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NORTH AMERICA

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United States

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75.1. Introduction

What the history of phenomenology in the United States is depends on how broadly one construes the term “phenomenology.” Should the reception of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s work—which did not begin here until the mid-1970s, and not under the label of phenomenology—be considered part of the history of phenomenology? One might wonder whether even Heidegger belongs to the history of phenomenology in the United States. By 1962, when William Richardson published the first full-scale treatment of Heidegger in English, Heidegger was already known as an “existentialist,”2 and English translations of a few of Heidegger’s essays on Hölderlin preceded the translation of Being and Time—arguably his most phenomenological work—by more than a decade (Heidegger 1949). Despite its subtitle (“A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology”), Sartre’s Being and Nothingness was “existentialism,” identified with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Camus, not Husserl or even Heidegger. Unless one restricts the term “phenomenology” to the philosophy of Husserl, then, it seems that one must construct the history of its dissemination in the United States as a story of the various guises and aliases through which it became familiar.

It is no accident that the first postwar professional society dedicated to phenomenology in the United States insisted on a distinction here: Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. The Heidegger Circle was established in 1967 and the Husserl Circle in 1969. The emergence of such societies highlights the fact that there was no reception of “phenomenology” as such in this country, but only of individual thinkers whose intellectual and personal relations in earlier decades of the century, in Europe, were repeated on these shores in temporally foreshortened ways and behind a pretty thick veil of ignorance. Thus there can be no talk of “the” Phenomenological Movement here. Herbert Spiegelberg’s 1960 volume by that name was a backward-looking history of the European scene in which both Heidegger and Sartre appear as somewhat marginal, and even dangerous, figures.

Further complicating the picture is the impact that Jacques Derrida exerted on what came to be called “Continental philosophy.” His earliest publications place Derrida squarely in the phenomenological tradition, but that is not how he was received in the 1970s, when a spate of translations appeared and, in the following decades, he took up teaching appointments at various American universities. Rightly or wrongly, deconstruction was seen as anti-phenomenological, and phenomenology itself appeared to be a paradigm of the “metaphysics of presence.” Thus,
when Derrida later insists that his work belongs within the scope of “the phenomenological reduction,” should we take deconstruction (and all its aliases) as another guise in which the history of phenomenology happened? Or is it merely an opportunistic use of the word – which may also be reckoned, precisely because of its opportunism, to that history, but which is hardly part of the narrative of the thing itself?

But what is the “thing itself”?

In a useful nuts-and-bolts article on the history of phenomenology in the United States, the *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* tackles this problem by distinguishing between “four successively emerging tendencies now discernable in the worldwide phenomenological movement,” which it employs as a prism for narrating the reception of Husserl, Heidegger, and others in this country (Embree et al. 1997, 718–723).\(^3\) The “tendencies” include two that are defined pretty narrowly in terms of Husserl’s thought (“realistic” and “constitutive” phenomenology, picking out the pre- and post- *Ideas I* Husserl respectively), and two that are constructed around major criticisms of the first two: “existential” phenomenology (early Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) and “hermeneutic” phenomenology (Heidegger, Ricoeur, Gadamer). The article notes that American phenomenology has “sometimes been challenged” by movements such as “deconstruction,” but it recoups such criticism for the history of phenomenology with the remark that this is “not unlike the way some existentialists and hermeneuticists, also under the influence of literary theory, ignored their origins.” (ibid., 723, my emphasis) The fact that a European philosophical movement originates in a *criticism* of phenomenology, however, does not necessarily mean that it belongs to the history of phenomenology in the United States. As for literature, we shall have occasion to return to its role below.

The *Encyclopedia* article also notes the rise of “analytical phenomenology” which, unlike the other tendencies, did not originate in Europe but in the “Anglo-American” tradition. Why do the philosophers mentioned here – among them David W. Smith, Ronald MacIntyre, Dagfinn Follesdal, Hubert Dreyfus, and John Searle – not find a place under one or another of the four previously mentioned tendencies? In part – and this shall provide our narrative thread – it is because the history of phenomenology in the United States is the story of how it has been *superseded* in the context of its original reception: university departments of philosophy receptive to philosophical tendencies originating in Continental Europe.

Currently, philosophy departments which self-describe as “Continental” typically have faculty members who work on an ever-changing list of figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, Arendt, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, Lyotard, Gadamer, Habermas, Deleuze, Irigaray, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Badiou, Vattimo, Agamben, and many others. Most of these have ties to Husserlian thought at some remove or another, but it would be absurd to think that a philosopher who writes on Badiou or Deleuze, say, is part of the history of phenomenology in the United States. Such a person will not claim to be doing phenomenology, but the same can be said of many (or even most) of those who work on Heidegger, Gadamer, or Levinas. This is not to suggest that there is no such thing as “hermeneutic” or “existential” or even “deconstructive” phenomenology; it is merely to say that the question of whether something belongs under one of those heads can no longer be answered by reference to historical origins at all.

Once phenomenology is divorced from the names of its originators in this way, the stance that “analytic phenomenology” adopts becomes normative: phenomenology is a distinctive, though vaguely defined, way of tackling philosophical problems. At present, much significant phenomenological philosophy in the United States is done in departments that do not self-describe as “Continental” and under rubrics such as philosophy of mind, moral psychology, or metaphysics. Such work often (but by no means always) makes reference to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, or Sartre; but the internecine quarrels that separated these thinkers from one
another and led to the balkanization of the various “tendencies” within “the” phenomenological movement make their appearance solely as moves within philosophical argumentation around a given theme.

In the United States today there is no reason why a phenomenological approach to phenomenal consciousness, intention-in-action, or perceptual content should not include elements of realistic, constitutive, existential, and hermeneutic thinking. The differences between Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and others continue to be vigorously debated in special societies dedicated to the philological preservation of their work and to following out the implications of their thought in its own terms. But only to the extent that members of these societies pursue particular philosophical problems – either among themselves or with philosophers of other persuasions – can they be said to contribute to the history of phenomenology in the United States today.

