Eugen Fink was born in Konstanz, Germany, on December 11, 1905. He undertook his university studies in Münster, then in Berlin and lastly in Freiburg im Breisgau, the town where he lived, except for a short period during wartime, until his death (July 25, 1975) and where he taught philosophy and pedagogy at the university uninterruptedly from 1946 to 1971.

§ 1. Fink was a student and scientific collaborator of Edmund Husserl for about ten years, from 1928 onwards, when the elderly founder of phenomenology was made Emeritus Professor and left the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg to his former disciple Martin Heidegger. In December 1929, Fink, with Husserl as first supervisor and Heidegger as second supervisor, discussed his doctoral dissertation about the acts of presentification and consciousness of image. It consists in a revision of the text that he had submitted in an essay competition announced by the Faculty of Philosophical Studies in 1927. From 1928 to 1931 – while he was already an assistant of Husserl (and from 1930 onwards the only one) – Fink attended all Heidegger’s lectures. Among these lecture courses he was strongly influenced by Heidegger’s winter course of 1929–1930 entitled *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (Heidegger 1983), whose main topic was the openness of the human being to the world. He also attended the famous Heidegger–Cassirer debate in Davos (Switzerland) in 1929.

In the same years Fink collaborated with Husserl on a set of projects – in the spirit of what we can define a genuine “co-philosophizing” between master and disciple – and was charged by Husserl with the task of revising for publication his Bernau manuscripts on time-consciousness (dating back to 1917–1918). But the most noteworthy step of this co-working relationship was when Fink attempted – in the early Thirties – to rework the previous text of Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* with a view to a systematic treatment of phenomenology. During the period of academic isolation of the “Jew” Husserl, following the ascent to power of Nazism in Germany (1933), Fink maintained an active and constant collaboration with him, relying economically on some scholarships he had obtained from Great Britain and the USA, until his master’s death in 1938. But in the new political situation of Germany, his relationship with the “non-Aryan” Husserl precluded any chance of him achieving the qualification as Professor. In March 1939, Fink emigrated to Louvain in Belgium, where the large legacy of Husserl’s manuscripts had been transferred from Nazi Germany and put in a safe place thanks to Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe’s care, but above all thanks to Franciscan friar Herman Leo Van Breda’s initiative. Together with Landgrebe, Fink planned the transcription of these manuscripts. After
the German invasion of Belgium in May 1940 and several other vicissitudes Fink was compelled to go back to Germany and drafted into the Wehrmacht; he was assigned as a common soldier to aerial surveillance around Freiburg till the end of the war.

It was at the University of Freiburg, in 1946, that Fink achieved the qualification as Professor, producing as his dissertation the unpublished text of that *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* which he had written in 1932, at the time of his active collaboration with Husserl. So, he was able to begin his activity as unsalaried lecturer and after two years he became full Professor of philosophy and educational science. Bureaucratic difficulties prevented him from accepting Felix Kaufmann’s invitation to teach for a year at the New School of Social Research of New York and at the University of Chicago. In 1950 he founded the Husserl-Archiv of Freiburg, which in the following years collaborated with the Husserl-Archiv of Louvain in order to publish Husserl’s manuscripts. Fink attended many philosophy conferences: in 1949 in Mendoza (Argentina); in 1966 in Vienna and in 1971 in Salzburg (Austria); in 1972 and 1973 in Merano (Italy). He also attended international conferences of phenomenology: in Brussels (Belgium, 1951); in Krefeld (Germany, 1956); in Royaumont (France, 1957); and in Sarajevo (former Yugoslavia, 1967). As a consequence of a surgical operation and poor health he retired in 1971. On July 25, 1975, Eugen Fink died of a heart attack.

