Introduction

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) deployed in 2008 is the biggest and most expensive mission of its sort in the history of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the course of ten years of its operation, EULEX’s annual budget has been 50 million euros (Haxhiaj 2018), a budget approximately 45% higher compared to EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) funds for Kosovo (Kursani 2012). The vast budget allocated for EULEX and its relatively higher number of staff compared to other CSDP missions around the world led to high expectations both from the local authorities and institutions in Kosovo as well as from international observers. Having been administered by the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) for nearly a decade (1999–2008), the locals in Kosovo perceived EULEX as an ‘upgrade’ that would deal more seriously with building democracy. The high expectations for EULEX were also international. Being the most ambitious mission in CSDP’s history, the mission was seen as a litmus test for the EU and its capabilities to build democratic systems ‘abroad’.

In its ten years of longevity, the legitimacy of EULEX has been questioned and hampered both locally and internationally. Internationally, it was first the European Court of Auditors which, in its 2012 report on EULEX, listed a number of problems pertaining to the lack of transparency and efficiency within divisions of the mission (European Court of Auditors 2012). At the local level, the legitimacy of EULEX was first and foremost hampered due to the inability of the mission to properly deal with high-level corruption cases (Miftaraj and Musliu 2016). Secondly, a number of scandals with EULEX staff between 2013 and 2015 cast a negative light on the mission both for the locals in Kosovo and for the image of EULEX worldwide. The scandal of EULEX police smuggling alcohol in Kosovo in 2010 (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2010) and the allegations made by the former EULEX prosecutor Maria Bamieh in 2014 that the EULEX Head of mission was involved in corruptive affairs with the justice system in Kosovo (Rettman 2014) became the two ‘landmark’ cases to damage the mission’s reputability. Reports and studies of local think tanks in Kosovo point out that from EULEX’s initial deployment, ‘it was clear that there was a lack of a serious strategy and political will to actualise the mandate of the mission’ (Kursani 2012; Miftaraj and Musliu 2016). In 2014, the mission started to downsizing...
and eventually phasing out, passing its responsibilities to local institutions, while in the meantime retaining an ‘observatory’ role.

These complications were not entirely unexpected. The idea of having an EU rule of law mission deployed in Kosovo was mentioned in the Plan for Kosovo’s supervised independence drafted by former UN Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. Article 1 of Ahtisaari’s Plan provides the following:

The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary power to ensure the effective and efficient of this Settlement...Kosovo shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end.

(United Nations Security Council 2007)

The same clause was reiterated in the Constitution of Kosovo enacted in 2008, in which the authorities of the newly declared independent country invited the deployment of an EU-led rule of law mission to help and support local authorities. Kosovo had declared its independence on 17 February 2008, swiftly backed by the United States and countries of Western Europe, yet strongly opposed by Serbia, Russia, and China among others. Though individual countries of the European Union were supportive of the declaration of independence, the EU still does not recognise Kosovo’s independence ‘en-block’. Five EU member states – Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus – do not recognise Kosovo as an independent country. The lack of recognition notwithstanding, all five of them were regular contributors to EULEX by sending their judges, prosecutors, and customs officials. The initial plan was to deploy EULEX under a legal mandate of the EU. However, this was not acceptable for Serbia who insisted that EULEX be deployed under the auspices of the United Nations. Kosovo was not recognised by the UN and in fact, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 reaffirmed Kosovo to be de jure part of Serbia. Eventually, EULEX got deployed under the UN, which effectively meant that the mission had to ignore the legal infrastructure enacted from the newly independent institutions of Kosovo. Shortly after, this proved to be practically impossible. As it will be elaborated below, EULEX had to systematically work with and through the legal infrastructure and the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. To that end, the ‘status-neutral’ approach remained mainly declaratory and on paper.