Thus the present chapter argues (1) that the European philosophical movement, phenomenology, has been superseded in the United States by other movements and is now the province of specialized societies dedicated to individual philosophers; and (2) that a home-grown version of phenomenology has emerged that draws upon the European tradition but understands itself primarily as a way of dealing with philosophical problems. Thus the history of phenomenology in the United States will appear here neither as the chronicle of its various aliases, nor as an exhumation of the origins of movements that are avowedly not phenomenological, but as the story of how a way of doing philosophy that stood in some contrast to the dominant traditions of Anglo-American thought came to have a non-adversarial relation to those traditions in the present.

75.2. The early reception of Husserl’s thought (1902–1950)

The initial reception of Husserl’s phenomenology took place at a time when American universities were dominated by versions of pragmatism and German (and British) Idealism. The fundamental intellectual challenge was to understand the place of “value” in a world increasingly conceived in natural-scientific terms (Blanshard 1962, esp. Chapter 1). Husserl’s account of the ideality of meaning in the *Logical Investigations*, and his descriptive approach to conscious experience, found resonance here (as it did in Germany) as a defense of the irreducibility of value. William Ernest Hocking, for instance, whose interests lay in integrating the idealism of Josiah Royce with naturalism, met Husserl in 1902. In the 1920s Hocking’s colleague at Harvard, Winthrop Bell (also a student of Husserl), taught phenomenological value theory and sent Dorion Cairns and Marvin Farber to work with Husserl in Freiburg. In 1931 an English translation of Husserl’s *Ideas I* appeared by W. R. Boyce Gibson, a Lecturer at the University of Melbourne with interests in the religious thinker, Rudolf Eucken. In 1939 a *Journal of Philosophy* article praised Husserl for initiating a “systematic study” of experience that reduced it neither to the physical nor the psychical (Montague 1939, 232). In 1935, when he was seventy-four years old and his situation in Freiburg tenuous, Husserl was offered a position at the University of Southern California, largely through the efforts of a graduate student, E. Parl Welch, who was then working on Max Scheler’s theory of value.

Had philosophy in America continued in this vein – that is, characterized by a kind of pragmatism with roots in Hegel’s thought and an idealism that shared a vocabulary and topical concerns with contemporary German neo-Kantianism – the reception of phenomenology might well have been different. After the war, however, leading American philosophy departments came increasingly to embrace a European philosophical movement that was specifically opposed to the pragmatic/idealist consensus: logical analysis. With its roots in Frege and Wittgenstein, and as championed by Russell, analysis, in the form of logical positivism, ran philosophical idealism
out of Oxford and Cambridge and served as a model for the restructuring of American philosophy departments from the 1940s on. To philosophers who embraced the “linguistic turn” – the idea that philosophical problems could be solved or dissolved by logically scrutinizing the kind of overt behavior in which they were formulated (i.e., linguistic behavior) – Husserl’s “systematic study” of the conscious experiences in which linguistic meaning was supposedly grounded seemed nothing but unscientific “introspection” and mystical “intuition.”

Thus the attitude toward phenomenology was already darkening when, in 1942, John Wild, together with Cairns and Farber, established the International Phenomenological Society and its journal, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. The Society included prominent European phenomenologists who had emigrated to America during the war, among them Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Fritz Kaufmann, Felix Kaufmann, and Herbert Spiegelberg. In retrospect, this beginning actually signals the end of a time when there was common ground between domestic philosophical concerns and European phenomenology. Wild had taught at Harvard since 1927, and the Harvard department produced students who went on to significant careers in phenomenology – Harmon Chapman, Hubert Dreyfus, Calvin Schrag, and Samuel Todes among them. But by 1961, when Wild left for Northwestern University, only Yale – where Ernst Cassirer had taught during the war and where Wild went in 1969 – among leading American graduate programs had any significant phenomenological representation. Edward S. Casey and David Carr taught there in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the 1980s the department was reorganized and lost its last phenomenologist when Maurice Natanson retired in 1995.

### 75.3. The “University in Exile”: phenomenology as an “exotic transplant”

Beginning in the 1950s, then, phenomenology came increasingly to be identified exclusively with “foreign” ways of thinking, an “exotic” in the words of Dorion Cairns (writing in 1950) (Natanson 1969, vii). In part, this was because it gained its foothold in universities that did not participate in the analytic consolidation: above all, the New School for Social Research, but also several Catholic universities whose interests were not well served by militant logical positivism. With growing postwar traffic between students from these institutions and the European bastions of the phenomenological tradition (Louvain, Paris, then Freiburg), and thanks to the increasing number of European philosophers on these shores, this was also the period in which disputes over orthodoxy that had characterized the pre-war phenomenological movement in Europe came to define the reception of phenomenology in the United States as well.

The New School in the 1950s and early 1960s boasted a faculty that included Dorion Cairns, Alfred Schutz, and Aron Gurwitsch – all of whom drew inspiration primarily from Husserl. Cairns was a prolific translator of Husserl and defended a systematic version of “constitutive” phenomenology. Gurwitsch focused on phenomenological psychology and developed a “non-egological” conception of consciousness that tried to mitigate Husserl’s idealism without abandoning it altogether. And Schutz, trained as an economist and sociologist, turned to Husserl’s account of meaning to ground Max Weber’s social-scientific method of *Verstehen*. These philosophers produced a generation of students who would continue largely in this Husserlian vein – among them, J. N. Mohanty, Maurice Natanson, Fred Kersten, Lester Embree, and Richard Zaner.

At the same time, the New School was home to other emigres who brought with them very different currents of European thought, including different takes on phenomenology. European critical social thought (e.g., Frankfurt critical theory) was represented: the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science (the branch of the New School in which the phenomenologists also held appointments) had been founded as the University in Exile, a home to European scholars threatened by the Nazis. But Hannah Arendt wrote her major Heidegger-inspired works of
political theory there; Karl Löwith and Hans Jonas were on the faculty; and Werner Marx taught there from 1949 to 1964. Thus while it is true that these years saw the emergence of something called “existential phenomenology” in the United States, the paramount question at the time was whether any of this existentialism was phenomenology.

