In the course of the phenomenological movement, the concept of existence refers *prima facie* to the “existential analytic” that Heidegger elaborates in *Being and Time* (1927). “Existence” is thus intended in the light of *Dasein*, as “human existence”, and represents a key notion in the fundamental ontology that permits Heidegger to formulate the “question of being” (*Seinsfrage*), whose sense is at once conveyed and hidden by the history of metaphysics. As part of a conceptual plot constituted by related notions like “transcendence”, “world”, “freedom”, “responsibility”, “authenticity” and so forth, the concept of existence occupies an even more relevant position in existentialist philosophy through an appropriation of the phenomenological method that generally stands in critical opposition to the rationalism of Western tradition. This raises the related issue of the affinity between these two multifaceted forms of thought, phenomenology and existentialism, giving way to composite interpretations that have been tending to antithetical outcomes: the association that, on the one hand, legitimates a form of “existentialist phenomenology” and the differentiation that, on the other hand, does not allow phenomenology for compatibility with the so called “philosophies of existence”. Heidegger, for his part, openly rejected such a combination as evidenced by the *Letter on humanism* (Heidegger 1976); instead, Sartre did not hesitate to claim a convergence, by redefining his phenomenological proposal in terms of “existentialist humanism”.

Further examinations concerning the concept of existence, mostly sympathetic with the motifs of the phenomenological inquiry, between the first and the second half of the twentieth century, are in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, in the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler and in other authors that, beyond the field of philosophical studies, addressed the problematic nature of the human condition under the concepts of paradox and of crisis. In literature, Sartre himself is one such example, together with Albert Camus and Simone de Beauvoir; in religious studies, Martin Buber, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich are enumerated among the most illustrious scholars.

Original meanings of the concept of existence should also be noted in the “School of Brentano” aside from the existential as well as existentialist approaches, in a philosophical context characterized by issues of an entirely different order. The categories’ deduction proposed by the young Brentano in his 1862 dissertation on the several senses of being in Aristotelian; the ontological nature of intentional objects faced with the phenomena classification into “mental” and “physical”; the understanding of existential judgements; and, beyond Brentano, the method-
Existence

Theological suspension of the thesis of existence about the world of the natural attitude elaborated by Husserl following the transcendental stage of phenomenology. The plot of related notions of which the concept of existence is here systematically part, is as follows: “being”, “reality”, “essence”, “substance”, “fact” and “fiction”; a philosophically wide-ranging plot placed at the intersection of logic and ontology, whose sense radically changes when exposed to the various requirements of the phenomenological research.

Existence’s modes of being

On the basis of this preliminary consideration, a distinction may be drawn between two different understandings of the concept of existence: existence is philosophically conceived as the way of being particular to man or, more generally, as a certain way of being. Therefore, two are the sections to be introduced in order to phenomenologically illustrate the concept of existence following a chronological order: (i) from the young Brentano who, since the 1862 dissertation, makes existence (ἐξω τῆς διανοίας, “outside the mind”) one of the criteria to define substance as the leading meaning of being, (i.i) up to the issues concerning the “intentional in-existence” of mental contents and the equivalent debate between some of Brentano’s pupils (Husserl and Twardowski) about the ontological status of intentional objects; (ii) from Heidegger, who initially addresses being’s polysemy in the light of Dasein, conceived as the “privileged entity”, whose essence coincides with existence, (ii.i) up to Sartre and the subsequent project of an existentialist phenomenology that firmly asserts the primacy of existence over essence.

Historical background

The reference to Aristotle, even though ideally shared by both sections, does not entail an exact correspondent of the term “existence” in Aristotle’s lexicon. The Greek ὑπάρχειν, which translates to the Latin “existere”, is associated with existentia as a result of a long series of historical transformations. Being, for Aristotle, is always being of a certain essence; and the distinction between “essence” and “existence” made in Posterior Analytics (see for instance Aristotle 1991, 5:1, 2, 72a 23–24) cannot be equated with the doctrine of the “real distinction” established in medieval philosophy since the thirteenth century; a doctrine that was designated to articulate an even more metaphysically and theologically relevant distinction, on the basis of which existence, contrary to Aristotle’s conception, shows a specific determination that is not contained in the predication of essence. “Essence” (esse essentiae) and “existence” (esse existentiae) would thus be separated in creatures and identical in God. Two different arguments connected by a unique principle: all that exists, exists by participation to being and this being – as paradigmatically stated by Thomas Aquinas – is God.

