15

ETHICS

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The term “ethics” in the phenomenological tradition is used in a broad sense, encompassing (1) ethics considered as the discipline that investigates the nature of the good life and the notions of character and virtue; (2) moral philosophy considered in the Humean sense as the discipline whose subject matter is the human as born for action; and (3) morality considered in its broadly accepted contemporary sense as the discipline that investigates, most often with a view to our relations with others, the right and the wrong, the obligatory, non-obligatory (permissible), and the impermissible. On contemporary understandings, in other words, moral philosophy is the philosophical discipline concerned with the question: What is the right thing to do? The term “ethics,” by contrast, denotes the philosophical discipline concerned with the questions: What is the good life—the flourishing life—for humans? And: What sort of character must I develop in order to realize that life? In the phenomenological tradition, however, the term “ethics” has been used in relation to all these and other questions as well, such as: What is the ground of ethical life? What is it to act morally? And: How does practical reason come to know what to do? Indeed, to put the matter as briefly as possible: for phenomenologists “ethics” refers to every form of moral experience, from grounding experiences to recognizing goods to be pursued and bads to be avoided to choosing what to do. Speaking most generally, then, phenomenologists are concerned to clarify the intentional structures at work in (1) our varied experiences of valuing, choosing, planning, trying, striving, and acting in ways that have moral significance; (2) our experiences of persons, actions, situations, and events as good or bad and right or wrong; and (3) our experiences of institutions and social structures as beneficial or harmful or as liberating or imprisoning.1

These varied experiences include moral perceptions encompassing not only the use of one’s perceptual faculties but also one’s affective responses to what is sensibly given. Such perceptions involve the appearance of an instantiated moral attribute2 as presented in one’s perceptual/emotional experience. Moral perception underlies moral judgment, i.e., the formation of a proposition explicitly asserting the belongingness of a moral attribute to one’s actions (present, past, or in prospect) or to one’s character (present, past, or future) or to the actions or character of another. Moral judgments can be spontaneous judgments of the value of a thing, action, or person, or they can be the result of moral deliberation, i.e., the process of formulating moral propositions in which one mulls over their plausibility, thinks about reasons for and against, entertains other options, and so forth, all of this with the aim of reaching a moral verdict of some
type about some course of action or issue. Moral deliberation often takes the form of weighing competing goods and recognizing the priority of one good over another, a recognition that underlies the experience of an obligation to realize the higher good. Arguably, however, the experience of obligation can be direct and absolute, for example, in the experience of another person as, say, making (spoken or unspoken) demands of various sorts upon an agent.

Moral emotions, we have suggested, are already at work in moral perception’s presenting things as good or bad and in our judgments of value and obligation. Moreover, moral emotions, both positive (e.g., gratitude, respect, admiration) and negative (e.g., embarrassment, shame, guilt), besides having a robust and complex phenomenal character, have ethical significance insofar as a well-ordered and balanced emotional life, both personally and in our interpersonal relationships, is a constituent of a flourishing life (see, e.g., Drummond 2010; Ozar 2010; Hermberg and Gyllenhammer 2013; Steinbock 2014, 2016; Drummond and Rinofner-Kreidl 2017).

All these categories and aspects of moral experience are facets of our moral agency and part of the subject matter of moral phenomenology. Moreover, they are porous; they blend into and separate from another in ways that are themselves subject to phenomenological investigation and description. In what follows, I shall not explicitly discuss where and how moral phenomenology intersects different approaches to normative ethics and contemporary discussions in metaethics, but I do hope to illustrate them.

## 15.1 Axiology and ethics

The porous character of moral experiences is most evident in the moral phenomenology of the early phenomenologists—those working (roughly) in the first third of the twentieth century, such as Edmund Husserl (see 1988; 2004), Adolf Reinach (1912–13), Edith Stein (1989; 2007), Max Scheler (1973), Nicolai Hartmann (1963), and Dietrich von Hildebrand (1916; 1922; 1953a)—who adopted an axiological approach to ethics. These phenomenologists agree that values and the significance that attaches to them are dependent for their disclosure on subjects capable of feelings and emotions. They agree that intentional feelings (or emotions) grasp value-objects independent of those feelings, at least in the sense that a thing’s being valuable is not reducible to its being felt valuable. To that extent, they are all value-realists. Furthermore, they agree that the emotions have moral relevance and that our choices are in some manner rooted in the emotional disclosure of the value of both the ends at which the agent aims and the actions considered conducive to those ends.