Heidegger had published Being and Time in 1927 under the banner of phenomenology, but by 1929 the rift between his thinking and Husserl’s had become public, and Heidegger’s subsequent involvement with the Nazi regime had made him anathema to thinkers like Schutz and Gurwitsch. Indeed, in 1960 Spiegelberg could refer to the “fateful and almost fatal influence” that Heidegger’s thought had exerted on phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1982, 273). For Schutz and Gurwitsch, “existential” phenomenology was represented by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, whose adaptation of Husserlian ideas seemed more palatable. They thus passed the disputes of the 1920s and 1930s in Germany on to their own students in the 1950s and 1960s. Representatives of Heideggerian thought at the New School, in turn, viewed the history of phenomenology as a progression from Husserlian idealism to a concern for the “factic” historical, social, and political world – a story in which phenomenology was finally to be superseded by hermeneutics, dialectics, or the “thought of being.” And they passed on this view of phenomenology to their students. Constructive dialogue between the two camps became increasingly difficult. Their students, however, benefitted from the opulence of university budgets in the growth economy of the late 1950s and 1960s, when courses on existentialism came to be offered and most philosophy departments felt that they could afford to have (as Natanson put it) a “token” phenomenologist.

These same tendencies were found at the several Catholic universities which served as another conduit for phenomenology in the United States – above all, Duquesne, Catholic University, Fordham, and Boston College. The important connection between Catholic theology and the metaphysical tradition made such places less hospitable to logical positivism and preserved a respect for the history of philosophy that facilitated reception especially of the hermeneutic strand of phenomenology. But equally, the touchstone of Aristotelianism in these departments provided the context for a reading of Husserl’s work that – in contrast to the New School and to the Harvard diaspora – emphasized its ethical motivation and reconstructed its idealism as a modernist version of classical realism. Thus Robert Sokolowski, who received his doctorate from Louvain in 1963 with a thesis on Husserl, established himself at Catholic University, where he has taught several generations of students. As with Schutz and Gurwitsch, Sokolowski’s phenomenology has little time for Sartre or Heidegger; it is Husserl’s way of re-casting what it means to be a human person that represents the “essence” of phenomenology.

William Richardson, in contrast, who also received his doctorate from Louvain and taught for many years at Fordham and later at Boston College, established his reputation with a book whose title announced Heidegger’s move through phenomenology to “thought” (Richardson 1963). Richardson represented in the Catholic context the sort of view found at the New School among thinkers like Werner Marx and Hannah Arendt: phenomenology is a kind of transition – beginning with Husserl and developed by the early Heidegger – from traditional philosophy to a post-phenomenological kind of thinking. Thus Boston College, for instance, has had its share of notable Husserlians, but it is equally known as a place where phenomenology’s various “aliases” have found a home: Gadamer was for many years a regular part-time visiting professor, as was Jacques Taminiaux.

75.4. The Age of Societies: the Americanization of phenomenology

Despite the tensions described in the previous section, phenomenology achieved a certain momentum during the 1950s and 1960s, as students trained at the New School, Harvard, Yale,
and the Catholic and European universities found positions and established their reputations. Though these positions were widely scattered around the country, the 1960s saw a great expansion of university philosophy departments and graduate programs, and one of these – at Northwestern University – became especially strong in phenomenology and existentialism. John Wild moved there in 1961, and in 1962 his earlier plans for a “society devoted to the examination of recent continental philosophy” became a reality with the founding of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), together with Northwestern University Press’s book series, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. This inaugurates the Age of Societies. The growth of philosophy graduate programs demanded new outlets for presentation and publication of work, and phenomenological philosophy was no exception. The internal tensions in its reception thus became institutionalized in societies devoted to individual figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, and many others. But it is to SPEP that we must turn if we want to understand where phenomenology finds itself today, and why.

SPEP was founded as an alternative to the national professional organization, the American Philosophical Association, which was dominated by departments that were increasingly hostile to European thought. SPEP’s founders understood that such an alternative could not fly under a unified banner. If phenomenology found a home there, it was only along with the culturally more familiar “transplant,” existentialism. The strategic aspect of this coupling could not mask the underlying disagreements between the philosophers brought together in this way. In subsequent years it became clear that neither phenomenology nor existentialism constituted the core of the alternative identity; that could only be the connection with Europe itself, where “Europe” came to be understood as whatever is not analytic philosophy. This development calls for more careful treatment; here we shall examine only how it inflects the history of phenomenology in the United States.

In the 1960s, the work of most philosophers who met at SPEP annual meetings was either phenomenology of a generally Husserlian sort (a translation of Cartesian Meditations had appeared in 1960, of “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” in 1965, and of Formal and Transcendental Logic in 1969), or else an existentialism that drew on recently translated texts by Sartre (Being and Nothingness, 1957), Heidegger (Being and Time, 1962), and Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception, 1962). Among the latter group, some cultivated a topic that found little resonance among Husserlian phenomenologists: philosophy in literature. It was not as though the branch of phenomenology that looked to Husserl had no interest in literature. Roman Ingarden’s classic, The Literary Work of Art, appeared in 1965 and was translated into English in 1973 in the Northwestern series. But existentialism treated literature itself as a mode of philosophizing, drawing on Sartre as an example, and on Heidegger’s Hölderlin lectures.

With the translation of some of Heidegger’s important later works (among them, Poetry, Language, Thought and On the Way to Language) during the late 1960s and early 1970s, some who came together under the banner of “phenomenology and existentialism” as an alternative to analytic philosophy began to consider whether their work might not be better described as an alternative to philosophy. The idea arising with literary existentialism – that creative literature was not merely a topic for philosophy but a way of doing philosophy with its own mode of “truth” – would be developed in two directions in the 1970s: first toward a “philosophical hermeneutics” (Gadamer, Ricoeur) and then toward the “deconstruction” of philosophy (Derrida). The former represented an attempt to contain the question of literature within something like a phenomenological framework, while the latter, within the context of SPEP, represented the kind of linguistic turn that, since the 1940s, had rendered phenomenology otiose in the analytic mainstream.
Against the background of literary existentialism, the interest in hermeneutics forced a confrontation between the two narratives of phenomenology developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Published in 1960, Gadamer’s *Wahrheit und Methode* precipitated significant controversy in Germany for its thesis that the pre-judgments that structure the interpretation of texts are a universal feature of all understanding, thus apparently rendering impossible the sort of critical social science projected by the Frankfurt School. This also came to be part of the debate in SPEP (*Truth and Method* was translated in 1975), but here hermeneutics was conscripted into the Heidegger-inspired version of the phenomenology narrative (“through phenomenology to thought”). In this way (to use the *Encyclopedia’s* vocabulary) the phenomenological “origins” of hermeneutics were de-emphasized in favor of its connection to German Idealism, ancient Greek philosophy, and the later Heidegger. In the United States, then, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was not received as hermeneutic phenomenology but as an altogether distinct thought-formation. Critics like Thomas Seebohm, who sought to recast hermeneutics in specifically Husserlian form, were not part of “hermeneutics” as this was understood within the SPEP context.

