperscript{16}

Regardless of the later troubles suffered by Princess Al Altan or the Uyghur dynasty itself, the initial military unit commanded by Barchuq resembled those of other consorts: it was significant in size (or even quite large, at 18,000 men), it was composed of Barchuq’s subjects and it functioned as an auxiliary to the main army. Barchuq’s influence on Chinggis Khan’s military decisions may have begun as early as 1209 during his initial submission, when Chinggis Khan was planning his first campaign against the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia. The Uyghurs had important cultural, commercial and diplomatic ties with the Tanguts, thus Barchuq’s decision to ally himself with the Mongols instead of with Xi Xia may have been a factor in Chinggis Khan’s decision to attack. Later Barchuq participated in a punitive campaign in 1218 against the Naiman ruler Güchülüg, who had taken over Qara Khitai territory. Thereafter Barchuq joined the Western Campaign (1218–23), although it is unknown whether Princess Al Altan also went; Barchuq and his troops fought at Otrar (1219–20), Talaqan and Wakhsh (1220–21), and Nishapur (1221–2). By 1224 or 1225, he was high enough in Chinggis Khan’s favor to be able to ask for and receive the return of some of the Uyghurs working for the Mongol Empire. Thereafter Barchuq and his forces participated in the Mongols’ second campaign against Xi Xia (1226–27).\textsuperscript{17} A similar Uyghur presence during the 1236–42 campaign to establish Jochid territory may be deduced from the fact that all the princesses and sons-in-law were ordered to send their sons (presumably leading troops) on it, while Uyghur troops are indeed attested as taking part in the Iran campaign of the 1250s.\textsuperscript{18}

THE SPECIAL UNITS, THEIR COMMANDERS AND THE WIVES: JUNIOR PRINCESSES

Although the senior princesses formed the most important links in the Chinggisid confederation, junior princesses also did their part. These were Chinggis Khan’s daughters from wives other than Börte or from concubines. Unfortunately, the historical sources present incomplete information about these women, to the extent that we do not know the number of the junior princesses, the identities of their mothers or, often, the princesses’ own names.

The most prominent of the known junior princesses was a woman named Töre, whose mother is unidentified but who herself married Arslan Khan, the Muslim ruler of the Qarluq Turks at Qayaliq and a vassal to the Qara-Khitai. Töre’s match can be seen as similar to, but lesser in status than, those of her senior half-sisters and particularly resembled the one between Princess Al Altan and the Uyghur Barchuq, Arslan Khan’s neighbor. Like Barchuq, Arslan Khan submitted to Chinggis Khan and met with him in person in 1211. Also like Barchuq, Arslan Khan’s troops formed an auxiliary to the main Mongol forces, which were presumably composed of his own men and had greater numbers (6,000) than a standard army unit. Arslan Khan may have participated in the punitive campaign against Güchülüg in 1218; he certainly attended the Western campaign and fought at Otrar, Talaqan and Wakhsh, along with Barchuq.
Similarly, a daughter of Jochi married Arslan Khan’s Qarluq neighbor, Ozar of Almaliq. After Ozar was captured and killed by Güchülüg, his princess widow remarried his son, Signak Tegin, through the levirate. Since Ozar had been a son-in-law, Chinggis Khan may have been able to use this murder as part of his casus belli for sending the expedition against Güchülüg, in which Signak Tekin may have fought. Signak Tekin definitely participated in the Western campaign, albeit with unnumbered forces.

Other junior princesses married military commanders within the Chinggisid armies, not vassals. These were lower-status matches since the husbands in question were not rulers in their own right. The two previously mentioned matches between unnamed Chinggisids and lesser Qonggirat military commanders, Toquchar and Qadai, provide examples of these unions. Others include a match between one of Chinggis Khan’s commanders of a thousand named Ashiq and a junior princess whose name has been lost, and one between a Baya’ut commander, Buqa, and a similarly unidentified junior princess. Another son-in-law and military commander in the regular armies was “Fiku,” about whom little is known and whose Chinggisid wife is almost completely invisible in the sources. Furthermore, in these cases the commanders in question did not necessarily enjoy homogenized troops, even though they themselves were consorts; rather, the troops for these lesser sons-in-law may simply have been regular atomized ones. In later years after the establishment of the initial Chinggisid-consort relationships, junior princesses could also marry consort men, like two junior Chinggisids – one daughter of Chinggis Khan and one from Tolui and a lesser wife – who married Princess Chechiyegen’s sons.

