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PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

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60.1. Two traditions

Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two different philosophical traditions, at least historically – that is, in terms of reconstructing the more or less recent history of a discipline by trying to answer the question, “How did we get here from there?” (Williamson 2014). Philosophical traditions are shaped by various factors, which play a more or less important role depending on the context in which the traditions developed. Starting with Brentano’s concern with the centrality of such constitutive features of mental phenomena as consciousness and intentionality and the research conducted by his students on these features, phenomenology rapidly developed into a philosophical discipline with its own journals, institutional centres and internal polemics between competing philosophical agendas, both inside and outside these centres.

These contextual and institutional factors are essential for the shaping of a tradition. Additional theoretical principles can also play a role. Like any other philosophical tradition, phenomenology tolerates theoretical divergences, insofar as they occur within the realm of the mentioned factors, and more generally within the same broadly conceived spatial and temporal boundaries in which the rest of the tradition is located.

The same holds for analytic philosophy. Though it is disputable to some extent, it seems quite reasonable, or at least useful, to identify Husserl as the father of 20th-century phenomenology and Russell as the father of 20th-century analytic philosophy, to point out that Cambridge was the most important centre for early analytic philosophy, or to stress the fact that analytic philosophy initially aimed at providing an analysis of thought through an analysis of language, while phenomenology aimed at a faithful description of our experience. Such a characterization does not have to be taken as the expression of a gap, divide, or split between the traditions (as it has been considered by many); it serves merely as an orientation aid that helps us to understand why a given philosopher addresses a specific topic from a specific angle, and why her arguments are directed against a specific view. It gives the broad context in which individual philosophical works are to be understood.

But if this is the case, why is there so much discussion about the fact that analytic philosophy and phenomenology are two different traditions? Many different factors play a role here. Let us start with Dummett (1993), who suggested that we see analytic philosophy and phenomenology,
represented by Frege and Husserl, as the Danube and the Rhine, which both have their sources in Germany, but which at some point flow in different directions. From this perspective, it is reasonable to see phenomenology and analytic philosophy as sharing a common background, which has much to do with the philosophy of Bolzano, but also involves the immediate influence of Frege on Husserl, Russell, and Wittgenstein.

Dummett’s thesis is both ideological and historically problematic. It is historically problematic because whether analytic philosophy and phenomenology have the same source is a matter of perspective. If anti-psychologism and the common focus on Sinn or intentional content is the only concern at stake, as it obviously is in Dummett’s view, then Bolzano, Frege, Husserl, and Russell are indeed addressing the same issues, but anti-psychologism came to play a very different role in both traditions, which is why it seems somewhat exaggerated to see anti-psychologism as a constitutive feature of phenomenology in general.

Dummett’s thesis is ideological inasmuch as it presents analytic philosophy and phenomenology as two divided streams of a single unified source that can re-establish communication “only by going back to the point of divergence” (2014, 182), that is, to the point when analytic philosophy was able to take the linguistic turn and when it was impossible for phenomenology to do so. Such an account introduces a divide on the basis of normative reasons: good analytic philosophy should come back to linguistic analysis, and good phenomenology should come back to the early Husserl. Otherwise, “it’s no use now shouting across the gulf” (Ibid.). With or without the normative dimension of the divergence, this picture of the relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology has been influential from early on in both analytic philosophy and phenomenology, to such an extent that people from both traditions proclaimed the necessity of “bridging the gap”.4

There are further problems with Dummett’s thesis of a divide: Dummett sees the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy and the transcendental turn in phenomenology as the first manifestation of the divide. But then how should we read philosophers like Gareth Evans and Roderick Chisholm, who both reject the linguistic turn, although they clearly belong to the analytic tradition? Conversely, the focus on language that is central to the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer could perhaps qualify this school of thought, which historically belongs to a late phase of phenomenology, as analytical philosophy. Obviously, Dummett’s characterization poses problems.