The simple statement of these agreements, however, obscures significant differences among their views. In particular, there is disagreement about the nature of value as experienced, a disagreement best exemplified in the difference between Husserl, on the one hand, and Scheler and Hartmann, on the other. For Husserl, to experience a value is to have an intentional feeling or emotion grasp an object (e.g., a thing, state of affairs, action, event, person, institution) as valued. The value of the object is grounded in particular, non-axiological properties possessed by the object, which, relative to the physiological constitution, interests, concerns, and commitments of the subject, are valuable in the current experiential context. This is a “weak” value realism insofar as the value attribute is understood as a dyadic attribute dependent upon both features of the object and subjective structures at work in the subject’s evaluatively intending the object.

Husserl characterizes this experience of value as a type of perception; he uses the term wertnehmen (1989, 12)—a modification of wahrnehmen, to perceive or take as true—to denote the taking of “objects, things, qualities, and states of affairs that stand there in the valuing as valuable (im Werten als werte)” (Husserl 2014, 190). Such value-perceptions underlie both value-judg-
ments and the identification of the a priori “values as objects themselves” \([\text{Wertgegenstände}} or \text{Wertobjektitäten} \) (Husserl 2014, 190–1), which involves the identification of the non-axiological properties and the subjective interests, concerns, or commitments necessary for an object to have that value. Given his view that the value is first and foremost the valued object (a thing, event, or situation) perceived or judged, Husserl adopts a version of Franz Brentano’s idealized utilitarianism, one that views ethics as a thoroughly rational and objective discipline comparable in its rigor and universality to logic and whose laws underlie choices that seek to maximize the good.

The rationalism of Husserl’s ethics is tied to the views (1) that our ethical judgments are grounded in an evidential insight into axiological and practical truths and (2) that the laws governing our axiological and ethical reasoning are a priori laws. Ethical norms are grounded in a theoretical science whose claims about the rules governing the contents of moral thinking are necessary and universal. In this vein, Husserl articulates a version of the categorical (but not Kantian) imperative inherited from Brentano: “Do what is best among what is attainable within your entire practical sphere” (Hua XXVIII, 142, 221). Husserl reformulates this subjective formulation in more objective terms: “What is best among what is achievable in the entire practical sphere is not only comparatively the best, but the sole practical good” (Hua XXVIII, 221). Husserl also identified two other fundamental laws: (1) the laws of the summation of goods [“the existence of a good alone is better than the simultaneous existence of a good and a bad”; “the existence of a good and a bad at the same time is better than the existence of a bad alone”; “the existence of two random goods together is better than the existence of one of them alone”; and “for every summative composite of values, the sum of goods is better than an individual good belong to the summation or any reduction of it” (Hua XXVIII, 93–4, 97)] and (2) the law of absorption [“In every choice, the better absorbs the good, and the best absorbs everything else that is to be valued as a practical good in and of itself” (Hua XXVIII, 136)]. Taken together, these laws entail a consequentialism aimed at acting so as to achieve the greatest summative good.

Husserl subsequently considered an objection, raised by Moritz Geiger, to the laws of the summation of goods (Hua XXVIII, 419–22). Geiger objected that not all values are comparable. Hence, they cannot be summed in a simple calculation. Husserl considered the example of a mother faced with a choice between rescuing her own child or another person, even when that other person is of exceptional character and whose continued life would maximize the good of the greatest number. The mother, Husserl concedes, need not even consider saving the other person. The mother’s love for her child demands that she protect her child from harm even when sacrificing her child is a lesser good for the aggregate or when saving her child leads to harm for others. Central to Husserl’s new position is the recognition that the same objective value can become an “individual, subjective value of love,” i.e., that “the same value can be infinitely more ‘significant’ for one person than another” (Hua-Mat IX, 146n.). Hence, Husserl came to favor the view that “absolute loves” (commitments) generate “absolute oughts” (Hua-Mat IX, 146; 2014, 391–2). This does not entail a subjective relativism; instead, the idea is that an object valued by a subject with certain commitments (loves) unconditionally binds that subject to honor those commitments regardless of what any purely objective calculation might require (Hua XLII, 391–2). Such absolute loves motivate an agent to adopt an ethical life-project and to undertake those actions necessary to realize that project, a project that is “the deepest ground of [her] personal identity and individuality” (Melle 1991, 131; see also 2002, 243–4).³

