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MAX SCHELER

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56.1. Life and personality

Max Scheler was born in Munich (August 22, 1874) and died in Frankfurt am Main (May 19, 1928) just before taking up his post as professor at the University of Frankfurt. He started his studies in Munich (1893), where he was enrolled for medicine, but transferred to Berlin the next year, where studied philosophy under Wilhelm Dilthey and sociology under Georg Simmel. He wrote his doctoral and habilitation theses in Jena (1897, 1899) with Rudolf Eucken, where he also started his career as a Privatdozent. He lost his right to teach in 1910 while Privatdozent at the Catholic University of Munich (a position that he had acquired with Husserl’s help). This was due to rumors spread by his first wife (whom he had just divorced) and publicized (libelously) in a newspaper that he had accrued debts in order to enjoy affairs with young women. He then moved to Göttingen, where he lectured privately in cafés and hotel rooms and soon became a central figure in the local realist Phenomenology circle. Tensions in his relationship with Husserl, who felt both jealous of Scheler’s growing fame and angry for not being recognized as source in his writings, drove him back to Munich (1911) and then to Berlin (1912). During this period, he worked on his Ressentiment and Formalismus books, and started working as freelance writer and propagandist (after 1914) of the rights of Germany in the First World War. In 1919 he was again permitted to teach philosophy at Cologne and also became one of the directors of the newly founded Institute for the Social Sciences. During this period, he distanced himself from Catholicism, and eventually moved to Frankfurt in 1928, where he was expected to work as professor of philosophy and sociology at the city’s university.

His personal life is notorious for its scandalous twists and turns, which concerned not only his three marriages and rumored love affairs, but also his religious, political, and professional stances. Born to a Jewish mother and a Protestant father, he turned to Catholicism at fourteen years old, later distanced himself from it, then returned, only to later abandon it again for panentheism. He had an early philosophical interest in Nietzsche, became a Marxist enthusiast, supported the old conservative German establishment, and later promoted the view that only the German bourgeois elite could lead the country out of crisis during the unstable Weimar Republic period.
56.2. Overview of his thought, work, and influence

In his time, Scheler was recognized as one of the most important figures for the future of German and European philosophy. Decisive in the reorientation of his thought away from Eucken’s neo-Kantian “constructivism” and toward the phenomenological realist position was his acquaintance with Edmund Husserl in 1902.¹ In the Phenomenology of the latter’s Logical Investigations (1900/01), Scheler found a systematic analysis of the ideas he was working on during this period.² He adopted some of the then-developed central tenets of Husserl’s Phenomenology and formed his own phenomenological style. The dazzling result of his work was Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, which appeared in two installments (1913, 1916) in the corresponding consecutive volumes of the Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie (I/2 and II), which was instituted by Husserl and then run by Pfänder, Scheler, and others. The fundamental insights and views developed there set the ground for a course of thought that eventually reached the stage found in his last work, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1928), published just before his untimely demise.

During the period that separates these two works, Scheler wrote a series of important texts, many of which were also published. Their thematics included the sociology of knowledge, war, the spirit of capitalism, the essence of religion, feminism, the tragic, and many others.³ His talent, however, was not bounded by the limits of philosophy in the strict sense. Before, during, and after the First World War, he also defended the rights of Germany and participated actively in public discussions regarding the identity and future of Germany and Europe. Between 1917 and 1918 he even worked for the German state as a diplomat at posts in Geneva and The Hague. His fame spread quickly throughout the Western world, especially to the USA, and then also to Japan.

After the Second World War, when twentieth-century German philosophy and especially Phenomenology fell into disrepute, this influence declined. Progressively, however, interest in Phenomenology began to grow again. The great winner of this was certainly Heidegger (who had himself benefited significantly from Scheler’s thought), but Husserl and Scheler also attracted renewed attention. However, Scheler’s thought did not attract the same degree of interest and scholarly elaboration as that of Heidegger and Husserl. The reasons for this have been thoroughly discussed, and there is unanimous agreement among Scheler scholars that he was magnificent in terms of achieving new, far-reaching insights and mesmerizing his audiences,⁴ but disappointing as regards systematicity and expository clarity in his written works. For instance, an analysis of or even a mere remark from his Formalism can leave a deep impression and inspire enthusiasm, but, soon after, frustration and a feeling of helplessness can set in due to apparent jumps or discrepancies in his work, along with his sometimes–cryptic phrasing.