The philosophical roots of the concept of existence lie in the Christian appropriation of the term existo (a compound of ex and sisto from stare, “stand”), that in the classical Latin of Cicero (De Officiis: I, 30, 107) or of Lucretius (De rerum natura: II, 871) simply means: “step up”, “come forth”, “arise”. The semantic reconfiguration of the concept steams from the encounter between the dogma of Christian theology and the philosophical grammar of Greek ontology, Platonic and especially Neoplatonic, in response to another crucial distinction: between the οὐσία-substantia, whose mode of being is determined by accidents, and being purely and simply, without determination, relating to ὑπάρξις (“existence”) that specifies the pre-existing subsistence of an origin. The neologism existentia introduced by authors like Marius Victorinus (fourth century A.C.) hence allows us to express the indication of a provenance, as evidenced by the prefix ex; a provenance back to which anything that exists is referred (Adversus Arium: I,
Existere, as Richard of Saint Victor states among others, means nothing but ex alio sitere: to receive one’s own substantial being from someone else, that is to say from an origin (De Trinitate: IV, 12 937C–983); an origin that is subsequently interpreted as a cause, the effect of which is existence.

The basic outcomes of this historically composite transformation become established in the thesis of Suarez: the real entity is what exists extra suas causas et extra nihilum – “beyond its causes and beyond nothingness”. Eventually, it is along this way of thinking that Leibniz and Wolff come to superimpose the concepts of “cause” (causa) and “effect” (effectus) over “power” (potentia) and “act” (actus), thereby translating existentia into the semantic domain of efficiency and actuality (Leibniz: Theodicy, art. 87; Principles of Nature and Grace, art. 1; Wolff: Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, §174). For Kant, the link between existence and causality is continued within the moral law as regard to the idea of freedom understood in terms of autonomy; as Dasein, “existence” belongs to the category of modality in the Critique of Pure Raison’s table of categories, between “possibility” and “necessity”, and on the ground of the second postulate of empirical thought it means that which is “real” (wirklich).

Objective existence, real existence, intentional in-existence

In 1862 the young Brentano, in line with the exegetical tradition of the Aristotles–Renaissance of nineteenth-century Germany, aimed at demonstrating against Kant’s and, partly, Hegel’s criticism that the number of the Aristotelian categories respects a clear criterion of ordering. The strategy of the 1862 dissertation is as follows: to trace the several senses of being back to the figures of predication (τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας), by electing substance (οὐσία) as the leading meaning of being and reconfiguring the Aristotelian ontology as an “ousiology”. All that exists is either substance or is depending on substance and substance, according to Aristotle’s Categories, is defined as “first substance”, the synolon of matter and form that denotes sensible reality (Aristotle 1991, 3: Cat. I, 1b25–2a4). The criterion of ordering is so established: the object of metaphysics properly concerns that which exists per se (ὅν καθ’αὑτό), outside the mind (ἔξω τῆς διανοίας), whose existence is “real”, contrary to that which exists only by accident (ὅν κατὰ συμβεβηκός) in connection with something else (in alio). The different modes by means of which the categories relate to the substance express the substance’s modes of being; and substance is determined in accordance with “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “place”, “time”, “position”, “state” and “action”. The remaining ontological meanings mentioned by Aristotle – the accident, the true and the false and to a certain extent that which is potentially or actually (Aristotle 1991, 85: Metaph. E 2, 1026a34) – are excluded from the metaphysical inquiry. Saying that something is does not result, indeed, in saying that something exists. “Is” in the sense of “it is true” merely signifies the copula that is applied to all that can be thought: one may claim, for example, that the centaurs are mythological monsters, that Jupiter is a false god, etc. As Brentano argues: “every mental construct [Gedankendingen], i.e., everything which in our mind can objectively [Alles, insofern es objectiv in unserem Geiste existierend] become the subject of a true affirmative assertion, will belong to it [i.e. to being as truth]” (Brentano 1862, 37).

