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DEGLOBALIZATION

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Introduction
The paradigm of deglobalization was advanced by Focus on the Global South in 2000, at a time when corporate-driven globalization appeared to be irresistible. It first attracted attention and provoked discussion in progressive circles but only after the 2008 financial implosion it attracted attention from the mainstream, with the Economist (2009) writing that with the ‘integration of the world economy in retreat on almost every front,’ the economic melt-down ‘has popularized a new term: deglobalization.’

As a program for organizing the economy, deglobalization was, interestingly, first proposed in France. It inspired the platform of Arnaud Montebourg, a socialist running for the presidency of France in 2012 (Haski 2011). Unfortunately, deglobalization was also embraced by the right in France, and today deglobalization and the critique of globalization more generally are most strongly identified with the right.

This situation makes it imperative to clarify what deglobalization is all about, and why it is something that should be associated with liberation, not xenophobic nationalism. Clarification is needed, not only to detach deglobalization from its embrace by the right but also to assess its relevance as a liberating paradigm for today’s world. In other words, the world has moved forward – or backward, as the case may be – since the 2000s, when we first articulated deglobalization. Aside from the 2008 financial crisis, other developments have come to the fore, such as the acceleration of climate change, automation, inequality, and now the COVID-19 pandemic. In the light of these changes, it is worthwhile to revisit deglobalization to see if it still provides a way to cope with these developments and to compare it to other alternative paradigms that have drawn attention more recently.

How the right hijacked deglobalization
Before we embark on this broader task, it is important to briefly consider how the critique of globalization was hijacked by the right. The left’s critique of neoliberalism and globalization took off in the mid-1980s. In the South, it unfolded as part and parcel of the opposition to neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ in developing countries imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the key aims of which were accelerated liberalization of trade,
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deregulation, and privatization. In the North, it was triggered by the drive of transnational corporations to relocate their facilities to cheap labour locations, which accelerated with China’s integration in the 1980s. It was also a response to neoliberalism which elected governments introduced in the US and Britain in the early 1980s. The establishment of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1994 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 added fuel to the spread of what came to be known as the anti-globalization or alter-globalization movement. September 11 dented the momentum of the anti-globalization movement, but the World Social Forum provided a North–South avenue for the elaboration of anti-globalization strategies. With the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, the anti-globalization movement re-emerged in force in the North in the Occupy Movement, the coming to power of Syriza in Greece and the rise of Podemos in Spain.

The left’s ability to ride on the anti-globalization agenda, however, was severely compromised by the fact that, since the 1990s, the centre-left in the US and Europe had bought into and aggressively promoted the free trade, neoliberal agenda. In the US, under the leadership of Democratic Clinton administration, NAFTA, and the WTO came into being and the New Deal-era Glass Steagall Act was repealed. Obama’s Democratic presidency promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that, to the working class, meant a continuation of the export of their jobs to China. Similar processes occurred in the UK with New Labour and the ‘Third Way’ in Germany, under the Social Democratic Party led by Gerard Schroeder and in France, with socialist figures being enthusiastic proponents of the Euro (Bello 2017). Established workers’ parties became defenders of the pro-globalization agenda, leading not only to failure to expand their mass base but also to part of that base leaving their ranks. Liberal non-governmental organizations also played a role in promoting globalization as they bought into the neoliberal trade paradigm but sought to tweak it with ‘reformist’ measures. Their critics saw this as providing the corporate capture of global trade with a human face (see Bello 2002, Cleary 2002).

