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HORIZON

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The philosophical background: the history of the concept

The concept of the horizon derives from the Greek verb horizein, which one could roughly translate as “to divide,” “to delimit,” or “to mark off by boundaries.” In Antiquity, this concept was employed primarily in astronomy. One can trace the specifically philosophical applications of this term to Neo-Platonism and its doctrine of emanation. We come across the concept of the horizon in The Book of Causes (Liber de causis), which in the middle ages was falsely assumed to have been written by Aristotle. This work, whose content derives from Proclus’ Elements of Theology, contends that the human soul finds itself in the horizon of eternity, under and above time.

Such a metaphysical interpretation of the horizon remained central in medieval philosophy until the 13th century. The situation changed with Thomas Aquinas, who was the first to interpret the concept of the horizon anthropologically. For Aquinas, the nature of a human being is both spiritual and physical, and thus a human being is said to have the limits of both natures in itself.

While medieval philosophy determined the concept of the horizon either metaphysically or anthropologically, in modern philosophy the horizon became an epistemological concept. With the advent of modernity, it was no longer a question of metaphysically determining the soul’s or the human being’s place in the order of the cosmos, which presumably had been set in advance and which one could only subsequently identify, although by no means modify. Modernity introduced new distinctions between true and apparent horizons, as well as individual and universal horizons. With modernity, the horizon became a matter of reflection and self-determination.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, as well as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, employed the concept of the horizon in their pursuit of the rational and historical limits of human knowledge. The task of determining the breadth and limits of human knowledge remained the central task that guided Immanuel Kant’s use of the concept of the horizon. It was especially the synthesizing powers of Kant’s philosophy that rendered his reflections on the horizon highly outstanding. In post-Kantian philosophy of the 19th century, and especially in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey, we face a growing philosophical interest in cultural, individual, and historical horizons.¹
Thus, in the history of philosophy, the horizon has received a number of complementary and conflicting determinations, the chief of which are metaphysical, anthropological, epistemological, historical, and cultural. Nonetheless, in all these diverse frameworks, the concept of the horizon remained a metaphorical term, whose significance was only marginal and which never reached a clear determination. Edmund Husserl was the first not only to transform the horizon into a notion of central philosophical importance, but even more notably, to uncover its full-blown problematic and significance.2

The psychological background: William James’ Principles of Psychology

In phenomenological literature, the concept of the horizon originates in the first volume of Husserl’s Ideen. Such at least was Husserl’s own view, which he expressed in Formal and Transcendental Logic.3 In Ideen I, the concept of the horizon refers to a non-intuitive context, which co-determines the sense of any object consciousness might be contemplating.4 To obtain a more precise understanding of this concept, one needs to address Husserl’s relation to William James.

As is well known, Husserl did not receive formal training in philosophy, but rather in mathematics and psychology. It should therefore come as no big surprise that his use of the concept of the horizon has more affinities with James’s psychology than with any philosopher, who has used the concept of the horizon before him. As Husserl himself has repeatedly observed, James’ concept of fringes of consciousness, which we come across in the Principles of Psychology, marks the psychological basis of Husserl’s concept of the horizon.5

In his Principles of Psychology, James uses the terms “fringe,” “halo” and “horizon” interchangeably. James employs these terms in the framework of his argument that there is no such thing as a purely thematic consciousness. As James puts it, “into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it” (James 1950, 240). Just as to be conscious of a sound is to be simultaneously aware of other sounds or of silence that precede and follow it, so to be thematically and explicitly conscious of any perceptual, affective, or conceptual object is to be simultaneously aware, although only non-thematically and implicitly, of other objects that surround and escort it. According to James, any thematic consciousness whatsoever is always “fringed” or “suffused” with emptiness “that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh” (James 1950, 255).

Following James, Husserl employs the notion of the horizon still in the lecture notes and research manuscripts that precede the publication of Ideen I. However, in these early writings, the notion of the horizon is not yet employed in the phenomenological sense, which the term was subsequently given in Ideen I. In the earlier works, Husserl uses the terms horizon (Horizont), background (Hintergrund) and halo (Hof) interchangeably, while he repeatedly acknowledges that he takes all three terms from James and understands them psychologically, as qualifications of experience (what James calls the “inner world of consciousness”) and not determinations of objects themselves. The situation changes in Ideen I, where Husserl for the first time employs the concept of the horizon as a transcendental notion.

