The Routledge Handbook on Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations

Gibney Mark, Türkelli Gamze Erdem, Krajewski Markus, Vandehole Wouter

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Publication details
Anne Oloo, Wouter Vandehole

Accessed on: 19 Jul 2023

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Enforcement of extraterritorial human rights obligations in the African human rights system

Anne Oloo and Wouter Vandenhole

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the enforcement of extraterritorial human rights obligations in the African Union by its human rights monitoring bodies. The main human rights instrument of the African Union is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR, Charter or Banjul Charter), which was adopted in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. The Banjul Charter is monitored by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR or ‘the Commission’) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR or ‘the Court’). The ACtHPR was only established in 1998 due to lack of support for a judicial enforcement mechanism of the Charter at the time of drafting (Plagis and Riemer 2020, p. 16). It then only became fully operational in 2008 due to the slow ratification of the Protocol establishing the Court (Ssenyonjo 2011, pp. 9–10). At the time of writing, only 30 out of 55 AU member states have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, and only 7 member states have made a declaration allowing individual complaints and NGOs direct access to the Court (African Union 2017). This explains the low number of judgments so far.

The 2014 Malabo Protocol creates an African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, thereby merging the ACtHPR with the African Court of Justice, but has not yet entered into force. Another influential human rights instrument is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC 1990), which is monitored by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC or ‘the Committee’).

Our interpretative approach in this chapter can be explained as follows: we seek to identify whether, and if so, which unique African perspective has been adopted on extraterritorial human rights obligations. It is worth noting that unlike other international and regional human rights treaties, neither the ACHPR nor the ACRWC contain any reference to jurisdiction, let alone extraterritorial jurisdiction. Since the legal instruments in themselves neither exclude (through restrictive notions of jurisdiction) nor explicitly include extraterritorial obligations, we look primarily at the (teleological) interpretation given by the monitoring bodies. A comprehensive review of the Commission’s, Court’s and Committee’s work has been undertaken. Since we did not have access to the travaux préparatoires – in fact, many documents on the preparatory work are generally inaccessible (Plagis and Riemer 2020, p. 8) – we have not been able to look into
Enforcement of ETOs in African system

the intentions of the drafters. In order to structure the analysis and to contextualise it within the global ETO discussion, we have sought to draft this chapter in analogy with the other chapters on regional enforcement in this Handbook.

In the first section, we look at the way human rights obligations are attributed to states other than the territorial state. In the second section, we examine the nature and scope of extraterritorial obligations under African human rights instruments. The third section zooms in on the division of responsibility for human rights violations between the territorial and one or more foreign states. The fourth section concludes and offers a forward-looking perspective.

**Attribution of obligations (jurisdiction)**

The most common concept for attributing human rights obligations is the notion of jurisdiction (see also Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in this Handbook). The starting point in much of human rights law is that jurisdiction is territorial: a state is duty-bound towards those who find themselves on the territory of a state. We refer to this state as the territorial state. At least three models of extraterritorial jurisdiction have been identified and employed by human rights monitoring bodies: the personal model, the spatial model, and the cause-and-effect model. These refer to control over persons, control over territory, or a merely causal relationship (see Chapter 9 in this Handbook; see also Vandenhole 2019).

The literature on extraterritorial jurisdiction in the African system has not reached a consensus, as some have argued for a strictly territorial approach, whereas others have suggested to follow the principles adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Pascale 2014, p. 646). This is partly because neither the ACHPR nor the ACRWC contain any reference to jurisdiction, let alone extraterritorial jurisdiction. Article 1 ACHPR simply states that the state parties must recognise and give effect to the rights in the Charter, without any limitation as to legal space or people concerned. In other words, the general obligation incumbent on states does not limit the scope of their obligations under the Charter to their territory, or the legal space of the African Union, for example. Lack of access to the (limited) travaux préparatoires also renders it impossible to determine whether this was a deliberate omission at the time of drafting and negotiations (1979–1981). Plagis and Riemer have identified four meta-narratives – sovereignty, African particularity, types of rights, and no expansive list of rights – to elucidate the content of the Charter. These four meta-narratives draw on the ‘political and historical circumstances of the drafting process of the Charter’ (Plagis and Riemer 2020, p. 6), but are to be distinguished from the ‘drivers of context’ (Plagis and Riemer 2020, p. 9). Since the already limited travaux préparatoires are moreover not easy to access, we will resort to these meta-narratives as a kind of secondary source to understand the intentions of the drafters.

