Neither phenomenology nor Austrian philosophy have clearly defined boundaries, hence it is somewhat futile to try to assess how these two movements are related, historically and systematically, without at least some preliminary, pragmatic definitions. The idea of an “Austrian philosophy” as a distinct historiographical category in the history of 19th- and 20th-century philosophy has been advanced and formulated in increasing detail since the 1970s. While it makes little sense to define “Austrian” philosophy purely on the base of geographical notions, neither as “philosophy in Austria” nor as “philosophy by Austrians”, it can nevertheless serve as a starting point.

Austrian philosophy

Rudolf Haller has tried in his works to establish both the historical as well as the systematical coherence of Austrian philosophy as a “more or less homogenous development”, providing a list of “essential traits” (Haller 1979, 7). The first main trait that Haller brings to the fore is the opposition to Kantianism, since Austrian philosophy did not follow Kant’s “Copernican revolution”. By aligning itself with pre-Kantian thinkers, it is an anti-idealistic, and specifically anti-Hegelian, current. Haller points to Herbart and Bolzano as early representatives of Austrian philosophy that exemplify such traits. One of the most influential groups, and the first actual school in Austrian philosophy, however, was born in the wake of Franz Brentano’s program of doing philosophy as science. Haller identifies a set of core rules of Brentano’s method, which at the same time picks out central traits of Austrian philosophy:

First, to pursue philosophy as a scientific discipline, second, to acknowledge experience as a source of knowledge about facts [Tatsachenerkenntnis], and accordingly to consider the evidence of inner perception as foundation for the perception of facts [Tatsachenwahrnehmung]. Finally, in accordance with the Aristotelian goal of clarity, the application of methods of linguistic analysis and critique [sprachanalytischer und sprachkritischer Methoden] to discover and overcome illusory problems [Scheinproblemen].

(Haller 1979, 12)

Not only would the School of Brentano then count as the school of Austrian philosophy, it also mediated between the earlier representatives and later movements. Indeed, Zimmermann, both
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a student of Bolzano as well as influenced by Herbart, was the other professor of philosophy in Vienna during Brentano’s time there and taught several of his students. With Brentano and his students it becomes clear that one of the defining characteristics of Austrian philosophy is a specific form of empiricism, inspired by (Neo-)Aristotelianism, British empiricism, and (Comtean) positivism, entailing a strong opposition to the speculative “degenerations” of rationalism (Haller 1979, 16–17; 1986, 36).

After the caesura of WWI, in which many philosophical currents found their end through the death or displacement of their representatives, this tendency would morph into something much more extreme, i.e. the complete rejection of any metaphysics at all in the context of the Vienna Circle. Nevertheless, according to Haller, the Vienna Circle still stands in a sufficiently continuous connection to the earlier Austrian philosophy that it can be viewed as part of the same tradition (Haller 1986, 39; 1991, 41).

As Barry Smith claimed, in an even more encompassing sense:

The most important and typical Austrian thinkers, from Bolzano to Wittgenstein, were not advocates for a big system-building “philosophy from above” of the Fichtean of Hegelian stamp, but for an empirical, concrete, and anti-systemic “philosophy from below”, a philosophy rooted in examples and painstaking description and analysis of individual cases.

(Smith 1993, 95)

Smith also proposed a similar set of criteria to classify philosophers as “Austrian”: a continuity of philosophy with the natural sciences, empiricism, a concern with (ordinary) language, a decided rejection of the Kantian “revolution” understood as a source of relativism and historicism, a special relation to the a priori, a concern with ontology and mereology, and with the relation of macro- to micro-phenomena without reductionism (think e.g. of the notion of Gestalt). This is accompanied by the caveats that, on the one hand, of course none of the Austrians shared all of these features, and on the other that many shared a majority of them without being in any relevant sense “Austrian”. Beyond loose geographical and historical constraints, a defining characteristic is the opposition to what is considered as “German” philosophy.

