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PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CARTESIAN TRADITION

Édouard Mehl

Included in the Cartesian tradition is not only the actual *corpus* of Descartes but also its critical reception. The philosophical debate in the 17th and 18th centuries was decisively shaped by figures such as Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694), Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), John Locke (1632–1704) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). And, in addition to these major figures, one should still mention those *minores*, some of whom (e.g. Johann Clauberg, 1622–1665) tried to combine the newfangled Cartesianism with a certain kind of *Schulmetaphysik*. In its long tradition – from Francisco Suárez to Christian Wolff, at least – this *Schulmetaphysik* struggled to ground philosophy in a general doctrine of being; independently of the Cartesian project of a “first philosophy”, and even before it, this doctrine – that would come to be called “ontology” at the beginning of the 17th century – defined its object, the *ens*, as the universality of the conceivable: *ens ut cogitabile, omne intelligibile*; πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν (Courtine 1990, especially part 4; Carraud 1999; Mehl 2019, ch. 1, §3). This is the tradition that sustains the history of Western metaphysics as well as its onto-theological constitution and which, according to Heidegger, runs in a straight line from Spinoza’s *Ethics*, passing through the Leibnizian constitution of the principle of sufficient reason, all the way to Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (Heidegger 1969, 1991). On the one hand, then, at the crossroads between the Cartesian legacy and scholastic ontology, we would find the core of modern “rationalism”, ascribing to subjectivity both the task of securing knowledge and the challenges involved in its foundation. On the other hand – and already in the 1930s – a completely different path of Cartesianism would arise that consisted in regarding subjectivity as free will. This path, considered by some to be more authentically Cartesian, is the one that would be followed by post-Sartrean phenomenology in its opposition to Husserl’s emphasis on theoretical reason.

If, bringing the discussion back to Husserl, one wanted to assess his position in regard to the philosophical project of Descartes, the most reliable sources would be: first, the *Cartesian Meditations*, a work consisting of a series of conferences delivered by Husserl in Paris and Strasbourg in 1929; and, secondly, the great historical fresco in §§16–21 of the *Krisis*. This relationship, nevertheless, remains inescapably ambiguous. In fact, Husserl only seems able to overcome Descartes by repeating the latter’s own gesture, i.e., by reproducing it on that strictly transcendental level that Descartes himself would not have been able to grasp. Now, since a thorough treatment of such a fundamental theme cannot be carried out here, however, this entry will focus on three specific questions that revolve around the confrontation between phenom-
enology and what could be deemed its modern starting point (Ausgangspunkt), i.e., Cartesian move of a beginning a primis fundamentis (AT VII, 17,6).

I – Evidence and truth: the absolute foundation of knowledge

Husserl was acquainted with Descartes since much before the 1907 “turn” and the project of a transcendental phenomenology. There are notes dating from before 1900 (Majolino 2003) that show an early reading of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. This text was, for the Neo–Kantians, despite being an unpublished, unfinished manuscript, the best expression – maybe even the birthplace – of modern philosophy, as well as the cornerstone of its later criticism.

Now, the origin and the consolidation of this Neo–Kantian tradition took place with the works of Paul Natorp (1882), Ernst Cassirer (1899), and, later, Heinz Heimsoeth. And, at least according to Natorp’s reading, the goal of the Regulae is to argue for an equivalence between evidence and truth. “All knowledge is certain and evident cognition” (Regulae, II, AT X, 362/vol. 1, 10), as Descartes put it in that work. This introductory remark, as obvious or tautological as it may sound, would disclose the fundamental turning point in modern science: certitude is not in the object of knowledge – the object does not even appear in this formulation. Certitude is a modality of knowledge itself, one that we could call “subjective”, even if Descartes himself never used the term in this specific sense. The first consequence of this Copernican turn is that epistemic certainty does not vary according to the domain of object but is built solely on the evidence of a “clear and distinct” perception. Hence, the privilege that mathematics – or rather its two fundamental disciplines: arithmetic and geometry – has frequently enjoyed vis-à-vis the other sciences is not due to its objects having a special ontic dignity or their being abstracted from matter. It is due only to the fact that its formal object – that is, quantity, and its two species: continuous and discrete – are “so simple and easy to conceive” that it poses no resistance to our mental apprehension of it (II, AT X, 365, 14–22). This privilege, therefore, is not a monopoly; it does not have to be restricted to this specific domain. Indeed, the Regulae claim that the subject can find the same character of evidence in any objectual knowledge, and this evidence will not differentiate between one and another type of knowledge: “Thus everyone can mentally intuit that he exists, that he is thinking, that a triangle is bounded by just three lines…” (AT X, 368, 21–23/vol. 1, 14).