In the Thirties Fink was appreciated by scholars of phenomenology as Husserl’s faithful disciple and the “official” interpreter of his thought. This reputation was due above all to the publication in *Kant-Studien* in 1933 of Fink’s long article *The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism*, which included a foreword where Husserl stated that “it contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction” (Fink 1966b, VIII/74). That explains the propensity, among the first readers of Fink, to understand his earlier works as writings born in the spirit of Husserl’s research. This was the opinion of French phenomenologists Gaston Berger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who were among the first scholars to obtain knowledge of Fink’s project of a *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. As a matter of fact, the collaboration between Fink and Husserl in the Thirties had led to a complex discussion in which the disciple did not fail to assert new ideas and original problematic statements within his master’s phenomenology. We can say that Fink’s contribution to phenomenology was so important that – as Ronald Bruzina writes – “Husserl’s phenomenology, at least as it reached its maturity in his last years, was not just Husserl’s – it was Husserl’s and Fink’s” (Bruzina 1995, xxviii). We can also say that, from Husserl, Fink learned the exactness of the phenomenological way of seeing; from Heidegger, he learned the speculative tendency to “project” the being-question, which he tried to insert into transcendental phenomenology. From the phenomenological decade (1928–38) of Fink’s research, we must distinguish a second stage that starts with the beginning of Fink’s teaching at the University of Freiburg in 1946. In this second stage he focuses his research on the relation between the human and the world through an original interpenetration of ontological, cosmological and anthropological themes.

§ 2. In his doctoral dissertation of 1929, published in 1930 in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* and entitled *Vergegenwärtigung und Bild* (Fink 1966a), Fink stressed that the intentional interpretation of acts, in the whole of the phenomenological analysis of the constitution, remained fundamentally provisional and preliminary to the “constitutive clarification in proper and pregnant meaning”, which comes back to a last level of problems: the “temporal constitution” of the acts themselves (Fink 1966a, 19). It is a matter of a problematic level which in his unpublished drafts and working notes of the Thirties (now in course of publication)⁵ Fink assigned to a *meontic* (from Greek *mē on*, “non-being”, “non-existent”) consideration referring to the question of the “origin of being”.⁶ In its provisional outcomes Fink’s dissertation – which originally involved a second part – not only offered a study of the
intentional forms of “presentification” and “consciousness of image” with a view to outlining a phenomenology of non-actuality, but it also put at the center of phenomenological research those moments of consciousness of time (the forms of “de-presencing” [Entgegenwärtigung]) (Fink 1966a, 22), in which un-actual backgrounds surrounding our living experiences take their forms (as happens, for instance, in “forgetting”). It was an attempt to refer to phenomena that are not susceptible to being thematized on the basis of something given and intuitionally present, and therefore to proceed beyond the “presentialism” of Husserl’s analysis of intentional acts, which has its model in the object of sensorial perception. But it is also possible to find in the text of 1930 Fink’s propensity to confer a speculative character to phenomenology, much beyond Husserl’s preference for descriptive and intuitive analysis of phenomena.

Fink’s work must be placed in a period of revision and self-criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology, on the grounds of the need to tackle some recent objections which had been raised against it, like the criticism made by Heidegger, according to whom consciousness in its transcendental meaning, disclosed in phenomenological reduction, would remain a wordless subjectivity. In the years from 1929 to 1932 Husserl wavered between two different tasks: on the one hand, the project of a revision of his text of Cartesian Meditations (Hua I; Husserl 1960) to make it functional to a global presentation of phenomenological philosophy, much more than the French version published in 1931; on the other hand, the project of writing a system of phenomenological philosophy. Both projects were resumed by Fink, who proceeded to plan a new systematic presentation of transcendental phenomenology and to revise the five Cartesian Meditations published in France. But, above all, he wrote an entirely distinct Sixth Meditation, which aimed at laying the foundations of a second-level phenomenology by sketching the idea of a “transcendental doctrine of method” (with an explicit reference to the inner partition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason into “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” and “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”).

What distinguishes Fink’s rewriting of the Cartesian Meditations is, first of all, his inclination to create a “de-Cartesianization” of the procedure of phenomenological reduction and to overcome the apparent pre-eminence in it of a self-sufficient and self-present ego, which the phenomenologist would detect by leaving simply behind any reference to the world. On the contrary, according to Fink, it is important to show how this reduction has its worldly starting situation, which constitutes an inescapable moment of the reduction itself: it is not possible to take leave “at one stroke” from the general thesis of the natural attitude and avoid the question of the pre-givenness of the world. While the text of Husserl’s First Meditation moves from the idea of a true science in order to attain the apodictic evidence of the transcendental ego, after having put the objective world “between brackets”, Fink’s rewriting of it establishes a kind of “circularity” between pre-givenness of the world (as a world which also includes me in my human existence) and reduction. This emphasis on the pre-givenness of the world will have a noteworthy weight in preparing that concept of “life-world”, which later will be the core of Husserl’s Crisis (Hua VI; Husserl 1970) and will justify the overcoming of the “Cartesian way” to phenomenological reduction.