This reception of hermeneutics without phenomenology was abetted when Paul Ricoeur began teaching at the University of Chicago in 1970. Ricoeur’s 1960 study of the will, *Freedom and Nature*, was a classic of “existential” phenomenology, but it was not translated until 1966, by which time Ricoeur had turned his attention to the Continental debates over hermeneutics. In an influential book (*Freud and Philosophy*, 1965; English translation 1970) and a series of essays written in the mid-1960s (translated in *The Conflict of Interpretations* in 1974), Ricoeur rejected the idea that there was a phenomenological method that could dispense with “detours” through dialectics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, and structuralism. “Hermeneutics” here names the stance that is to mediate between these positions, the goal of a phenomenological elucidation of meaning endlessly deferred.

The reception of hermeneutics was contemporaneous with the development of large graduate programs devoted to “phenomenology and existential philosophy” at SUNY Stony Brook and at the Pennsylvania State University. Here and elsewhere, the tensions between the Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology narratives that had characterized the earlier reception of existentialism reappeared in institutionally more trenchant form in the struggle over how to situate philosophical hermeneutics.

One significant example is found in the history of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP). Established in 1971 by two New School alums, Lester Embree and Richard Zaner, together with the Canadian Jose Jourdas-Huerta, CARP saw its mission as one of preserving the heritage of phenomenology – which meant, largely, the anti-Heideggerian wing of the New School’s version of it. In 1974 Embree moved to Duquesne University, where John Sallis had been teaching since 1966 and had founded a journal, *Research in Phenomenology*. In 1975 Embree, Jourdas-Huerta, and Pina Moneta, a student of Aron Gurwitsch, established the *Collegium Phaenomenologicum*, whose purpose was to run a summer workshop in Perugia, Italy, for American students interested in European thought. But because both the students and faculty of the *Collegium* were drawn from the larger graduate programs where, increasingly, hermeneutics held sway – that is, the German Idealist reading of Gadamer and the French structuralist context that informed Ricoeur’s work – the *Collegium* soon came to have only a tangential connection to phenomenology. Though Husserlian-style phenomenology was not absent, it was typically historicized as a bygone stage in what began to seem a permanent stream of European movements: existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstruction, post-modernism, and so on. In the late 1970s the *Collegium* split from CARP, and it exists today as a flagship of mainstream Continental philosophy in the United States, while CARP continues to represent the Husserlian wing of the New School tradition.
If something like “existential” phenomenology dominated the 1960s in America, the era of “hermeneutic” phenomenology was much shorter. This is because by the time *Truth and Method* had been translated into English, the influence of “deconstruction” was already on the rise, generating a Continental version of the analytic linguistic turn that was hostile to phenomenological (and hermeneutic) concepts such as “experience,” “subjectivity,” and “meaning.” Derrida had written on Husserl in the early 1960s, but it was the post-structuralist themes of the three major works that were translated into English in the 1970s (*Speech and Phenomena*, *Of Grammatology*, and *Writing and Difference*) which facilitated his reception. In that context, literature – which both existential and hermeneutic phenomenology held to possess a truth-claim similar to that of philosophy – became something of a Trojan horse. Deconstruction seemed to show that the “plenitude” of meaning that some phenomenologists sought in literature as a counterweight to analytic philosophy’s supposedly “abstract” and lifeless concepts was doomed, by the very structure of writing, to be displaced or postponed forever. The phenomenological (and hermeneutic) search for a kind of originary experience was exposed as nothing but the *deformation professionelle* of philosophy as such.

Throughout the 1970s Derrida held visiting appointments at leading American universities such as Yale and Johns Hopkins, but these appointments were in departments of literature. The fact that Derrida’s thought had roots in phenomenology could not be denied, but what he did with it seemed to entail the collapse of any distinction between philosophy and literature. This increased the tension within SPEP and its feeder graduate programs, for Derrida’s followers confronted colleagues who did not want to see the history of phenomenological (or hermeneutic or existential) philosophy as entailing the deconstruction of their discipline. By the mid-1980s, such programs were faced with a dilemma: the “phenomenological” narrative as such – including the Heideggerian-hermeneutic version that arrived at a non-metaphysical “thinking” – seemed every bit as naïve as the worst forms of analytic logicism or foundationalism. Yet embrace of the deconstructive, thoroughly *post*-phenomenological narrative seemed to imply that all the action was elsewhere – in departments of comparative literature, or else in a growing number of interdisciplinary programs such as cultural studies, gender studies, post-colonial studies, and the rest.

By the early 1980s, then, the term “phenomenology” had come to denote one entry on a long list of thought-currents from Continental Europe that could be found in non-analytic philosophy departments, and the omnibus term, “Continental philosophy,” came to be used to describe what SPEP represented. This was made official when departments adopted it to advertise faculty positions in the American Philosophical Association’s organ for that purpose, *Jobs for Philosophers*. By that time SPEP had grown quite large and diverse, but its institutional structure had not kept pace. Faced with the demand for a more representative program and greater access to decision-making by feminists, critical theorists, and others not enamored with deconstruction, SPEP established an Executive Committee whose seats were to represent what were then perceived as the main directions in Continental philosophy. One seat went to phenomenology, understood as including work on Husserl and Husserl-inspired interpretations of later figures (early Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), but excluding “hermeneutics” (which had its own seat) and French philosophy – meaning figures such as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard: post-structuralism or post-modernism – which too had its own seat, as did feminism and critical theory. Thus the history of phenomenology in the United States became a chapter in the history of American “Continental” philosophy, inextricably entangled with the conflicting ways in which home-grown advocates of various European movements defined their relation to the thought of Edmund Husserl.

Before leaving the Age of Societies, a significant footnote should be mentioned. In 1930 Emmanuel Levinas published his *Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology* (English transla-
tion 1973), and throughout the 1940s and 1950s he published essays on Husserl and Heidegger. In 1961 *Totality and Infinity* appeared, proposing a radical reorientation of phenomenology in the direction of an “ethical first philosophy.” None of this work found much resonance in the early days of SPEP, and even after *Totality and Infinity* was translated into English, in 1969, it did not gain much traction. Derrida had written a lengthy critical essay on Levinas in 1964, but while deconstruction held sway Levinas’s thought was more or less invisible.