Evidence and certainty are gained in and through the exercise of doubt, whose function is to distinguish and to discriminate what is certain from what is doubtful. This equivalence between esse verum and esse certum provides the outlines of a general science that will be defined as mathesis universalis (Rule IV). Accordingly, the Regulae dictate that, before getting to know any of the objects to which the intellect is related, one must know the intellect itself (Rule VIII). And they also demand that knowledge be limited according to the representability of those objects that are “imaginable”, instead of being extended all the way to pure noumena – as one can never know whether there really are objects in experience that correspond to the latter (Rule XIV).

Natorp’s work of 1882, dealing essentially with the Regulae, includes a polemic appendix against Julius Baumann (1837–1916) who, in a book published a few years before (Baumann 1868), had defended a purely metaphysical reading of that text and had presented his own view of Descartes’s ontology of mathematics. According to Natorp, the fundamental concepts of Cartesian philosophy, starting from space, time, and number, do not have, as Baumann suggested, a metaphysical justification – the famous “divine veracity” to which Baumann subjects a posteriori, so to speak, the theory of evidence in the Regulae. Natorp shows that Baumann incurs in a “countersense” when he attributes to Descartes the idea that mathematical objects must be “real” because, as they are clearly and distinctly perceived, they must be “something” instead of...
“nothing”. By following this faulty reasoning, Baumann would thus be misled into affirming that mathematical idealities prove the existence of their object – an assertion deemed absurd by Natorp. His objection to Baumann is, reasonably enough, that mathematical objects are expressly devoid of any existential claim and that imagination, in so far as it is a clear and distinct perception, both suffices as a criterion of reality and dispenses with any divine assurance. This is in accordance with (Princ. Phil., II, 21, AT VIII-1, 52), where it is applied to indefinite spaces; these spaces are not only “imaginary” but also “perceived as really imaginable and, therefore, real”: “vere imaginabilia, hoc est realia esse perippium”. It is then the “theory of pure knowledge”, i.e. purified of any metaphysical presupposition not open to intuitive verification, that constitutes the ground and the basis on which rests the edifice of Cartesian knowledge, including metaphysics itself. Much later, Husserl, by his turn, would make a similar move and, with surgical precision, would deliberately “purify” Leibnizian monadology, getting rid of the useless and wavering hypothesis of a creative and conservative cause of the harmony of the monads.

All things considered, one of the remarkable strengths of the Neo-Kantian reading of Descartes is that it lays out the plan and the task of first philosophy: namely, the search for and the establishing of a general criterion of truth – the same research, that is, as the one that guides Husserl’s Third Cartesian Meditation. In refusing formal logic and the usefulness of the syllogism, Descartes had excluded dialectics from “true logic”. The latter, meanwhile, had been brought down to its simplest form: a theory of the perception clara et distincta. On this point, then, Husserl was less influenced by the discussions of the Marburgians than by the works of Kasimir Twardowski (1866–1936) – see Twardowski (1892) – who, like Husserl himself, had been a student of Brentano. In 1892, Twardowski had presented the basis for a general theory of evidence conspicuously exemplified in the cogito, and it seems that Husserl’s first appeal to the “phenomenologically grasped” pure ego, in the Logical Investigations, deliberately follows Twardowski’s reliance on evidence in opposition to Natorp’s Kantian views, according to which a “pure I” cannot be grasped (for it could not be apprehended except as this object that, by definition, it is not) (Hua XIX/1, 372–376/91–94). Husserl – taking note of Kant’s radical critique toward the entire metaphysical tradition that preceded him – firmly refuses the argument of the “venacitas dei”, regarded as nothing more than a useless and wavering metaphysical trick. And in doing so, he also refuses, as a corruption of their inaugural discovery, the psychologism that, latent but inherent in their innatism, affected the Cartesians.

In Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie, a text from 1903, Husserl had already drawn the outlines of a theory of knowledge grounded in originary evidence, while also challenging the Cartesian distinction between the subject, the object, and the mental act itself in the intuitus mentis. Husserl understands this mental act of the intuitus mentis rather as the “presentification of an intuitive sense”, and he shows how this can be referred back to a form of ante-predicative or “originary” evidence that is mixed with the absolute givenness of this object: “every sort of object has its own mode of being given according to their ipseity – they have, that is, their own evidence”. With Husserl, the phenomenological gaze will focus on the evidence of the pre-given objects as it consists in the soil or the substrate presupposed in every predicative judgment (Experience and Judgment, §4) but which is out of the narrow visual range of formal logic. This is what Husserl meant by his own endeavor of coming back “to the first foundations” (“a primis fundamentis”) or to what he calls sometimes – in a reference to Goethe’s Faust – the “kingdom of mothers”.

At the time of the Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie and the Logical Investigations, Husserl’s Cartesianism is deployed to defend the possibility of true knowledge and, working against all kinds of skepticism, relativism, or frivolous subjectivism, to provide it with foundations. The Regulae, thus, are still read and understood in a neo-critical, transcendental perspective. There is no intention here of finding in them the traces of an unacknowledged, irresolute ontology. This will only come about with
Heidegger, in his later portrayal of the Cartesian project of the *Regulae* as that of a “kind of formal ontology” where we could identify “something like a doctrine of the most common determinations of being in general …” – in such a way, however, that the relation between “the matheusis universalis – as the project of a formal ontology – and the rest of his work” remains, to Descartes himself, “unclear and undecided” (Heidegger 2012, 423–428).16

II – *Descartes’s failure to grasp the transcendental point of view and the misunderstandings of modern “rationalism”*

In 1903, at this early, developing stage of Husserlian phenomenology, the philosophy of Descartes appears as an effort to provide Galilean science with stable foundations – in the sense of the opening statement of the *Meditationes*: “*aliaud firmum et mansum in scientiis stabilire*”. Now, this Galilean or Cartesian–Galilean science17 gets rid of sensible qualities and operates only under the parameters of quantity (*magnitude, figura et motus*). As such, it would constitute both the model and the intrinsic goal of all philosophical activity, even if, at this stage, the metaphysical – or, rather, meta-theoretical – interlude of the *Meditationes* is meant only to establish the science of nature or of bodily being in its definite and ultimate truth. As Descartes himself had put it: my *Meditations* contain “all the foundations of my physics” (*Descartes to Mersenne, January 28th 1641, AT III, 298, 1–2*). Therefore, says Husserl: “The new and much-admired science of nature had become the prototype of authentic science in general, and that can be seen in the way we now take for granted the type of reality of spatial things as the prototype of every type of reality – including psychic reality” (Hua VII, 101). Descartes, in spite of all his efforts, cannot break free from this presupposition of the omni-validity of Galilean science: “Is Descartes here not dominated in advance by the Galilean certainty of a universal and absolutely pure world of physical bodies?” (Hua VI, §18, 81/79). In this sense, the discovery of the ego, unlike the phenomenological disclosure and exploration of a “realm of subjective phenomena which have remained ‘anonymous’ so far” (ibid., §29, 114/111), is not a goal in itself. On the contrary, it is merely a means to an end, a moment to be overcome in the task of establishing Galilean science in all its certitude and in its omni-validity.

The mathematization of the science of nature stems from an act of idealization and, at the same time, of a covering up of the world of experience with that of mathematical idealities: “The mathematization of nature […] has become so much a matter of course that, already in its Galilean conception, the exact world was from the first substituted for the world of our experience” (Husserl 1973, §10, 44). Mathematization – and, more generally, idealization – operates then as a “veil of ideas”, covering the primitive layer of sense givenness. It is a “veil” or “garment” that phenomenology must “destrukt”, says Husserl, in an implicit but clear reference to the Parmenidean critique of the theory of forms. Moreover, this “substitution” (“*Unterschiebung*”), for its part, induces another one: Descartes would have been led to cloak transcendental subjectivity, at the very moment of its discovery, with an analogous and, indeed, perfectly symmetrical cover-up. Barely glimpsed at, the pure transcendental ego would become itself an intra-worldly theme. One can see it in Descartes’s passing from the claim that “ego sum, ego existo” to that other, different claim: “sum […] res cogitans” (ATVII, 25, 12; ATVII, 27, 18; Hua I, §10). Implicitly, and unaware of what he was doing, Descartes would lend to the reality of this *res cogitans* the same constitutive traits of the *res extensa* – even though the latter was already, at that point, suspended by doubt.