As this occurred, the extreme right was detaching itself from the free trade, neoliberal agenda that it had formerly supported along with the centre-right. In the US, Donald Trump broke with the Republican Party and big business when he opposed the TPP. Seeking to make inroads into the working class, right-wing parties in Europe gradually abandoned anti-tax, anti-big-government, and free-market concerns and opportunistically embraced an anti-neoliberal and anti-globalization agenda and the welfare state. The strategy paid off (Bremner 2014). It became the extreme right’s passport to power or to the antechamber of power throughout Europe. But there were two ingredients that the right added that marked off its anti-globalization agenda from the left: racism and a reactionary nationalism aimed at migrants. This happened in Denmark, Norway and Austria (Judis 2016), in Greece (Varoufakis 2017) and in the US with welfare proving a fertile ground for debate (Lowery 2018). In the Global South, there were right-wing figures that also engaged in cherry picking of left-wing themes. Foremost among them was Rodrigo Duterte, who was elected president of the Philippines in 2016. In summary, the subordination of trade to the social good, the expansion of social protection, and the re-embedding of the market in society are progressive themes that are appearing in the right’s deglobalization discourse, but they have been articulated within a racist and nationalist framework, within an exclusionary political economy that marginalizes large numbers of people on account of their race, ethnicity, nationality, and culture. The challenge then, is how to bring deglobalization back to the left, how to regain its original appeal as an emancipatory paradigm for all rather than just for some. Undertaking this task means revisiting not only the strategic prescriptions of deglobalization but also its foundational concepts, as they were originally articulated by Focus on the Global South.
Revisiting the foundational concepts of deglobalization

Deglobalization is, at its core, an ethical perspective (Bello 2002). It prioritizes values above interests, cooperation above competition, and community above efficiency. It does not say that interests, competition, and efficiency are bad but that their pursuit must be subordinated to values, cooperation, and community. Translated into economics, the aim of the deglobalization paradigm is to move beyond the economics of narrow efficiency, in which the key criterion is the reduction of unit cost, never mind the social and ecological destabilization this process brings about. It is to move beyond a system of economic calculation that, in the words of John Maynard Keynes (1933), made ‘the whole conduct of life… into a paradox of an accountant’s nightmare.’ It aims to promote effective economics, which strengthens social solidarity by subordinating the operations of the market to the values of equity, justice, and community and by enlarging the range of democratic decision-making in the economic sphere. To use the language of the great Hungarian thinker Karl Polanyi in his book *The Great Transformation* (1957), deglobalization is about ‘re-embedding’ the economy and the market in society, instead of having society driven by the economy and the market.

The deglobalization paradigm asserts that a ‘one size fits all’ model like neoliberalism or centralized bureaucratic socialism is dysfunctional and destabilizing. Instead, diversity should be expected and encouraged, as it is in nature. As Pablo Solon (2017a) has pointed out, deglobalization ‘does not seek to replace the homogenizing vision of globalization with another model that can be universally applied to all countries and communities.’ Shared principles of alternative economics do exist, and they have already substantially emerged in the struggle against and critical reflection over the failure of centralized socialism and capitalism. However, how these principles – the most important of which have been sketched out above – are concretely articulated will depend on the values, rhythms, and strategic choices of each community.

What was missing in the original formulation was an elaboration of the idea of community, for it was this ambiguity that allowed the right to step in and hijack the paradigm. For the right, community is determined by race, ethnicity, and blood. It is narrow in terms of who is included in it rather than expansive. For the left, community is principally a matter of shared values that transcend differences in blood, gender, race, class, and culture. Community tends towards continual expansion and incorporation of people that share the same values, though of course this sharing may be imperfect, limited, and open to different interpretations. Central to this interpretation of community is the assumption that all people are entitled to the full range of political, civil, economic, social, and human rights, including the right to join a desired community. This does not mean that there are no procedural rules governing the acquisition of citizenship or migration. It does mean though that these rules and regulations are guided by a fundamental openness towards accepting those who wish to join a community.

**Reassessing the deglobalization program**

Moving beyond these contrasts between our paradigm of deglobalization and that of the right, we now look at the concrete program for deglobalization as it was initially formulated to see how relevant it is to current conditions. Fourteen key thrusts were proposed:

1. Production for the domestic market must again become the centre of gravity of the economy rather than production for export markets.
2. The principle of subsidiarity should be enshrined in economic life by encouraging production of goods at the level of the community and at the national level if this can be done at reasonable cost in order to preserve community.

3. Trade policy – that is, quotas and tariffs – should be used to protect the local economy from destruction by corporate-subsidized commodities with artificially low prices.

4. Industrial policy – including subsidies, tariffs, and trade – should be used to revitalize and strengthen the manufacturing sector.

5. Long-postponed measures of equitable income redistribution and land redistribution (including urban land reform) can create a vibrant internal market that would serve as the anchor of the economy and produce local financial resources for investment.

6. Deemphasizing growth, emphasizing upgrading the quality of life, and maximizing equity will reduce environmental disequilibrium.