In Fink’s texts, a certain propensity is evident to take into account Heidegger’s objections to transcendental phenomenology and to assume his existential analytics developed in Being and Time (1927) as an elaboration of the starting point of philosophy, which prepares the task of phenomenological reduction. However, unlike Heidegger, Fink does not give up the transcendental character of phenomenology and rather interprets its fundamental question as the question on the “origin of the world” (Fink 1966b, 102/98). According to Fink’s reading of transcendental phenomenology, the performance of phenomenological reduction does not lead metaphysically “outside” of the world, i.e. into a sphere that is separate from it. On the contrary, the move of
transcending the world, which happens with reduction as the disclosure of transcendental sub-
jectivity, involves at the same time the retention of the world in the “absolute” in the phenom-
enological sense. That is to say, “the world remains immanent to the absolute and is discovered as
lying within it” (Fink 1966b, 105/99).

This phenomenological absolute must be understood, according to Fink’s Sixth Cartesian
Meditation, not only as a comprehensive unity of world and origin of the world, but, in its most
pregnant meaning, as the comprehensive unity in which transcendental life is articulated; as the
unity of constituting life and phenomenologizing life, or as constituting life that comes to self-
consciousness in the process of phenomenologizing, i.e. in the pure theorizing activity and in
the self-reflection peculiar to the transcendental onlooker “non-participant” in the constitution
of the world. In idealistic and speculative language, Fink speaks about the “being-in-itself” and
the “becoming-for-itself” (Hua-Dok II/1, 164/148) of the phenomenological absolute, in order
to characterize it as the synthetic unity of two antithetical tendencies. We can thus recognize
in it, on the one hand, a constitutive tendency that is directed to the world; in this tendency
(the “being-tendency” or “enworlding”) (Hua-Dok II/1, 23/21) we can distinguish further
between “constituting pre-existent [vorseidendem] performance” and “constituted existent [seien-
dem] ‘result’”; on the other hand, we can also recognize a properly transcendental tendency as
the opposite “tendency of self-elucidation, of coming-to-oneself” (Hua-Dok II/1, 163/147). If
it is the task of a “regressive phenomenology” to explore the world-constitution, if this regres-
sive phenomenology is accompanied further by a “constructive phenomenology” that investig-
ates those problems that cannot be certified intuitively, now, according to Fink, it is a matter
of attaining a “phenomenology of phenomenology”: this second-level phenomenology, instead
of pursuing the task of drawing out the “transcendental cosmogony” (Hua-Dok II/1, 157/142)
(i.e. the constitutive becoming of the world) from its concealment, brings into focus the activ-
ity of the phenomenological onlooker. That is to say that, whereas in the previous stages of
regressive and constructive phenomenology the phenomenological onlooker was fundamentally
directed to the constitutive operations of transcendental subjectivity, which have the world as
their end-product, we are now, on the contrary, facing the task of a phenomenological science of
phenomenologizing, directed to a transcendental elucidation of the acting life of the same ego
that phenomenologizes transcendentally.