In sum, while there are gray areas and debates about which individual philosophers should or shouldn’t be included, there is a general consensus about the central characteristics of Austrian philosophy, following Haller: “the emphasis on psychology, language, science, analysis and empiricism”. These would then pick out “Brentano, Meinong, the great Vienna Circle of this century, and the enigmatic figure of Wittgenstein” as some of the main figures (Lehrer and Marek 1997, ix). This broad description would put Austrian philosophy in opposition to “the tradition of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger in Germany characterized by metaphysical extravagance”. Yet such an approach might be too simplistic to accommodate the great diversity of authors and positions that have been associated with Austrian philosophy. One cannot straightforwardly take Austrian-born authors or trending philosophies in Austria in a specific historical period as a yardstick. After all, Brentano was born in Germany and worked in Vienna for just two decades, Bolzano had limited influence in his own time, Wittgenstein’s philosophy developed and had its fortune mostly outside of Austria, etc. Hence, if we take the criteria of Austrian philosophy as just being “scientific, analytic, and empirical”, it becomes nearly co-extensive with theoretical philosophy at large. Moreover, with the possible exception of the School of Brentano, there is little actual historical and systematical unity to be found in such a broadly defined Austrian philosophy.

What we can find, however, is a relatively clear-cut list of candidates that could be categorized as German or Austrian philosophers respectively. According to Smith:
The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line of the second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Mach and Meinong, and ending with Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper.

(Smith 1994, 1)

Also, for Smith, the “central axis” of Austrian philosophy is the School of Brentano (Rollinger 2008). Indeed, having been receptive to a broad spectrum of authors, including the British empiricists and Bolzano, and having been influential in a variety of contexts, from early analytic philosophy to Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, and Polish logic, it is easy to see how the School of Brentano, and in particular Brentano himself, could function as the glue that holds Austrian philosophy together. Smith argues that there are both historical as well as systematical reasons for this choice: Brentano and his pupils occupied the most important chairs in philosophy in the Austro-Hungarian empire, founded lasting schools and institutions, and spread their theories far and wide (Smith 1994, 21). Moreover, by and large they ticked all the boxes of the main features of Austrian philosophy (of course with some exceptions and changes over time).

Yet, this is a narrow basis for such broad claims. Brentano, after all, besides being German, had a host of problems politically and institutionally in Austria, including being denied funding for a psychological laboratory (which would have anticipated Wundt’s by five years) and being denied re-appointment to his chair (Albertazzi 2006, 23–24). In part due to such a strained relationship with the authorities, he left Vienna and Austria after barely two decades. Of his more prominent students, only Marty, Meinong, and Von Ehrenfels had lasting academic careers in the Habsburg empire. In particular, Marty spread Brentanism for three decades in Prague, originating the second generation of orthodox Brentanists, including Kraus and Kastil. However, Stumpf, Twardowski, and Husserl found their fortune and had their influence mostly outside of Austria.

In particular, turning to Husserl and his phenomenology, we can see how this leads to a very distinct problem of categorization. In what sense could he be considered an Austrian philosopher? Even if we would agree that his phenomenology developed at first in the context of Austrian philosophy, did it later maintain (some of) its typical features?

Husserl was active as a philosopher in Vienna for much less time than Brentano: barely two years. While he did complete his dissertation in mathematics in Vienna before that and then gained a second layer of Brentanism under the supervision of Stumpf in Halle, his categorization as an Austrian philosopher on these grounds (or on birthright alone) would be tenuous at best. Yet, if we take into account that through Brentano he also came into contact with Bolzano’s thought and that through Zimmermann he acquired some familiarity with Herbart, he starts to look more embedded in the context of the typical Austrian thinkers listed above. Moreover, thanks to his technical background in mathematics, he was perhaps best equipped to investigate the connections between the a priori and empiricism in the context of the philosophy of mathematics (although nearly all the members of the School of Brentano worked on this (Ierna 2011, 2017a)). Indeed, it was the issue of the link between “the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of knowledge” (Hua XVIII, 7) that pushed him further and further in his research and ultimately to positions that would seem quite distant from those of Brentano’s particular strand of Austrian philosophy. Indeed, if we look at the later developments of phenomenology, we cannot but notice that Heidegger, Husserl’s most prominent heir, is classified as a representative of precisely the opposite orientation: German philosophy.

