The work of Alfred Schutz can undeniably be located within the phenomenological tradition in which Edmund Husserl has been taken to be founder. Even though Schutz repeatedly criticized Husserl’s work and despaired once in a private letter about its “indefensibility” (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989, 310), nevertheless at the end of his life, he described Husserl to his friend Eric Voegelin as the old “wizard” [Hexenmeister] who always survives the many objections one may raise against his philosophy (Schutz and Voegelin 2004, 565). To examine how Schutz engaged the phenomenology of Husserl, who “valued independent thought far more than slavish following” (Cairns 2013, vi), this entry will consider 1) the locus of Schutz’s phenomenological investigations (“a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude”), 2) his phenomenological description of that natural attitude, 3) the relationship of that description to the social sciences, and 4) his disagreements with specific Husserlian positions and creative deployments of phenomenological concepts.

57.1. The locus of Schutz’s phenomenological investigations

Schutz’s magnum opus, The Phenomenology of the Social World, originally Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, grew out of his desire to provide philosophical foundations for the social sciences, in particular sociology (Schutz 2011, 1). Although Schutz found most compelling Max Weber’s “interpretive sociology” (2004, 85/5), he recognized that Weber’s main problem, “understanding the subjective meaning a social action has for the actor” (2011, 1), needed philosophical underpinnings. Not finding neo-Kantian thought satisfactory for such philosophical foundation, but drawn to the philosophy of Henri Bergson, Schutz, through the intervention of Felix Kaufmann, eventually discovered the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology for his project. In The Phenomenology of the Social World, after briefly touching on questions in Weber’s thought that required philosophical elaboration (meaningful action, the alter ego, the difference between subjective and objective meaning), Schutz, in an all-important “Appended Note,” pinpointed precisely where, within the phenomenological framework, his philosophical investigation was to be placed (Schutz 2004, 129–130/43–44).

First of all, he affirms that he intends to study the constituting process in internal time-consciousness, developed within section two of The Phenomenology of the Social World, within the phenomenological reduction, as described in Husserl’s Ideas 1 (Hua III/1, 63–69/57–62). Since
to analyze the phenomenon of meaning in mundane social life did not require him to remain
further within the transcendental sphere, he discontinues relying on the reduction, beginning
in section three, confident that what he had found within the reduction would be applicable
within the natural attitude, as Husserl had stipulated in his 1930 “‘Nachwort’ zu meinem Ideen”
(Hua V, 138–162). Schutz, however, cautions that even after having dispensed with the reduc-
tion, his analysis remains “on the ground of inner appearance as the appearance of that which
is peculiar to the psychic” (Schutz 2004, 130/44; Hua V, 144) with the result that he is developing
in effect a “phenomenological psychology” (Ibid.). Husserl had remarked in the “Nachwort”
that since, as often happens, one designates descriptions that restrict themselves purely and truly
to what is given in intuition as “phenomenological,” the title “phenomenological psychology”
perfectly fits an undertaking that seeks to describe accurately psychic processes (Hua V, 144).
In fact, Husserl envisioned such an enterprise as being a great, self-standing science, as long as
it did not focus on factual matters, but rather on a science of essence, that is, one which “seeks
the invariant, unique structures of the psyche [Seele], of a community of psychic life, that is,
with reference to its Apriori” (Ibid.). It is just such a phenomenological psychology that Schutz
claims that The Phenomenology of the Social World instantiated (Schutz 2004, 130/44) and that he
designates with Husserl’s own words from the “Nachwort” as a “constitutive phenomenology of
the natural attitude” (Ibid.; Hua V, 158).