56.3. Themes and characteristics of his work

Many of Scheler’s works were published during his lifetime. After his death, his third wife, Maria Scheler, preserved his research manuscripts and edited some of them for publication in the Gesammelte Werke series. In 1973, Manfred Frings took up the continuing work on this edition of Scheler’s writings, which was completed in 1993, comprising fifteen volumes, and published by Franke Verlag (Bern) until 1986, then by Bouvier Verlag (Bonn).⁵

The bulk of Scheler’s contribution to philosophy and to understanding the problems facing humanity can be boiled down to his critique of rationalistic, hedonistic, and utilitarian ethics, leading toward an ethics based on the concrete human person in the world. This emphasizes
an embodied spiritual existence, living in a solidary community with other persons, grounded in an order of emotions conditioned by love. This emotive life is not irrational, but rather connects us to a value-laden reality in praxially meaningful ways; it also has its own normativity, determined by an objective hierarchy of values. Under conditions relative to the socio-historical milieu, however, the formable and transformable internal ethos of a person may fall into a state where these ordered values cannot be intuited correctly (or at all) anymore. Humans are thus found to follow courses of action that lead to the realization of values that fail to guarantee the prevalence of the good.

The array of topics that occupied Scheler during his philosophical career reflect his efforts to clarify this core idea and explore the fate of the person and humanity in the becoming of the world. In his later thought Scheler tries to overcome the problems that humanity faces, especially in the Western world, including the crises that led to the First World War and that were giving rise to the fascism and racist nationalism that eventually resulted in the disaster of the Second World War. His sensitivity to the problematic situation made it urgent for him to adopt an unconventional way of working at the limits of Phenomenology, a way that—repeatedly and not always clearly—crossed the borderlines between ethics, psychology, theology, sociology, anthropology, social criticism, the critique of ideology, and metaphysics. The importance of his insights and the similar urgency of our own times make his writings a valuable living source for theoretical guidance and inspiration even now. The deadlock in the thematic of values that prevailed as the first half of the twentieth century drew to a close appears to have now been overcome, and interest in this thematic, combined with that in the emotions and desire or the will, is rising again.

56.4. The context of Scheler’s thought and work

Scheler’s family difficulties and tempestuous love life contrasted with his early Catholic conviction. This is said to have made Scheler quickly realize the difficulty of combining theory with praxis, especially insofar as Christianity and bourgeois worldviews could no longer provide guidance on values to the European peoples in the twentieth century. At his first university year in Munich, Scheler came to believe that the problems of injustice and evil could be solved by giving precedence to radical moral reform before any corresponding political-institutional change. Later in Berlin, he saw the face of radical industrialization and the miserable living conditions of the helpless and cruelly treated proletariat (Staude 1967, ch. 1, esp. 8.). By the time of his move to Jena (1895), Scheler had abandoned the Church for philosophy as a guide for his searches. The anti-positivist neo-Kantian thought of his Doktorvater, R. Eucken, influenced Scheler in thinking that Geist is autonomous with regard to the living, and that humanity’s course in history, away from his original experience of nature and toward the control and manipulation of the latter through work and science, had emptied human life of meaning. Human spirit, as a reflection of the absolute spirit, is our capacity to be in contact with eternal ideals and values in the pure realm of being (Ibid., 13–14). The solution, then, to the crisis of nihilism was thought to be a rebirth of spirituality.