We must not forget, however, that the term “phenomenology” itself did not originate with Husserl. Indeed, the core of Brentano’s approach lay in his “descriptive psychology”, on which he lectured in Vienna in 1887–88 while Husserl was studying with him. The next
year, Brentano changed the title to “Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology” (Brentano PS 77). Up to 1903 Husserl would still regard his own phenomenology as a kind of descriptive psychology. Famous Alexander Pfänder wrote his habilitation on Phänomenologie des Wollens (The Phenomenology of Willing) in 1900, independently from Husserl, but partially influenced by his reading of Brentano (Schuhmann 1988, 99).

Phenomenology

Independently from the term itself, in what sense would Husserl’s phenomenology be a part or a continuation of Austrian philosophy? We are now confronted again with the same problem: the lack of a clear definition of what phenomenology is. Can we give a comprehensive, unambiguous, and useful definition? Are we even entitled to speak of the one and only universally agreed upon phenomenology, or should we rather say that we can speak of phenomenology in various senses, e.g. a broad and a narrow sense? In the narrowest sense it would be a very specific discipline, as elaborated by Husserl in a select few works:

Husserl is the founding father of phenomenology but it has often been claimed that virtually all post-Husserlian phenomenologists ended up distancing themselves from most aspects of his original program. Thus, according to [one] view, phenomenology is a tradition by name only. It has no common method and research program. It has even been suggested that Husserl was not only the founder of phenomenology, but also its sole true practitioner.

(Zahavi 2008, 661)

In the broadest possible sense, the phenomenological movement would include most of the School of Brentano, Munich phenomenology, all of Husserl’s phenomenology, French phenomenology, and perhaps even some analytical philosophers.

a future historian of ideas might perhaps maintain that there cannot have been any single philosophical movement called phenomenology, for too many different and even contradictory things are said in the documents about it. There might seem to be as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists.

(Hintikka 2010, 91)

There is not just one phenomenology, but rather many phenomenologies. Even if we would restrict ourselves purely to the doctrines elaborated by Husserl himself, we can distinguish at least two: before and after the transcendental turn. Updating Merleau-Ponty’s remark in the preface to his Phénoménologie de la perception, more than a century after the publication of Husserl’s core works a univocal definition of phenomenology is still missing (Zahavi 2008, 663). How should we deal with this? One option would be to avoid biographical and historical references and to conflate any variations into a unified picture (Crowell 2002, 419–420). Volens nolens this would lead to defending one distinctive position within the wider field of phenomenology and hence becoming part of the problem rather than solving it. The other option would be to provide detailed analyses in the style of e.g. Spiegelberg’s Phenomenological Movement, presenting the history of phenomenology in a certain sense as “the history of Husserlian heresies” (Ricoeur 1987, 9), acknowledging biographical and historical relationships as well as philosophical conflicts, working as an impartial historian. Ideally we would like to gain a comprehensive definition of phenomenology based on an evaluation of the many phenomenologies: “Even if there
were as many phenomenologies as phenomenologists, there should be at least a common core in all of them to justify the use of the common term” (Spiegelberg 1982, 677).

In Husserl’s time as well as today, in both the primary as well as the secondary literature, there is no clear agreement about what phenomenology is. Given the plurality of phenomenologies, “the major need is that for providing historical background, especially when the texts no longer appear in their contexts” (Spiegelberg 1975, 21). How did this plurality come about?