Now, of course it would be a blunt paradox to accuse Descartes of being fascinated by the object of Galilean physics. All the work of the *Meditations* is obviously an attempt to develop, with the *cogito* and with the *idea entis infiniti*, a (proto)type of reality that is not only incommen-
surate with the reality of bodies, but also completely independent from it – and one on which the reality of bodies itself would be founded, not the contrary. Nevertheless – and Husserl’s opinion on this is increasingly clear throughout his texts – Descartes’s lack of radicality is due to his understanding of the ego merely as a mirror, as a counterpoint to objectivity. This is, in fact, the fundamental meaning of what Husserl calls “rationalism”: when Descartes defines the ego as “mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio” (AT VII, 27, 14), it is already the sign of having overlooked the universal transcendental ego and of having failed to see in it anything but the simple reflection of the rationality of the real.

III – The monadological ego and the overcoming of the Solipsismus-Streit

More than any other of Descartes’s successors, it was Leibniz who managed to challenge Cartesian objectivism and the pernicious way in which philosophy was made a servant of the science of the material world. This remains true even if Leibniz himself, just like Spinoza, Descartes, and Malebranche before him, would ultimately succumb to the senseless illusion of the possibility of a universal objective knowledge of the world “more geometrico” – a knowledge that would encompass both the science of bodily nature and a rational psychology.

Moreover, and indeed as all of Descartes’s successors, Leibniz firmly disputes the thesis and the procedure of the Sixth Meditation, which intends to prove the existence of bodies and the real distinction between thinking and extended substances. The bewilderment that plagues “Cartesian dualism” would be the effect, rather than the cause, of a problem that was even more radically metaphysical: namely, solipsism. Leibniz thus writes, in a fragment from 1679, that “we cannot know the reality of those objects that affect our senses in any other way but a priori, insofar as we cannot be alone in the world”.

This point defines very precisely the program of Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation: it shows the Other to be absolutely necessary to the constitution of an “objective” world. To be objective and to be true means through and through to be there for everyone (für-jedermann-da). Now, this is not the same idea, or at least not specifically the same, as Descartes’s objectum purae matheseos. The latter, indeed, was the object of an understanding indifferent both to the existence of the Other and to the existence of a world that would be objectively valid only to the extent that it were valid for everyone. In the Fifth Meditation, however, having reestablished the others’ being present for me as a transcendental condition, even if implicit, of every kind of objective validity, Husserl managed to bridge a significant gap created in metaphysics by solipsism – which was, as we have seen, the cause and, at the same time, the symptom of the failure of metaphysics. From now on, if the objectivity of the world is still to be understood on the basis of a predication of universality, this predication itself is not to be taken in the merely logical sense of that which is true in every case, of that which is true by means of some internal necessity, proper to the combination of its terms. It is universal, instead, in that it is the same for everyone – for me as for any other “I”. All that is shared and common “for everyone” is universal in this second sense. The very idea of an “objective” world has no meaning if not within a transcendental community of egos related to the same world, while the characteristic unity of this world, unifying the indefinite multiplicity of the Umwelten, is founded upon the unity of the unique community, universal and necessary, of all coexisting monads. The ego cogito would not, therefore, be enough to found objectivity, as the latter requires, aside from representation – no matter how constant – the agreeing co-representation of a common, unique nature. Hence the passage, in the Cartesian Meditations, from a transcendental egology to a transcendental monadology, and from a “Cartesian” paradigm to a Leibnizian one, where both the possibility and the sense of being of the objective world depend on transcendental intersubjectivity as its necessary precursor.
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And yet, in conclusion, it must be added that Husserl’s monadological turn is not a refutation of Cartesian egology: it is a delving further into it, a course correction after the misleading interpretation that replaced the universal ego with an intra-worldly being, clad in the pseudo-consistency of a thing – an interpretation whose first victim was Descartes himself. To put it in other words, a monadology, for Husserl, is the necessary consequence of this first philosophy whose program and method were established by the *Meditationes de prima philosophia*. Husserl did not take distance from Descartes so that he could turn toward Leibniz, just as his longstanding interest for Leibnizian monadology never implied the abandoning of the Cartesian path. On the contrary, Husserl found in Leibniz, and in his definition of the ego as monad, precisely the only way to carry out the Cartesian undertaking of a first philosophy.27 That is the reason, despite the seeming paradox, for the crucial part assumed by the doctrine of Leibniz in these (nevertheless) *Cartesian Meditations!*