In the background of Fink’s theoretical design we can see some resumptions of different phil-
osophical conceptualizations: 1) a conceptualization of a dialectical kind (the formulation of
the movement intrinsic to transcendental life as coming-to-itself, as proceeding from being-in-itself
and being-outside-itself to being-for-itself), which entails an unusual introduction of Hegelian
themes into phenomenology; 2) a conceptualization of a criticist kind, according to which the
idea of a “system” of phenomenology is planned on the grounds of a “structural analogy” with
the design of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; 3) a conceptualization of an ontological kind, which
arises from Fink’s intent to establish a connection with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. From
this last point of view, Fink makes explicit an ontological meaning implicit in the phenomeno-
logical reduction, as a reflection that discloses the difference in being between the transcendental
subject and the world. Further, he maintains that performing the phenomenological reduction
involves “a separation of transcendental being into two heterogeneous regions” (Hua-Dok II/1,
22/20): the region of the constituting I and the region of the phenomenologizing I. With
regard to these questions Fink raises the issue of a “thematic reduction of the Idea of being”
(Hua-Dok II/1, 80/71); the execution of this complex task introduces the transition to a sphere
of problems that are focused on the concept of a “meontic philosophy of the absolute spirit”
(Hua-Dok II/1, 183/1) (as he wrote in the draft of a Foreword to the Sixth Cartesian Meditation).
Fink seems to refer to such a concept in the text of the Sixth Meditation, when he stresses that
the theoretical experience of the phenomenologizing I tends towards something that properly is not, i.e. that is not existent in the meaning of the mundane concept of “being” and, at most, may be expressed analogically as “pre-being” [Vor-sein] (Hua-Dok II/1, 83/74, 85/76). In this regard, to the reduction of the Idea of being Fink strictly connects the question of mundane language, settled in the natural attitude. This language, which unavoidably transmits ontic meanings, is now taken over by the phenomenologizing onlooker and employed as an analogical medium to predicate transcendental knowledges and to signify meontic meanings.

Since he raises the question of the phenomenologizing I, which is separated both from the constituting I and from the natural human I, Fink can state a transcendental tendency to “un-humanization” [Entmenschung] (Hua-Dok II/1, 43/40; 119/109; 132/120), which must be understood as the tendency of man – when he performs the phenomenological reduction – to “overcome” himself and his mundane self-apperception in order to find the transcendental onlooker in himself. Now, this transcendental onlooker – the phenomenologizing I – comes into a relation of antithetic opposition to the activity of the transcendental constituting I, since the former does not share the “being-tendency”, peculiar to the latter, and only reveals this tendency to the constitution of worldly being. Fink, however, does not purpose to emphasize this polarization inside transcendental life; on the contrary, his reflection on the phenomenologizing onlooker allows him to mediate between worldliness and transcendentality. Indeed, it is the onlooker who is charged with the task of this mediation, owing to his necessary tendency to reenter into worldliness: his phenomenologizing does not happen only as un-humanizing and abstention from transcendent apperceptions, but realizes also a tendency to enworlding [Verweltlichung], in the meaning of what Fink calls a “non proper or secondary enworlding” (Hua-Dok II/1, 108/99) and conceives as a tendency to the “appearance” of the phenomenologizing subject in the world. At this point, the full subject of phenomenologizing must be characterized, according to Fink, not only as transcendental, but also as worldly, on the ground of what he defines as a “dialectical unity” (Hua-Dok II/1, 127/116) between the spheres of the transcendental and the mundane.

Fink’s design of a systematic completion of phenomenology through a phenomenology of phenomenological reduction arose from an intensive dialogue with Husserl and was bound to take account of the critical remarks expressed by the older philosopher about several points of the project of a Sixth Cartesian Meditation, whose manuscript text remained unpublished and had a limited circulation among few readers. Although, afterwards, Fink departed from the problems of phenomenology in its transcendental meaning in order to undertake new ways of research, the following developments of his thought are rooted in his early projects, arising from daily conversations between him and Husserl on the basic principles and limits of phenomenology. To understand these developments, it is most important to consider the task of a “constructive phenomenology”, in which Fink included those problems that rise at the margins of regressive phenomenology and its genetical developments, i.e. the problems which belong to the external horizons of the reductive givenness of transcendental life and cannot be certified intuitively any longer, as, for instance, in the question about the “beginning” and the “end” of our constituting life. To face the generative problems (birth and death) and the problems of the reference to something that is not given intuitively requires one, according to Fink, to go beyond the boundaries of intentional analysis, which maintains its fundamental model in the object of perception. Rather than to describe – as Husserl did – the phenomena in an intuitive and analytical way by attaining them in the original sources of the experience, Fink prefers to anticipate speculatively the last horizon in which these phenomena are placed. It is not astonishing that, in §7 of the Sixth Meditation, Fink makes explicit an analogy between the concept of a “constructive phenomenology” and Kant’s concept of the “transcendental dialectic”. Indeed, he stresses
that in one as in the other there is an inquiry into structures of wholeness that are in principle non given: here concerning the totality of transcendental subjectivity, there the totality of “appearances” (the cosmological antinomies). […] In both cases it is a matter of the basic problem of the relation of the “given” to the “non-given”.