The four meta-narratives do not lead to an unequivocal conclusion regarding the lack of explicit reference to jurisdiction. For instance, sovereignty neither implies nor precludes the deliberate exclusion of extraterritorial obligations, as it was predominantly geared towards independence from the former colonial powers, self-determination, and limited regional accountability and adjudication (Plagis and Riemer 2020, pp. 13–16). This leaves room for a teleological interpretation whereby obligations are not exclusively assigned to the territorial state. The meta-narrative of African particularities also leaves the door open to extraterritorial obligations. One of the intentions of the drafters was to draft a regional instrument that reflected ‘an African understanding of human rights’ (Plagis and Riemer 2020, p. 19). As a consequence, unlike other regional human rights instruments, the ACHPR imposes obligations not only on states individually but also collectively. This, for instance, applies to the right to economic, social, and cultural development (ACHPR, art. 22) and to the right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources.
resources, with Article 21(4) ACHPR calling on states to ‘individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African Unity and solidarity’.

The next section examines the jurisprudence of the regional bodies to determine whether this potential extraterritorial application of the African human rights instruments has materialised and to identify which of the three models of extraterritorial jurisdiction it embodies. However, the dearth of case-law on extraterritorial human rights obligations in the African human rights system makes any strong conclusions premature.

**Commission decisions**

Early attempts to hold states responsible for extraterritorial violations of rights in the Charter were unsuccessful as they were brought against non-African states and were thus dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the ACHPR. This shows the limitations of invoking extraterritorial obligations under a regional human rights instrument. Inevitably, these obligations will only apply to states that belong to the legal space of that regional instrument, in this case, the African Union. Moreover, only states that are party to a treaty are bound by it. Nonetheless, monitoring bodies could choose, even if only by way of obiter dictum, to also include in their analysis extraterritorial obligations of non-state parties.

The jurisprudence of the Commission is thus primarily embodied in three later cases involving African states and in the Commission’s General Comment on the right to life:

- **The DRC Invasion case** (ACmHPR 2003b), involving accusations by the DRC of large-scale human rights violations (mass killing of civilians and Congolese military personnel, destruction of property, sexual violence) resulting from the armed activities of the three respondent states (Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda) within Congolese territory.
- **The Burundi Embargo case** (ACmHPR 2003a), involving the imposition of economic sanctions on Burundi by Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, the DRC (then Zaire), and Zambia, preventing the importation of vital goods (e.g. fuel, school materials).
- **The Al-Assad case** (ACmHPR 2014), on the alleged extraordinary rendition of a Yemeni citizen from Tanzania to Djibouti, where he claimed to have been interrogated by US government agents at Camp Lemonnier.
- **The General Comment on the Right to Life** (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2015), which elaborates on the nature and scope of this right in the ACHPR, including issues of extraterritorial obligations. Like other human rights bodies, the Commission adopts and relies on General comments (see ACmHPR 2009b, paras. 209–210) to elaborate and give guidance on specific provisions of the Charter. It is empowered to do so vide Article 45(1)(b) of the Charter, which authorises the African Commission to ‘formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples’ rights’.

In these cases and general comment, the Commission unequivocally recognised the extraterritorial jurisdiction of states under the personal and spatial model and offered less conclusive suggestions that it may accept principles akin to the cause-and-effect model.

The DRC Invasion and Burundi Embargo cases also shed light on state parties’ views on the extraterritorial application of the ACHPR. Although they involved activities located outside the territories of the respondent states, none of the parties argued against extraterritorial application of the ACHPR. This suggests ‘that the African states tend not to reject the principle for
which a State Party has to comply with the obligations deriving from the ACHPR even in case of actions which take place or produce effects outside of the national territory’ (Pascale 2014, p. 650). This lack of objection could be taken as tacit acceptance by state parties to imposition of extraterritorial human rights obligations under the Charter (Chenwi and Bulto 2018, p. 40).