All that changed when Derrida, and deconstruction itself, was caught up in the brackish cesspool of scandal surrounding, first, the revelations of the extent of Heidegger’s Nazi involvement (attendant upon the French publication of Victor Farias’s *Heidegger and Nazism* in 1987), and then the suggestion that Derrida’s close friend and fellow literary deconstructionist, Paul DeMan, had been a collaborator in Belgium. These involvements cast suspicion on the “ethics” of deconstruction, which in turn was taken by many outside the profession to exemplify the ethical bankruptcy of Continental philosophy as a whole. In the rush to find a response to this threat, Levinas became, for several years, the dominant figure on the SPEP program, reflecting the exponential increase in courses and publications devoted to him. Far from constituting a post-deconstructive return to phenomenology, however, this embrace of Levinas mostly remained within the orbit of deconstruction itself, since it was not Levinas’s self-described phenomenological *method* that drew attention, but precisely his attempt to escape the totalizing “atmosphere” of Husserlian and Heideggerian thought – an ambition he shared with deconstruction. Thus what seemed important was the idea that Levinas had taken Derrida’s criticisms of the “phenomenological” position of *Totality and Infinity* to heart and had abandoned phenomenology in *Otherwise than Being*.

With the waning of Levinas’s prominence in SPEP, and the turn toward a host of thinkers whose only connection is that they are European (Badiou, Deleuze, Rancière, Vattimo, Agamben), the reception of phenomenology in the United States comes to an end.

### 75.5. The path of “analytic” phenomenology

But the end of the *reception* of phenomenology in the United States does not spell the end of phenomenology there; rather, it signals the beginning of a phenomenology that is not a European movement, not part of “Continental” philosophy at all – though by the same token it is not an “American” movement either. To understand this development, we need to return to what the *Encyclopedia* termed “analytical phenomenology,” a strand of the reception that was associated with SPEP early on but which distanced itself increasingly after the 1960s. The roots of analytic phenomenology were at Harvard, where Hubert Dreyfus (PhD 1964) and Sam Todes (PhD 1963) were students, and where Dagfinn Føllesdal received his PhD in 1961 under Quine and taught for several years. Dreyfus, Todes, and Føllesdal were all involved in SPEP at the beginning and were Board members on the Northwestern series, but with Føllesdal’s removal to Stanford in 1968 and Dreyfus’s move to Berkeley in the same year, a kind of phenomenology appeared that did not track the fate of phenomenology in SPEP.

While drawing on both Husserlian and existential phenomenology, the character of analytic phenomenology was defined by Føllesdal’s claim that Husserl’s noema is best understood as an abstract entity, like a Fregean *Sinn*. Føllesdal’s work in logic and semantics in the 1960s offered a phenomenological contrast to logical positivism, and his project was taken up by his students, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald MacIntyre. But Føllesdal’s interpretation also allowed Dreyfus to situate Husserl in the camp of “representationalist” philosophers and develop a more pragmatic and existential version of phenomenology. For Dreyfus, Husserlian phenomenology has more in common with the logicism of Quine and the early Wittgenstein than it does with...
the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, which in turn can be connected to the kind of philosophy practiced by the Wittgenstein of the Investigations.

Dreyfus’s influential critique of the Artificial Intelligence program – his What Computers Can’t Do was published in 1972 – exemplified how phenomenology could engage directly with non-phenomenological philosophy and issues. When practiced in this way, phenomenology is no longer understood in terms of originary names or European developmental stories; rather, it is non-rigorously characterized as a philosophical approach that rejects constructivism and scientism and insists on the careful description of experience. To adopt such an approach, one need not choose between realistic, constitutive, hermeneutic, and existential versions; instead, one can draw on each as the problems at hand demand. “Analytical” phenomenology is thus a misnomer, coined because its practitioners sometimes take up problems also treated by analytic philosophers and respond to these analytic treatments. But it is true that such work is in evidence in traditionally non-Continental schools (among them Chicago, Boston University, Columbia, Riverside, Irvine, and Florida) and has spawned its own societies (Society for the Study of Husserl’s Philosophy, International Society for Phenomenological Studies, and a host of smaller workshops and conferences). Similar trends can be identified in Europe (for instance, the Center for Subjectivity Studies, in Copenhagen), suggesting that this is not a phenomenon limited to the United States.

What, then, is the relation between this development in phenomenology and Continental philosophy in the United States more generally? When university philosophy departments stopped expanding in the late 1970s, the analytic mainstream had virtually no incentive to find room in the curriculum for the newer European movements, and Continental philosophy (including phenomenology) became increasingly isolated in departments devoted primarily to it. In the SPEP context phenomenology was associated with an oppositional stance toward analytic philosophy, and so phenomenologists who did communicate with analytic philosophy were not considered Continental philosophers (hence not phenomenologists) at all. Thus “analytic phenomenology” found no home at SPEP or its feeder graduate programs. Nor was it better received in the special societies devoted to the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and others, since these generally overlap in membership with SPEP. But the broader field of philosophy in the United States today is actually quite hospitable to phenomenology. In philosophy of language (for instance, the work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell, which goes back to ideas of Wilfrid Sellars), moral psychology (one thinks here of Christine Korsgaard, Stephen Darwall, and Bernard Williams, among many others), philosophy of mind (for instance, David Chalmers’ work on consciousness, and the immense literature this has generated), philosophy of science (Kuhn and the “post-positivists”), and in several other areas, there exists something like the situation that obtained prior to the militant analytic revolution and the Continental reaction it inspired, when phenomenology found resonance with American pragmatic idealism and value theory.