7. The development and diffusion of environmentally congenial technology in both agriculture and industry should be encouraged.

8. The power and transportation systems must be transformed into decentralized systems based on renewable resources.

9. A healthy balance must be maintained between a society’s population and ecology.

10. A gender lens must be applied in all areas of decision-making so as to ensure gender equity.

11. Strategic economic decisions cannot be left to the market or to technocrats. Instead, the scope of democratic decision-making in the economy should be expanded so that all vital questions – such as which industries to develop or phase out, what proportion of the government budget to devote to agriculture, etc. – become subject to democratic discussion and choice.

12. Civil society must constantly monitor and supervise the private sector and the state, a process that should be institutionalized.

13. The property complex should be transformed into a ‘mixed economy’ that includes community cooperatives, private enterprises, and state enterprises, and excludes transnational corporations.

14. Centralized global institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO should be replaced with regional institutions built not on free trade and capital mobility but on principles of cooperation.

While the foundational concepts of deglobalization were generally welcomed, the strategic program drew a number of useful questions, comments, and criticisms. The principal ones were:

- Does deglobalization propose delinking the local economy from the international economy?
- It was still articulated within a developmental framework whereas what is now needed is ‘an alternative to development.’
- It did not appreciate the urgency of climate change.
- It did not give sufficient stress to food security and food sovereignty.
- It did not pay adequate attention to the gender issue.
- It was not sensitive to structural changes in the economy.

There is, in varying degrees, merit to all these criticisms, and one problem they point to is that we devoted most of our effort to elucidating the foundational concepts of deglobalization and left the economic program proper rather brief, like the items in a doctor’s prescription. An
extended explanation could have been given on some of the key points, one that could have addressed some of the issues or problems associated with their implementation in real life. But perhaps the more important reason for the paucity of substantive articulation of some of these proposals is that we ourselves were still grappling with their implications when we first drew up the deglobalization program. The following section briefly addresses each of these points in turn.

**Does deglobalization propose delinking?**

In her initial forays on international trade, Marine Le Pen came across as advocating ‘an exit by France from the euro and erection of barriers at France’s borders’ (Haski 2011). Le Pen was superseded by Brexit, but both Le Pen’s position and Brexit are caricatures of deglobalization. Contrary to the claims of some critics, deglobalization in our formulation was never about delinking from the international economy. It was always about achieving a healthy balance between the national economy and international economy, one largely presided over by a state that pragmatically employed tariffs, quotas, and other mechanisms to ensure the survival and health of local industries competing against highly subsidized Northern agriculture and industrial corporate giants with deep pockets. It is about modifying the rules of trade to protect the welfare of all sectors of the community from the predatory acts of corporations that are justified by appeal to free trade, and it was never proposed as a nationalist weapon in global economic and political rivalries.

**Development alternative or alternative to development?**

In recent years, development has become a controversial word, with its connotations that the non-Western countries had only one way to go, and that was to follow the stages of development pioneered by the West. Few of those proposing deglobalization envision development as following the trajectory of the West or even of the newly industrializing countries. In so far as we have used development, we have meant it as the building of a society’s capacity to meet people’s needs. That industry must eventually supplant agriculture as the largest economic sector in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and that the services sector will eventually be the biggest employer, are not views that we hold. In fact, a vibrant agriculture that not only keeps its workforce but expands it while raising incomes would be seen as positive. Deglobalization, however, is not anti-industry. Industry and manufacturing are not, however, seen as important because they add more value to GDP than agriculture, but owing to their building capacity, making an economy more self-reliant because it has a diversified production base. That a country’s industrial structure must be environmentally congenial or sustainable goes without saying, which means extractive industries and ecologically and socially disruptive industrial processes that trigger land grabs, are wasteful in terms of their material inputs, or cannot minimize their industrial waste, pollution, or carbon output, would have to be banned or phased out.