**Military presence and occupation (spatial model)**

The DRC invasion case is the first instance in which the Commission recognised extraterritorial obligations stemming from military presence and occupation, thereby affirming (though not explicitly) the spatial model. This recognition was, however, perhaps surprisingly, primarily done in passing when, at the admissibility stage, the Commission ‘[look] note that the violations complained of are allegedly being perpetrated by the Respondent states in the territory of the Complainant State’ (para. 63). The Commission repeated subsequently at the merits stage, as a matter of fact, ‘that there cannot be peace and security “under the conditions created by the Respondent States in the eastern provinces of the Complainant State” (para. 66), which is qualified as occupation (para. 69). While not framed in terms of jurisdiction, this corresponds to the spatial model of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Military action (boots on the ground) and (in this case illegal) occupation of the territory of another state leads to the assignment of human rights obligations with regard to that extraterritorial conduct, given the effective control exercised over parts of the DRC territory (paras. 88 and 91).

As noted above, the three defendant states also did not seem to object to the Commission’s jurisdiction. To the contrary, Rwanda and Uganda recognised and justified the presence of their troops in the DRC (paras. 22 and 24).

The Al-Asad case further affirmed the Commission’s recognition of extraterritorial obligations when states are in effective control over parts of a territory. The Commission drew attention to the difference between the Articles 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of the Banjul Charter: ‘the former expressly limits the application of the ICCPR to within the territory and jurisdiction of a state Party. The latter by contrast does not expressly limit the application of the Charter within the territory and jurisdiction of State Parties’ (para. 134). The Commission further noted that, while the jurisdiction exercised by states is primarily territorial, ‘circumstances may obtain in which a state assumes obligations beyond its territorial jurisdiction such as when a state assumes effective control of part of a territory of another state (spatial model of jurisdiction)[…]’ (para. 134). In the present case, the Commission relied on the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the Armed activities in the Congo case to hold that occupation by a state of the territory of another state amounts to effective control and triggers the obligations of the occupying state under the charter (ACmHPR 2014, paras. 135, 136, and 139).

**Control over individuals (personal model)**

In Al-Asad, the Commission also explicitly endorsed the personal model, noting that ‘circumstances may obtain in which a state assumes obligations beyond its territorial jurisdiction such as […] where the state exercises control or authority over an individual (personal model of jurisdiction)’ (para. 134). The Commission emphasised a requirement to establish ‘a sufficient connection between the alleged violation and the Respondent State’ (para. 135), i.e. ‘by proving that he or she was under the territorial jurisdiction or effective control or authority of the Respondent State when the alleged violation occurred’ (para. 136). In the case at hand, the complainant failed to demonstrate that he had been ‘within the territorial jurisdiction or indeed
under the effective control or authority of the Republic of Djibouti’ (para. 176), leading the Commission to declare this case inadmissible.

**Cause-and-effect jurisdiction**

While the previous cases centred on effective control over territory or individuals, the Commission also appears prepared to hold states in violation of the Charter where their actions or those of their authorities have effects outside their territory. While the defendant parties were absolved of any wrongdoing in the Burundi Embargo case, the Commission indicated that it would be ready to hold states responsible for acts committed extraterritorially if their actions were found ‘disproportionate to the end sought to be achieved or are indiscriminate or lack monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the basic rights of individuals and groups are not jeopardised’ (Chenwi and Bulto 2018, p. 38; 2003, para. 75). Thus, had the embargo been disproportionate, indiscriminate, and without monitoring and adjustment (paras. 75–76), the Commission may have held the respondent states responsible, even though they had control over neither Burundian territory nor individuals. This suggests that the Commission may accept that the states that had imposed the sanctions were duty-bearers with regard to the effects caused to the Burundian people, although this is not expressed explicitly.

In its *General comment No. 3 on the right to life (2015)*, the Commission again explicitly referenced the personal and spatial model of extraterritorial jurisdiction (as in ACmHPR 2014) by referencing notions of ‘effective authority, power, or control over either the perpetrator or the victim (or the victim’s rights)’, and of ‘effective control over the territory on which the victim’s rights are affected, or whether the state engages in conduct which could reasonably be foreseen to result in an unlawful deprivation of life’. This last clause suggests that cause-and-effect may play a role in attributing extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the same vein, the Commission also made the bold claim that ‘in any event, customary international law prohibits, without territorial limitation, arbitrary deprivation of life’ (para. 14), which can be read as a recognition of another dimension of a cause-and-effect model.