Scheler (1913–16), in contrast to Husserl, adopts a stronger version of value realism. He identifies an emotive intentionality through which values are directly apprehended a priori. The experience of value in an intentional feeling or emotion is prior to the experience of an object as a bearer of value. The prior apprehension of the value underlies the grasp of the object as a good. The value-perception, in brief, apprehends the instantiated value as the good-making
characteristic of the object valued as good, but, contra Husserl, the value does not depend on any non-axiological properties of the bearer or any psychological features of the subject experiencing it. While valued objects (goods), considered as objects of desire, are empirical, variable, and subjective, the values themselves are not; they are a priori, immutable, and objective ideals. Whereas, for Husserl, values are a priori (necessary features of objects possessing that value) but not epistemologically prior to goods, they are, for Scheler, ontologically and epistemologically prior to goods. And whereas for Husserl value attributes are dyadic, value-objects are for Scheler monadic.

Scheler further believes that there is an a priori hierarchy of values, a fact that has moral significance. The lowest level comprises values of the pleasant and unpleasant. Next are the vital values, such as the fine and the vulgar; then the spiritual values, such as the beautiful and the ugly, correctness and incorrectness. At the highest level are the values of the holy and unholy. It is noteworthy, however, that the list does not itself include any moral values. Scheler views moral values as attaching to the actions that realize the values listed in the hierarchy. This view is rooted in Scheler’s distinction between the purely ideal ought-to-be (the value) and the moral ought-to-do (Scheler 1973, 203ff.). In opposition to Kant’s formal, categorical imperative, Scheler claims that insight into the ideal ought-to-be serves as the basis for willing and for realizing the moral ought-to-do. But there is no clear account in Scheler of the transition from the insight into ideal value-possibilities to the experience of moral imperatives, for the experienced value must be grasped in a feeling, i.e., it must strike one as desirable or lovable prior to the experience of the moral ought-to-do. Because the relation between the desire for the value itself and the experience of the imperative is not elucidated, it is not clear how, or even whether, the moral ought would be recognized were one not to experience the feeling or emotion directed to the value itself. Scheler’s imperatives, therefore, would, in Kant’s terms, be only hypothetical imperatives.

Hartmann, like Scheler, maintains that feelings and emotions access a priori values. Hartmann stresses to a greater degree than Scheler the universality of values, although he tacks back toward Husserl in recognizing that values can have a different importance to different persons. Hartmann, more interested in metaphysics than in epistemological matters, discusses less the nature of value-consciousness and more the nature of value itself. He advances the view that ideal values are experienced as universal demands, but he acknowledges that personal and universal values conflict in ways that can never be fully resolved. To do what everyone should do in the same circumstances is, in effect, to say an agent is replaceable by anyone, and this is to deny the agent’s individuality as a person (Hartmann 1963, 357). Indeed, Hartmann argues an even stronger point. Appeals to universal principles depend upon a typicality among the situations in which we are called upon to act, but any maxim of action must be tied to a particular situation and to a particular agent in that situation. Hence, the universality of a principle undercuts its own applicability to a particular situation that, owing to the uniqueness of persons and their interests and commitments, is itself unique (Hartmann 1963, 358–60). Universal principles, in a paradoxical way, just insofar as they fail to heed the individual personalities of agents, do not, and cannot, offer moral guidance.

15.2. An ethics of freedom

Martin Heidegger was a critic of the then-prevalent theories of value (see, e.g., 2010, 97). He argued instead that the experience of value depends upon the prior disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of being-in-the-world. Disclosedness, for Heidegger, is a function of three, equally primordial, dimensions of our being-in-the-world: understanding, disposedness (Befindlichkeit), and discourse. Being-disposed to the world is to find oneself immersed in the world in a particular
affective state. Disposedness, to put the matter differently, “manifests itself as affect: mood, feeling, emotion … [I]t is through mood that the world as a whole—the context of significance co-structured by my projects—is opened up as mattering in a certain way” (Crowell 2013, 70–1). Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety, however, reveals that the context of significance can break down such that what previously mattered no longer does. Such a breakdown reveals a subject who is called to give meaning back to the world and responsible for the meaning given. It is disputed whether Heidegger commits himself to a “decisionism” (see, e.g., Tugendhat 1986; Okrent 1999) or a “deep deliberation” (Burch 2010, 212; Crowell 2007, 55–6, 59–62; 2013, 206–13). Whichever view is correct, for our purposes we need note only that Heidegger does not develop an explicit theory of value beyond his discussions of Befindlichkeit or of ethics beyond his discussions of conscience (Gewissen) and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).