Two modalities of existence should therefore be distinguished since 1862: “objective existence” that refers to the objects of thought and “effective existence” that corresponds to the reality of transcendent things. A first testing ground for the nascent phenomenology will concern, and it is not coincidence, the understanding of this relationship between “immanence” and “transcendence”, in an attempt to reorganize the concept of intentionality under an equivalent distinction between the “content” and the “object” of a consciousness act. Indeed, if being, as Kant asserted, is not a real predicate, what about the ontological character of objects that exist...
only by virtue of an act of thinking? Should a residue of reality (Realität) be attested in spite of the non-existence of such objects? Objective existence – Brentano replies – is mental existence, to wit, an “in-existence” (Inexistenz) that is relative to our mind. “Objective” is consequently to be understood as a modifying adjective that shows the conversion of an existing object into the “in-existence” of a mental content.

Drawing inspiration from the Aristotelians of the Middle Ages, Brentano, as is well known, employs the word Objekt not in the modern sense, but as synonymous to “intentional”, as opposed to the physically characterized thing, the object, to which the mental act is referred, continues to be conceived in the 1867 Psychology of Aristotle in terms of Inexistenz (“existing in”). “Materially, as physical quality, coldness is in the cold thing. As object, i.e., as something that is sensed, it is in him who feels the cold” (Brentano 1867, n. 6, 80). The theory of the intentional reference – as we read in a footnote of Psychology from empirical standpoint – has its roots in this passage from Aristotle’s De Anima (II 2, 425b, 25) where Aristotle asserts that “in actuality the sensible is in the sense” by virtue of an identity relationship (ὁμοίωσις) that makes the one who perceives similar to what is perceived (Brentano 1867, 80). While being perceived, sounds and colours are objects of an act that we are immediately aware of; by hearing a sound, we experience the hearing regardless of whether the sound, physically understood, really exists or not. There is a communion between the act and the mental object, the “proper sensible” as Aristotle would have said, that Brentano rephrased in terms of an “special connexion” (eigentümliche Verwebung) or a “fusion” (Verschmelzung) among the “immanent objectivity” and the “intentional reference”: “in presentation something is represented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on”. (Brentano 1874, 68). The epistemological primacy of inner perception that constitutes the methodological principle of empirical psychology acquires legitimacy on the account of this “connection” that leads to a complete overturning of the initially established relationship between the two modalities of existence (intentional and real). If a sound can in principle be thought, irrespective of the awareness concerning the hearing of the sound, it is nevertheless the hearing that one should address so as to grasp the difference between that which is really given and that which is announced through apparitions. Contrary to “physical phenomena”, Brentano defines as “mental” all those phenomena that intentionally have an object whose existence, thanks to the support of inner perception, is true and evident beyond any doubt.

The several senses of existence

But if an object is intentionally contained in a mental act, how are representations to be interpreted in relation to non-existing objects? In this respect, Bolzano was talking about “objectless representations”, whose meanings – one may think of the squared circle example – cannot intuitively be fulfilled. The difficulty, in such cases, is determining the reference of the mental act, given that the object of representation is separate from the act of presentation. “It is not the stone which is in the soul” – as Aristotle would have asserted – “but its form” (De An. III 8, 432a). The controversy between Husserl and Twardowski essentially focuses on this issue in view of Twardowski’s threelfold distinction of “act”, “content” and “object”, initially presented in his 1894 work, On the Content and Object of Presentations; a threelfold distinction on the ground of which the two aforementioned meanings of existence (intentional and real) are associated with Brentano’s mental phenomena classification into presentation [Vorstellung], judgement and phenomena of love and hate. It would thus be up to the act of judging to accept or reject the existence of that which is represented, as opposed to the phenomenal or intentional existence pertaining to the object of representation. Representing, as Twardowski in turn argues, is neces-
sarily representing something; and even if the object does not exist per se, that which is presented is there as “mental content” (Twardowski 1894, 28).