Furthermore, especially since the 1990s, the linguistic turn can no longer be said to be central to the characterization of analytic philosophy. Many historians of analytic philosophy have abandoned Dummett’s characterization in favour of a new one in terms of a “style” that emphasizes “‘logic’, ‘rigour’ and ‘argument’” (Leiter 2004, 11). Beaney, for instance, dismisses Dummett’s account of analytic philosophy’s “most popular creation myths”, offering as a positive qualification an “emphasis on argumentation, clarity, and rigour” (2013, 23ff.), much along the lines of Leiter. But it is still questionable whether the characterization of the so-called divide in terms of style and rigour offers an account to which both traditions would subscribe.

60.2. The story of a mutual contempt

The idea of a divide has played a central role in the self-interpretation of both phenomenology and analytic philosophy, and for the interpretation of their relationship in the 20th century. Certain historical elements have played an important role. For some, the conflict between phenomenology as inspired by Husserl and analytic philosophy emerged historically around 1928, with the publication of Heidegger’s inaugural lecture What is Metaphysics? (Friedman 2000).
As Husserl’s successor in Freiburg, Heidegger was considered by many to be the future of the phenomenological movement. This explains many of the attacks addressed against him after the publication of the lecture. Carnap’s attack on Heidegger’s nihilism can be seen as one of the first official manifestations of a conflict between the traditions (Carnap 1932). Similar manifestations occurred at the same time. Oskar Kraus, a pupil of Franz Brentano, also attacked Heidegger’s nihilism on different grounds, although Carnap and Kraus agreed that Heidegger’s views on metaphysics were simply an instance of bad philosophy.

Already a few years before, the label of “phenomenology” was used as a term of opprobrium in Kraus’s introduction to the new edition of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Kraus 1924). The lengthy review by Ryle of Sein und Zeit in 1928 shows that he had read Kraus’s introduction. Here also, Ryle sees in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit a “disaster” (Ryle 1928), a falling down into a subjectivism that would invalidate the original project of phenomenology as it had been laid out by Brentano. Up to the late 1960s, the last students of Brentano took great pains to distinguish Brentanian descriptive psychology from the late phenomenology of Husserl and his heirs (Kastil 1950; 1958; Del-Negro 1953; Mayer-Hillebrand 1959; 1966), confirming on a different basis the view expressed by Ryle and Carnap that phenomenology was not something that anyone wanted to be identified with. The Royaumont conference of 1958, where analytic philosophers and phenomenologists unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement on some topics, also seems to have left a lasting impression on many representatives of both traditions.5 It is disputable, however, whether it had the significance that many analytic philosophers and phenomenologists still attribute to it today.

Finally, the debate between Derrida and Searle has often been understood as a debate between analytic philosophy and phenomenology (Moati 2014). This is also a matter of perspective, since it is not clear whether Derrida was defending a view that aims to be representative of phenomenology.

What is common to all these debates, attacks, and polemics is that they were most of the time utterly fruitless. Though they were once identified as tradition-building events by the protagonists of both analytic philosophy and phenomenology, this identification seems quite artificial today. The attacks on Heidegger may be seen as isolated events that most likely did not have the importance that was attributed to them later on; the Royaumont meeting is perhaps better understood as a philosophical conference that went wrong on the basis of an overly optimistic choice of participants; and the debate between Derrida and Searle is by no means emblematic of the relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

There are other debates that were more important and more central for both analytic philosophy and phenomenology, but they did not necessarily take place between the two traditions. Take, for instance, the correspondence between Chisholm and Sellars (1957), or the numerous debates on the nature of intentionality between Follesdal and other readers of phenomenology such as Dreyfus (1982). These debates played a role in the shaping of both phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The theory that there was a “divide” cannot account properly for the role of these debates in the development of the two traditions.