In Ideen I, Husserl draws a distinction between the horizon, on the one hand, and halo and background, on the other. In §28 of this programmatic work, he argues that for consciousness transposed into the arithmetical “world,” the natural world is “a background for my act-consciousness, but it is not a horizon within which an arithmetical world finds a place” (Husserl 1983, 55). Husserl continues to employ the terms “background” and “halo” as James had done before
him, that is, as equivocal terms, which can determine either the “inner” or the “outer” world of consciousness. By contrast, he employs the concept of the horizon as a concept meant to cover only the phenomenon’s essential determinations, that is, those determinations in the absence of which the object would no longer be the object that it is. With this in mind, one could qualify the horizon as a notion that is meant to cover those dimensions of sense that consciousness implicitly co-intends in a way that the sense of what is co-intended is inseparable from what makes an object into what it is. Thus, while pre-Husserlian history of philosophy provides us with metaphysical, anthropological, epistemological, historical, and cultural determinations of the horizon, and while James enriches this arsenal of senses with a psychological determination, Husserl was the first to transform this notion into a specifically transcendental concept, which was eventually meant to account for the world’s constitution.

Husserl’s static phenomenology of the horizons

As far as Husserl’s static phenomenology of the horizon is concerned, the most elaborate analysis is to be found in *Ideen I*. Here Husserl thematizes the horizon as a necessary dimension of intentionality. For Husserl, the horizons belong neither to the natural world, nor to consciousness as it is conceived from the natural standpoint. The horizons are not components of nature and natural things, but essential aspects of intentional consciousness, which in *Ideen I* lends itself to a noetic and a noematic analysis.6

In virtue of noematic horizons, the explicit and thematic appearances are always already intentionally tied to implicit and non-thematic appearances. Due to these intentional ties, what appears explicitly and thematically is apperceived as an appearance of this and no other object of experience. For example, to hear a melody is to hear a particular tone explicitly as well as a number of other tones implicitly—tones one has already heard in the past or tones one expects to hear in the future. If other past and future tones were to accompany the tone I hear at the moment explicitly, one would in effect hear a different melody. Thus, to hear a melody, one needs to hear not only tones, but also relations between tones—to hear how the tones are bound to each other, in what harmony or disharmony. Insofar as appearances are appearances of an intentional object, they have their noematic horizons.

This insight gains its central significance in the framework of Husserl’s reflections on constitution. To account for how an intentional object is constituted is to clarify the implicit totality of references, which binds a plurality of noemata into an intentional unity. The horizon-consciousness thereby proves to be an empty-consciousness, which renders pure presence a sheer impossibility. The horizon-consciousness initiates a play between presence and absence, between what is given thematically and non-thematically, in virtue of which an appearance becomes an appearance of this and no other object of experience.

While noematic horizons signify the intentional bond that ties appearances to each other, noetic horizons are formed by intentional references that bind explicit acts of consciousness to implicit intentional relations, made up of sedimented retentions and protentions. These implicit relations contribute to the apprehension of the object that consciousness thematically intends. To return to the example of the melody, consciousness of the tone carries with it its past and future noetic horizons: when it intends a tone, consciousness also intends its own past actualities as well as future possibilities. This necessary overlap of what Husserl calls “transverse intentionality” and “longitudinal intentionality” highlights the fact that noetic horizons are essentially temporal: each act of consciousness carries with it the horizon of the before and after, and just as what is given before, so also what might be given after co-determines the intentional content of consciousness and transforms the present content into a momentary phase of consciousness.
Besides offering a noetic and noematic accounts of the horizons, *Ideen I* further thematizes horizon-intentionality in terms of the intentional object’s *inner- and outer-horizons*, which can be clarified both noetically as well as noematically. From a noematic standpoint, the inner-horizon refers to the cogivenness of those implicit and non-thematic appearances, which, taken along with explicit and thematic appearances, constitute the intentional object’s inner determinations. From a noetic standpoint, the inner-horizon stands for the references that bind the explicit and thematic act of consciousness to those implicit and non-thematic acts, through which the inner determinations of the intentional object are constituted. Due to the noetic and noematic references that constitute the object’s inner-horizon, the cup of coffee that lies on my desk has a side unseen. I must be conscious of this unseen side if I am to identify this object as a cup of coffee.