OTHER WOMEN

In addition to Temüüln, Börte and the senior and junior princesses, two other women contributed to the initial formation of the Chinggisid confederation through their marital or family ties. These were Chinggis Khan’s mother, Hö‘elün, and one of his wives, the Kereit princess Ibaqa. The military unit to which Hö‘elün connected was composed of the Olqunu’uts from whom she herself came, after Chinggis Khan gave her 3,000 of them to be her subjects. The military commanders in question were Hö‘elün’s father, Olar, followed by her brother, Taichu, both of whom married a junior daughter of Chinggis Khan in succession (through the levirate in Taichu’s case). It seems likely that both commanded the Olqunu’ut fighting men that Hö‘elün received, rather than atomized troops, but the sources are not entirely clear on this point, nor on the size of the Olqunu’ut military unit: the numbers range from 1,000 to 3,000. The unit seems to have been a part of the main army, not an auxiliary. In a further marital exchange with her own family, Hö‘elün wedded her youngest son, Temüge, to a relative named Sandaqchin. Nevertheless, Temüge does not appear to have commanded Olqunu’ut soldiers himself. In addition, and unlike some of the other consort family units, this family did not play an especially prominent role in the conquests.

The last woman to support the Chinggisid confederation at its establishment was Chinggis Khan’s Kereit wife, Ibaqa, through a second marriage into the commanding family of the Uru’ut. Her story is anomalous. Although Chinggis Khan conquered most of the Kereit subjects belonging to Ong Khan and atomized them across the
Mongol forces in 1203, Ibaqa’s father and Ong Khan’s relative, Jaqa Gambu, instead joined Chinggis Khan as an ally with his possessions and forces intact and negotiated sensible marriages for his daughters: Ibaqa married Chinggis Khan, while her sisters, Begütümish and Sorqoqtani, married princes Jochi and Tolui, respectively. This gave Jaqa Gambu in-law status and the right to keep his subjects. But after 1204 Jaqa Gambu seems to have turned against Chinggis Khan and was ultimately killed by the Uru’ut commander and Chinggis Khan’s follower, Jürchedei. Thereafter Chinggis Khan separated from Ibaqa and remarried her to the same Jürchedei, whether in order to reward him for killing her father (surprising to modern sensibilities) or as the result of a prophetic dream. The lack of clarity stems from apparent attempts by the historical sources to obscure the cause of this unusual separation and remarriage. But in any case, Ibaqa is alleged to have retained her status as Chinggis Khan’s wife even while remarried – another anomaly – and she continued to visit court regularly and meet with her sister Sorqoqtani.22

The unit that Jürchedei and his descendants controlled was part of the main army but retained the typical privileges for consorts: the men in it were Uru’ut, not atomized soldiers, and their number was set at 4,000, not 1,000. The Uru’ut unit participated in the campaign against the Jin Empire (1211–15) and was one of the consort units that formed the backbone of Muqali’s army in 1217. Ibaqa herself ultimately relocated to northern China, and her descendants, and the Uru’ut forces, were prominent in the Yuan armies.23

A recapitulation of the military distribution of consort officers in the Chinggisid confederation appears thus: Many were commanders of a thousand in the army, including Butu of the Ikires; Alaqush of the Önggüt; Chigü, Alchi and Qadai of the Qonggirat; Olar and then Taichu of the Olqunu’ut; Jürchedei of the Uru’ut; and Buqa of the Baya’ut, along with a few others whose affiliations are not known (Ashiq, Fiku). Other than Ashiq, Qadai and Buqa, who married junior Chinggisids and led standard-sized units, these men commanded units that were larger than the typical thousand. Furthermore, despite the significant overlap between the confederation and the atomized units of the army, some members of the confederation functioned outside the army command as auxiliary fighting units. These were Qutuqa Beki of the Oirat, Barchuq of the Uyghurs, both Qarluqs – Altan Khan and Ozar – and Toquchar of the Qonggirat.