Phenomenology does not only have an endless task, but also many beginnings, or, using another metaphor, besides splitting into many branches, it also has many roots. At various stages there are significant changes in Husserl’s position, leading to repeated attempts to “introduce” phenomenology anew. Consider also that the two major works introducing phenomenology, the Logical Investigations and the Ideas, were unfinished. The Logical Investigations were not originally meant to be published in their current form (as Husserl himself stated in a letter to Natorp) (Hua-Dok III/5, 76; Hua XIX/2, 783), and were actually intended just as the first of two series (as Husserl remarked in a letter to Meinong) (Meinong 1965, 105; Hua-Dok I, 63), while the 1913 Ideas was originally meant as just the first book of three, of which the second and third never appeared during his lifetime. Hence, his works cannot be taken simply and straightforwardly as “admurations” of the same coherent doctrinal whole. Unsurprisingly, those who were influenced by Husserl at one stage did not always follow him uncritically to the next (Moran 2000, xiii). No wonder that there is still a need of scholarly works analyzing Husserl’s relationship to his teachers, colleagues, and students.

Before any attempt to find the origin and unity of phenomenology could conceivably be made, all these phenomenologies and phenomenologists have to be put in context. This does not imply a mere catalog of influences or a side-by-side comparison of almost randomly picked philosophers, but the search for a red thread. What is it that ties these phenomenologies together and that even makes them into phenomenologies and not rather other kinds of philosophies? Such a search for a comprehensive definition and systematic unity could be articulated as a kind of “phenomenology of phenomenology” (at this point still an obscurum per obscurius), since it would be certainly too reductive to define phenomenology as a unitary whole just on the base of a historical, contingent relation to Husserl and his works, as this would indeed be a quite extrinsic and inessential criterion. Phenomenology cannot be defined just as “Husserlism”; returning to the earlier metaphor, the trunk is not the tree.

For some Husserl scholars it has become too much of a habit “to view Husserl as a highly original philosopher who blazed his own trail” (Rollinger 1999, 7), as if he had been operating in isolation. Both the relations to his predecessors and peers as well as to his own former positions are often neglected. The opposite excesses are just as silly, e.g. portraying Husserl as being converted to anti-psychologism overnight by Frege or merely as a (bad) copy of Brentano; Husserl was neither an isolated, solitary pioneer, nor a purely passive victim of circumstances.

When comparing two positions, both have to be taken seriously, and we should not make the analysis of one functional to the explanation of the other. When comparing early and late Husserl, we should neither dismiss early stages as immature, nor consider them interesting only as precursors of later stages. Such reverse chronological interpretations of Husserl tend to produce an equally unbalanced assessment of those that influenced him or were influenced by him at various stages, leading rather to excluding them from phenomenology in the narrow sense than to including them in phenomenology in the broad sense. Such teleological tendencies are made obvious in labels such as “pre-phenomenological” or “pre-transcendental” to indicate periods in Husserl’s development, which show that who applies them has already a clear criterion to decide what qualifies as “real” phenomenology, a criterion that Husserl himself did not
have or could likewise only apply retrospectively. Later positions depend on earlier positions, not the other way around; hence we might as well (and perhaps even more appropriately) label him as “post-realist” after the transcendental turn.

What qualifies as phenomenology is certainly not arbitrary, but the historical authors that contributed to establish the phenomenological movement were entitled to provide their own definitions, as opposed to current interpreters and historians trying to define what they were doing. When Husserl at one stage called “phenomenology” a kind of “descriptive psychology”, we should take that just as seriously as his later dismissal of such terminology. And if some of his students after that still kept doing “phenomenology” as “descriptive psychology”, this cannot be simply dismissed as an aberration or misunderstanding. If we were to do so, then we would indeed deny that there is something like a “phenomenological movement” as phenomenology would be restricted to Husserlian phenomenology at a specific stage. We cannot therefore choose one single definition as historically given by one single phenomenologist as the true and only criterion, but must perforce look at the broader context of the phenomenological movement.21

If we were defining in the systematical sense, we would have to articulate and stress differences in methods and topics to arrive at a delimitation of phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1982, 2–3). However, in this way we risk making arbitrary choices. We could e.g. arrive at a separation based on the scientific dignity of phenomenology, with the School of Brentano, Munich phenomenology,22 and most of Husserl on one side and the “geniale Unwissenschaftlichkeit” of Heidegger (Hua-Dok III/2, 184)23 and many French phenomenologists on the other. What additional criteria could we possibly cite to make our choice, if choosing is at all meaningful or possible?