After having depicted what such a phenomenological psychology might look like, Husserl in
the “Nachwort” proceeds to discuss the implementation of the transcendental-phenomenological
reduction in which psychological subjectivity, along with all that is naively taken to be real, loses
its sense of being a psyche in the spatio–temporal nature of a body (Hua V, 145). Husserl repeat-
edly points out how this transition to transcendental phenomenology launches a “philosophi-
cal science” (Hua V, 147) that is driven by the philosophizing ego (Hua V, 147); that provides a
philosophically fundamental science as a basis for all philosophical knowledge (Hua V, 147); that
attempts to exercise a radical philosophical self-responsibility that takes nothing for granted (Hua
V, 148); and that returns to pure experience and builds up an account of what is encountered
step by step and only on the basis of what is evident (Hua V, 148), since to do otherwise would
contradict the very meaning of philosophy (Hua V, 148). As if attuned to the different possibilities
that Husserl’s “Nachwort” affords, Schutz acknowledges the importance of the phenomenological
and eidetic reductions for the foundation of a philosophy free of unexamined presuppositions, but,
guided by his training in the social sciences, he feels that a phenomenology of the natural attitude
would be more appropriate for exploring social reality (Schutz 2011, 2). In a sense and in good
phenomenological style, Schutz allows the reality he intends to investigate to determine even the
level and type of phenomenology appropriate for that reality. His approach apparently met the
highest standards of phenomenological investigation since, when he sent his book to Husserl, it
elicited “highly gratifying comments” and “warm approval” (Ibid.).

57.2. The phenomenology of the natural attitude

In order to deal with the issue of the meaning that an action has for an actor—Weber’s basic
problem—Schutz insists that one needs to penetrate to the deepest stratum of experience acces-
sible to reflection, out of which the phenomenon of meaning emerges: that is, one must grasp
the foundational experience of internal time-consciousness—a central theme of Husserlian
phenomenology (2004, 93/12). Consequently, Schutz affirms that “the problem of meaning is a time
problem” (Ibid., the italics are Schutz’s).

Following Bergson’s definition of durée as a continuous flux of not clearly distinguished, het-
erogeneous qualities, Schutz states that the reflective regard, which Husserl calls “recollection” or
“reproduction” and which illuminates the-just-having-flowed-by stream of durée made available through “retention,” apprehends and distinguishes experiences from each other (Schutz 2004, 141–145/47–51). Such reflection captures experiences that were merely undergone or suffered (such as pains) and it also apprehends the intentional attitudes that one spontaneously takes up toward such experiences, and Schutz classifies such spontaneous “behavior” [Tun] as a meaning-endowing experience of consciousness (Schutz 2004, 151/55–56). Just as ongoing experiences are maintained after one experiences them in an ongoing string of retentions moving into the past, and just as one can turn reflectively to such flowing-by experiences or to long-past experiences and single them out in reproduction and reflection, so Schutz also articulates parallel conscious structures that were directed toward the future (Schutz 2004, 152–161/57–63). Hence protentions (the counterparts of retention) anticipate what is immediately coming, but one is also able to represent reflectively via foreseeing expectations [Vorerinnerung] what will happen or what one will make happen in the more distant future (the counterpart of reflection or reproduction).

This temporal bi-directionality of the stream of consciousness, flowing into the past and aimed toward the future, makes possible Schutz’s account of action, which plays a central role in his effort to provide foundations for Weberian sociology. Reflection discloses three levels: 1) passively undergone pains and reflexes that Leibniz called the surf of indiscernible and confused small perceptions of which one is not usually not aware; 2) meaningful intentional acts emanating from our spontaneous life, often taken up in reaction to events, as when one perceives an object impinging on oneself or fights a suddenly experienced pain; and 3) “action,” in which one constructs in advance a project that one envisions an outcome that will have come about (and hence is phantasized as a completed “act”) by one’s taking the steps to realize it and that will guide the steps taken to realize it (Schutz 1962, 210–211). Schutz makes it clear that “the meaning of any action is its corresponding projected act” (2004, 157/61; Schutz’s italics).