Meanwhile, within SPEP itself a use of the term “phenomenology” that is independent of the way phenomenology is positioned in the post-structuralist, deconstructive narrative can now be found. This usage has been sparked by contemporary interest in environmental philosophy, where Merleau-Ponty, the “new” Husserl, and “life” philosophers like Bergson loom large. Because an interest in nature, life, embodiment, and environmental ethics is shared by phenomenologists working in cognitive science, consciousness studies, philosophy of biology, and practical and moral philosophy, a confluence of “Continental” and non-Continental phenomenology appears possible. Indeed, the questions that occupy both camps – questions concerning nature, meaning, and normativity – are pretty much the ones that brought phenomenologists together with other philosophical directions during its initial American reception in the early decades of the 20th century. “Phenomenology” is once more becoming a term around which a diverse
group of philosophers can find common ground. Thus it may well be that the future of phenomenology in the United States lies on the far side of any Continental/Analytic divide. Not that the divide does not exist: graduate programs in both analytic and Continental philosophy insist on it for their own reasons. Phenomenology, however, has nothing to do with it, being, at its core, neither Continental nor analytic.

Canada

Rodney Parker

Many Canadian phenomenologists can trace their lineage back to the University of Toronto. It was there that Canadian phenomenology was born in the early decades of the 20th century – the unplanned child of historians of Scholastic philosophy and German Idealism. For a large part of the 20th century, Toronto was also where phenomenology flourished in Canada. However, the story of phenomenology in Canada does not begin in Toronto; it begins in Göttingen by way of the Maritimes.

Edmund Husserl's first Canadian student was Winthrop Pickard Bell (1884–1965). Born in Halifax, Bell began his academic career at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick. After obtaining his MA from Mount Allison in 1907, Bell continued his education at Harvard, where he became a student of Josiah Royce. He completed a second Master’s in Philosophy at Harvard in 1909, and after brief stays at Cambridge and Leipzig, Bell enrolled at the University of Göttingen to study with Edmund Husserl in April 1911. Over a span of six semesters, Bell attended the lectures and seminars of Husserl and Adolf Reinach, as well as the “secret lectures” held by Max Scheler for the members of the Göttingen Circle. In 1914, Bell completed his dissertation, Eine kritische Untersuchung der Erkenntnistheorie Josiah Royces, under Husserl’s supervision.8 After returning to North America, Bell taught briefly at the University of Toronto from 1921 to 1922 and then at Harvard from 1922 to 1927.9

With the exception of Gustav Hübener (1889–1940), Bell’s friend and fellow member of the Göttingen Circle who took up a position as the chair of German Studies at Mount Allison in 1937,10 Husserl’s students and followers did not flee to Canada during WWII. And whereas Harvard, in large measure due to Bell, continued to provide Husserl with North American students – such as Dorion Cairns, Marvin Farber, Charles Hartshorne, and Vivian Jerauld McGill – none were Canadian and none returned from Germany to academic positions in Canada. Though scattered individuals across eastern Canada may have known something of Husserl and his followers during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, this material was not widely taught. It was not until 1946, when Lawrence Edward Michael Lynch (1915–2001) began teaching phenomenology and existentialism at St. Michael’s College at the University of Toronto, that phenomenology took root in Canada.

Lynch was born in Toronto and completed his BA at St. Michael's College in 1936. Most of his teachers had little training in philosophy, with one notable exception being the Haligonian Gerald Bernard Phelan. Lynch went on to write a doctoral thesis at the Mediaeval Institute under the supervision of Étienne Gilson. While there is no evidence that Phelan or Gilson taught or even mentioned phenomenology during Lynch’s student years, they were certainly aware of it.11 Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent entry of the United States into WWII, Lynch – who was born to American parents – joined the US navy. He was assigned to on-shore duty at Pearl Harbor, working in naval intelligence, and it was during this time that he recalls being introduced to phenomenology by a friend. When he returned to U of T in 1946, he petitioned to give a graduate course on existentialism and phenomenology (Slater 2005, 568).12 Lynch’s review of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism (Lynch 1948) leaves little doubt that the phenomenologists he first came to know were Sartre and
Martin Heidegger. The first PhD written on phenomenology in Canada was completed under Lynch’s supervision – Richard Caswell Hinners’ *Martin Heidegger’s Conception of the Question: “What is the meaning of to be?” in Sein und Zeit* (Hinners 1955). In his dissertation, Hinners also thanks Emil Ludwig Fackenheim (1916–2003), who had joined the faculty at Toronto shortly after Lynch began offering courses on existentialism and phenomenology.

After completing Gymnasium in 1935, Fackenheim enrolled in rabbinic studies at the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin. There he had the mixed fortune of being a student of Arnold Metzger – who had served as Husserl’s private assistant in Freiburg from 1920 to 1924. Fackenheim recalls: “Metzger was the worst and best philosophy teacher I ever had: worst pedagogically, expecting first-year students to understand Kant or Husserl; best in making philosophy seem monumentally relevant” (Fackenheim 2008, 16). During Kristallnacht, Fackenheim was arrested and taken to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He was released in 1939 and fled to Scotland but was then held as an enemy alien and sent by the British forces to the Newington internment camp in Quebec. After his release in 1941, Fackenheim enrolled as a graduate student in the department of philosophy of U of T. In 1945, he completed his dissertation (Fackenheim 1945), and became professor in 1948. Along with Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, he began teaching and supervising dissertations on Husserl and Heidegger. His students include Henry Pietersma (1932–2017), Graeme Nicholson (b. 1936), and George di Giovanni (b. 1935).

It seems that phenomenology began to draw the attention of philosophers in Quebec and the Maritimes in the late 1940s and early 1950s independent of the developments at the University of Toronto. Phenomenology’s way into the predominantly francophone province of Quebec is difficult to trace. Despite the popularity of phenomenology in France during the 1930s, it lacked a strong foothold among professional philosophers in Quebec until the 1970s, in the wake of the Quiet Revolution. Nevertheless, there were some philosophers in Quebec with an interest in phenomenology prior to this. One was Hubert Aquin (1929–1977), who, upon completing his Licentiate in Philosophy at the Université de Montréal in 1951, moved to Paris and began writing a doctoral thesis titled *Phénoménologie de la création du personnage dans le roman* under the supervision of Étienne Souriau at the Sorbonne. His intention was to apply Husserl’s phenomenological method to an analysis of literary works (Massoutre 1992, 70). Another was Raymond Klibansky (1905–2005).