**Notes**

1 We refer to the works of Descartes in Charles Adam’s and Paul Tannery’s edition as presented by Bernard Rochot and Pierre Costabel. The volumes are indicated in Roman numerals, followed by page and line numbers.

2 Also, Husserl dedicated two seminars to Descartes in the 1890s (*Sommersemester* 1892 and *Wintersemester* 1896).

3 On the evolution of Natorp’s own interpretation of Descartes, see Dufour 2006. See also the valuable remarks in Calan 2013.

4 Following his breakthrough work, *Descartes Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis* (1899), Cassirer will hold a more speculative, more comprehensive interpretation than that of Natorp: instead of considering the “*erkenntnistheoretisch* rationalism” of the *Regulae* as a form of ascetism, a sort of abstinence from any metaphysical position, Cassirer reads the metaphor of the sun, in the First Rule, as a “new form of relation between thinking and being, necessarily shaping both the possibility and the value of objective knowledge”.

5 Heinz Heimsoeth was the author of *Die Methode der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und Leibniz* (1912). This work had a very cold reception in France, as one can see from a review in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (1912), whose conclusion reads: “It is regrettable […] that the author, a disciple of Natorp, only keeps from Descartes that which can forecast Kant […] Mr. Heimsoeth’s book is marked by a systematic ignorance of everything that was not published by the Marburg masters.”

6 Reference, respectively, to the AT edition and to the English translation: Descartes 1985.

7 In 1905, J. Baumann, then a student of Hermann Lotze working in Göttingen, would oppose the appointment of Husserl as Professor at the university.

8 See *Disours de la Méthode*: “and I always had an extreme desire to learn how to distinguish true from false” (DM I, AT VI, 10, 9–11).

9 “Die konstitutive Problematik. Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit”. To put it more precisely, the expression “criterion” is not from Descartes. He speaks only of the search for a rule of truth (*regula veritatis*/*regula generalis*). The expression “criterion” is more likely established following (Lambert 1915). On the non-psychological theory of the criterion of truth as the core of “rationalism”, see *Couturat an Husserl*, 26. VII. 1899, (Hua-Dok III/6, 28): “we realize that what constitutes the logical kernel of thought, that is, the criterion of true and false, eludes introspection and psychological analysis”.

10 On this work, see the instigating study in Starzyński 2017.

11 See also the note of the Second Edition to §6 of the *Fifth Investigation* (Hua XIX/1, 368/352).

12 See Kant 1999, 134: “However, the *deus ex machina* is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions. It has – besides its vicious circularity in drawing conclusions concerning our cognitions – also this additional disadvantage: it encourages all sorts of wild notions and every pious and speculative brainstorm.”

13 In his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl uses the Latin expression “veracitas” two times: §1 (Hua I, 45) and §40 (Hua I, 116). It is worth mentioning that Étienne Gilson dedicated a study specifically to this question: “La vérité divine et l’existence du monde extérieur”, collected in Gilson 1930. On the actual role of the “divine veracity” in Cartesian metaphysics (strongly contested by J.-L. Marion, according to...
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whom the rule of evidence is never really founded, but is always — and from the start — operational), see the presentation of the debate in Olivo 2005, especially 165–210.

14 A psychologism that is also that of Kant in his *1770 Dissertation*. On this point, see Pradelle 2012, 114–121.


16 On the relation between the *mathesis universalis* and formal ontology, see also Hua XXV, 132–135. The important text of Heidegger was not yet known when Jean-Luc Marion put forth his interpretation of the *Regulae* (Marion 1975) that follows along the same line of Heidegger’s commentary and sketches the outlines of this “ontology” of the *ens qua objectum*. Both Heidegger and Marion go against the idea of a somewhat sterile notion of evidence, such as it was understood by the Neo-Kantians and by A. de Waehlens after them, according to whom “The author of the *Discurso on the Method* carefully avoids any ontological problem” (de Waehlens 1938).