This brings up the question of growth, which is more fully discussed in the next section. But in connection with the idea of development as the building of capacity, agricultural and industrial output do need to grow in order to raise the population’s standard of living. However, growth rates would be much less than the 6–10 per cent per annum that have been characteristic of the newly industrialized countries or emergent economies owing to three factors. First, in the deglobalization paradigm, production would be accompanied by radical redistributive policies, which was not the case with these countries. Second, recognition of the reproductive
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rights of women, along with greater income equality and better health and social services, would lessen the pressure to have large families, which is a key force behind high population growth rates that growth apologists use as a justification for high economic growth rates. Third, a conscious effort by civil society would be made to discourage consumption along the lines of the unsustainable western model, and to delink the measurement of social worth from material consumption and link it with the growth of non-material sources of psychological satisfaction.

If sustainable development is seen as undertaking radical reform in order to build the capacity of a community to survive and flourish while enhancing the environment, then it would probably meet with little objection. But orthodox sustainable development discourse has depoliticized the process of transformative change and concealed the fact that unequal social structures have to be changed to bring about a better life for the world’s billions who are currently marginalized, and that inevitably, there will have to be losers in this process which will undoubtedly involve much conflict (Kothari, Demaria and Acosta 2014). Thus, more socially imaginative alternatives are needed for deglobalization.

**Deglobalization, decoupling, and degrowth?**

In recent years, the most contentious debate in ecological economics has been that between decoupling and degrowth. This debate is central to defining the substance of deglobalization.

Decoupling means delinking the rise in GDP from the rise in carbon emissions. Relative decoupling refers to a GDP growth rate that rises faster than the carbon emissions rate. Absolute decoupling means the GDP growth rate continues to rise while the carbon emissions rate either flattens out or decreases. Absolute decoupling is what matters for climate activists. Two things make this possible. One is the ‘dematerialization’ of commodities, that is, the amount of materials that go into a product becomes greatly reduced. The second is more efficient use of energy throughout the economy. The first phenomenon leads to reduced draw on natural resources, the second to lower carbon emissions in the production process and consumption. Most of the debate has centred on the role of energy efficiency in cutting down greenhouse gas emissions, a position associated with both liberal advocates and progressive ones like Robert Pollin (2018, 9) who argues that ‘absolute decoupling’ of GDP growth from carbon emissions is possible, citing data that showed that in 21 countries expanded their GDP while reducing their carbon emissions.

The problem with the decoupling argument is twofold. First, as pointed out by Tim Jackson (2009) and conceded by Pollin (2018), there is no evidence of absolute decoupling of growth and carbon emissions either at a global level or among, respectively, low-, medium-, high-income country groupings between 1965 and 2015, although it may have occurred in some countries. Also, there is no evidence for absolute decoupling of growth and resource consumption. Indeed, ‘Global resource intensities (the ratios of resource use to GDP), far from declining, have increased significantly across a range of non-fuel minerals. Resource efficiency is going in the wrong direction. Even relative decoupling isn’t happening’ (Jackson 2009, 51).

Second, what appears to be happening is the rebound effect or ‘Jevons effect,’ after the British economist William Jevons, who observed that by raising the productivity of coal, that is, making its use more efficient in the production of iron, the price of iron would drop, creating more demand for iron and consequently increasing the use of coal. Efficiency gains in one area translate into savings that fuel energy consumption in other areas, generally raising fossil fuel use overall and raising carbon emissions. Thus Jackson (2009, 8) says that ‘simplistic assumptions that capitalism’s propensity for efficiency will allow us to stabilize the climate and
protect against resource scarcity are nothing short of delusional.’ The problem is that this may not simply be delusional but politically dangerous. As Jorgen Norgaard writes, ‘Unfortunately, the notion of decoupling has served as a peacemaker between environmentalists and growth-oriented politicians by conveniently exempting economic growth of any responsibility for environmental problems’ (cited in Owen 2011, 26).

Once the decoupling myth is brushed aside, it becomes evident that the addiction to growth must be confronted squarely. Since the demands of addressing poverty and respecting global justice and equity demands that the countries of the South will have to experience some growth, then it is clear that the adjustment in terms of radically restraining growth and consumption must fall for the most part on the rich countries, though of course, in both the rate of growth and consumption the poorer countries must not follow the way of the West by putting the emphasis on equity-enhancing economic strategies.