A historical-genealogical examination of the context in which phenomenology developed would rather preserve a neutrality and objectivity not unlike those advocated by phenomenology itself. This can yield a quite detailed periodization and consequent delimitation that is not quite as arbitrary. Various phenomenologies can be defined and separated without value judgments or pretensions of having found the one true criterion to define all phenomenology. Coherent with its endless task and its character of a work-philosophy, we can then also define phenomenology, among other things, as being still a work-in-progress.

The phenomenological movement and Austrian philosophy

Having sketched the problems and possibilities of defining or at least circumscribing phenomenology and Austrian philosophy, we can now approach the issue of the connection between the two.

Besides Husserl himself belonging to both groups (Ierna 2017b, 25 ff.), it is not only the case that the other Austrian philosophers from the School of Brentano influenced him, but also influenced his students. Indeed, what would become “Munich phenomenology” started out as a reading group in which many works from the School of Brentano were prominently discussed, particularly Anton Marty’s (Schuhmann 1990, 198, 209, 214; Smith 1990; Schuhmann and Smith 1991, 313). Hence, one prominent reason for the development of Munich phenomenology is that Brentano’s Austrian philosophy had already paved the way for Husserl’s, as Schuhmann points out:

One of the reasons for the fertile ground in Munich and for the origination of the phenomenological movement precisely there, was that there was a generally congenial atmosphere. Throughout the years the people in Munich, more than at any
other German university, had engaged very positively with Brentano and his School; i.e. with that circle of thinkers to which Husserl himself also belonged.

(Schuhmann 1988, 97)

Following Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg 1982, 165), while there might not be a precise date for the foundation of the “phenomenological movement”, it is only with the physical movement of the Munich invasion of Göttingen that we can speak of a broader philosophical movement beyond the circle of Husserl’s direct students (Schuhmann and Smith 1991, 304). Moreover, beyond constituting the “first branch” of phenomenology (Schuhmann 2004b, 82), the Munich phenomenologists played an important role in its early development. It was during the historical encounter with the Munich phenomenologists Alexander Pfänder and Johannes Daubert in Seefeld in 1905 (Schuhmann 1973, 23, 131–132) that Husserl began at first to develop the notion of the transcendental ego, which, ironically, would then lead also to the ultimate break with the more realist Munich phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1981, 72). It is also together with the Munich phenomenologists Daubert, Geiger, Pfänder, Reinach, and Scheler that Husserl would come to found the main publishing organ of the phenomenological movement: the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. It is in the joint editorial statement preceding the first volume in 1913 that we find clear indications of shared views and ambitions between the School of Brentano and the Phenomenological Movement, which, moreover, place them squarely in the field of Austrian philosophy:

Increasingly we are pushed towards phenomenological clarifications and analyses of essence, not just for the sake of properly philosophical problems, but also with the aim of a foundation for the non-philosophical sciences. […] This journal is meant to serve such needs. It shall first and foremost unite in shared work those who hope that the pure and rigorous application of the phenomenological method will enact a fundamental reform of philosophy – setting it on the road to a securely founded, progressively developing science. […] It is not a school-system that unites the editors and that is to be required from all future collaborators; what unites them is rather the shared conviction that only through a return to the originary sources of intuition, and to the essential insights to be drawn from it, can the concepts and the problems of the great traditions of philosophy be appraised, that only on this path can concepts be intuitively clarified and problems framed anew on an intuitive basis and then solved in principle. They have the shared conviction that to phenomenology belongs an unlimited field of strictly scientific and highly consequential research, which, as for philosophy itself, has to be made to bear fruit also for all other sciences – wherever questions of principle are at stake in them. Hence, this journal shall not be a playground for vague reformatory ideas [nicht ein Tummelplatz vager reformatorischer Einfälle], but a place for serious scientific work.