**Court**

The ACtHPR has hitherto only opined on territorial jurisdiction. In *ACmHPR v. The Republic of Libya* (ACmHPR 2016b), it held that since the events had occurred in a territory under the authority of Libya, which was a party to the ACHPR, the instrument applied ‘with respect to Libya and on its territory’ (2016, paras 58–59). Although the Court noted this in the context of the examination of its own territorial jurisdiction to hear the case, it reflects (not surprisingly) that territorial jurisdiction of a state is taken for granted.

**Committee**

The ACERWC has attributed extraterritorial effect to Article 22 ACRWC on children and armed conflict. In its 2020 General Comment on children in situations of conflict (ACERWC 2020), it has stated that the said provision defines States Parties’ obligations ‘domestically and abroad’ (para. 45). With respect to the obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, it considers this obligation applicable not only to the domestic state, but also to ‘other states and non-State partners operating in other states’ (para. 52). The latter reflects the spatial model. Elsewhere in that same General Comment, it refers to control over territories (para. 70), which reaffirms the spatial model that the Committee seems to envisage.
In sum, whereas the case-law of the African human rights monitoring bodies on extraterritorial obligations is too limited to draw any firm conclusions, the Commission in particular has been willing to go beyond the spatial and personal model commonly found in the case-law of the ECtHR, and has aligned itself with the Human Rights Committee’s and inter-American monitoring bodies in (albeit tentatively) applying also the cause-and-effect model of jurisdiction.

**Nature and scope of extraterritorial obligations**

**Commission**

The precise contours of extraterritorial obligations remain to be defined by the Commission. Most importantly, while the Commission has recognised that extraterritorial obligations stem from effective control over territory and individuals (and perhaps from cause-and-effect), it is yet to elucidate what effective control entails. This has led some to conclude that the expression ‘effective control’ in the African system is not used in the ‘(European)’ technical-juridical meaning, perhaps to allow a broad extraterritorial applicability of the Charter (Pascale 2014, p. 648). In the *Al-Asad* case (ACmHPR 2014, para. 134), however, the Commission in outlining effective control situations, references European court decisions seemingly attaching the same meaning as their European counterparts. Defining effective control remains especially crucial when several states are implicated (such as in ACmHPR 2003b) and questions may arise regarding the respective level of control (and therefore perhaps of obligations and responsibility) of each of these states (see also Section 4 below).

The nature and scope of extraterritorial obligations derive from the general obligations incumbent on the state parties to the ACHPR, which are traditionally divided into four levels: the obligation to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil rights under the Charter (ACmHPR 2016a, para. 68). A violation of rights under the Charter entails a breach of any/of all the four obligations (ACmHPR 2018, para. 127). These four levels of obligations entail both negative and positive duties of the state (ACmHPR 2001, para. 44). The obligation to protect, promote, and fulfil rights constitutes positive duties, while the obligation to respect is a negative duty which also ‘obligates states to refrain from measures that would unjustifiably curtail or prevent individuals from enjoying the rights and freedoms’ (ACmHPR 2001, para. 45; ACmHPR 2018, para. 93).

The obligation to respect rights requires the state to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of all rights. In both the Burundi embargo and DRC invasion cases, the respondent states were found to have certainly negative extraterritorial obligations, namely the obligation to respect the rights in the Charter. The respondent states were thus required to refrain from any action or omission that would nullify or interfere with the enjoyment of human rights in other (Complainant) states.

In the DRC invasion case, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda were found in violation of many provisions of the Banjul Charter including Article 2 on non-discrimination as the violations were directed at the victims as result of their national origin, the right to respect for life and integrity (Article 4), the right to dignity (art. 5), the right to freedom of movement (art. 12), the right to property (Article 14), the right to family life (Article 18), and the right use and dispose of wealth and natural resources (Article 21) (paras. 86–89). Additionally, the Commission found the killings, massacres, rapes, and mutilation committed by the three respondent states’ armed forces to be in contravention of international humanitarian law (para. 79). The long list of violations found, across categories of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and collective rights, suggests that the Commission assigns to them as occupying forces obligations with regard to the full range of rights (see in particular 2003b, para. 88). This is in line with the Commission’s
jurisprudence on the indivisibility and interrelatedness of all rights in the Charter (ACmHPR 2001, para. 44; ACmHPR 2003c, para. 80).