The shift in the West must not be simply one based on cutting down on material consumption but psychological in nature too, embracing less material consumption as a precondition for a superior way of life. As Kothari et al. (2014, 369) articulate:

> the emphasis should not only be on ‘less’ but also on ‘different.’ Degrowth signifies a society with a different metabolism (the energy and material throughput of the economy), but more importantly, a society with a metabolism which has a different structure and serves new functions. In a degrowth society everything will be different from the current mainstream: activities, forms and uses of energy, relations, gender roles, allocations of time between paid and non-paid work, and relations with the non-human world.

While integrating bioeconomics and ecological macroeconomics, degrowth is a non-economic concept as it attempts to challenge ‘the omnipresence of market-based relations in society (i.e., commodification) … replacing them with the idea of frugal abundance’ (Kothari et al. 2014, 369). It also promotes deep democratic engagement, and ‘a redistribution of wealth within and across the Global North and South, as well as between present and future generations’ (Kothari et al. 2014, 369). A similar vision is offered by Tim Jackson, one of the most respected proponents of degrowth. He writes:

> The rewards from these changes are likely to be significant. A less materialistic society will be a happier one. A more equal society will be a less anxious one. Greater attention to community and to participation in the life of society will reduce the loneliness and anomie that has undermined wellbeing in the modern economy. Enhanced investment in public goods will provide lasting returns to the nation’s prosperity.

(Jackson 2009, 93)

As far as the relationship between decouplers and degrowthers is concerned, it is clear that deglobalizers would be on the side of the latter. So long as it is understood that the main adjustment in terms of ‘degrowing’ is understood to lie with the North and that the so-called emerging economies must also rein in their high growth rates, the degrowth paradigm is not only compatible with but must be assimilated into deglobalization.

**Deglobalization and food sovereignty**

Deglobalization, when originally formulated, had as a major concern the protection of small agricultural producers from being bankrupted by cheap imports by big agro-corporations
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facilitated by the WTO, leading to the loss of a country’s food security. We soon realized that this was a rather limited formulation of larger concerns we had. Fortunately, the international peasant organization Via Campesina formulated ideas we were grappling with far better than we ever could under the rubric of ‘food sovereignty.’ As articulated by its representatives, the key propositions of food sovereignty include following: food self-sufficiency, a focus on quality, low input, small-scale, locally produced food, locally-controlled food systems, a focus on farmer and consumer welfare and a balance between urban and rural needs, delinking from global production chains and transnational corporations, an end to land grabs, democratic control over trade and more (Desmarais 2007). Just as proponents of degrowth clarified the principles of climate science and activism that needed to be incorporated into it, Via Campesina and its allies articulated the elements of food sovereignty that needed to be integrated into – and enrich – the deglobalization paradigm.

Deglobalization and feminist economics

The gender question barely figured in the original articulation of deglobalization but feminist economics advances and complements the paradigm. Of particular significance are two ideas. One is the demand that women’s reproductive work, that is, creating the social and economic conditions for recreation of work traditionally regarded as ‘productive’ work, must be recognized as creating value and this must be recognized in the national accounts. With its focus on GDP and its bias towards productive work as the source of value, traditional economics as well as Marxist economics have disparaged and denigrated women’s work despite the fact that research has shown that the total amount of unpaid work in a national economy is greater than the amount of paid work (Aguinaga et al. 2013).

The issue of the value of reproductive work has brought up the broader issue of the ‘economics of care,’ which ‘identifies the need for the care of children, the sick, those with special abilities, and the elderly, as one of the most important human needs for living a full life with dignity’ (Aguinaga et al. 2013, 52). Once we talk about the economics of care, we move away from the criterion of efficiency to a less tangible and more comprehensive measurement of the value of a product or service than the reduction of unit cost. This approach ties into our discussion in the original deglobalization paradigm of the transition from ‘efficiency economics’ to ‘effective economics,’ with the contribution a product or service makes to enhancing the welfare of a community – not reduction in unit cost as in efficiency economics – being the decisive measure of value or worth. Measuring value within this framework will be a challenge but a common measure would be a major advance towards the kind of ‘absolute decoupling’ – of non-material ‘flourishing’ and material consumption – that really matters.