During the period that followed, Scheler returned to the Church and its message of love. He also discovered Husserl’s Phenomenology and Bergson’s life philosophy, as well as both thinkers’ trust in the essential riches that simple intuition can offer the unprejudiced philosopher. With this equipment, he could now turn to the depths of the human constitution and the structure of the cosmos in order to thoroughly examine the problems of humanity. He explicitly recognized the root of discontent among modern humanity in bourgeois de-spiritualization brought about with naturalization and capitalism. Scheler emphasized the philosophically suppressed emotive
substrate of humanity and saw the world as the value-rich garden of God’s creation, veiled by scientism and a morality that reduced all value to mere utility (Staude 1967, 23; Stikkers 1980, esp. 21–23, 26ff.; Frings 2001, 168–172). He remained distrustful of liberalism and the idea of popular sovereignty, biased instead toward traditional and religious views of society and politics. After his return from Jena to Munich and experiencing the harshness of life without a job or an income, Scheler became pessimistic about the future of Europe and humanity, fantasizing about the supposed lost paradise of the medieval rural and pre-industrial, communal and pre-individualist, ‘organically’ arranged natural life, wherein solidarity was valued over competition. The general climate in Germany during these pre-war years, however, was not very different than the one he himself was living in.

The loss of a context for a communal life of solidarity with others, said Scheler, was a result of the anti-metaphysical, scientific spirit that had eyes only for material bodies and mechanical interactions, not only in nature but also in labor and human exchanges. The value of persons was reduced to their calculable productivity and the wealth they produced, which could be used to buy consumerist goods, conveniences, and pleasures (Scheler, 1961, 32, 38, 41; Frings 2001, ch. 6). The new liberal and socialist ideologies preached humanitarianism (privileging and loving humans) outside the religious framework of Christian love, and equality for all irrespective of the genuine personal value of each person. Scheler believed that this created a false conception of unity and functionality in society, casting the seed of resentment for all that did not already enjoy the promised privileges of the successful. Arrivism and corruption become, then, the natural state of the modern society, with the socialists and the bourgeois parties remaining content with only irresponsible criticism of the situation and each other, drawing on resentful populist slogans without any real vision for escaping the crisis (Scheler 1961, 50–52, 56–57; Frings 2001, 151–167). Only Christian metaphysics and the relevant ruling elite, Scheler then thought, could restore the lost unity and harmony in modern societies, away from societies divided by class. In addition, it was not class struggle but Christian love and solidarism/corporatism (as opposed to both bourgeois individualism and socialist collectivism) that Scheler took to be the remedy for bourgeois inequalities, individualism, selfishness, and alienation (Staude 1967, 32ff., 67ff.).

When the First World War was visible ahead, Scheler thought it a great opportunity for renewal of the spiritual condition in Germany and, through its prevalence over the decadent European nations, in the Western world in general. A Christian order based on love and organic unity of the people, ruled by a sublimated noble feudal elite instead of the industrialist-merchant bourgeois elite that had corrupted Wilhelmian Germany with its monetary wealth and comfort, would restore humanity to the objective order of values. His propagandist Genius of War (1915) immediately made Scheler a favorite thinker among Germans. It treated the war as a call addressed to Germany so that it might accomplish its historic destiny: to rediscover humane and heroic values in order to fight, in the name of humanity, against the English spirit of material comfort, selfishness, calculative rationalism, commercialism, and love of wealth, but also—he decried—against the slavish, barbaric, and irrational Orthodox Christian world in the East and the Balkans, at the head of which was Russia. After all, since the rise of German romanticism, this was how many German intellectuals represented the non-Germanic world in the post-Enlightenment era, if not also in our own time.

56.5. The core theory of his philosophical remedy

However, Scheler believed that any hope for the future and rebirth of Europe under Germany’s guidance and control should be based on essential knowledge of what humans are and how they stand and act in the cosmos. The greatest achievement of Scheler’s philosophy is the discovery
of a way of building a normative material ethics of values without falling prey to the dangers that Kant understandably pinpointed in any such effort. Kant claimed that any ethics that refers to non-formally (or materially/contentfully) grounded moral values is necessarily an ethics of goods and purposes, only a posteriori and inductively valid and condemned to concern only the consequences of action, thus unable to thematize the virtuous ethos (Gesinnung) of the person. Such an ethics would be reducible to mere hedonism or an ethical legalism that presupposes a heteronomous and egoistic subject (Scheler 1973a, 6–7; Spader 2002, ch. 1; Blosser 1995). Scheler recognizes the greatness of Kant’s criticism against all pre-existing, non-formal ethics, but also rebuts this as no longer valid since Phenomenology discovered a way to overcome the traditional view of the constitution of our experiential possibilities and of the worldly beings we are presented with.