### 60.3. Realism and anti-realism

What makes the case of the relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology so special is that the contextual and institutional factors described in section 60.1 seem by themselves to account for the unity of the tradition. In contrast with opposing traditions such as empiricism and nativism, each of which is constituted by a theoretical core, phenomenology and analytic philosophy both lack such a set of constitutive theoretical principles. In fact, some strands of
analytic philosophy share the same theoretical principles as some versions of phenomenology, while other versions of phenomenology do not share the same principles.

In the absence of a clear-cut theoretical separation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, it could be more helpful to assess the theoretical relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology from another perspective. Many perspectives suggest themselves. The primacy of the theoretical or practical interest, or the distinction between atomism and holism, might well serve as an orientation here, although they are not meant to be exhaustive on the nature of the relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The same holds for a further distinction, which I suggest to take here as an orientation, between realist and anti-realist insights. In both traditions, we find positions that could be called realist in the broad sense that they hold that we actually, in our everyday attitude, possess knowledge of reality, and that our descriptions of the world and of the mind within it are descriptions of objectively existing things, structures, etc. that are mind-, theory-, and discourse-independent. We also find anti-realist positions in both traditions. What I mean here by the label “anti-realism” is the very general position or set of positions according to which our knowledge of reality being already conceptually, pre-theoretically, normatively, subjectively, narratively, or discursively constituted, our descriptions of the world and of the mind within it are not descriptions of mind-, theory-, or discourse-independent entities. Therefore, according to the anti-realist, any philosophical investigation should account for the way or ways in which they are constituted. This distinction seems to be more fundamental than the analytic–phenomenological distinction, since it is grounded strictly in theoretical concerns. It overlaps partly, but importantly, with the distinction between those who accept the Sellarsian critique of the given and those who reject it. In the remainder of this chapter I will use the labels “realism” and “anti-realism” exclusively in this sense.

We find analytic and phenomenological positions on both sides of the realist/anti-realist divide. We find this opposition in analytic philosophy, for instance, between Quine’s position that the constituents of the world are those posited by our best theory of nature (Khentzos 2004, 2), and Dummett’s and Putnam’s, who argue that realism cannot really meet the challenge of giving a sound account of how our beliefs are linked with the mind-independent entities they represent. We find it also between the correspondence theory of truth, which is generally realist, and the coherentist theory, like Davidson’s, which is anti-realist. An analogous opposition holds among phenomenological positions, for instance, between the early and the late Husserl on the nature of truth and meaning – Husserl defends mainly realist intuitions on these issues in the Logical Investigations, and turns to an anti-realist in the Ideas and in his later works. We see a similar opposition among contemporary phenomenologists: west-coast phenomenology, for instance, is realist in substance – in the sense that it considers intentional relations as mediated by an objective semantic entity: a meaning), but also in the sense in which it takes the descriptions of our experiences to be mind- and theory-independent. On these two points, it opposes east-coast phenomenology, which considers that our descriptions are neither mind- nor theory-independent, advocating for the phenomenological reduction as the condition of possibility of our experience of objects. They side with anti-realists for this reason. Something similar to the division between realism and anti-realism has been already identified (using slightly different terminology) by philosophers from both traditions as the actual bone of contention between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Papineau, for instance, suggests that a “new and […] more fruitful division is emerging. […] In place of the old analytic-continental split we now have the opposition between the naturalists and the neo-Kantians” (2003, 12). Glendinning makes a similar observation (2002, 214–215).