Deglobalization and ‘Emancipatory Marxism’

Another issue which deglobalization must address more fully are structural changes in the local and international economies. Swift technological change and neoliberal ‘reform’ within a global capitalist system has created a social upheaval the end to which is not yet in sight. The negative consequences of this fatal combination have become all too evident and alarming and include increasing wealth and income inequalities in most countries and among countries; concentration of power in a few corporations linked to the rise of information technology (McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson 2017); and the vulnerability to workers created by advances in artificial intelligence. For the South this latter issue is particularly problematic, as Lowery (2018, 20–1) writes:
'Premature industrialization' might turn lower-income countries into service economies long before they have a middle class to buy those services ... A common path to rapid economic growth, the one that aided South Korea, among other countries, might simply disappear ... Mass unemployment would likely hit high-income countries first. But it could hit developing nations hardest.

Unless there is radical structural change, the deadly combination of neoliberal policies, corporate and income concentration, and advances in artificial intelligence would not only give capital unparalleled power over labour but it would make a very large part of society redundant, marginal, and miserable.

If, on the other hand, technology was no longer controlled by the imperatives of capital, artificial intelligence could be liberating, allowing the vast masses of people to truly move from the realm of history to the realm of freedom. This is the intriguing view of what we might term ‘Emanicipatory Marxism.’ According to Paul Mason (2016, 138), in a piece of writing known as the Fragment on the Machine, Marx imagined that in a society where information technology was no longer bound by the laws of the market and profit, the main objective of the working class would be ‘freedom from work.’ In such a society, ‘liberation would come through leisure time’ (Mason 2016, 138).

Short of a radical transformation of the economic system, so that leisure becomes the condition for the collective creation of socially useful work, there are other strategies that can be undertaken to counteract job-displacing technology. First, strong controls over the diffusion of labour-saving technology, which can be done via trade and investment restrictions. Second, focus on creating or developing jobs that cannot be replaced by robots, such as occupations involving intensive emotional care (Mason 2016). Third, promote agroecology–industry and industrial agriculture are extremely vulnerable to automation and its accompanying massive job displacement, but agroecology would be much less vulnerable to robotics and thus much more absorptive of human labour. Fourth, states can provide a basic income to everyone.

**Buen Vivir, deglobalization, and the convergence of alternatives**

A major contribution to the debate on alternatives to capitalist globalization in recent years has been the paradigm of ‘Buen Vivir,’ or ‘Living Well,’ distilled by progressive scholars from Latin America from the ‘cosmovisions’ of Andean indigenous communities (Solon 2017b; Prada 2013). This paradigm was largely articulated after deglobalization made its appearance as an alternative. However, it fits remarkably well with the spirit and goals of deglobalization.

Like deglobalization, degrowth, ecofeminism, and post-capitalism, Buen Vivir is critical of development as growth. It also shares deglobalization’s stress on respecting diverse roads to the achievement of the ‘good life,’ as well as the latter’s stress on the primacy of values and community. The different paradigms do have different emphases and some real differences – for instance, Buen Vivir’s acceptance of inequality as a part of the cosmic condition while the other paradigms value equality (Solon 2017b), but the overriding thrust is convergence in their values and directions, in particular, the subordination of the market to social solidarity, the value placed on cooperation over competition, the move away from GDP as a measure of social well-being, the reintegration of the economy and the environment, and the respect for different roads to the ‘good life.’ Buen Vivir’s key principles are outlined in the section on pedagogy below as well as exercise to get students to think about the similarities and differences with deglobalization.
Evolving ideas of deglobalization: some pedagogical considerations

The chapter offers a range of issues that can be used to engage people in debates about the structure of the global economy and the meaning of a good life. A few examples follow, all based on having this chapter as background reading.

a. *Unsustainable development:* show a video of a Jeffrey Sachs discussion on sustainable development. Discussion: in his book, *The Age of Sustainable Development*, Sachs (2015) posits that the four pillars of sustainable development are: economic prosperity, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and good governance. He says these can be achieved if only elites can see that it is in their interest that the poor are lifted up from their current condition, further they will be willing to support sustainable development if they see that it will cost them nothing or little. There is no mention of economic exploitation, of capitalism and capitalism’s drive to create poverty and inequality. In so far as corporations contribute to poverty, inequality, and environmental destruction, it is owing to misguided policies which are remediable because there really is no reason deep social conflicts should persist. Sachs says change will be brought about by the power of ideas and exhortation to achieve the sustainable development goals plus foreign aid. Discuss what apolitical means? Is this approach apolitical, why or why not? How does this differ from the chapter by Bello?