The first systematic theory covering this appears in the two installments of Formalism in the Jahrbuch (1913, 1916). Experience is not a matter of only having access to internal representations caused by outer beings, and the latter are not mere spatio-temporal clusters of sensory properties to which representations somehow refer. Humans exist as persons, as concrete beings, a fundamental part of which is their emotive make-up, and their experience is characterized by intentionality. This intentionality means that the beings that appear to us belong to a transcendent world-horizon, while the fact that humans exist as concrete persons with emotive lives means that beings in the world appear and are recognized by us, primordially, as always already invested with value and meaningfulness. In straightforward experience, we do not come across mere sensory things; rather, we experience beings having this or that value for us and for our life or existential and praxial aspirations in the world. That is, in our primordial experience of the world we are conscious of goods, i.e., of thingly substrates bearing—or metaphorically ‘invested with’—values. Values have a special status with regard to the things that happen to be their contingent bearers. And the phenomenological way of seeing can show us that values stand independently from their bearers and are hierarchically interrelated as either lower or higher values, which are also deemed either positive or negative (Scheler 1973a, 12–22, 85–100; Frings 2001, 19–34).

Our ethos-defining emotive life is conditioned by an a priori stratification that enables us to experience the corresponding objective order of values, which are either to be realized in the world as good or otherwise avoided. Echoing Husserl’s remarks in the fifth Logical Investigation (1901), Scheler distinguishes between mere sensory feelings and specifically intentional feeling acts.8 In the former we become aware of sensory contents like pain, pleasure, fatigue, vigor, sadness, etc., corresponding to analogous states in our body, organism, or psyche; in the latter, however, by experiencing the organismic, psychic, or spiritual self we intuit values, such as agreeableness, nobility, healthiness, beauty, or holiness as special objects in the transcendently appearing world of (correspondingly valued) beings. In the cognitive act of preferring we can experience the objective order of values, which can be either negative or positive and low or high. The specifically moral values of good and evil, according to Scheler, are not values standing as such within reality, but are realized, as it were, “on the back” of non-moral values (Scheler 1973a, 27; Frings 2001, 39–41). What he means is that whenever we realize positive and high values, we are promoting or realizing the good. The contrary is the case with evil. The actions of a person in the world who has a healthy ordo amoris aim at realizing the higher positive values, which promote good, and avoiding the lower negative values, which promote evil. Good acts and persons, then, are those that promote positive high values (and vice versa for evil acts and persons).

The study of ethics is precisely about the conditions that should be presupposed on the side of the person’s ethos so that his or her actions can achieve the ultimate goal of safeguarding the
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promotion of the good. Scheler develops an amazing and very delicate analysis of the emotive and willing or desiring factors that come into this picture. The foregoing basic exposition suffices to show us that it constitutes a necessary basis upon which to build a new non-formal (material/contentful) ethics of values, immune to the threats evoked by Kant. But this can only provide a basis for a new ethics if we also have a well-developed theory about the factual presence of evil in the world. If we are beings with the capacity for experiencing the objective order of values and a preference for the good, then why is there—at least moral—evil in the world? The difficulty of developing a full account of this forced Scheler to explore, in separate studies, the problems of how evil enters the world and of our prospects within it. In the first exposition of his theory, Scheler developed a phenomenological theory of emotion, value, and motivation that culminates in a rich and penetrating theory about the constitution of the person. In parallel and in a further development of the theory, Scheler conducted separate analyses regarding the ordo amoris, ressentiment, and related issues such as the forms and bonds of sociality, the metaphysics of the living organism, history, and culture, some of which were also published. Finally, Scheler elaborated further on some ideas regarding the place and course of the human being in the cosmos as a result of the way in which he or she confronts reality qua painful resistance to his or her aspirations.9