(Hua XXV, 63–64)²⁴

The connections to the earlier project of doing philosophy as science in the School of Brentano are unmistakable.²⁵ A new foundation is needed to reform both philosophy as well as the other sciences, enabling “strict” and “earnest” scientific research, but not by imposing a new system from above. The focus is on a rigorous method, capable of founding and reforming all sciences, philosophy included.²⁶ The materia prima is to be found by returning to intuition as “original source”. The same ideas and wordings appear in multiple programmatic writings by Brentano and his students. Famously, Brentano had advanced his idea of philosophy as science, based on
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commonality of method, already in his habilitation theses in 1866: “Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est” (Brentano 1929, 136–137). He aimed at “the renewal of philosophy as science”, not by conjuring up “proud systems” out of thin air, but by humbly “cultivating fallow scientific ground”. In such a project there was no room for “taumelnde heroen” like the speculative philosophers of German Idealism (Brentano 1929, 130–131). Brentano considered only one source of knowledge to be indubitably evident: inner perception, sharply distinguished from introspection (Brentano 1874, 35, 119). Moreover, even though Brentano did try (and fail) to enforce orthodoxy from his students, nevertheless the school as such fits the modernist idea of scientific progress as a collaborative achievement (Richardson 1997, 434).

The phenomenological side of the story is slightly more complex. We have seen above that one of the characteristics of Austrian philosophy is its anti-Kantian and anti-idealistic tendency, which can easily be found in many of Brentano’s works, lectures, and manuscripts. Husserl, however, came progressively closer to Kant, famously re-defining his phenomenology from a kind of descriptive psychology into a transcendental idealism (with the caveat not to read other theories into his terminology). Despite important critiques, Husserl ultimately reserves a central role for Kant in discovering a new sense of scientificity:

The Kantian system is the first attempt, and one carried out with impressive scientific seriousness, at a truly universal transcendental philosophy meant to be a rigorous science in a sense of scientific rigor which has only now been discovered and which is the only genuine sense.

(Hua VI, 102/99)

Husserl still credits Brentano with important contributions to the study of consciousness and intentionality, but considers him, retrospectively, as still working under naturalistic presuppositions (ibid., 236, 346). Indeed, Brentano accepted the existence of external causes of sensation (the most fundamental psychic phenomena and the prime source for all others), denying only their knowability (in a quite Lockean and Comtean fashion). Where Brentano was aiming at the same kind of scientificity for psychology and philosophy as the one of the natural sciences, later Husserl endorses a wholly new kind of scientificity, much more in line with Kant’s “Copernican revolution”. Brentano assigned an epistemic privilege to internal perception, but did not make the limited validity of the sciences based on external perception completely and directly dependent upon it. Husserl, however, makes all knowledge and validity ultimately dependent on the constitutional activity of the transcendental ego: no object without subject.30 The encompassing project of doing philosophy as science is present both in the School of Brentano as well as in phenomenology. Where Brentano aimed at establishing philosophy and psychology along the natural sciences, as primus inter pares, sharing the same empirical method (broadly understood), Husserl is much more radical. As we can read in Fink’s notes of Husserl’s lectures on Natur und Geist:

All sciences obtain their ultimate meaning and apriorical foundation in the universal foundational science of transcendental philosophy, whose most important forerunners are Descartes and Kant, and whose current representative is phenomenology.