Schutz rounds out his treatment of meaning by noting how through polythetic experiences synthetically linked to each other, one builds up monothetic schemes of experience that constitute the stock of knowledge through which one interprets lived experience (Ibid., 175–195/71–86). Thus the object given to a spontaneous act of perception arising in response to the presence of a table is grasped as a “table,” a “typification” that has been built up in one’s stock of knowledge by repeated table-experiences. Or, when one phantasizes the action that will govern one’s project of “purchasing milk at the store,” one draws on the knowledge of how to execute typically such a project that can be found in the stock of knowledge built up over time. Such typifications in one’s stock of knowledge, although grasped monothetically, are not only assembled across time, but are also socially transmitted to an actor. The methodology of “constitution” employed here, going behind a static given, the monothetic typifications in one’s stock of knowledge, to uncover the experiences that went into the build-up of what one finds as given, is typical of Husserlian phenomenology that, for instance, traces the many conscious processes that must have gone on for one to be able to have an object given in perception.

Finally, to clarify the notion of motivation on which Weber relies and to terminate his analysis of bi-directionally oriented internal time-consciousness within the confines of the phenomenological reduction, Schutz distinguishes between the “in-order-to” and “because” motives of an action. The “in-order-to” motive is established when one phantasizes before undertaking an action that action as completed, as what “will have been brought about,” that is, in future perfect tense, and as what will give direction to all the sub-steps one will take to realize that project. Hence, one conceives a project of robbing a bank, phantasizing what it will be like for the bank to be robbed, before one sets about to realize it. Likewise, it is possible to inquire about “because motives,” that is, to determine those events or circumstances in one’s past that
may have determined or influenced the adoption of a project. In this case, one must start with a decision to implement a project already arrived at and hence in the past, and then go back into the past before that past, in the pluperfect tense, to find prior events that may have influenced that decision. Hence, for example, experiences of being violently abused in the bank robber’s childhood may provide the because motive explaining the robber’s decision to undertake the project to rob a bank.

Schutz is fully aware that his sojourn within the phenomenological reduction in section two of *The Phenomenology of the Social World* focuses on structures essential to the individual consciousness, but he is also cognizant that an adequate constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude undertaken to provide a foundation for Weberian sociology must take account of intersubjective relationships. Instead of addressing the difficult problem of constituting the Thou from within the constraints of transcendental phenomenology, as did Husserl in his Fifth Cartesian Meditation (Hua I, 121–183), Schutz dispenses with the phenomenological reduction and turns to describing how intersubjective understanding is experienced within the natural attitude (2004, 219–220/97–98). Like Husserl, he denies that one perceives the other’s experiences originarily as the other experiences them “from within” (Ibid., 222–225/99–101; 1962, 313–315). Instead, the other’s psychological life is appresented, parallel to the way that the front of an object appresents its unseen back side. However, the other’s body appresents the other’s psychological life with such immediacy and continual confirmation that the one apprehending the other need not resort to inferences about that psychological life (Schutz 2004, 224–225/101) and, in fact, one might feel as though he or she were actually perceiving the other’s experiences. The regular efficacy of intersubjective understanding further depends on the socially acquired interpretive schemes and typifications established through repeated experiences of others and sedimented in one’s stock of knowledge. These interpretive schemes and typifications enable interactors to know what others are doing and to understand their goals and motives at particular times and in particular circumstances (Schutz 1962, 55–56). Hence, even without originary access to another’s consciousness, a jury can determine whether a defendant killed a victim with premeditated intent, a teacher understands that a student wants to ask a question when she raises her hand, or everyone understands the police officer who turns on the sirens of her car in order to let everyone know that she is driving at excess speed to deal with an emergency.