Klibansky was born in Paris and educated in Germany, receiving his doctorate from the University of Heidelberg – where he studied with Ernst Cassirer and Karl Jaspers – in 1928. His dissertation was on the School of Chartres and written under the supervision of the Neo-Kantian Ernst Hoffmann. From 1927 to 1933 he was an assistant at the Heidelberg Academy and from 1931 until 1933 he was a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. In 1933, he was forced to flee Germany due to his Jewish heritage. After teaching at Oxford from 1936 to 1946, Klibansky took a position in the department of philosophy at McGill University. For over three decades Klibansky taught at McGill and lectured at the Université de Montréal until his retirement in 1979. Though Klibansky’s primary area of research was medieval philosophy, he had a special interest in phenomenology and was friends with Jean Hering, Alexandre Koyré, Paul Ricoeur, and Jan Patocka. In 1969, he gave the opening address at the first meeting of the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society at the University of Waterloo, and hosted this group in Montréal in 1974. Another important early Québécois phenomenologist is Yvon Gauthier (b. 1941), who wrote his dissertation, *L’arc et le cercle* (Gauthier 1969), at the University of Heidelberg with Hans-Georg Gadamer in 1966. Gauthier taught at U of T from 1972 to 1973 before settling at the Université de Montréal. He was an influence on both Jean Grondin (b. 1955) and Denis Fisette (b. 1954).
The Maritimes lacked a practicing phenomenologist for decades after the death of Hübener. It was only in the 1960s, when philosophers such as Cyril Welch (b. 1939) and William Robert Miller Elderkin (b. 1936) took positions at Mount Allison and the University of New Brunswick respectively, that phenomenology was taught to students in the Atlantic provinces. Yet there were murmurs of Heidegger and Sartre among academic philosophers along the East Coast prior to this, most notably from George Parkin Grant (1918–1988) and James Alexander Doull (1918–2001). Grant taught philosophy at Dalhousie University in Halifax from 1947 to 1960, and during this time he developed an interest in the work of Heidegger (Christian 1993, 364). In his writings and lectures from this period, Grant refers to the “existentialists” Sartre and Heidegger, but not phenomenology as such.20 Doull, his colleague at Dalhousie, had also read the work of Heidegger. Whether Grant introduced Doull to Heidegger or vice versa is unclear.21 What is clear is that Doull introduced Graeme Nicholson to phenomenology.

Born in Nova Scotia, Nicholson began his university career at Dalhousie in 1953. After completing his BA, Nicholson began working on a Master's thesis on Kant's critical philosophy under Doull's supervision. Struggling to understand the chapter on “Phenomena and Noumena” from the Critique of Pure Reason, Doull recommended to Nicholson that he read Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik (Heidegger 1953). However, it was when Nicholson was studying at Union Theological Seminary that he would realize it was phenomenology that he had been searching for in his philosophical endeavors all along. Nicholson left Halifax for New York in 1957. In 1958–59, Ricoeur held a visiting professorship at Union and became Nicholson's first proper teacher in phenomenology. Heeding Doull's advice, he read Heidegger – the English translation of An Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger 1959) had just been published and introduced many English-speaking readers to Heidegger. Nicholson worked on his Master's thesis intermittently while at Union, eventually obtaining his degree from Dalhousie in 1961. Nicolson then enrolled in the PhD program in Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He completed his dissertation, The Ontological Difference. A study in Heidegger (Nicholson 1968) under the supervision of Fackenheim. His other mentor at U of T was Henry Pietersma.

Pietersma was born in Opende, The Netherlands. After completing his Master's thesis on Sartre's Being and Nothingness at the University of Indiana, Pietersma moved to Canada. While he had intended to study medieval philosophy with Gilson, he ended up writing his dissertation on Edmund Husserl's Concept of Philosophical Clarification (Pietersma 1962) with Fackenheim. Thereafter, he was given a position at U of T and began offering graduate and undergraduate courses in phenomenology. His interest in phenomenology began with Husserl's theory of knowledge and the attempt to render Husserl's epistemological project in the language of Anglo-American philosophy. Pietersma was a self-professed realist, and in his own way attempted to revitalize realist phenomenology, though it appears he knew little, if anything, of the Göttingen and Munich Circles. Despite the power of Husserl's philosophy, Pietersma believed it fell short with respect to a key requirement of epistemology: an account of the real reality of the external world. His reflections on the theories of knowledge of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are published in Phenomenological Epistemology (Pietersma 2000). One of Pietersma’s notable students is Jay Raymond Lampert (b. 1957). Lampert earned his PhD from U of T in 1987.

In the mid-1960s, two more phenomenologists joined the faculty at the University of Toronto alongside Pietersma and Nicholson: Thomas D. Langan (1929–2012) and James Carlton Morrison (b. 1938). These four formed the core of what we might call the Toronto school of phenomenologists. Langan earned his PhD from the Institut Catholique de Paris and was the chair of Philosophy at Indiana University before coming to Toronto in 1967. He had previously worked with Gilson on the two-volume collection, Recent Philosophy, authoring the entry on “German Philosophy”, which included sections on Husserl and Scheler (Langan 1966a), and...
Heidegger and Jaspers (Langan 1966c), as well as a chapter on existentialism and phenomenology in France (Langan 1966b). His final book, Human Being: A Philosophical Anthropology (Langan 2009), was edited by Antonio Calcagno (b. 1969). Calcagno studied with Langan, Nicholson, and Pietersma at Toronto shortly before they retired. He went on to complete his dissertation under Lampert and has since established himself as a leading scholar of Edith Stein. James Morrison came to U of T circa 1965 after completing both an MA and PhD at Pennsylvania State University, though neither dealt with phenomenology. However, while at Penn State Morrison had been influenced by Stanley Rosen, who worked on Husserl and Heidegger and who studied with Alexandre Kojève in the early 1960s. It was perhaps because of Rosen’s influence that Morrison took up phenomenology when he arrived at Toronto, teaching Husserl and Heidegger. His most notable student is James Richard Mensch (b. 1944).

Mensch came to Canada from the US in 1967. As an undergraduate at St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland, he studied with Jacob Klein, a former student of Heidegger. In Toronto, he received a Licentiate in Mediaeval Studies from the Pontifical Institute and his doctorate from U of T in 1976 for his work The Question of Being in Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Mensch 1981). In addition to Morrison, Mensch studied with Langan, Pietersma, and Fackenheim, and took a year-long course circa 1970 with Gadamer in Toronto. From 1989 to 2013, Mensch taught at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. Other important Canadian phenomenologists associated with the Toronto school are Philip Buckley (b. 1959), who received his BA and MA from U of T before earning his PhD at KU Leuven; John Russon (b. 1960), who completed his PhD at U of T with Nicholson; and Evan Thompson (b. 1962).