Subsequent phenomenologists develop the idea of decision or choice as constitutive of value more systematically. Jean-Paul Sartre (1992), Simone de Beauvoir (1948), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012) all believe that values are created in the exercise of human freedom. Sartre, for example, attributes the reality of values to the fact that the freedom definitive of human beings can consciously and freely transcend what exists in their own situation and grasp a non-existent possibility as the object of their desires and choices. Human autonomy, in other words, is the sole source of value, including the value of human existence itself. On Sartre’s view, an autonomous agent recognizes and values his or her existence as it is: free, gratuitous, and lacking transcendent values to justify it (Sartre 1992, 76–8). Although there are factical circumstances that serve as obstacles to the (morally) solipsistic agent’s exercise of freedom—obstacles that are to be overcome—freedom itself is unconstrained by objective values or principles. Sartre, in brief, affirms an anti-realist axiology.

Simone de Beauvoir follows Sartre both in placing freedom and transcendence at the center of her ethical reflections and in recognizing the obstacles freedom faces in its exercise and in transcending the limitations of the human situation. Indeed, this is, for de Beauvoir, the fundamental ambiguity that characterizes human existence. A human being, identical with its freedom and unconstrained by objective principle, chooses freedom as its end. However, the goal at which freedom aims “is not fixed once and for all” but rather “is defined all the along the road which leads to it” (de Beauvoir 1948, 153). De Beauvoir also believes, moreover and now moving beyond Sartre, that one must not merely tolerate the freedom of others; the other’s freedom cannot be viewed simply as an obstacle to one’s freedom. Rather, one’s own freedom and the realization of one’s projects requires the (cooperative) freedom of others.

For Merleau-Ponty, moral agency is analogous to artistic expression insofar as it attempts to institute value within the limitations of a given situation. Whereas Sartre thinks that meaning—and not only value—is constituted in the free, even if unconscious and non-deliberated choices of agents, Merleau-Ponty believes that persons are born into a world already permeated with meaning and that freedom is exercised in this context. Moral agents take the world as a task to be completed, a task of instituting meaning and value wherever and whenever possible (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 32). To create value consists in actively taking up our situations of chance, making something out of contingency, establishing communicative relationships, and creating and recreating values by working to change the world such that values may truly be instantiated (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 464–73, 480–1).

15.3. An ethics of obligation

Values are often experienced as confronting us, that is, as prescriptions, norms, imperatives, obligations, demands, requirements, and so forth. But since, in the views discussed above, values
are largely experienced as arising in relation to our interests, our feelings and emotions, or our choices, it would seem that we are always (at least somewhat) free to value and choose otherwise, precisely because our interests, feelings, and choices can vary. It is, in other words, difficult to understand in what sense the values we encounter as the objects of our feelings, emotions, interests, desires, and choices can be thought to impose obligations.

Hartmann, we have seen, adopts a skeptical attitude toward the possibility of universal ethical rules (although not universal values). This attitude is for him rooted not merely in the fact of freedom but in the very structure of individual personhood itself. Von Hildebrand, by contrast, seeks to address this problem of accounting for obligation from within the axiological approach. Thinking that Scheler’s view allows for the spontaneous love of value as heteronomously motivating action, von Hildebrand insists that moral obligation has not hypothetical but categorical force (although he avoids Kant’s formalism). Von Hildebrand speaks of the “importance” (Bedeutsamkeit) of objects, where importance is understood as that “property of a being which gives it the character of a bonum or a malum” (von Hildebrand 1953b, 24) and, hence, what enables the being to awaken a person’s interest and motivate her to act. Von Hildebrand distinguishes three “categories” of importance: the “subjectively satisfying” to or for a person; the “objective good for the person”; and the “important-in-itself” (von Hildebrand 2016, 14). Since the second category presupposes the third, these in practice collapse into two (see, e.g., von Hildebrand 1953b, 34–43, 53–9), and von Hildebrand concludes, “Only that which is important-in-itself is a value in the true sense” (von Hildebrand 2016, 16). Von Hildebrand argues that any attempt to ground an imperative in the experience of the subjectively satisfying determines the will only contingently and heteronomously, and he identifies a group of intrinsic values that “challenge” (rather than “invite”) the agent apart from any relation to subjective interests, emotions, desires, needs, and wants (von Hildebrand 1953b, 42). If, however, he gains a ground for obligation in so doing, he does so at the expense of divorcing these values and their attendant challenges from their importance to or for an agent. This, in turn, raises questions concerning whether things having intrinsic value can by themselves motivate action.