Schutz, like Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, and other phenomenologists, develops his account of intersubjective understanding on the basis of face-to-face relationships in which both parties share the same time and the space (and so have access to each other’s bodily expressions). In such a “We-relationship” between “Consociates,” each’s knowledge keeps pace with the other’s stream of consciousness, increases from moment to moment, and undergoes immediate correction (e.g., of the typifications one deploys toward the other) when the least bodily movement of the other, such as a scowl, might call for it (Schutz 2004, 319–326/167–172). Moving beyond the foundational face-to-face relationship, Schutz points out how certain modifications, often unnoticed in commonsense but recoverable in careful phenomenological reflection, occur once one’s face-to-face partner departs and moves to a different space in such a way that the partner’s body is no longer accessible (Ibid., 331–334/176–178). One’s knowledge of the partner, who now becomes a “Contemporary” and who shares time with one but no longer space, “freezes,” in the sense that such knowledge is based on all one’s past experiences of the other up to that point and collected in the construction of an ideal type (much like a sociological type) of that other, a type much less revisable than the typifications given face-to-face. Consequently, one’s knowledge of a Contemporary is mediate, descriptive, and inferential, since one corrects one’s understanding of the other only through the occasional letter or email in which one pieces together information about one’s partner as opposed to the
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abundant feedback given in that “interlocking of glances” and “thousand-faceted mirroring of each other” (Ibid., 331–334/176–178) uniquely characteristic of the face-to-face relationship. Finally, one knows Predecessors and Successors, who share neither the same time nor the same space and who are known also through types, corrigible also on the bases of the trickle of information available, as might occur when the discovery of long-lost letters of one’s great-grandmother makes it possible to modify one’s type of her. Consociates given in immediate We-relationships and Contemporaries, Predecessors, and Successors, given through inferentially developed types, in what Schutz calls “They-relationships” (Ibid., 343–344/185, 359–360/195, 368–369/202–203), represent the various ways partners encounter each other in the structure of the social world.

In summary, Schutz develops his constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude with an eye to providing philosophical foundations for Max Weber’s interpretive sociology, and hence this phenomenology focuses on issues such as meaning, the meaning of action (in its phantasized project imagined prior to its unfolding), the socially and temporally developed schemes of experience for the interpretation of experiences and of other persons, motivation, and the social world; in particular, the different ways one understands others depending on one’s spatio-temporal location in the structure of that world. At the same time, it is obvious that Schutz’s entire explanation is based in phenomenological ideas and concepts: inner-time; the selectivity of consciousness; intentionality (whether of a spontaneous act adopted in reference to impinging events and circumstances or projects correlative to acts of phantasying and to the subsequent acts aimed at realizing such projects); typifications constituted in inner-time through repeated, similar experiences; motivations understandable by reference to inner-time indexes; and intersubjectivity, also indexed with reference to space and time, and requiring different cognitive, intentional activities depending on the placement of one’s partner within the structure of the social world. Indeed, besides operating within parameters established by Husserl himself, namely differentiating between a transcendental phenomenology and a phenomenological psychology, Schutz’s entire work here can be described as a major project in phenomenological constitution. Hence, he builds from the ground of the stream of consciousness upward (hence the German title “sinnhafte Aufbau” or the “meaningful build-up” of the social world) and details all the conscious processes that go into there being “a natural attitude” or social world. Clearly Schutz abides provisionally within the constraints of a phenomenological psychology, limiting himself to “inner appearance as the appearance of that which is peculiar to the psychic” (Schutz 2004, 44; Hua V, 144) and the structures of a community of psychic life. Furthermore, he does not concentrate on factual matters, but rather on a science of essence, that is, seeking invariant and unique structures. Hence, one recognizes that his “structure of the social world” is eidetic in character: Consociates, Contemporaries, Predecessors, and Successors cannot be understood in any other way than that in which Schutz presents them, namely as determined by spatio-temporal coordinates and as correlative to immediate, revisable typifications or inferentially constructed types. In fact, this picture of the natural attitude Schutz gives is itself eidetic insofar as Schutz’s characterizations of temporality, meaning, schemes of interpretation, motivation, and intersubjective understanding are such that one cannot imagine any concrete instantiation of the natural attitude, any culture, or any society that would not be describable in these terms.