The intentional object’s outer-horizon also calls for both a noetic and noematic clarification. From a noematic perspective, the outer-horizon covers those intentional references that bind the explicit and thematic appearances of this particular intentional object to the implicit and non-thematic appearances of other intentional objects. From a noetic standpoint, the outer-horizon binds the explicit and thematic acts of consciousness with those other implicit and non-thematic acts, through which other intentional objects are constituted. If what appears intentionally is to be qualified as an object, it must have both an inner- and an outer-horizon. Thus the cup of coffee of which I just spoke is on my desk, to the left of the book, in this study, and so on.

Besides spatial objects, temporal objects also have their inner- and outer-horizons. To return to the melody: it is given to me not only in the now, but also in the past and the future that I now intend. This implicit givenness of the melody in the past and future qualifies the melody’s inner-horizon. So also, temporal objects have an outer-horizon. Thus while I hear this melody in the concert hall, I can also hear someone coughing, or I can keep comparing the present performance to other performances of the same piece I have heard in the past, or, finally, I can anticipate the applause I will hear after the performance comes to its end. These implicit references to the givenness of other temporal objects constitute the non-spatial object’s outer-horizon. Different types of objects, be they conceptual or affective, also have their inner- as well as outer-horizons.

It is crucial not to overlook that Husserl’s discussion of the noetic and noematic, as well as inner- and outer-horizons, takes place in the framework of his *transcendental* analysis. For Husserl of *Ideen I*, it would be an error akin to psychologism to reduce the horizons to merely psychic properties. For Husserl, the horizons are *essential* determinations of intentional consciousness and one of phenomenology’s central tasks is to clarify the role they play in the intentional object’s constitution.

Building on the basis of Husserl’s analysis of the horizon in *Ideen I*, one could further qualify horizon-consciousness as a peculiar form of *self-consciousness*, which is just as characteristic of transcendent as it is of immanent perception. Horizon-consciousness is a type of self-consciousness in three different senses. First, horizon-consciousness can be conceived as the consciousness of the “I can,” which entails the awareness of what one can do if one does the things one can do. In the words of Ludwig Landgrebe, the consciousness of the horizon is the “more or less dark awareness that ‘I can continue in this direction and thus gain experiences that will confirm or correct my previous experiences’” (Landgrebe 1973, 10). Secondly, for each act of consciousness to be a unified act, the now-point of the act must be experienced along with references to a system of retentions and protentions, in the absence of which the act of consciousness would lose its unity and, thus, could not be qualified as an act at all. Thirdly, each act of consciousness is experienced as bound not only to retentions and protentions, but also to the outermost limit of all acts, namely, the stream of consciousness itself. What unfolds beyond this limit (i.e. the
experiences that belong to other streams of consciousness) does not play a constitutive role in determining the sense of one’s transcendental experiences.

**Husserl’s genetic phenomenology of the horizons: the horizons of subjectivity**

When the further development of Husserl’s phenomenology of the horizons is taken into account, one can identify two chief limitations of Husserl’s static phenomenology of the horizons. First of all, this analysis misses the phenomenon of the world. Secondly, it also misses the horizons of transcendental subjectivity. The reason for both shortcomings is methodological: it concerns the reduction, as it is understood and practiced in static phenomenology in general, and in *Ideen I* in particular. The alternative paths to the reduction (especially the paths through psychology and through the lifeworld), have significantly enriched Husserl’s phenomenology of the horizons, so much so that the horizon could be qualified as a specifically genetic theme, which in its emergence appears dressed in static garb. While this section will concentrate on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology of the horizons of subjectivity, the next one will turn to the world-horizon.

For Husserl, horizon-intentionality is a characteristic of horizon-consciousness. However, static and genetic methods determine horizon-consciousness in significantly different ways. As we saw, in static phenomenology, horizon-consciousness is understood in terms of the object’s inner- and outer-horizons, each of which lends itself to a noetic and noematic clarification. By contrast, genetic phenomenology addresses it as “the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object is pregiven” (Husserl 1973, 150). The latter qualification suggests that consciousness is horizontal insofar as it typifies appearances, due to which it can anticipate the phenomenon’s subsequent modes of appearances. The awakening of typical pre-acquaintance is the awakening of the horizons of anticipation, that is, of the other possible manners of givenness, which consciousness prescribes in advance to the appearing phenomena. Husserl further qualifies the horizons of typical pre-acquaintance as the horizons of *determinate indeterminability*, which means that the projections of sense that the horizon-consciousness gives rise to can lead both to fulfillment and disappointment. The horizons could thus be said to be defining, yet not definite; determining, yet not determined.