It is the problem of making the transition from the experience of value to the experience of obligation that provides the context for understanding those phenomenologists, chief among them Emmanuel Levinas, who seek to ground the notion of obligation independently of the notion of value. Levinas claims that the experience of obligation is prior to all acts of evaluation, all choices, all projects, and all dictates of reason. Hence, Levinas considers ethics to be wholly non-teleological in character. This is expressed in his opposition to “totalizing” views of ethics that organize all our ethical experience under a single ego-centered overarching set of values or hypergoods or an objective hierarchy of goods. Obligation arises for Levinas, as it does for Kant, from beyond all “inclinations.” Unlike Kant, however, Levinas turns his attention to intersubjectivity to find the ground of obligation. Whereas the phenomenological axiologists and advocates of a freedom-centered ethic stress the first-person perspective, Levinas adopts a “second-person perspective” (cf. Darwall 2006) in which moral demands are experienced in encountering the “face” of the Other.

Levinas’s ethics begins from the fact that intersubjective life begins when another addresses me, summons me, and commands me. The “face” of the other is pure expression (Levinas 1969, 66), and this expressive face, “exceeding the idea of the other in me” (Levinas 1969, 50), carries the summons and the command. The other and I are in an asymmetrical relation; the other’s ethical superiority outweighs my egoism (Levinas 1969, 215). The other approaches from on high, disconcerting my conscious intentionality and contesting my freedom, calling both into question in such a way that I have no choice but to respond. The other’s address, summons, and command awaken in me a sense of responsibility such that my concerns must transcend the
merely egoistic in the direction of the other (Levinas 1969, 43, 50–1; 1998, 181). Encountering the face of the other in a face-to-face relation gives rise to transcendence in the response to the summons and the recognition (implicit or explicit) of the command. Only because I have already acknowledged this command do I live in a world with the other and become a person myself. Morality begins, then, neither with my feelings and emotions nor with my freedom, but with the recognition that my freedom is arbitrary. The other challenges my identity by presenting itself as a face that exceeds any idea I can have of him or her. In confronting me in this manner, this radical alterity obligates me to give more of myself than I can expect from the other. The experience of the other is thus from the start an experience of obligation.

The question raised by this account is similar to the one raised by von Hildebrand’s account. I can encounter moral obligation as my obligation only insofar as what I encounter is referred back to my moral concerns. As Hartmann recognizes, obedience to the moral imperative apart from any reference to inclinations depersonalizes the action—whether in Kant, von Hildebrand, or Levinas—insofar as the action is divorced even from the agent’s will to flourish precisely as a moral agent through obedience to the moral imperative and in fulfilling her own moral commitments. The will to flourish is entirely displaced in Kant by obedience to law, in von Hildebrand by obedience to the call of the important—in-itself (value), and in Levinas by the presence of the Other. The question arises whether this is satisfactory as an account of moral motivation.

15.4. Other developments

It would be misleading to leave the impression that these are the only issues discussed by phenomenological thinkers or that these thinkers are the only ones by means of which connections to developments in contemporary moral (and political) philosophy can be established. One need note only (1) Hannah Arendt’s attempt to retrieve the Aristotelian notion of the polis (1958; 1968) and to synthesize notions of radical freedom with the excellences of the Greeks, the virtù of Machiavelli, the virtues of Montesquieu, and Jefferson’s notion of citizenship, or (2) Gabriel Marcel’s discussion of the virtue of fidelity and of the manner in which it imposes unconditional obligations on the faithful agent (1964), or (3) Adolf Reinach’s discussions of the a priori foundations of civil law (1983) and of deliberation (1989), or (4) Herbert Spiegelberg’s attempt to establish a value-based foundation of natural law (1935; 1937; 1986), or (5) Paul Ricoeur’s discussions of the nature of justice (1992; 1995; 2001).