**NON-CONSORT SPECIAL UNITS**

In addition to the sons-in-law and their princess wives who formed the Chinggisid confederation, certain other units in the army were larger than the norm and contained homogenized soldiers – that is, they resembled the consort units in structure and makeup – but were not led by sons-in-law. In these cases, the leaders were most often individuals who had been hereditary servants to Chinggis Khan or his relatives, or had performed special services for him, and earned these privileges as a reward.

First among them was Muqali, known as one of Chinggis Khan’s “four steeds.”24 He was not only commander-in-chief of the left wing but also became responsible for the entire campaign of 1217–23 against the Jin. Muqali was allowed to lead 3,000 Jalayirs, who served in China with him. Similarly, one or both of the Ba’arin
commanders, Qorchi or Naya’a, were permitted to lead 3,000 Ba’arin. Another, smaller, homogenous unit was the Negüs, under Narin To’oril, whose father’s death for Temüjin at the Battle of Dalan-baljut in 1187 earned his son this command. Similarly, the Baya’ut steward, Önggür, was allowed to lead up to 1,000 homogenous soldiers. The Mangghut also stayed together under Quyildar Sechen, who had played a crucial role at the battle of Qalqajit Sands in 1202, died of his wounds and bequeathed his privileges to his heirs. Others leading their own people were Jebe of the Besüt and Sübedei of the Uriangqat, both important generals for Chinggis Khan and considered among his “four hounds,” while Tolun the Qongqotan, son of Hö’elün’s third husband, Mönglik (himself a commander), was allowed to control people he and his father had collected.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Chinggisid confederation was a unique phenomenon in the Mongol Empire. It represented an anomalous military coalition that functioned between Chinggis Khan’s imperial guard and his army and overlapped significantly with the latter. The confederation evoked nomadic formations of the pre-Chinggisid days because the majority of its members were connected to the imperial house through marriage. The confederation can also be noted for its irregularities: the size of units, types of authority and even role in the army (regular troops or auxiliaries) all varied according to the specific in-law relationship, the rank of the princess wife (senior or junior) and that of her husband (ruler or mere commander), and the time of his entry into the Chinggisid enterprise. Furthermore, the confederation also included special units whose leaders were not sons-in-law but who enjoyed special personal relationships to Chinggis Khan himself and whose troops resembled the consort ones in makeup and size. All of these units and their leaders provided Chinggis Khan with a pool of officers and men that functioned outside the other units of the army and the guard and therefore could contribute to the system of dual leadership that the Mongols favored. Furthermore, the confederation provided Chinggisid women with opportunities to enjoy wealth and influence and perhaps rule as regents in important regions, even as they supported the ongoing Chinggisid imperial project.

NOTES

1 Broadbridge 2018, 103–106.
2 May 2007, 27. Most units can be understood to have reached approximately 60% of this capacity.
3 Zhao 2004, 4–6 & 22–23.
4 Broadbridge 2018, 153.
5 Broadbridge 2018, 135–136 & 142.
6 Broadbridge 2018, 247.
8 Broadbridge 2018, 140–141.
10 Broadbridge 2018, 149–150.
11 Atwood 2014–15, passim.
13 Broadbridge 2018, 150–152.
14 Broadbridge, Forthcoming, entire passim.
17 Broadbridge 2018, 156–160 & 162.
18 SHM §270; Allsen 1997, 8.
24 SHM §163, §177, §209, II, n. 591–592, 792–793. These were Muqali, Bo’orchu, Boroqul and Chila’un.
25 These were Qubilai, Jelme, Jebe and Sübedei, not to be confused with the four steeds. SHM §209; SHM, II, n. 792–793.
26 Broadbridge 2018, 125.

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SHM, See List of Abbreviations.