On the one hand, because of the pregivenness of horizon-consciousness, each and every appearance is always already apperceived as an appearance of a particular intentional object. On the other hand, new experiences, insofar as they do not lead to pure fulfillment but bring about some kind of disappointment, transform the horizon’s anticipatory schema. This means that horizon-consciousness originates in experiences themselves, or more precisely, in the *sedi- mentations of experience*. Experience itself generates *habitualities*, which in its own turn guides subsequent experiences.

One might wonder if phenomenology of the horizons does not land in a vicious circle when it maintains that just as experiences are determined by the horizons, so the horizons are determined by experiences. For Husserl, this apparent tension is inherently productive: it proves that there are no fully formed horizons; that is, that the horizons are always in the process of formation. Moreover, this tension points toward deeper levels of genetic constitution, which phenomenology of the horizons is meant to clarify. To conceptualize horizon-consciousness genetically is nothing other than to inquire into the rudimentary sense-accomplishments that make up the horizontality of the horizon. More precisely, for Husserl, the tension in question originates in the syntheses of homogeneity and heterogeneity. The horizon of typical pre-acquaintance “has its ground in the passive associative relations of likeness and similarity, in the ‘obscure’ recollections of the similar” (Husserl 1973, 150).
The awakening of the horizons of typical pre-acquaintance is possible only as far as consciousness retains its past accomplishments as sedimented capabilities. The horizons thereby reveal themselves as the “mirroring” of the whole life of consciousness within each lived-experience. Horizon-consciousness, once taken in its concreteness, proves to be a horizon of subjectivity. That subjectivity itself possesses its own unique horizons can be considered one of the most fundamental accomplishments of Husserl’s genetic analysis of horizon-intentionality. The horizon of subjectivity proves to be the thematic field of genetic phenomenology itself: to thematize the origins of sense-formation is nothing other than to delineate the crystallization of the horizons.

The genetic references that bind different appearances to each other is exactly what makes up the horizontality of the horizon. This basic fact enables one to single out the first sense of the genetic concept of the horizon: the horizon is the implicit system of references (Verweisungshorizont), which embraces all appearances, due to which an actual appearance is an appearance of a particular objectivity.

As we have already seen, it is primarily potential appearances that are entailed in the actual one. The implication of potentiality within actuality highlights the second sense of the genetic concept of the horizon: the horizon is the horizon of validity (Geltungshorizont). That is, only in virtue of the implicit references that bind the actual appearance to potential appearances does my actual appearance become an appearance of a particular intentional object. The horizon thereby turns out to be the unity of validity, which in its own turn designates the homogeneous style of the forward streaming experience.

**Husserl’s genetic phenomenology of the horizons: the world-horizon**

In some of his research manuscripts, which are meant to clarify the concept of the world-horizon, Husserl draws an intriguing distinction between world-consciousness (Weltbewusstsein) and world-experience (Welterfahrung). This distinction suggests that the world-horizon can be thematized at least at two fundamentally different levels of transcendental experience. The world-horizon, as it is given through world-consciousness, could be further qualified as the world, conceived as the wherefrom of experience. By contrast, the world-horizon, as it is given through world-experience, could be further determined in two complementary ways: as the wherein and the whereto of experience.

When it comes to determining the horizons of things, conceived as singular realities, one must distinguish between the core appearance, given directly and immediately, and the horizons of typical pre-acquaintance, which enable consciousness to apperceive various other modes of the object’s appearance and thereby to transform the actual appearance into an appearance of this and no other object. Yet as Husserl maintains in some of his research manuscripts, “one should not overlook that the world is not constituted the way singular realities are constituted” (Hua XXXIX, 83). So also, in his Crisis Husserl qualifies the being of the world as unique and further suggests that “there exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects” (Husserl 1970, 143). In contrast to things, the world is not given through horizons; it is rather given as a horizon. With this in mind, one can determine the world-horizon, conceived as the wherefrom of experience, in the following way: the world-horizon, insofar as it is given to world-consciousness, and not world-experience, is a background without foreground, a halo without any kind of intuitive core. We are faced here with the world’s non-objective, non-thematic, and non-intuitive givenness. Despite such a threefold negative determination, the concept of world-consciousness remains a phenomenological concept in that it forms a necessary counterpart of the appearance of existent things. Thus the “universal ground of belief in a world which all praxis presupposes” (Husserl
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1973, 30) forms the necessary basis that underlies all consciousness of singular realities. The world as ground of experience, conceived as the intentional correlate of the universal passive belief in being, is nothing other than world-consciousness itself.