(Hua XXXII, 267)

It is not Husserl’s aim to merely establish one new scientific discipline alongside the other sciences, but as he says in the Crisis, “[to subject] the scientific character of all sciences to a serious and quite necessary critique” (Hua VI, 3/5). From the initial aim in Brentano’s Austrian
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philosophy of rendering philosophy and psychology scientific through the empirical method of the natural sciences, in Husserl we move to the foundation of philosophy as rigorous science on ideal, apriorical grounds. This makes it problematic to include “post-realist phenomenology” among Austrian philosophy.

Husserl’s later position is perhaps most succinctly and emphatically stated in his inaugural lecture in Freiburg, immediately after WWI, where he underscores the radically new nature of his approach: “A new philosophical foundational science has arisen, pure phenomenology. … It has a methodological rigor that is not inferior to any of the modern sciences. … It makes philosophy as rigorous science at all possible” (Hua XXV, 69). With his fundamental distinction between pure phenomenology and descriptive psychology, Husserl is clearly moving beyond Brentano (ibid., 74–75). In the transcendental-idealistic phase, pure phenomenology is defined as an apriorical science of consciousness in the sense of being concerned with the possibility rather than with the facticity of experience (ibid., 79). Instead of the inductive method of the natural sciences as Erfahrungswissenschaften, Husserl looks to the deductive and pure arithmetic and geometry as inspiration. If we abstract from the themes of transcendental constitution and the pure ego, the metaphysical questions of solipsism and the reality of the external world, we nevertheless could still see how, with respect to the ideal of philosophy as science, Brentano’s and Husserl’s aims can be considered as part of a cohesive and central current within Austrian philosophy.

Notes

1 “Austrian philosophers are an assorted bunch” (Simons 2006, 180).
2 “The independence of Austrian philosophy did not come from the soil it grew on, but the combination of influences that shaped it” (Uebel 2000, 107). All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
3 Compare the “extensional” approach in Binder, Fabian, Höfer and Valent 2005, 54: “For the IBÖP, ‘Austrian Philosophy’ is defined through a list of names. These names represent the Austrian philosophers, where we count as ‘Austrian’ the following persons: (1) those born within the current borders of Austria, except when they work(ed) exclusively abroad; (2) those born within the borders of Austria before 1918, under the condition that their philosophical activities belong to Austrian philosophy (compare the preface to IBÖP 74/75); (3) foreign nationals, only if they have worked and gained influence during longer periods as philosophers in Austria. Of course, there still remains a series of open cases that is neither simple not straightforward to determine.” This approach is essentially unchanged since the early publications in the series.
4 Also see Haller 1991, 50. Also consider the critical account in Morscher 2006, 261.
5 Haller 1979, 8; Haller 1986, 38, considers as hallmarks of Austrian philosophy its Anti-Kantianism, Anti-Idealism, and Anti-Irrationalism.
6 “In him we see the actual founder of Austrian philosophy” (Haller 1979, 10) and Haller 1986, 36: “if we wanted to exaggerate, we could indicate the year 1874 [the publication of Brentano’s Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte] as the year in which Austrian philosophy was born.”
7 Compare Haller 1986, 38: “First, the requirement of scientificity of philosophy and the recognition of the natural scientific ideal of science [naturwissenschaftlichen Wissenschaftseideals], second, empiricism as epistemological and methodological heuristic, third, the language-critical attitude [sprachkritische Einstellung], that aids an analytical method of philosophizing and avoids a metaphysics that operates with postulates.”
8 See especially the excellent Varga 2015 on Zimmermann’s influence on Husserl.
9 This is not just a result of recent historiography, but an assessment made by his contemporaries as well, see e.g. Conrad Martius 1959a, 175: “Heidegger and his large following have in the end, even though not in the beginning, distanced themselves the most from Husserl’s intentions.” I’d like to thank Kimberly Baltzer Jaray for helping me find the relevant texts of Conrad Martius.
10 See the extensive analysis in Schuhmann 2004a.
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11 (Brentano PS 76). In the Husserl-Archives Leuven a copy of the lecture notes by Hans Schmidkunz is preserved with the signature Q 10.