56.6. The formation of the ethos in a turbulent reality

Why do humans commit evil? The inner life of the person, Scheler said, is continuously formed and reformed, each time taking the shape of a concrete ethos or, as it is more generally known, a particular ordo amoris. The constituents of our emotive lives are each time ordered or “crystallized” in ways that depend on the moral education and experiences that each of us has in the course of life (Scheler 1973c, esp. 100; Frings 2001, 58–70). The normative, loving inner organization, then, breaks down and others are established. This reorganization of the ethos of a person results in corresponding misapprehensions of the objective order of values. Responding to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality (1887), Scheler focuses especially on the formation of the ethos of ressentiment, which he holds responsible for the pathological systematic reverse of the objective order of values in our experience. In a society in which this has happened, nothing makes sense and the society is then doomed to fail, its culture collapsing into nihilism. Another source of the problem is that human persons are finite beings, never having fully developed their ordo amoris to the degree of an absolutely pure loving personality, which does not allow us a full vision of the total spectrum of objective values. In addition, the facticity of reality and our lives in it makes it so that, more often than not, we come across situations in which we experience irresolvable, original conflicts of values in the Kantian sense: for example, a mother being asked by the police to inform on her thief son; a radical pacifist being forced to decide what to do when terrorists are about to cut the throat of his or her beloveds, etc. In Formalism, Scheler works on the idea that moral life is not achieved legalistically by conforming to abstract rules, but in the very core or internal lived ethos of the person. We obtain guidance for leading such a life from a priori possible living exemplars or model personalities experienced in terms of their value, while being and acting in situations like the latter (Spader 2002, 140–5; Frings 2001, 74–80).

From Scheler’s analyses, we have the model personalities of the saint, whose ordo amoris is sensitive and preferentially locked to the values of the holy; the genius, who sees spiritual-cultural values; the hero, who sees psychic or vital values; the leading spirit, who is sensitive to the values of usefulness and achievement; and the bon vivant, who has eyes for sensory values (Scheler 1973a, 109–110, 502–503, 585–586; Stikkers 1980, 17ff.; Spader 2002, 135ff.).10 These models could provide sufficient guidance if we were not simple finite beings who cannot be
fully in all these modes of being or experientially and ‘commensurably’ estimate the worth and appropriateness of each, and, furthermore, beings who can never experience the full spectrum of objective values. Does it follow, then, that we are inexorably doomed to moral fragmentation and inconclusiveness?

Scheler originally hoped that a deep relation to (participation in) God somehow offers a way out of this tragic difficulty. In the closing sections of his *magnum opus*, he explicitly states that further research regarding the essence of God and the intentional acts of faith, in which we supposedly come to know God, will show us the way. Scheler actually engages in such a project in *On the Eternal in Man* (1921). The outcome is an extended attempt at the phenomenologization of religious consciousness and (supposedly) experience. However, the effort to show precisely how this is done and to complete his non-formal ethics of values raised severe problems regarding the essence of a theistic God and the presence of evil in the world, which forced him to reconceive his program and its possibilities (Spader 2002, 143–148 and ch. 8).

**56.7. The ideal, the real, the becoming of God and of the world**

After 1921, Scheler progressively moved toward dramatically new views. From 1922, he was also disappointed with the Catholic Church, which showed marks of open hostility against him after his third marriage in 1924. At this point he came to believe that personal, social, and ideological conflicts could not be solved via the Catholic religious experience of a theistic God. It was no longer the model personality of a saint that could bring about the sought-after overcoming of finiteness and partiality, the presence of which was torturing human persons and their social formations, but scientific knowledge of the social basis of all political ideologies and *Weltanschauungen* (*Ibid.*, 137–138, 144, 147, 189–190). The post-war Weimar mass democracy was becoming a failed attempt at rationalization and technocratization of human affairs. Against this tendency, *Lebensphilosophie* called for re-spiritualization through intuition of the essence of life and its inner forces. Scheler suggested that values and meaningfulness might be provided by the elite in religion or philosophy, but, in agreement with Weber, now believed that science should be recognized as the value-free provider of impartial grounding truths. Against the rising anti-rationalism cultivated in the masses by the Church, as well as by the radical political right and left, in 1924–25 Scheler started to appeal to the Enlightenment science and liberal-democratic principles for the salvation of Germany and human culture from conflict and collapse (*Ibid.*, 152).