The complaint in the Burundi Embargo also involved an alleged breach of negative obligations. Burundi alleged that the imposition of the embargo prevented the importation of essential goods and school materials, and the exportation of tea and coffee, which ‘are the country’s only source of revenue’. They thus alleged that the respondent states violated the right to life (art. 4), right to education (art. 17(1)), and the right to economic, social, and cultural development (para. 3). Additionally, Burundi claimed that the embargo constituted an interference into its internal affairs thereby infringing on Articles 3(1), (2), and (3) of the OAU Charter. The Commission, though absolving the respondent states of any wrongdoing, showed that it would have found a violation of the Charter where a sanction was determined to be ‘excessive, disproportionate, indiscriminate and seeks to achieve ends beyond the legitimate purpose’ (ACmHPR 2003a, para. 79).

The obligation to protect rights entails the state protecting ‘right holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of effective remedies’ (ACmHPR ESCR Principles and Guidelines 2010, para. 46). The Commission has held that illegal acts by third parties even when not directly attributable to the state ‘can constitute a cause of international responsibility of the state, not because it has itself committed the act in question, but because it has failed to exercise the conscientiousness required to prevent it from happening and for not having been able to take the appropriate measures to pay compensation for the prejudice suffered by the victims’ (ACmHPR 2009a, para. 89). In General comment No. 3 on the right to life, the Commission thus further elucidates the scope of states’ extraterritorial obligations to include the responsibility of the state to hold third parties domiciled in their jurisdiction accountable for any extraterritorial violations of the right to life (para. 18). Similarly, the Commission affirms in General Comment No. 4 on Torture (ACmHPR, General Comment no. 4 2017, para. 27) that the obligation to provide an effective remedy and means of reparation extends to victims of torture regardless of where the torture and other ill treatment were committed and that state parties to the charter are ‘obliged to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of torture when they are present in any territory under their jurisdiction and to adopt the necessary legislation to make this possible’.

The obligations to promote and fulfil human rights require states to provide an environment in which individuals can exercise the rights through, for instance, ‘promoting tolerance, raising awareness and building infrastructures’ (ACmHPR 2001, paras. 45–47). In the DRC invasion case, the Commission also seemed to impute positive obligations to the occupying foreign states, by arguing that ‘the general duty of states to individually or collectively ensure the exercise of the right to development’ (emphasis added) had been violated (2003b, para. 95).

The jurisprudence of the Commission shows that not only does it assign the four-layer of obligations (to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil) to states Parties for their extraterritorial conduct but that states’ extraterritorial obligations extend to the full range of rights under the Charter. The ECtHR has most clearly spelt out that the scope of obligations varies with the model of jurisdiction: under the personal model, the obligations are limited to the rights at stake, whereas under the spatial model, the full range of rights applies. The African Commission has clearly endorsed the latter approach.

Court

The ACtHPR has not yet had the opportunity to pronounce itself on the nature and scope of extraterritorial obligations. Plans to merge the ACtHPR with the Court of Justice of Human and Peoples’ Rights may provide it with more occasions to develop its jurisprudence on the
matter (Chenwi and Bulto 2018, p. 36). The merged court once in operation will have jurisprudence to try transboundary crimes such as trafficking in persons, drugs and hazardous wastes, terrorism, money laundering, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and mercenaries (Malabo Protocol, art. 46C). Transboundary harmful conduct by states, such as transboundary pollution (ICJ 2008, para. 37), may trigger states’ extraterritorial obligations (See Altwicker 2018; and Boyle 2012).

Committee

The ACERWC has argued that the extraterritorial positive obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law extends to ‘both civil and political rights, and economic and social rights’ (GC armed conflict, para. 52, footnote 16). For example, it considers the positive obligation to protect the right to health applicable in instances ‘where children have been displaced to other states or territories where a state or receiving state has control’ (GC armed conflict, para. 70).