However, there are two problems here. First, they both identify as the terms of the analytic/continental divide positions that are representative neither of analytic philosophy nor of phe-
Phenomenology as a whole: some phenomenologists may call themselves post-Kantian or neo-Kantian, but this is by no means representative of the attitude of phenomenologists in general. The same holds for analytic philosophers: not all analytic philosophers are naturalists. Second, there are naturalists on both sides of the realism/anti-realism divide, as well as in both traditions. Philosophers like Hacker, McDowell, Putnam, and Brandom, who are naturalists on ontological grounds, reject epistemological versions of naturalism in favour of a normative view of human knowledge. Quine accepts both versions of naturalism. Similarly, phenomenologists like Varela (1996) are ontological naturalists, but argue for the irreducibility of first-person descriptions of our experience. But it would be wrong to deduce from the fact that some ontological naturalists who reject epistemological naturalism hold a normative view of knowledge, that all ontological naturalists who reject epistemological naturalism would argue for a normative or post-Kantian view of knowledge. This is what Glock himself seems to think when he suggests that the only option for analytic philosophers who were not keen on adopting the naturalist programme of Quine was to go back to Kant (Glock 2008, 79ff. and 121ff.), as if there were no alternative to epistemological naturalism other than post-Kantianism or anti-realism. In fact, the most recent philosophy of mind shows that there are other alternatives, as we will see in the next section.

### 60.4. Realist convergences

Using the realism/anti-realism distinction as an orientation to study the relation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology has an advantage over the “divide” reading. It can give a better account of the different convergence points between the traditions, without explaining them as irregularities of the divide, as mere coincidences, or as family resemblances between siblings of a mythical parental source.

In analytic metaphysics for instance, we see this convergence in Husserl’s concept of foundation in the third *Logical Investigation*, especially in the discussion developed by Peter Simons (1982) and Kit Fine (1995). Furthermore, the theory of essences developed in the *Logical Investigations*, but also by other students of Husserl such as Jean Héring (1921) and Roman Ingarden (1925), shows interesting similarities with the theory of essence and modality developed by Fine (1994). In the recent literature on grounding, Bolzano (2014) is often seen as providing the first systematic account of the grounding relation (*Abfolge*). In Husserl’s conception of a theory of sciences in the *Prolegomena*, Bolzano’s conception plays an important role.

In the theory of emotions and values, many varieties of cognitivism defended today – the thesis that emotions presuppose cognition or even have a cognitive function themselves – echo views that were defended in early phenomenology. The view that emotions are based on cognitions – defended in different flavours by, for instance, Anthony Kenny (1963), Michael Stocker (1987), Kevin Mulligan (1998), and Peter Goldie (2002) – are to be found in the works of Brentano and the early phenomenologists (Brentano 1874; Pfänder 1900; Stumpf 1899; 1928). The value objectivism defended by Scheler also finds echoes in Graham Oddie’s robust realism about values (2005). The view that emotions themselves have a cognitive function is defended by Husserl (Hua XXVIII) and Meinong (1917), but is also to be found in Peter Goldie (2005), Sabine Döring (2007), Linda Zagzebski (2004), Christine Tappolet (2000), and Mark Johnston (2001).

In social ontology, the views developed by Searle are in many respects similar to the views developed by early Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists (Searle 1995; 2010). Searle’s social ontology is based on what he calls “speech acts”, which are what Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists call “social acts”, especially in the works of Adolf Reinach (1989a), Edith Stein (1922; 1925), and Gerda Walther (1923).
In epistemology, the view championed by Williamson (2000), according to which the traditional project of an analysis of knowledge in terms of true justified belief should be abandoned in favour of a conception of knowledge as one of the most fundamental psychological and epistemic states, also has important predecessors in the phenomenological tradition. This is the case, for instance, of Reinach (1989b), Dietrich von Hildebrand (1916; 1950), and Friedrich Bassenge (1930). Similarly, many of the recent views on the irreducibility of intuition to belief come close to some of the views on intuition developed in phenomenology, especially by Brentano and Husserl (Bealer 1998; Chudnoff 2013; Huemer 2001; 2007).