Husserl’s criticism directly addresses the character of this threefold distinction, by denouncing the danger of an “ontological duplication” inherent to Twardowski’s argument. “If a round square” – Husserl affirms in a text on Intentional objects contemporary with Twardowski’s work – “is immanent in the representation in the same sense as the intuited color, then there would be a round square in the representation”. (Hua XXII, 310). Two meanings of the same thing should be instantiated under these circumstances, “immanent” and “transcendent”, two meanings that would problematically claim the right to existence; and when the object does not really exist, there would at least be its content which, like a mental image, would serve as an ersatz object. By criticizing the Brentanian division of phenomena into mental and physical, Husserl refuses by the same token to provide the mental content with an existential character and conceives of transcendence – to which intentionality is systematically oriented – in an ontologically wider sense than that of what is regarded as real. “Representation [Vorstellung]” – we read in a draft of a letter to Anton Marty – “is not the mere being-there [Dasein] of a content in consciousness – that is, its presence in the real context of psychical processes. Rather, representation is an intentional process, a certain minding [Meinen], whereby an object appears […]” (Hua-Dok III/1, 75). The objective reference of the intentional act, for Husserl, can be determined regardless of the temporal existence of the object itself; and “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit) – as attested by the Second Logical Investigation – is a sufficient mark of “reality” (Realität) as opposed to the “timeless ‘being’ of the ideal” (Hua XIX/1, 124). “If this experience is present” – Husserl asserts in the Fifth Logical Investigation –

then, eo ipso, and through its own essence (we must insist), the intentional “relation” to an object is achieved, and an object is intentionally present […]. And, of course, such an experience may be present in consciousness together with its intention, although its object does not exist at all, and is perhaps incapable of existence.

(Hua XIX/1, 372–373)

The debate with Twardowski achieves this result: any representation represents something, but it does not necessarily contain an existing object. “Existence” and “nonexistence” are neither determined by the objective of the intentional reference, nor by the acceptance or by the rejection resulting from an act of judgement in accordance with Brentano’s theory, but by an act of fulfilment that intuitively confirms or possibly contradicts a related intention of meaning. The object, phenomenologically speaking, is in conclusion to be understood in several senses: as spatiotemporal and hence existing, as timeless or, which is tantamount, as ideal, as singular or general, as empirical or eidetical; as real or ideal, following the methodological principle of intuition, the reach of which is extended by Husserl far beyond the limits of sensible perception.

We should note that the link between “existence” and “reality” is maintained in the transcendental stage of phenomenology where “existence” continues to be mainly intended as spatiotemporal. “Factually existent” is that which belongs to the world as a totality of objects traceable, directly or indirectly, to the field of sensible perception; a totality of objects available by means of the various activities we are capable of (theoretically, practically and axiologically). “The world” – Husserl states – “is always there as an actuality [Wirklichkeit]” (Hua III/1, §30). This is the sense in which the “thesis of the natural attitude” is defined; a thesis that the phenomenological attitude aims at suspending in order to reveal a new region of being, “transcendental consciousness”, conceived as “the primal category of all being”, as “the primal region in which all other regions of being are rooted” (Hua III/1, §76, 141).
Existence, existentiell, existential and existentiality

In his *Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics* (1941), Heidegger openly acknowledges the restriction dictated by *Being and Time* to the concept of existence: the *existentia* of the philosophical tradition that was originally grounded on the Greek substance (οὐσία) and led to “effective reality” (Wirklichkeit) by way of the Latin “actuality” (actualitas), in 1927 is conceived as “existence” (Existenz) that is the basic character of human being, notoriously renamed *Dasein*. From *existentia* to *Existenz*, from the mode of being relative to all that there is to man’s mode of being, such a restriction – as Heidegger says – only apparently follows Kierkegaard’s enterprise at the crossroads between philosophy and Christian theology; in an attempt to make coincide the human existence and the quest for the self; an enterprise that is explicitly recovered by Jaspers through analysis of the existential situation, the distinctive aspect of which is man’s relation to transcendence.