(Hua-Dok II/1, 71/64)

Especially in Fink’s working notes of the Thirties we can see the outlines of a phenomenology that, in a subterranean way, takes form as a phenomenology of non-givenness, referring to those “phenomena” that cannot be thematized on the basis of what is “given” as an object or a set of objects. Fink focuses on particular phenomena of “circumstantial” and “all-pervasive” character or denoting an absence (for instance, “day light” and “night”, “silence”, “wakefulness” as the original way of being open to the world, “sleep” as a state of closure to the world). Moreover, in Fink’s analyses, the whole field of phenomenality is not circumscribed by a fixed and stable horizon, equally distant from a center – from a subject that describes phenomena as lived and perceived by it – but it is structured variously in “proximities” and “distances”, according to the different reference points inside it. We can find here Fink’s peculiar theoretical tension towards a “cosmological phenomenology”, which aims at founding the appearing of beings not on subjectivity but on the world, according to a point of view that is also at the roots of the idea of a “non-subjective phenomenology”, developed by Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977), who shared with Fink a lifelong dialogue.9

§ 3. In the university courses of the post-war period – some of which are at the basis of important published works: Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum – Zeit – Bewegung (1957); Sein – Wahrheit – Welt. Vorfragen zum Problem des Phänomenbegriffes (1958); Alles und Nichts. Ein Umweg zur Philosophie (1959); Spiel als Welterlebnis (1960); Nietzsche’s Philosophie (1960); Metaphysik und Tod (1969) – and in manifold articles and lectures (collected posthumously in Nähe und Distanz), Fink moves beyond Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Now, transcendental phenomenology is considered by him as inadequate to clarify those dimensions of “space”, “time” and “movement”, which are not “things” that come to a phenomenological givenness, but ways in which the world as a whole deploys itself. However, the world is not considered by Fink in the same way as Husserl, i.e. as the universal and athematic horizon of phenomena, but ontologically, as the “whole of being” in its difference from “beings” which are inside it. The assertion of a “cosmological difference”, owing to which the world is not “a being” – it is not an object and neither is it the sum of all things – brings Fink’s thought near to Heidegger’s theme of the “ontological difference” as a distinction between being [das Sein] and beings [das Seiende]. However, Fink does not refer first of all to the problem of being as the fundamental question of philosophy, as Heidegger did in Being and Time, but inserts this problem in the question of the world, because he thinks that the being-question can be posed only with regard to the world, conceived as the dimension of the manifestness of all beings – i.e. of their appearing.

According to Fink, the appearing of beings must not be thought any longer as a subjective event – the becoming object for a subject of representations – but as their coming to light, their coming out of concealment and entering disclosure, in conformity with a cosmic movement that coincides with the process of universal individuation, through which things are outlined in space and time. The cosmic movement of appearing and individuation of beings cannot be the object of intuition and description as it is in the phenomenological method, which remains bounded to phenomena that are given, but requires the transition to speculative thought. For Fink, this thought demands that we make use of peculiar symbolic concepts. It is the case, for instance, of the concepts of “heaven” and “earth”, which, if on the one hand border on myth, on the other hand are suitable for pointing out the poles of the movement
through which beings come out of concealment, emerging from the shapelessness of elements, and expose themselves in the light of appearing. So Fink tries to establish the premises for a non-metaphysical thought of the world,\textsuperscript{10} i.e. a thought which does not conceive the world on the basis of thing as substance; therefore, in his lessons of the post-war period he does not address Husserl any longer, but Nietzsche and pre-Socratic thinkers (especially Heraclitus, on whom he holds a seminar together with Heidegger in winter 1966–1967) (Heidegger and Fink 1970).