In contrast to world-consciousness, world-experience presupposes the same background/foreground schema that characterizes the consciousness of singular realities. In this regard, it is crucial not to overlook that Husserl qualifies things in terms of “existence-in” (Inexistentz): “the existence of anything real never has any other sense than that of existence-in” (Husserl 1973, 34). The qualification of things as existences-in calls for a correlative qualification of the world as the wherein of the experience. While real intentional things are qualified by their being-in-something, the world needs to be qualified as the wherein-of-everything: “everything is in it, and it itself is not an in-something” (Husserl 1973, 137). Husserl identifies such a notion of the world-horizon as the totality of nature. “The totality of nature is also ‘experienced’” (Husserl 1973, 137): it is experienced as the bond that ties all individual and plural substrates to each other. Such is the meaning of the world-horizon, conceived as the wherein of experience.

Yet Husserl himself admits that the notion of the world as the totality of nature is an abstraction: “but the world of our experience, taken concretely, is not only the totality of nature” (Husserl 1973, 138). This is because the world conceived as the totality of nature does not include founded, but only founding objects of experience. The concept of the world-horizon as the wherein of experience is meant to overcome this shortcoming. While the first two notions of the world-horizon refer to sensuous experience taken in its unmodalized manifestation, the third concept is meant to describe in its essential features the enrichment of sense the world-horizon undergoes due to modalization and non-sensuous experience.

Modalization is genuinely productive in that it generates essentially new types of experience. According to Husserl, “with each new object constituted for the first time (genetically speaking) a new type of object is permanently prescribed” (Husserl 1973, 38). This generation of a new typology of experience brings with it new horizons of anticipations, which guide subsequent experience. Thus, while unmodalized experience merely brings to fulfillment what was entailed in the previous horizons of anticipation, modalization gives rise to new horizons of anticipation, which do not overlap with the previous ones. Thus, the experience of the new transforms not only the subject’s understanding of concrete objects of experience; it also transforms the “horizon of all horizons”—the world-horizon. We come to face here “an enrichment of the world through new intentions and acquisitions” (Hua XXXIX, Text Nr. 41), which derives from modalized experience. Due to modalization and the generation of new types of experience, “our pregiven surrounding world is already ‘pregiven’ as multiformed, formed according to its regional categories and typified in conformity with a number of different special genera, kinds, etc.” (Husserl 1973, 38).

The world-horizon, conceived as the wherein of experience, is an accomplishment of intersubjective historicity. To suggest that the world-horizon is inherently historical is to recognize that it is always in the process of constitution. Taken in its historical concreteness, the world-horizon embraces not only what is constituted in founding unmodalized experiences, but also what is given through founded and modalized sense formations. In this way, the world-horizon, conceived as the wherein of experience, proves to be the lifeworld itself, taken in its concreteness. Thus, even though scientific theories and logical constructs are not things like stones, houses, or trees, they nonetheless “belong to this concrete unity of the life-world, whose concreteness thus extends farther than that of ‘things’” (Husserl 1970, 130). To emphasize this point, Husserl speaks of indentation (Einrückung) that founded objectivities leave on the world-horizon. Just like the sea indents the coastline, so the streaming-in of new experiences continuously indents the world-horizon, thereby transforming its “pregivenness.” For Husserl, when the constitutive
effects of such “indentation” are taken into consideration, the lifeworld proves to be a universal philosophical theme.

Thus, as a genetic concept, the horizon is simultaneously a horizon of subjectivity and the world-horizon. This does not mean that Husserl’s phenomenology of the horizon takes one in two opposite directions. Rather, such a state of affairs corroborates one of Husserl’s central claims he has argued for ever since Ideen I: the horizon is a figure of intentionality.