57.3. The social world and the social sciences

The natural attitude is generally counterpoised to the transcendental phenomenology domain into which one enters through the phenomenological reduction, but when Schutz comes to consider the sphere that is roughly equivalent to the natural attitude but that is counterpoised
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to the realm of the social sciences, he speaks of it as “common sense everyday life” (1962, 57). He links this sphere to Husserl’s Lebenswelt, and he takes this sphere, which he also denominates “the world of daily life,” as interchangeable with the natural attitude (Ibid., 208). In his 1937 manuscript, “The Problem of Personality in the Social World,” Schutz makes it clear that he hopes to enrich his earlier The Phenomenology of the Social World by including “working” (2003, 132/277), which consists in bodily action in the outer world based on a project that one seeks to bring about (1962, 212). In effect, this articulation of the importance of “working” (Ibid., 230), the prevalent form of spontaneity in the world of everyday life, highlights how for Schutz “a pragmatic motive governs our natural attitude toward the world of everyday life” (Ibid., 209), even though pragmatic motivations were not absent from The Phenomenology of the Social World. By emphasizing the pragmatic character of the world of everyday life, Schutz converges with Husserl’s own account of the Lebenswelt, which precedes and contrasts with the disinterested scientific attitude that arises out of it according to “The Vienna Lecture” (Hua VI, 329–332/283–285; Husserl 1954, 52–53/53; Hua XXXIX, 58, 156, 201, 262, 264, 312–313, 320, 352, 387).

Having modified his earlier account of the natural attitude by emphasizing the pragmatic motives ruling in everyday life, Schutz, in his essay “On Multiple Realities” and in repeated discussions on the outlook of social scientists (1962, 36–38/63), argues that they undertake a shift in attitude away from the pragmatic orientation, similar to that of the epoché adopted by the phenomenologist, in order to embark upon the world of scientific theory (Ibid., 145). They set aside the pragmatic motives prevalent in their commonsense life and those of the subjects of their investigation and allow the scientific problem alone to determine what is relevant for them, thereby seeking to realize what Max Weber meant by the objectivity of the social sciences (Ibid., 63). Their predominant interest, or relevance, is not to master the world, as it would be in pragmatic everyday life, but to observe and to understand it (Ibid., 245).

Not only does Schutz differentiate the pragmatic world of everyday life from the sphere of scientific reflection by conceiving social scientists as resembling phenomenologists in undertaking a kind of an epoché, adopting a distinctive attitude, and entering a reflective domain with a specific relevance-ranking. But also, Schutz’s phenomenological perspective, from which he constitutes the natural attitude and depicts the particular the stance of the sociologist, requires that the phenomenologist, following Husserl, exercise strict philosophical responsibility in not accepting unexamined presuppositions. Though Schutz’s focus is not on transcendental phenomenology, he exemplifies the critical spirit of such phenomenology in his exchange with the positivist philosophers of the social sciences of his time, particularly Carl Hempel and Ernst Nagel. These philosophers contended that the highly successful methods of the natural sciences should be employed also in the social sciences, restricting scientists to what is given in sensory observation, ruling out any talk or invisible purposes or meanings of actions, and resorting to behavioristic approaches. Schutz criticized this position because it operates uncritically with the presupposition that the methods of the natural sciences should supplant all other methods, without first considering what the object of social scientific investigation is and then determining what methods might be appropriate for its investigation. Instead, for Schutz, the object of social scientific science is the world of everyday life, or “social reality,” whose essential features he had already mapped out. In that world or reality, the “objects” studied are unlike the objects studied by the natural scientists, who examine objects like electrons and molecules that do not interpret their world. Social scientists, by contrast, are engaged in a project of interpreting subjects who are in turn interpreting their word. Furthermore, as previously noted, purposes and meanings of actions in social reality, as Schutz describes it, need not be invisible if one does not limit oneself to bare sensory observation as do the positivists and if one relies on the standard typifications of everyday life that make purposes and goals accessible, such that, for instance, one can interpret a
raised hand as indicating that a student wants to ask a question. By simply assuming that natural scientific methods are appropriate for the social sciences and by not first having clarified the object of their investigation, social reality, as Schutz himself had done phenomenologically, the positivistic philosophers of social science ended up not even seeing the intricate interpretive tasks that face social scientists, which Schutz describes as “constructing the constructs” (Ibid., 59) of actors in everyday life. By providing his philosophical foundation for the social sciences, Schutz recapitulates what Husserl achieved in his Crisis, which explains how “the knowledge of the objective-scientific world is ‘grounded’ in the self-evidence of the life-world” (Hua VI, 134/130).