This article omits many other important past and current Canadian phenomenologists. A more comprehensive history needs to be written.

Notes

1 This paper first appeared, in an Italian translation by Antonio Cimino (Crowell 2012), and was subsequently published, in English, as Crowell 2013. It has been lightly revised for the present volume.
2 See, for instance, Langan 1959, in which, as Spiegelberg notes, “the phenomenological aspect is named but not developed,” and Grene 1957, about which Spiegelberg says that the “connections with phenomenology are hardly mentioned” (Spiegelberg 1982, 420).
3 Another indispensable source of information is Kaelin and Schrag 1989.
4 My account is restricted to the history of phenomenological philosophy. In a certain sense this is a distorting restriction, since much phenomenology is done other fields. There are phenomenological currents in psychology, sociology, literary theory, and film and media studies, to name a few. But to do justice to these trends – which, in any case, reflect the disputes and ambiguities that one finds in the more strictly philosophical reception of phenomenology – would require more space than is allotted here.
5 See Blanshard 1962, chapters 3–7 for a contemporary’s view of these events. For a recent account see McCumber 2001.
6 For instance, Maurice Natanson began at the University of Houston and moved to the University of California Santa Cruz, Herbert Spiegelberg taught at Washington University in St. Louis, Calvin Schag and William McBride taught at Purdue, Edward G. Ballard had an appointment at Tulane, Frederick Kersten at the University of Wisconsin, J. N. Mohanty at Oklahoma, and Hubert Dreyfus taught at the University of California at Berkeley.
8 Due to the outbreak of WWII, Bell was interned by the German government, first at the student prison in Göttingen and then at the Ruhleben internment camp. During his imprisonment, Bell delivered a lecture to the other internees titled “Canadian Problems and Possibilities” (Bell 2012). As a result of his detention, Bell’s doctorate was not formally conferred until 1922, some eight years after he had passed his oral exams. Bell declined Husserl’s invitation to have the dissertation published in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. The dissertation is now published as part of the Husserliana Dokumente (Bell 2018).
9 Bell left academia in 1927 to pursue a career in business. However, he remained active in the governance of Mount Allison and published on Canadian history.

10 According to Raymond Klubansky, during his time at Mount Allison, Hübener “taught his pupils there how to apply the phenomenological method to the study of literature” (Klubansky 1972, 18).

11 Gilson had met Husserl during Alexandre Koyré’s thesis defense at the Sorbonne in 1929 and attended the famous Paris Lectures (Kojevnikov 2015). Phelan wrote his dissertation Feeling Experience and its Modalities (Phelan 1925) at the Catholic University of Louvain. There is a mention of “phenomenology” in Phelan’s dissertation, but the only figure associated with the movement he refers to by name is Theodor Lipps.

12 In 1946, Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) also joined the faculty at U of T. McLuhan was not himself a phenomenologist, but we know that he was at least aware of the work of Heidegger, who he names in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1962). In correspondence, we find reference to Existenzphilosophie as early as 1946 (McLuhan 1987, 183–184).

13 See also his essay on Heidegger (Lynch 1959).


15 Aquin had studied Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Ideas I, as well as Heidegger. See Massoutre 1992, 55–75.

16 Ricoeur and Patocka both contributed to Klubansky’s Festschrift (Kohlenberger 1979). Klubansky supervised Lucinda Vandervort’s dissertation on Adolf Reinach in 1973 (Vandervort Brettler 1973). Jeffrey A. Mitscherling, who works on Roman Ingarden, was also acquainted with Klubansky. However, Mitscherling attributes his interest in Ingarden to his teacher Jakob Amstutz (1919–1995) at the University of Guelph.

17 This conference was organized in part by Richard Hood Holmes (b. 1941). Holmes was a student of Herbert Spiegelberg. After completing his dissertation, Husserl’s Transcendental Turn (Holmes 1972), under Spiegelberg at Washington University in Saint Louis, Holmes took a position at the University of Waterloo. There he was joined by José Huertas-Jourda (1931–2007). Huertas-Jourda received his PhD from New York University in February 1969, with his dissertation On the Threshold of Phenomenology: A Study of the Philosophie der Arithmetik (Huertas-Jourda 1969). In June of that same year, he co-founded the Husserl Circle with Algis Mickunas and F. Joseph Smith. In 1970, Huertas-Jourda took a position at the University of Waterloo, and in 1974 moved to nearby Wilfred Laurier University. He was also a co-founder of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.

18 For more on the key figures who brought phenomenology to French Canada, see Fisette and Fréchette 1998.

19 Cyril Welch is the son of Edward Parl Welch, known for his book The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (Welch 1941) and his correspondence with Husserl from 1933, which occasioned the offer of a position at USC to Husserl (Spiegelberg 1972). Cyril Welch completed his dissertation, A Phenomenological Analysis of the Occurrence of Meaning in Experience (Welch 1964) at Pennsylvania State University under the supervision of John M. Anderson and was given a professorship at Mount Allison in 1967. Elderkin, who came to UNB from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, introduced John van Buren, known for his work on The Young Heidegger (Van Buren 1989), to phenomenology at UNB during the latter’s early student years in Fredericton.

20 See Grant 2002.

21 Prior to taking a position at Dalhousie in 1947, Doull had studied at Harvard. It may have been that Doull was exposed to phenomenology first at Harvard, either through his teacher Werner Jaeger – who had previously taught at the Humboldt University of Berlin, alongside Nicolai Hartmann and Jacob Klein – or another faculty member.

22 Morrison studied with John M. Anderson around the same time as Cyril Welch.

23 Gadamer spent significant time in Toronto and at McMaster. Gadamer taught at McMaster for three years (1972–1975) and had intended to establish the archives for his Nachlass there. This was in large part due to the efforts of Gary Brent Madison (1940–2016), a former student of Ricoeur who began teaching at McMaster in 1970. In 1984, Madison founded the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought (now the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy) along with a group of his students, including Jeff Mitscherling and John van Buren.

24 From 1986 to 1992 Buckley worked as a research assistant at the Husserl-Archives in Leuven.

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