**Post-Husserlian phenomenology of the horizons**

The horizon, conceived both as a phenomenological concept and a phenomenological theme, does not exclusively belong to Husserl’s phenomenology. We come across this concept in the works of virtually all other phenomenologists, who implicitly or explicitly derive it from Husserl’s writings. Heidegger employs the concept of the horizon most frequently in Being and Time, and especially in the context of his account of temporality. Part One of his monumental study is titled “The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being” (Heidegger 2008, 65). Of central importance is the distinction Heidegger draws between the horizon of vulgar temporality and the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality. Just as in Husserl’s writings, so in Being and Time as well, the horizon is understood in two complementary ways: it concerns the transcendental determination of Dasein as well as the determination of transcendent entities. Such a two-sided determination of the horizon leads to the realization that the factual Dasein necessarily understands itself in the horizon of transcendence—a realization that, in its own turn, lies at the basis of Heidegger’s account of authenticity and inauthenticity. After Being and Time, Heidegger rarely employs the notion of the horizon, arguably due to the concept’s epistemological connotations. In Heidegger’s later writings, the notion of the horizon is replaced with that of releasement (Gelassenheit), which in contrast to any kind of horizonal projections of sense, is meant to let things be in whatever way they may be.

Just like Heidegger, so also Merleau-Ponty derives the concept of the horizon from Husserl’s writings. Just as Husserl, so also Merleau-Ponty understands the horizon as a figure of intentionality. In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty employs the concept of the horizon in the framework of his analysis of the lived-body, which has its counterpart in the natural world, conceived as “the horizon of all horizons” and “the style of all styles” (Merleau-Ponty 1976, 330). For Merleau-Ponty, the horizons are essentially open, which means that the horizontal synthesis is a temporal process and that this synthesis merges with the moment of the passage of time. According to Merleau-Ponty’s main contention, the horizons one inhabits can never be made fully explicit (Merleau-Ponty 1976, 332–333). This realization underlies the central role that ambiguity plays in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. With the discovery of the concept of flesh in his late works, Merleau-Ponty re-conceptualizes the horizon as a pre-egological “syncretism,” which he also calls a “polymorphic matrix” and a “new type of being” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 220–221).

While for Heidegger the horizons are first and foremost temporal, and while for Merleau-Ponty they are primarily perceptual, for Hans-Georg Gadamer, the horizons characterize the essence of understanding. Borrowing the concept of the horizon from Nietzsche and Husserl, Gadamer transforms this concept into a central hermeneutical theme, which concerns the relation between the universal and the particular. According to one of Gadamer’s most famous definitions of understanding, “understanding is the fusion of the horizons, supposedly existing by themselves” (Gadamer 2004, 306). This definition suggests that in the hermeneutical frame-
work, the horizons are always already “fused” (verschmolzen) from the outset, although not “fused enough” to abolish the differences between cultures, languages, or individuals. The horizon turns out to be a concept that embodies the living unity of identity and difference, and this unity in its own turn is conceived as a necessary condition of hermeneutic understanding.

While Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer have appropriated Husserl’s concept of the horizon and have sought to develop it in different frameworks of analysis, in more recent French phenomenology, we also come across attempts to abandon this concept. According to Jean-Luc Marion, the horizons of anticipation transform the unseen into the pre-seen, thereby erasing the phenomenon’s “fundamentally irreducible novelty” (Marion 2002, 186). For Marion, the horizon is a “visual prison,” “a panorama without exterior, forbidding all genuinely new arising” (Marion 2002, 186). The task of Marion’s phenomenology becomes that of freeing givenness from the horizon and that of demonstrating that certain phenomena exceed their horizon.

Notes
1 For a more extensive historical overview of the concept of the horizon, see Scherner 1974.
2 See in this regard Kuhn 1940 and Kwan 1990.
3 See Husserl 1969, 199.
4 See Gander 2010, 133.
5 For instance, in the Crisis, Husserl observes: “as much as I know, James was the only one who, under the heading of ‘fringes,’ became aware of the phenomenon of the horizon” (Husserl 1970, 267).
7 See Hua VIII, 147.
8 Or, as Husserl puts it in one of his research manuscripts, “to make the world thematic and, in a certain way, to direct to it a thematic regard, to want to know the world ‘experientially,’ to want to bring the world to intuition as the universe of possible experience … the unthematic world-horizon precedes all this” (Hua XXXIX, 83).
9 See Gadamer 2004, 301.

References