Among symbolic concepts, the concept of “play”, which rises to the function of “symbol of the world”, holds a central position in Fink’s thought (as highlighted in his work of 1960 \textit{Play as Symbol of the World}).\textsuperscript{11} The “speculative concept of play” (Fink 2010a, 28/30) allows him to think of the cosmic movement as a process that is not “focused” on a unique subject in its theological-metaphysical (God) or idealistic (the ego) meaning, but as the universal emergence and decline of all beings in their individuation, as the process through which finite things arise and fade in space and time. According to Fink, cosmic play, unlike human play, consists in a game without a player. As such, it has no foundation – it does not refer to a purpose, a meaning or a project – but starting from itself produces all foundations for the being of things and men. At the same time, play, understood as human play and thought as “symbol” (in its original Greek meaning of a fragment destined to be completed), allows Fink to refer to the process of the peculiar “completion” of man with the world, by which man enters into relation to the whole. The world, which is never visible as such, appears in human play as in a field within itself; play reflects thus not only the ecstatic openness of human being to the world, but also the prevailing of the world itself. In this meaning, “the world comes to appear in the appearance of play: it shines back itself into itself in taking on an intrawordly relation, even if in irreal form, taking on features of the prevailing whole” (Fink 2010b, 215/207–208).

If in Fink’s cosmological thought man has no longer an absolute cosmic centrality, as in subject-oriented philosophies, he retains, however, a primacy among all beings. Indeed, man, unlike other living beings, does not confine himself to follow a predesignated way, that is, to live according to fixed patterns, but he projects himself ceaselessly and engages himself in multidimensional projects. He is the only one among intra-worldly beings that not only is in the world, but also relates to his being-in-the-world and is so open-to-the-world. What distinguishes man from stone, plant or animal is that he lives in a meaningful dimension and shares this dimension with other men in a common social context, according to ways of existence that at the same time are ways of “co-existence”; in play – as well as in work, in struggle for dominance, in love and in the experience of death – man realizes his openness to the world in co-existential relations and joins himself to the whole of the world. In the light of these themes – which are at the center of some important courses of lectures published after Fink’s death (Fink 1979, 1987) – the goal of Fink’s thought seems to consist in an anthropology of cosmological tendency. In the situations of play, work, struggle, love and death Fink, indeed, recognizes the “basic phenomena” \textit{[Grundphänomene]} of human existence, which at the same time act as “ways of the understanding of being and world” \textit{[Bahnen des Seins- und Weltverständnisses]} (Fink 1976, 273, 276) and therefore can be defined as “symbols of the world”.

Notes

1 On Fink’s life see Fink S. 2006. See also the recent illustrated biography of Ossenkop, Kerckhoven, Fink R. 2015.

2 See the Appendix, which contains the speech Heidegger made in celebration of Fink’s sixtieth birthday: “Für Eugen Fink zum sechzigsten Geburtstag” (Heidegger 1983, pp. 533–536/367–369).
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3 On Fink’s early philosophical itinerary, see Bruzina 2004.
4 An interesting account of the working relation between Husserl and Fink is provided by Dorion Cairns’s notes from his conversations. See Cairns 1976.
5 See Fink 2006. The vol. 3/1–4, Phaenomenologische Werkstatt, includes the transcriptions edited by Ronald Bruzina of Fink’s unpublished drafts and working notes; up till now the following sub-volumes of EFGA 3 have been published: 3/1, Die Doktorarbeit und erste Assistentenjahre bei Husserl (2006), and 3/2, Die Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte, Cartesianische Meditationen und System der phaenomenologischen Philosophie (2008). Other published volumes of EFGA: 2, Textentwürfe zur Phaenomenologie 1930–1932 (2019); 5/2, Sein und Eindlichkeit. Teilband 2: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (2016); 6, Sein, Wahrheit, Welt (2018); 7, Spiel als Weltsymbol (2010b); 13/1–3, Epilegomena zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2011); 16, Existenz und Coexistenz (2018).
7 Hua-Dok II/1–2. For an insightful review of Bruzina’s translation (Fink 1995), see Hopkins 1997. On Fink’s texts regarding the project of a rewriting of the Cartesian Meditations and Husserl’s marginal remarks, see the important and pioneering work of Kerckhoven 2003.
8 On Fink’s contribution to the writing of the “Crisis”-texts, see Bruzina 2004, pp. 61–63.
9 See and Patočka 1999.
10 These premises were already defined by Fink in his lecture course of 1949 on Welt und Eindlichkeit. See now Fink 2016, pp. 191–402.
11 See Fink 2010b. The key text, from which the volume takes its title, is on pages 30–224/33–215.

References