Nor are phenomenological approaches to ethics (in the broad sense outlined at the beginning) of mere historical interest. There has recently been an explosion of interdisciplinary research into the emotions, including work by phenomenologists. Although not all of this research is concerned with the evaluative role and ethical significance of the emotions, much of it revives the axiological and teleological approaches of the early phenomenologists. For example, Ingrid Vendrell Ferran has explored the work on the emotions by early, realist phenomenologists (2008), and she has explored the implications of their work for contemporary metaethics and theory of value (2013) and for the analysis of individual moral emotions (see, e.g., 2017). Ullrich Melle (e.g., 1991; 1992; 1997; 2007) and Henning Peucker (2011), in addition to editing Husserl’s ethical writings, have offered careful commentary on those writings. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, developing ideas found in Husserl and Scheler, has explored the ethical significance of a number of emotions (e.g., 2011; 2014a; 2014b; 2017). Sophie Loidolt (e.g., 2010; 2011; 2018) has developed ideas from both Husserl and Arendt. Sara Heinämäa (e.g., 2014; 2017), Anne Ozar (e.g., 2009; 2010; 2017), and Michael Kelly (e.g., 2016a; 2016b; 2016c) have analyzed morally relevant emotions, and Paul Gyllenhammer (e.g., 2010, 2017) has tied his analyses of emo-
tions to the virtues (see also Reynolds 2013). John Drummond (e.g., 2006; 2010; 2013; 2015; 2017) has modified Husserl’s understanding of the founded character of intentional feelings and emotions and developed a eudaimonistic account that also addresses the issue obligation from within an axiological framework. Janet Donohoe (2004) and James Hart (e.g., 1992; 1997) have explored Husserl’s later ethical thought, and Anthony Steinbock (e.g., 2014; 2016) has developed a view of moral emotions grounded in Scheler’s views. William Smith (2012), Irene McMullin (forthcoming), and Steven Crowell (e.g., 2007a; 2007b; 2013; 2015) have addressed the question of moral normativity from a Heideggerian perspective. Similarly, there have been many commentators who have developed Levinas’s insight into ethics as first philosophy (e.g., Cohen 1985; Bernasconi 1989; Bergo 1999; 2002; 2011).

This recitation of both previous and current phenomenologists, incomplete as it is, is sufficient, I believe, to reveal the liveliness, breadth, and importance of phenomenological reflection on the ethical.

Notes

1 In what follows, I shall use the term “ethics” in this broad phenomenological sense, and I shall use the expression “moral phenomenology” as coterminous with “ethics.” One caveat: the expression “moral phenomenology” in the contemporary philosophical world is used in several senses. It can refer simply to the reflection upon the “what-it’s-like” of different moral experiences involving feelings of some sort, or it can refer to a reflection upon the character and content of moral experiences that are available to a first-personal, psychological introspection. The latter view would include in the scope of moral phenomenology a consideration of not only the what-it’s-likeness of the experience but its representative content. Finally, “moral phenomenology” can refer to the study of the structures of first-personal experience and its intentional object, where that intentional object is not a psychological or mental content. It is in the last sense that I use the expression; cf. Drummond 2007.


3 This idea is similar to Charles Taylor’s (1989, 63) notion of “hypergoods” as “goods which not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about.” The orientation to such a good, Taylor says, “comes closest to defining my identity, and therefore my direction to this good is of unique importance to me.”

4 Befindlichkeit is one of Heidegger’s many neologisms and is difficult to translate. It captures something at play in the ordinary greeting Wie befinden Sie sich? This is most commonly understood as “How are you?” or “How are you feeling?” when this last question refers not so much to one’s physical health but to one’s psychological state, one’s “state of mind,” as Macquarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit (1962, 172). Translated literally, the expression says “How do you find yourself?” and Haugeland (2000, 52) adheres closely to the literal when he translates Befindlichkeit as “sofindingness.” Blattner (1999, 45) translates the term by “affectivity,” saving “attunement” for the ways affectivity manifests itself. Crowell (2013, 70) uses “affectedness,” and Dahlstrom (2013, 62–3) “disposedness,” which Blattner now prefers (http://faculty.georgetown.edu/blattnew/heid/heidegger-jargon.html).

References


Ethics