The possibility of the scientific, neutral search for truth could show us that conflicting *Weltanschauungen* are not arbitrarily relativistic, but they rather grow out of a deeper common ground. For Scheler, this was none other than an “absolutely natural *Weltanschauung*” that Phenomenology could trace behind historically actualized views and cultures, corresponding to the eternal objective hierarchy of truths and values of *Geist* or Logos. Thus, a series of basic typologies of “relatively natural *Weltanschauungen*” grow in each region and time, becoming further bifurcated in response to the real material factors (*Realfaktoren*) of each time (Spader 2002, 155–161; Frings 2001, 195–212). He argued that philosophical-sociological scientific knowledge (critical of both Comtean and Marxian views) of how all this happens could help both in educating the elite to rule and in attaining mutual understanding between disparate moral outlooks and social groups. In an explicitly anti-Hegelian vein, Scheler insists that it is not the spirit and its’ ideal factors (*Idealfaktoren*) that cause the holding of a worldview, but the real factors. Leaving behind the view of an absolute complete God as the eternal, powerful, personal spirit that creates and moves everything, Scheler now conceives of spirit/reason in general as totally impotent. What comes to hold—or, in Scheler’s terminology, what gets “functionalized”—is
a particular worldview (viz. a system of values) (e.g., Frings 2001, 60–63). In other words, the world order we happen to experience depends on what we come to comprehend as value-meaningfulness in our interest- or urge-motivated struggle with the real factors we confront at each time. Thus, worldviews take hold depending on the course of the interest-driven struggle of our all-powerful urge or drive (Drang) against the rest of human and non-human reality.13

On the other hand, real factors, including social class identity (definable by its ethos and corresponding value preferences), cannot determine the content of a worldview and what is seen as real, true, or valuable, but only the picking of this or that a priori possible way of seeing the world. Socio-historical or interest-determined are only the vantage points (generally, but also the ones that prevail), not reality itself or the truths valid for it (Stikkers 1980, 9ff.; Staude 1967, 155, 159, 164, 174–178, 207; Spader 2002, 188ff.). The latter are a priori possible and only picked and actualized in history in the way sketched.

The phenomenological sociology of knowledge could, thus, show the whole of objective reality and the hierarchy of values, as well as humanity’s place ‘in between’ them and how worldviews become instituted in the course of history. The knower of all this—and not some absolute omnipotent God—could then guarantee the possibility of a unificatory context within which the historically partial and fragmentary could be understood and handled, avoiding deadly conflict and harms. On the basis of this, this privileged knower would be in the position to see what is the case at each time and, by contrast, what diverges (viz. evil) from the objective—even if not yet fully unfolded in the world—order of all beings. Accordingly, a suitable remedy for the realignment toward the prospective complete realization (viz. good) of the becoming cosmos could be discovered and applied. If someone had the possibility of such knowledge, then, along with knowledge of the formation and transformation of the human ethos, he, she, or they could eradicate evil from Earth.