Division of responsibility for violations

So far, the question of division of responsibility between the territorial state and foreign states, or between foreign states, has only arisen in cases before the Commission. In the DRC Invasion case, Uganda argued, while referring to the joint case against itself, Rwanda, and Burundi, that ‘there is never group responsibility for violations’ (para. 30). The Commission did not take up that point. In the Burundi Embargo case though, which considered a complaint lodged against six states that had imposed an embargo, the Commission did not seem to reject group responsibility as a matter of principle. Of course, since it did not find a violation, there was also no need to clarify whether there was shared responsibility, nor the need to divide responsibility between the territorial state (Burundi) and the sanctioning states, or between the sanctioning states. More generally, the division of responsibility for violations of extraterritorial obligations remains an underdeveloped question (see Vandenhole 2015).

Conclusions

The relative paucity of cases pertaining to extraterritorial obligations in the African system makes premature any definitive conclusion regarding the adoption of a uniquely African perspective by its human rights enforcement bodies. This especially applies to the Court and the Committee, as only the Commission has repeatedly pronounced itself on extraterritorial obligations. These decisions have however had a far-reaching impact on the work of the Commission, informing its guidelines on counterterrorism (ACmHPR Principles and Guidelines on Counterterrorism 2015), ESC rights (ACmHPR ESCR Principles and Guidelines 2010), and its approach to protecting the right to life (ACmHPR General Comment no. 3 2015).

The jurisprudence of the Commission does not reveal a uniquely African perspective, so that the meta-narrative of African particularities does not seem to have much relevance for extraterritorial obligations. The models of extraterritoriality that it endorses are greatly aligned with the European approach, mirroring its terms (for instance, by adopting the concepts of personal and spatial model) and envisioning extraterritoriality as an exception to the default principle of territoriality. However, there are also suggestions that the Commission may be open to a cause-and-effect understanding of extraterritoriality, thus also potentially aligning with the approach of the Inter-American monitoring bodies and Human Rights Committee which have gone
beyond the personal and spatial models used in the European approach. While not reflecting a uniquely African perspective, the latter takes it beyond the narrow European approach.

One avenue through which the African system could distinguish itself is by further developing the relationship between extraterritoriality and the collective duties found in the ACHPR, which are recognised as its distinguishing features and reflect the meta-narrative of African particularities. This would be consonant with the emphasis on these collective duties in the Commission’s principles and guidelines (for instance, on counterterrorism). The Maastricht Principles distinguish between two types of extraterritorial obligations: extraterritorial obligations sensu stricto, as discussed above in this chapter, but also obligations of a global character. Obligations of a global character require ‘action, separately and jointly through international cooperation, to realize human rights universally’ (Principle 8, Maastricht Principles 580). The notion of collective duties in the provisions of the Charter can help to conceptually develop a notion of regional obligations in parallel to the notion of global obligations that can be found in the Maastricht Principles. Regional obligations could be said to require individual and collective action from African states to realise collective human rights regionally. Such regional obligations, for instance, with regard to the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources (ACHPR, Article 21), could help to strengthen protection against predatory exploitation of natural resources by state companies of other African states, or by companies that are incorporated in other African states. The regional obligation to ensure the exercise of the right to development would put all African states under an obligation to collectively ensure the right to development.

The lack of explicit jurisdiction clause in the ACHPR additionally provides an opportunity to move beyond existing approaches to extraterritoriality, as no territorial limit or definition of territoriality is set in stone. The willingness of states Parties to accept extraterritorial obligations bides well for the development of the doctrine of extraterritorial obligations in the African system. It is now up to the African monitoring bodies to fully exploit these possibilities in their case-law. Nonetheless, much of the interference on the African continent stems from non-African states or companies that are domiciled in non-African states. These issues can only be addressed under UN or other regional human rights treaties.

Note
1. These include ACmHPR 1988b; ACmHPR 1990b; ACmHPR 1988c; ACmHPR 1990a; ACmHPR 1988a.)

References
_______ (1990a) Georges Eugene v. USA, Communication 37/90.
_______ (1990b) Wesley Parish v. Indonesia, Communication 38/90.
Enforcement of ETOs in African system

— (2016a) Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture et Ligue de la Zone Afrique pour la Défense des Droits des Enfants et Elèves (pour le compte de Céline) v. DRC.


Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Anne Oloo and Wouter Vandenhole