60.5. Anti-realist convergences

Anti-realists (in the sense of the term introduced above) generally reject the idea that the world is given to us as it is in a manner that is mind-, theory-, and discourse-independent. Rather, they believe that our perceptual, intellectual, cognitive, and moral experiences of the world are determined or informed in a significant way by our conceptual, subjective, pre-theoretical, normative, narrative, or discursive activity. Such conceptions of our multifaceted subjective contribution as decisive for the construction of perception (and experience in general) sometimes have clear Kantian or neo–Kantian overtones. In analytic philosophy, such positions were defended in various forms by Wilfrid Sellars (1956) in his critique of the myth of the given, in Peter Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics (1959), and by John McDowell (1994), among others.

Phenomenologists sympathetic to anti-realist accounts are generally sympathetic to accounts of phenomenology in which the role of the phenomenological reduction is central. Some of them believe that perception is normatively constrained; that there is no non–conceptual content (or more generally, that there is no content in which the active contribution of the subject doesn’t play a role); that phenomenology’s main concern “lies in the transcendental conditions of the constitution or disclosure of meaning”; that “the normative is at stake in the accounts of intentional content or meaning offered in both analytic and phenomenological traditions”; and that “it guided both Husserl and Heidegger towards the insight that phenomenological investigation of intentionality demanded a thorough reorientation in philosophy” (Crowell 2013, 2–3). They tend to believe that reality is “constituted” (normatively) and that subjectivity is constituting, and to see phenomenology as the endeavour allowing us, thanks to the phenomenological reduction or epoche, to see how this constitution takes place.

There have been many attempts in recent years by such phenomenologists to incorporate theories such as those of McDowell (1994) or Korsgaard (1996; 2008) into their conception of phenomenology (Crowell 2007; 2013; Smith 2011). But not all anti-realists are normativists in their interpretation of the subjective contribution in our experience of the world. In the line of Ricoeur, David Carr for instance emphasizes the role of narrativity (1986; 1987). Others, like Dan Zahavi, prefer to work with a minimal notion of selfhood as the basis of the experiential self but also underline its compatibility with narrative, social, or normative accounts of subjectivity (Zahavi 2014). While these phenomenologists agree that the phenomenological reduction, and with it a form of idealism, is an essential mark of phenomenology (with others like Jitendra Nath Mohanty [1989], John Drummond [1990], or Burt Hopkins [2011]) not all anti-realists are idealists in phenomenology. The best illustration of this is perhaps the debate between Hubert Dreyfus (2005; 2007a; 2007b) and John McDowell (2007a; 2007b) on the role of conceptual rationality in our skilful relation with the world. Drawing on Sartre, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus stresses the importance of embodied activity but rejects, for instance, the conceptuality of normative comportment.
60.6. Phenomenology and philosophy of mind

Given their shared object of research, the convergence between phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind is particularly significant. It has its own prehistory in the reception of Brentano in Cambridge and Oxford. In Cambridge this was thanks to Stout, who introduced his students Russell and Moore to Austrian philosophy, in particular to Brentano and Meinong (Stout 1896). Russell himself showed interest in the works of Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl. It was Russell who led Chisholm to read Brentano, and this reading is quite evident in Chisholm’s first papers on intentionality. In Oxford, the reception of phenomenology was assured from early on by Ryle’s reviews of phenomenological publications and by his later critique of phenomenology in the background of his *The Concept of Mind* (2000; 2009). Ryle’s low opinion of phenomenology – although he himself characterized his own approach as a “phenomenology” – had a clear influence on his student Daniel Dennett, especially in *Content and Consciousness* (1969), in which he sees with Quine (1960, 221) two possible attitudes towards the irreducibility of the intentional idiom: abandoning it (and conducting behaviourism), or defending the indispensability of the idiom, as did Brentano and the phenomenologists. Dennett adhered to the first attitude, to the extent that most of his work is an attempt to show the dispensability of the intentional idiom. A science of phenomena, that is, of first-person experience, must be replaced by a heterophenomenology that leads from third-person objective science to a “method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological scruples of science” (Dennett 1991, 72). Heterophenomenology amounts basically to the practice of the cognitive sciences, taking the *reports* of first-person experience as the data, and not first-person experience itself.