17 By the time he was writing the *Krisis*, Husserl found out about the work his disciple and friend Alexandre Koyré had devoted to Copernicus, Galileo and Descartes (from the 1930s, there are: the first French translation of the first book of *De Revolutionibus orbium coelestium* copernicien [1934]; *Trois Conférences sur Descartes* delivered at the University of Cairo in 1937 [1938]; and the *Études Galiléennes*, which build on an essay published in 1935 — before the *Krisis* — Koyré 1935).

18 On this point, see the issues of the *Second Meditation*: “*De mente humana. Quam nostror sit quam corpus.*”

19 See, for instance, how Husserl intelligently frames the problem in the project of a letter to Helmut Kuhn. In the passage, Husserl intended to warn Kuhn about the risk of understanding the reduction in a contradictory way, which would amount to “falling prey to the same mistake as Descartes, even if in a more elevated fashion”: “in this conception of epoché you mention, the I — which would have to be the transcendental I — is still the other pole of the correlation of intraworldly experience: it is the pole opposite to objects but it is, nevertheless, itself and for itself an object”. In opposition to this unfinished, fruitless *epoché*, Husserl insists that “the really universal bracketing of the world in its totality goes hand in hand with the opening of a new universum of ‘being’: and indeed with the opening of the dimension of transcendental subjectivity as the original location of the constitutive sense-givings of the universal sense ‘world’” (Hua-Dok III/6, 244–245).

20 On Leibniz, see Mahnke 1917; Rabouin 2006; Pradelle 2006.

21 Hua VI, §72: “this idea which led even Leibniz astray — is a nonsense”. On the idea of a universal science and of a pure mathematics of lived experiences, such as Spinoza considers to have developed in the third book of his *Ethics*, see already Hua I, §72, when Husserl poses the question of “whether a phenomenology would have to be constituted or even could be constituted as a *geometry of experiences*” (the answer is negative, of course, since phenomenology can only be a descriptive science). It is also worth noting that Descartes despised geometrical order, only having employed it in the *Secundae Responsiones* to satisfy the pressing request of Father Mersenne.

22 This is the double thesis of the *Sixth Meditation*, contested both by Spinoza and, from a different perspective, by Pascal. Husserl was not acquainted enough with the historical development of the Cartesian tradition to know exactly what in Leibniz was due to one or the other: to Spinoza, markedly, a metaphysical theory of expression – see, on this point, Deleuze 1968; to Pascal, the reading of *Disproportion de l’Homme*, and the theory of double infinity, that Leibniz himself considered to be the introduction to monadology. See de Buzon 2010.

23 Quoted in Fichant 2004, 285. The difficulty and the interest of this note come from the fact that, even more than a critique of what Descartes writes in the *Sixth Meditation*, it is a literal reiteration of what he had written in the *Third: (MM III, AT IX-1, 33). On Husserl’s relying on Leibniz to overcome the “Selbspinsus-Streit”, see Gérard 2006, 35.

24 On this point, Husserl is preceded, or maybe accompanied, by Mahnke 1917. On the notion of “objective” world as “world for everyone” — universality conquered by renouncing every form of realism — see §26, p. 24: “Only the logical form of the world is ‘objectively valid’, even if we do not want to describe it as an exterior, really existing transcendental world, but rather as a transcendental concept of the world”. For Mahnke, the sense of being of what is “really there” is grasped as a modality of the intentional lived experience. The lived character of what is really there (“*den Erlebnischarakter des ‚wirklich da’“) presupposes a community of monads (or ‘living beings’) of the same species, both having the same perceptions and being conscious of this identity. On the immanence of the sense of the world — and even of the world as “really being” — in conscious life, see Hua I, §28, 97.
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25 With a brief linguistic maneuver – the superposition of two adjectives formed by the same radical (allgemein and gemeinsam) – one could say: die allgemeinsame objektive Welt.

26 The conclusion of §55 suggests the constitution of the world and that of the intersubjective community to be concomitant and interdependent: they are, indeed, both sides of the same constitution (Hua I, 156).

27 See the exchange between Husserl and Mahnke, which deals largely with these questions (Pradelle 2016).

References