56.8. The future and the prospect of a salvation from evil

What does this panentheistic idea of a becoming God and the possibility of a human knower as described above signify with regard to the meaning of evil and the prospect of salvation? To his theist critics, this appeal to a historically becoming God indicates a psychological collapse and a surge of pessimism in Scheler’s soul during his last years (Spader 2002, 176ff., 196ff.). In reply, Scheler says that he was once told “that it is impossible to bear the idea of an unfinished and God-in-becoming.” However, Scheler then immediately responds to this position, saying that “My answer is that metaphysics is not an insurance company for weak people in need of protection. Metaphysics requires and presupposes human beings with strong and courageous minds” (2009, 66). But does Scheler show the strength and courage that he praises and promotes? It may well be said that his last approach to the issue is simply a more advanced version of the known uncurbable progressivism and eschatological optimism that characterizes most of philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition that has formed the Western religious and secular ethos. Instead of ascertaining a pre-existent, complete, personal, caring God or Spirit/Logos, Scheler projects its panentheistic analogue into some indefinite future. Meanwhile, he also believed that elite phenomenologists would eventually understand what this becoming of God is and what is expected of us in the interim in order to be safe from evil. Despite past and present tragic fragmentation and conflict, the good God, or rather our guided march toward goodness—qua harmony, “adjustment” or “equalization” (Ausgleich),14 this time, between Geist and Drang—miraculously synthesize everything in a perfect unity. One way or another, then, salvation is again guaranteed. But what if it is not? How should we live and act in case no such guarantee exists?
Be that as it may, Scheler has given us, in the interim, incredibly rich insights about the human predicament, our current standing, and our possibilities. Some of these can probably help us to proceed further, but also in a different manner.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Notes}

1 In his 1922 work \textit{Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart}, Scheler himself dates this first meeting as occurring in 1901 (Scheler 1973b, 308). It appears, though, that this actually happened in 1902. For details, see Henckmann 1998, esp. 11–13 and 13 n. 5.
2 There are clues that Scheler was thinking in ‘phenomenological terms’ even before his meeting with Husserl. See Spiegelberg 1994, 269–270; Staude, 1967, 19ff.
3 The vast scope of Scheler’s thought and work is well depicted in Frings 2001.
4 Scheler appears to have played a very important role in the conversion of Edith Stein. The young Jewish phenomenologist, “dazzled,” “seduced,” and “fascinated” by the “genius” Scheler and his lectures in Göttingen, turned to Catholicism. See Stein 1986, 259.
5 There are already introductions to Scheler’s thought that present aspects of his philosophical theory or overviews of some of his important publications. In what follows, my aim is to present a reading of how his philosophy interacts with his socio-political and religious views in the historical context of the first quarter of the twentieth century in Germany and Europe.
6 A rare exposition of this work can be found in Staude 1967, ch. 3.
7 The \textit{Genius of War} (1915) also suggested that Germany’s differences with France were less fundamental and that, after the war, they could be eliminated in the context of a unified Europe that would have eradicated the influence and threat of Britain, the USA, and Russia. In \textit{War and Rebuilding} (1916), however, Scheler placed France clearly on the side of the bourgeois spirit and identified Germany alone as destined to rebuild Europe. See Staude 1967, 86ff., 94, 96, 100.
8 For more on this pivotal issue in Husserl and a phenomenological axiology and ethics, see Theodorou 2012. For Scheler’s understanding of and efforts to develop this distinction and further information on issues around this taxonomy, see Theodorou 2018.
10 A silent compromise has been made here in the correspondence due to the known discrepancy in Scheler’s analysis between, on the one hand, the five model personalities and emotive spheres and, on the other hand, the four levels of values offered.
11 A short account of the main points of this analysis can be found in Davis and Steinbock 2016, §5. See also Spader 2002, 144–147 and ch. 7; Frings 2001, ch. 4.
12 This conception of the Geist in general, i.e., not only of the finite human, appears to have taken place after his “Problems of Religion” (1921) and is reflected in the first chapter of the \textit{Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge} (1924) and in the \textit{Problems of Religion} (1928).
13 It is generally acknowledged that Scheler’s thinking on spirit and urge (\textit{Drang}) is not developed as extensively and as clearly as we would have liked. Elements of these abstract and helplessly realistic metaphysical ideas, however, are presented in his published \textit{The Human Place in the Cosmos} and in the “Philosopher’s Outlook” (Scheler 1958). See also Scheler 2008.
14 On this notion, see Staude 1967, ch. 7.
15 I would like to thank James E. Hackett for his helpful comments on the penultimate draft of this paper and David Standen for his linguistic polishing of the text.

\textbf{References}