*Being and Time’s* originality is rather in the interpretation of existence in the light of the ontological question that, according to Heidegger, has nothing in common with Kierkegaard’s Christian philosophy or Jaspers’ philosophy of existence. *Dasein*’s existence essentially relates to being inasmuch as *Dasein* is the privileged entity in view of which the question of being has to be formulated. *Dasein*, the entity that in its being has this very being as an issue for it, is in an intimate relation with its own being; a relation that is made explicit by means of its ontological constitution: the possibility of being or not being itself that presupposes, at the same time, a relation to being in general. “Understanding of being” – as §4 of *Being and Time* reads – “is itself a definite characteristic of *Dasein*’s being”; as opposed to any other entity, *Dasein* “has to be” (zu-Sein) on the account of the possibilities that constitute its existence. In a famous formula Heidegger establishes that “the essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence”, thereby complementing the ontological question with the “who” question (Werfrage) that *Dasein* responds to in a first-person perspective as “an entity which is in each case I myself” and “its being is in each case mine” (Heidegger 1927, §9, 25). *Dasein*’s understanding of itself is also part of a context of relations that specifies another essential characteristic of *Dasein*’s existence: “being-in-the-world” – “Thus *Dasein*’s understanding of being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world’, and to the understanding of the being of those entities which become accessible within the world” (ibid., §4).

The initial restriction serves as condition for overturning the categories of classical ontology: the “what” is understood in the light of the “who”; *existentia* is translated into “present-at-handness” (Vorhandenheit) of things, the quidditas, whose properties can in principle be enumerated as it is the case, by way of example, for a “house”, a “tree” or “a piece of bread”; “present-at-handness” of things that designates a modality of being that is depending on a certain interpretation of being’s entity as performed by *Dasein*.

*Dasein*, on the ground of its existence, bears an understanding of any being’s entity that it is not itself; an understanding of any entity that for *Dasein*, as being-in-the-world, becomes accessible within the world. This explains the fundamental character of the 1927 ontology, to which any other ontology has to be traced back, to wit, any attempt of understanding the world that sciences – as *Dasein*’s behaviours or ways of being – address to all entities that are not like *Dasein*. By the same token, this explains the definition of *Being and Time’s* fundamental ontology as “existential analytic”; a definition that is based on a double priority: the ontic priority of *Dasein* as an entity whose being has the determinate character of existence; the ontological priority as a result of the relationship that *Dasein*, contrary to any other entity, has towards being. It is an ontico-ontological priority that allows an equivalent articulation between the two modalities, by means of which *Dasein* relates to its own existence: “existentiell” (existentiell) that specifies the way *Dasein* understands itself through existing, “existential” (existenzial) that specifies the
understanding of the ontological structures of existence or, to put the matter more formally, of “existentiality” that constitutes the state of being of the existing entity (Heidegger 1927, §4).

Yet another crucial feature of Being and Time’s existential analytic lies in the “destructive method” that organizes the historical interpretation of the ontological categories. Indeed, Heidegger aims at revealing the not sufficiently thematized presuppositions that preside over the constitution of Western philosophy’s leading concepts like, inter alia, the Cartesian cogito and the idea of substance in the wake of the Greek conception that would hiddenly direct the modern idea of the “subject”. These are concepts that, by way of the “destructive method”, ought to be traced back to their origin; that is to say, back to the “primordial experiences” – as Heidegger asserts – that the tradition, through its transmission process, problematically conceals. “Primordial”, following Being and Time’s lexicon, has to be regarded as synonymous with “existential”: “demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts” – as §6 of Being and Time reads – is nothing but displaying “their ‘birth certificate’”; “birth certificate” is relative to Dasein’s temporal dimension by reason of the systematic equivalence that Heidegger establishes between “being” and “temporality”. “Temporality” constitutes “the horizon for all understanding of being and of any way of interpreting it” as well as “the meaning of the being of that entity which we call Dasein” (Heidegger 1927, §5). Taking the example of substance, the objective of the destructive method is detecting the “ontologico-temporal” indication concerning the concept of οὐσία (“substance”) as παρουσία (“presence”), which concerns a specific Dasein’s mode of being; a temporally characterized mode that, according to Heidegger, eventually imposes “present-at-handness” as the general pre-understanding of being as such, thus preventing the revealing of Dasein’s proper existential dimension.

Beyond Being and Time, it should be noted that the concept of “existence” becomes increasingly scarce in connection with the Heideggerian project of overcoming metaphysics and the corresponding enhancement of the ecstatic character of human being. Existence is then understood in terms of “ecstaticity” under the metaphor of the “clearing” (Lichtung), conceived as the stance (da) from where Da-sein opens up to “the truth of being”: “the occasional use of the concept of existence” – as Heidegger himself retrospectively points out in 1941 – “serves only to prepare for an overcoming of metaphysics” (Heidegger 1961, 71). In response to Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology according to which “we are precisely in a situation where there are only human beings” (Sartre 1946, 36), Heidegger, at the request of Jean Beaufret, can consequently comment upon the supposed equivalence between “humanism” and “existentialism” as follows: “we are precisely in a situation where principally there is being” (Heidegger 1976, 165).