Heterophenomenology is one of the most radical options for dispensing with phenomenological data. It minimizes the fact that intentionality is basically a conscious experience, and that a description of this experience essentially includes a description of the first-person perspective, of the phenomenal character or “what-it-is-likeness” of intentional states. It eliminates altogether the phenomenological sense of “consciousness”. There are less radical attempts to deal with phenomenological data in contemporary philosophy of mind. A frequently employed strategy (for example, by Dretske, Tye, Prinz, Hill, Rosenthal, Lycan, Carruthers) is reductive representationalism, which reduces first-person experience and its intentionality to first-order or higher-order representations determined by their functional role in a physiological system. While such attempts share with phenomenological accounts the acknowledgement of the existence of phenomenological data, they suggest a reductive explanation of the data.

Reductive accounts of phenomenological data are compatible to some extent with phenomenology understood as descriptive psychology (as Brentano called it). The phenomenological task of describing one’s own experience is not challenged by the possibility of giving a reductive account – from a “genetic” standpoint, as Brentano puts it – of intentional conscious states, insofar as the phenomenological task is given methodological priority. But since they try to explain conscious experience in terms of intentional states, they leave out much of the phenomenological data. In the background of Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) and of Chalmers’s discussion of the “hard problem” (1996; 2002), philosophers of mind of all allegiances started to take the problem of consciousness more seriously. Searle argued that “there is no way to study the phenomena of the mind without implicitly or explicitly studying consciousness” (1992, 18); Siewert argued that “we have a distinctively first-person knowledge of our own minds” (1998, 6). These views were influential for the development of the view that intentionality is at bottom phenomenal, a view that was given such labels as “inseparatism” and “phenomenal
Different varieties of these views are defended today by philosophers such as David Chalmers (2010), Eliot Chudnoff (2013), Katalin Farkas (2008), Uriah Kriegel (2011), Josef Levine (2011), Michelle Montague (2016), Galen Strawson (2011), and David Pitt (2004, 2009), to name only a few. Whether they are reductive or not concerning the hard problem, what unites these views is the idea that in the order of explanation, consciousness, or phenomenal experience, should be considered prior to intentionality. This comes very close to the view that has been defended by phenomenologists since Brentano and Husserl. Programmes such as Siewert’s analytic phenomenology can be understood as contributions in both the analytic and the phenomenological tradition (Siewert 2007; 2016).

The distinction between broad realists’ and anti-realists’ insights discussed in the sections above also applies in this case, but it has to be complemented with further specifications. Most of the phenomenologists labelled as anti-realists in section 60.5 are realists concerning the features of the mind (e.g. subjectivity, consciousness, intentionality) but anti-realists concerning the world, insofar as they take those features of the mind to be constituting the world (in one of the senses discussed in section 60.5). This is the case of the later Husserl himself, but of many phenomenologists following this perspective. Others are realists concerning the features of the mind, but non-realists concerning the external reality of the world: they don’t take a stance on the nature of external reality, although they argue that it plays a causal role in perception. This seems to be the case of Brentano in the Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Finally, there are realist phenomenologists that are also realists concerning the external reality of the world. This is the case of the early Husserl and of many early phenomenologists such as Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, and more recently of Dagfinn Follesdal, David Woodruff Smith, Barry Smith, and Kevin Mulligan.