Schutz’s phenomenological constitution of everyday life in fact facilitates the interpretive endeavor of social science, which he, following Max Weber, defines as determining what actors mean by their actions, that is, their “subjective meaning” (1962, 57), as opposed to the meaning of an actor’s partner or a neutral observer. Effective social science requires via what Schutz calls the “postulate of subjective interpretation” (Ibid., 34–36) that social scientists examine the meaning of an action for the actor, and, for this scientific purpose, Schutz’s depiction of everyday life provides the much needed conceptual machinery. To understand such meaning, the social scientist seeks to establish the in-order-to motive, the phantasied beforehand project that guides every actor, that provides the meaning of every action, and that even life-world actors must grasp to understand the actions of their co-actors in everyday life, even though their ultimate relevances have to do with mastering the world instead of understanding it. The in-order-to motive governing an actor’s action serves as a kind of directing relevance for that action, and the action itself often serves further the ranking of relevances that ultimately govern an actor’s whole life. Moreover, one’s in-order-to motives are conceived of as typified, as the kinds of projects one has realized before or seen others realize, and any actor implementing a project must rely on the typified interpretive schemes in one’s stock of knowledge. In brief, the entire phenomenological account of everyday life, which includes a carefully established explanation of meaning, motivation, typifications, and relevances, stands available for any social scientist who seeks to construct the constructs of any everyday actor.

To satisfy the postulate of subjective interpretation, to take account of the in-order-to motive that gives meaning to an actor’s action, the social scientist can make use of the method for which Weber was renowned: ideal type-construction. For instance, Weber in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism constructs an ideal type of the in-order-to motive of the Protestant, that is, the religious purpose informing the Protestant’s entrepreneurial undertakings, its relationship to other subordinate relevances, and the Protestant’s stock of knowledge about the workplace, hard work, religious practice, and money. In fact, such type-construction by a social scientist such as Weber resembles the inferential building-up of ideal types that an everyday life actor constructs of Contemporaries, Predecessors, or Successors and that the everyday actor makes use of to understand the meanings of the actions or communications of the partners who no longer share this actor’s space and/or time. Consequently, Schutz recognizes that everyday actors already comport themselves as social scientists, though, of course the relevances behind type construction in everyday life and in social science are quite different (2004, 403/220).

Schutz, it should be noted, is not opposed to social scientific experiments or to the high-level generalizations and idealizations (1964, 84–85; 1962, 34–35), such as those employed in statistical social science, but he insists that such abstract conceptual schemes are a kind of “intellectual shorthand” and that one always can and sometimes must be able to refer to the activities of individual subjects in the social world, as the Weberian verstehende sociology, informed by Schutzian phenomenological foundations, can do. Furthermore, Schutz also acknowledges that he concurs with Ernest Nagel that social scientific empirical knowledge must be established through con-
trolled inference, propositionally articulated, and verifiable by anyone who is willing to examine the corroborating observations, provided that by “observation” one does not mean same kind of sensory observation that the positivist philosophers think will validate empirical propositions in the natural sciences (Schutz 1962, 51). Since Schutz dispenses with validation through such sensory observation, intersubjective validation by the community of social scientists assumes greater prominence in his theory. In addition, he adds that well-crafted social science must comply with a series of postulates that mandate that social scientific results be articulated with logical consistency, attentive to the subjective meanings of actors, and “adequate,” in the sense that the scientific model of human action would be understandable for the actor and interactors in everyday life (Ibid., 43–44). This last “postulate of adequacy” seeks to insure a consistency between scientific constructs and the constructs of commonsense experience, bringing into interaction thereby the dichotomy between science and life that the phenomenological *epoché* with regard to the life-world reveals.