b. *Food sovereignty* – read the Declaration on Nyéléni on food sovereignty (www.viacampesina.org/en/declaration-of-nyi/). Write down by yourself which ideas you find the most and least appealing and why you think those ideas are/are not appealing. In small groups share your thoughts and discuss what these principles add to those of deglobalization? Are there any differences in emphasis or ideas with deglobalization?

c. *Buen Vivir/Living Well:* the four key principles underlying this approach based on indigenous cosmovisions are:
   1. It is not centred on man and society but on the whole, the universe, the Pacha, of which human society and the earth are parts.
   2. There is a unity of past, present, and the future. ‘In the Aymara way of thinking,’ writes Solon (2017b, 17), ‘there is no death as understood in the West, in which the body disappears into a hell or a heaven. Here, death is just another moment in life, because one lives anew in the mountains or the depths of the lakes or rivers.’
   3. The thrust of Buen Vivir is towards equilibrium, not progress or growth.
   4. Buen Vivir does not aim towards homogeneity but towards diversity and not only respects difference but sees it as a source of strength.

What are the similarities or complementarities with deglobalization (and/or other paradigms) and differences? Where there are differences ask the students which they prefer and why.

d. *Overall discussion:* does one paradigm need to subsume the others under one overarching framework, with a unified narrative? Or should we simply acknowledge the convergence and leave the different paradigms the space to borrow from each other’s conceptual wealth? To conclude, note that in Bello’s view deglobalization is enriched by perspectives from the other narratives even as it expresses them in its distinctive discourse.
Conclusion

Deglobalization was first articulated by the left, but it was taken over by the right, which invoked its progressive propositions on trade and welfare but placed them in an exclusionary political economy based on racial and ethnic supremacy. While the foundational concepts of deglobalization met with approval in progressive circles, the economic program was regarded by some as needing more substantive articulation. Key issues that needed to be addressed more fully were whether deglobalization favoured delinking from the international economy, whether it was a ‘development alternative’ or an ‘alternative to development,’ whether it favoured decoupling or degrowth as the way forward in addressing climate change, what its relationship was to the food sovereignty paradigm, what its stand was on feminist economics, how it related to structural changes in the economy like advances in artificial intelligence, and what its relationship was to Buen Vivir and other paradigms influenced by indigenous perspectives.

The chapter clarified that deglobalization did not mean delinking from the international economy; was more of an alternative to development than a development alternative; favoured degrowth over decoupling; was enriched by the perspectives of food sovereignty and agroecology; and sought to integrate the insights of feminist economics, in particular, the value of reproductive work and the centrality of work related to care in the post-growth economy. Also, like emancipatory Marxism, deglobalization recognized both the massive threat posed to workers by advances in artificial intelligence and the liberating potential of the latter in terms of releasing people from the burden of work to concentrate on fulfilling their potential as creative beings.

Deglobalization has much in common with the perspectives and values undergirding Buen Vivir. Indeed, the shared perspectives among all the alternatives to development are striking. However, rather than subsuming all the discourses under one overarching discourse, it is probably more productive for each of these discourses to be articulated and developed separately, with their complementarities being pointed out along with their differences. The insights each paradigm now delivers might be lost under a homogenizing conceptual framework.

Key sources

1. Bello, Walden (2002). *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy*, London: Bloomsbury/Zed. This book highlights the failings of the current global economy, in particular the negative role of transnational corporations and footloose capital. It provides a comprehensive introduction and key concepts of deglobalization. This includes how to shift to a more decentralized, plural system of global economic governance. It emphasizes how states around the world need to be able to follow development strategies that are sensitive to their own context and needs.


This article argues that we need to go beyond ideas like the ‘Green Economy’ and develop alternative socio-economy systems that radically disrupt contemporary inegalitarian global systems.
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This article explores two divergent progressive approaches to the ecological crisis: the green new deal and degrowth. Pollin is largely a supporter of a green new deal, which argues for a global program of investing 1.5–2 per cent of GDP in energy efficiency and renewable energy. The article addresses a range of challenges around such a program including land use, jobs, industrial policy, and ownership forms.

**Note**


**References**