12 In 1903 he clearly denied it in his review of Elsenhans: “All natural scientific or metaphysical objectivations remain completely excluded. Phenomenology therefore should not be designated as “descriptive psychology” without further qualification. It is not, in the strict and proper sense. Its descriptions do not concern lived experiences or classes of experiences of empirical persons; because it does not know or presume anything about persons, about me and others, about mine and others’ experiences; regarding these it does not pose any questions, attempts no definitions, makes no hypotheses. Phenomenological description looks at what is given in the strictest sense, at the lived experience as it is in itself.” (Hua XXII, 206–207/251).

13 Compare Spiegelberg 1982, 1, and the sources quoted at footnote 1 therein.

14 Consider Conrad Martius 1959a, 175: “It surely is a unique situation in the history of ideas [geistgeschichtliche Situation], that from a great philosophical teacher have sprung not only such varied, even almost opposite, philosophical movements […], but that these movements each have obtained for themselves a quite conspicuous weight in the history of ideas.” However, given the immediately preceding example of Brentano and his school, the situation does appear slightly less “unique”.

15 Compare the picture in Spiegelberg 1982, 2, point 3.

16 This problem was already noticed by his students, see e.g. Conrad Martius 1959a, 177: “It has often been understood as if it [the opposition between the transcendental and the ontological] were simply different phases in Husserl’s own philosophy. Indeed: already the second volume of the Logical Investigations, but all the more the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy appeared to us direct students as an incomprehensible return of Husserl to transcendentalism, subjectivism, and even psychology.”

17 See Spiegelberg 1982, 149 on the need for works on “Husserl and …”.

18 See Spiegelberg 1975, 10: “Considering the variety of phenomenologies which have thus issued directly or indirectly from Husserl’s inspiration, it is not easy to find a common denominator for such a movement beside its origin.”

19 Which could contribute to mitigate the problem “that philosophical ideas are deformed […], particularly when they are interpreted from the outside” (Wolenski 1997, 46).

20 Compare Moran 2000, 2.

21 See also Spiegelberg 1982, 3–4; 1975, xxii.

22 As well as the work of many Göttingen phenomenologists, e.g. those of the Bergzabern circle. Indeed, the term “München-Göttinger Schule” has been used as well, see e.g. Conrad Martius 1959a, 175.

23 Also Smith 1997, 1: “Heidegger […] all but terminated the previously healthy scientific line in phenomenology”.


25 As well as the continuity with earlier representatives, e.g. for Reinach and Bolzano see Jaray 2006.

26 Also see Ierna 2014a; 2014b.

27 The expression (literally “tumbling heroes”), is clearly meant in a disparaging manner, i.e. dismissing convoluted metaphysical speculation as overblown antics.

28 Consider Conrad Martius 1959b, 43: “With this starting proposition of Husserl [that for pure consciousness nulla re indiget ad existendum] transcendental idealism, which had been riding high since Kant, surely reached its crest.”

29 Compare Conrad Martius 1959b, 50: “What is meant by realistic? It is the blending of the two functions, of which the first task is to go beyond empirical relationships to real, fully valid causes that are not included in the immediate data. […] To real, fully valid causes!”

30 This was criticized by many of his earlier students, who pursued “phenomenology pure and simple, investigation of essence without exclusion or limitation” (Conrad Martius 1959b, 47) and accepted “an ‘absolute’ world, one standing all by itself and for itself” in a “pre-Kantian, and above all pre-existentialist’ sense (ibid., 45–46).

31 This approach was not shared by all his students: “What can philosophy do here? Are we trying to go back to a priori methods […]? Are we again conjuring up the spectre of falsifying speculation […]? Certainly not. Who would dare do so today? […] It is impossible for the results of phenomenology to contradict those of natural science or vice versa” (Conrad Martius 1959b, 48–49).

32 Or among Austrian phenomenology (Rollinger 2008, 12).
References


Phenomenology and Austrian philosophy