57.4. Conclusion: specific disagreements and creative deployments of phenomenology

An indication of Schutz’s pertinence to the phenomenological tradition can be found in his serious critical engagement with the phenomenology of Husserl, who preferred followers who were, as Cairns noted, independent thinkers rather subservient disciples. Schutz’s criticisms focused on Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Schutz questioned whether the second *epoché*, by which one would seek to exclude the results of intentional activities referring to other subjectivities, could be successfully executed (Schutz 1966, 57–67/80–82; 1962, 120–132). He raised doubts about whether one would be able to apperceptively transfer the sense “living body” to another whose body differs markedly from one’s own, particularly if one is unable to experience the other’s body originally as one experiences one’s own body or if the other belongs to the opposite sex. Finally, he opposed the idea that there are personalities of a higher order. In the end, Schutz concludes that the problem of intersubjectivity cannot be solved within the transcendental sphere but is rather a “datum of the life-world” (Schutz 1966, 82). There were objections to Schutz’s interpretation of the Fifth Meditation, such as Dorion Cairns’s criticism that Husserl’s second *epoché* was not intended to prescind from a pre-constituted stratum whose importance he underestimates, namely the social world. Rather, in Cairns’s view, Husserl begins with the social world and seeks to imaginatively re-construct through a kind of *Abbau*, or de-constructing, one stratum that the social world presupposes, namely, the primordial stratum that is the psychophysical ego (Schutz 1957). In addition, although there might be differences between the other’s body and one’s own, the extensive similarities between both bodies might be sufficient for a non-inferential apperceptive transfer of the sense “living body” to the other. Such matters, however, deserve more in-depth discussion than can be carried on in this entry.

Despite these differences with Husserl, Schutz also deploys phenomenology creatively, in novel contexts. For instance, in “On Multiple Realities” he develops a series of finite provinces of meaning such as dreaming, phantasy, and scientific theory over against the pragmatic world of everyday life in analogy to the way that phenomenology, through its *epoché*, separates itself from the life-world while opening up an alternative, phenomenological “province of meaning.” In “Symbol, Reality, and Society,” Schutz correlates with this treatment of multiple realities a theory of symbolic representation by explaining how symbols, given in everyday life, “appresent” (in the Husserlian sense of that word) another multiple reality (e.g., religious or literary). In addition and on the basis of the distinction between the objective meaning (such as that of the
terms defined in a dictionary) and subjective meaning (the distinctive inflection terms take on due to one’s unique history), Schutz examines how racial groups differ from each other in their interpretation of group membership, equality, and equality of understanding. Finally, he develops an account of the role of relevances in pragmatic everyday life, illustrating, for instance, how actors on the basis of their intrinsic relevance-systems come to terms with imposed relevances (e.g., death, the onset of illness, or ontological limits) and how relevances play a key role in the selectivity of consciousness and in the continual attentional fluctuations between theme and horizon to which consciousness is prone.4

Notes

1 Letter of Schutz to Gurwitsch, February 3, 1959.
2 Letter of Schutz to Voegelin, October 16, 1958.
3 Cairns’s comments, also, were translated by Kersten for this Schutzian Research reprint, and the relevant comments referred to above appear in Schutzian Research 2, 19 n.15, 20 n.16.
4 The author would like to thank William Hannegan for his editorial assistance.

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