Existence and existentialism

“Existence precedes essence”: the principle of Heidegger’s existential analytic lies at the heart of the phenomenological ontology that Sartre realizes in Being and Nothingness (1943). Existence, according to Sartre, is defined as the mode of being pertaining to Dasein that translates to “human reality” on the basis of an articulated analysis of consciousness that explicitly requires a recovery of the Cartesian cogito. Consciousness, phenomenologically conceived as “consciousness of something”, involves a form of self-consciousness that Sartre understands in terms of pre-reflective self-awareness: being self-aware is thus the necessary condition for consciousness to be intentionally directed towards something other than itself. And it is in view of the “other” to which consciousness is primordially oriented that consciousness may become consciousness of the self; not like an object of knowledge, but, as Sartre specifies, pre-reflexively, as a result of an immediate relationship to itself of non-cognitive nature. Consciousness exists as being consciousness of what it is not, in connexion with the “other than self”; its way of being – as
Sartre stresses – is “for-itself”, which means that consciousness does not properly exist as separated from the world; in this sense, consciousness is understood as “distance from the self” and contrary to being that is “in-itself” (en-soi), the “for-itself” (pour soi) of consciousness – as Sartre concludes – has always to strive to be its own being.

Accordingly, human reality turns out to be fundamentally projected “out there”, “in the world”, whose structure is phenomenologically described as transcendence (Sartre 1936, 1943). The existentialist primacy of existence over essence implies nevertheless, in contrast to Heidegger, a basic opposition between these two notions: the understanding of human reality is, for Sartre, resistant to any aprioristic approach; there are no concepts that can be applied to man, the entity that exists, so as to establish his essential properties.”Man”, strictly speaking, “is nothing”; he “is nothing other than what he makes of himself” (Sartre 1943, 22). Sartre’s existentialism is grounded on this very principle, whereby the meaning of existence is achieved in terms of “project” and of “responsibility”, which are the expressions of a primordial freedom; a freedom that reflects, from the ethical perspective, the nihilating relationship (néantification) that man has towards being. “Existentialism” – as Sartre affirms – “is a doctrine that makes an authentically human life possible” (Sartre 1946, 18). Abandoned to his freedom, man is burdened with having to choose himself, with having to be his own legislator. The notion of existence, as Merleau-Ponty has for his part the opportunity to specify, serves as key to conceive of the human condition in a radically new way on the cultural scene of post-war Europe, where existentialism, once codified as a doctrine and disseminated beyond the field of philosophical studies, ends up being an alternative to the overriding views inherent to the Christian or to the Marxist doctrines. The need expressed by existentialism, according to Merleau-Ponty, is for combining the material with the spiritual aspect of man, which is not regarded as a thing among the things of the world, neither as a detached entity from the world itself, but rather as an existing embodied subjectivity ineluctably “condemned to be free” (Merleau-Ponty 1948).

Concluding remarks

Following the French reception of Heidegger’s reorienting shift in philosophy known as the “turn” (die Kehre), the concept of existence tends to become peripheral within post-war phenomenology, in favour of other notions allegedly considered as more relevant, like, for instance, “alterity” or “ethics” for Emmanuel Levinas, “flesh” or “revelation” for Michel Henri, “event” or “givenness” for Jean-Luc Marion. A critical tension appears to be registered between existence and the context of ontology in line with the project of overcoming metaphysics renovated by French phenomenology, in spite of divergent views on both Heidegger’s own project and Sartre’s existentialism (see, for instance, Levinas’s Existence and Existents). This tension is even more noticeable if we consider that the frame of reference for the composite realization of such an overcoming is no longer the problem of the categories that prevailed, though not steadily, in the German tradition of phenomenology: starting from Brentano, passing through the overturning of the two basic meanings of existence (real and intentional) established by empirical psychology, through the descriptive and transcendental reconfiguration of the categories proposed by Husserl up to the existential analysis of the ontological question formulated by Heidegger in Being and Time.

References