The situation is somewhat similar in analytic philosophy of mind, with some differences that seem more statistical than principled: many of the defenders of phenomenal intentionality or inseparatism are realists about consciousness with the proviso that it may or should be given a naturalist explanation. Phenomenologists – realists or anti-realists in the broad sense – rarely agree with this proviso. Also, many insights in analytic philosophy of mind are also anti-realists concerning the features of the mind. The heterophenomenology of Dennett is a good example of such an insight. But as we stressed earlier, not all analytic philosophers are naturalists. For this reason, these differences should not be considered as the expression of a divide between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, but rather – as is also the case with the other differences discussed here – as the expression of some of the specific problems that are constitutive of these two traditions respectively.13

Notes

1 I take here phenomenology as the philosophical movement originating in Brentano’s “Phänomenologie”, a discipline introduced in the late 1860s/early 1870s in Brentano’s metaphysics lectures as propaedeutic to ontology, investigating the contents of our mental phenomena. This propaedeutic developed into a more general research programme in psychology, first in the classificatory analyses in Brentano’s Psychology from an empirical standpoint (1874) but also in the works of Brentano’s students, for instance Carl Stumpf 1873; 1886, 1891, in Brentano’s descriptive psychology and phenomenology lectures of 1887–1891 (Brentano forthcoming) and in the works of Brentano’s students who either personally attended these lectures (Twardowski 1894; Kreibig 1909; Hillebrand 1890; 1891; Höfler 1890) or had personal copies of them (Stumpf 1886, 1891, Hua XVIII and XIX; Marty 2010 [orig. 1895]). While it is indisputable that Husserl was the most important of Brentano’s students and that his Logical Investigations were central for the history of the phenomenology of the 20th century – representing the first attempt of a systematic account of the discipline, encompassing logic, psychology, the theory of meaning, abstraction, mereology, pure grammar, and perception – we consider Husserl’s project as one
of the outcomes of Brentano's phenomenology. On this early version of phenomenology, see Fréchette 2019.

2 See for instance Husserl et al., *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Halle, Niemeyer (from 1913). In the more general context of the phenomenology of the school of Brentano, a similar phenomenon occurred with Twardowski's journal *Ruch Filozoficzny*, (from 1911 onwards) in Poland.

3 This is the case, for instance, of Brentano in Vienna, Husserl in Göttingen and Freiburg, Marty in Prague, Twardowski in Lemberg, Stumpf in Berlin, and Meinong in Graz.

4 On the phenomenological side, Paul Ricœur is perhaps the best example of a bridge-builder. His lecture notes from the 1960s show that he discussed Russell, Ryle, Wittgenstein, and linguistic analysis in many of his lectures at Wheaton College, John Hopkins, and Washington D.C. These discussions and the bridge-builder approach are explicit in many of his works, for instance in Ricœur (1982; 1990/1992). On Ricœur as a bridge-builder, see Engel 2014. More recently, the bridge-builder approach is also explicit in the editorial presentation of the newly relaunched journal *Phenomenological Studies* at http://proj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=journal&journal_code=EPH (last view on November 8, 2017) or in Norris 2000 and Rinofner-Kreidl and Witsche 2016. On the analytic side, Dummett (1993) is perhaps the most visible example, although the bridge-builder approach was developed much earlier by Findlay (1933; 1958; 1963) and has a long tradition in Germany (e.g. Gabriel 1975 or Künne 1975). Recent works such as Mulligan 2012, particularly on Wittgenstein and Scheler, also shows the fruitfulness of such an approach. Many philosophers are said to be bridge-builders, but it is not always clear whether they considered themselves as such. Hans-Johann Glock (2008, 256), for instance, names among others Föllesdal, Tugendhat, and Dreyfus. At least Föllesdal (in Frauchiger 2013, 347ff.) explicitly rejects this qualification and denies the existence of a gap.

5 See the extensive literature on this event, more recently Overgaard 2010.

6 Both are quoted in Glock (2008, 258) to make a different point.

7 On the problems of such a diagnosis, see Mulligan 2011.

8 On the phenomenological version of the knowledge first thesis, see Mulligan 2014.

9 On this relation between phenomenological and analytic views of intuition in epistemology, see Fréchette 2016; 2017.

10 See Russell’s early reviews of Meinong in *Mind* between 1899 and 1907.


12 On inseparatism, see Horgan and Tienson 2002. On phenomenal intentionality, see Kriegel.

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References


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