In terms of structure, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section deconstructs the language through which EULEX explains its operations in Kosovo and how it communicates its activities to the public. The second section, deconstructs the ambiguities surrounding EULEX and Kosovo’s political status. Bringing together the discussion on ambiguity and the changing concepts through which EULEX describes its operations, the conclusion interrogates whether rule of law in Kosovo is the inability of local institutions or whether it refers to the inability of the mission to manage to transfer its know-how to the local institutions.

Deconstructing ‘monitoring, mentoring and advising’

The chapter will now turn to the performance of EULEX in the period 2008–2018. Seven hundred ninety-four press releases issued by EULEX (2008–2018) have been collected and part of them will be analysed with the aid of deconstruction as conceptualised and used by Jacques Derrida. Derrida argued that there is a hidden patterning of power in all conversations. For him, power is not the name of something we possess, rather it emerges out of social situations (Derrida 1974). What guides deconstruction’s methodical shaking of the textual structures is, of course, the text itself. Obviously, not through what it shows explicitly. Rather, the text guides deconstruction through what it tries to hide in and through what it says, through the
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symptoms it manifests (Derrida 1985). Being essentially a tool to interrogate concepts, Derrida’s deconstruction has been seen a political method for discovering the oppressed others beneath phallogocentric discourse (Phiddian 1997); and, among others, as a conceptual tool for radical, social, and political critique of the capitalist-patriarchal institutions (Dickens 1990). In this chapter, Derrida’s deconstruction will be taken as a method that de-totalises self-enclosed and seemingly self-evident concepts. In doing this, deconstruction unravels the seemingly technical understanding of concepts and displays the hidden patterns of power that are constitutive to concepts and discourse (see also Musliu 2014a). Making a case for a critique of Western metaphysics, in his book Positions, Derrida (1981, 19) writes that “everyday language” is not innocent or neutral, because it carries with it a number of presuppositions. In other words, if a particular meaning or a concept is silenced or hidden from a particular discourse, we must at least ask why that is the case and what power dimensions or other encounters are at stake.

EULEX describes its mission statement to ‘monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo’s justice system’. The mandate of EULEX is however far more comprehensive. It includes the works and activities typically carried out by a number of government ministries, departments, and agencies in a country (Kursani 2012). To that end, what EULEX does and more pertinent how it monitors, mentors, and advises in practice, remain not entirely clear. In order to flesh out these conundrums, in this section, I deconstruct the mission statement of EULEX. I will first map out the various concepts and wording EULEX uses to describe its work in various situations. Next, I will problematise the choice of wording by EULEX.

Reporting on its activities in press releases, EULEX explains its role with the following concepts: Support, cooperation and coordination, facilitation, and partnership. These concepts are not used interchangeably. Rather, each concept is used in a particular situation to convey a specific meaning. Before matching each concept a specific situation, let us take a closer look at the definitions of these concepts. ‘Support’ refers to two or more parties bearing all parts of the weight of a particular decision or process. Along these lines, both parties – EULEX and Kosovo’s institutions – are constituents and shareholders of the rule of law in Kosovo. In the day-to-day work of EULEX ‘support’ is largely used to denote its expertise and know-how of legal practices, legal infrastructures, EU legislation, reading and commenting on Kosovo’s legislation. This becomes evident in the following statements:

The central aim of EULEX Kosovo, launched in 2008, is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, with a specific focus on the judiciary (EULEX 2012a).

EULEX supports the Kosovo government in the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan through its work in the Inter-Ministerial Working Group. (EULEX 2012b)

EULEX mission will continue to support relevant rule of law institutions in Kosovo on their path towards increased effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, free from political interference and in full compliance with EU best practices. (EULEX 2018a)

Similar to support, ‘cooperation’ and ‘coordination’ refer to situations in which two or more parties work jointly towards the same end. This implies that both EULEX and Kosovo authorities are working together towards Kosovo’s reaching European standards of rule of law. In the communication of EULEX, cooperation and coordination are generally mentioned to explain EULEX’s work with Kosovo (state) structures and NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR). As I will explain in greater detail in the next section, cooperation and coordination are brought up during sensitive inter-ethnic incidents or matters of security. For example, in January 2013, following the clash...
of the protestors with the security forces of Kosovo Police and KFOR in Northern Kosovo, EULEX declared:

EULEX police and prosecutors are closely monitoring the situation and coordinating with Kosovo Police and KFOR. EULEX is ready to step in and support the local rule of law institutions, if needed. (EULEX 2013e)

In 2012, the Assembly of Kosovo voted in favour of the border demarcation with Montenegro. This requirement stemmed directly from the discussions of enlargement with the European Union. Shortly after, EULEX would state:

Today’s vote at the Assembly is a strong indication of Kosovo’s determination to improve the rule of law, and the mission that I head will keep up its support in this process. EULEX looks forward to continuing its good cooperation with Kosovo rule of law institutions. (EULEX, 2012a)

‘Partnership’ refers to an engagement or an activity of two or more equal parties with a relatively same level of power. A defining characteristic of partnership is the ownership both parties have in their engagement. In its communication, EULEX would opt for the concept of ‘partnership’ when referring to its work with Kosovan judges and prosecutors in trials and indictments. Court panels in Kosovo are composed of local and EULEX judges.

Partnership between Kosovo rule of law institutions and EULEX continues to remain a priority for the mission. As more and more cases are being investigated jointly by investigators of EULEX and the Kosovo Police, this agreement will enable the exchange of intelligence, which will further the cooperation in the fight against organised crime and other criminal offences in Kosovo. (EULEX 2013a)

There are many challenges ahead for EULEX and for Kosovo. We are in partnership together and, with partnership, comes responsibilities on all sides. EULEX will continue to support Kosovo in enhancing the rule of law and in furthering its EU perspective. (EULEX 2013d)

Since 2013 when the Brussels Agreement was signed in the EU mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade in Brussels, EULEX has also talked about its role as ‘facilitator’ by overseeing the implementation of the agreement between the two. To facilitate is to ease, or make things run easily. Differently from support, facilitation refers to situations in which two parties bear the weight of a particular decision while a third party facilitates the discussion or the process. Facilitation as a process can vary from providing a physical space where the two parties meet to mediating their discussion. Importantly, the facilitator is not a stakeholder or a constituent actor in the process. Along these lines, both the EU and EULEX suggest to be more facilitators in the Belgrade – Pristina dialogue, rather than actual stakeholders.

In March 2015, EULEX facilitated a meeting between the Kosovan Police General Director and the Serbian Police General Director, as ‘part of its support to Pristina and Belgrade authorities under its mandated obligation to promote relations between Pristina and Belgrade Rule of Law institutions, including police, justice and customs officials’ (EULEX 2015)

Finally, looking at the press releases we acknowledge yet another role of EULEX which is not explicit: That of a ‘cheerleader’ praising and encouraging local institutions and structures in Kosovo. The ‘cheerleader’ character almost always appears adjacent to praising Kosovan
authorities being in ‘full compliance with EU best practices’ (EULEX 2018b). For instance, when Kosovo police made an arrest of a suspect for human trafficking in 2013, the Head of EULEX Police, Harry Long commented that ‘Kosovo Police should be congratulated for this proactive operation’, adding that operations like these ‘demonstrate the increasing professionalism of the KP and, hopefully, similar operations will be carried out in the future’ (EULEX 2013b).

The wording of praise is not only in cases of concrete action from Kosovo’s authorities. When it comes to inter-ethnic issues involving Albanians and Serbians, the mere sitting together of both parties is praised by EULEX. For instance, in the aforementioned meeting of police directors, the Head of EULEX, Gabriele Meucci, ‘praised the start of the direct meetings between Kosovo and the Serbian Police officials, recommending that such constructive cooperation continues in the future’ (EULEX 2015). Along the same lines, in his meeting with the newly elected mayor of Zvečan, a city in Northern Kosovo inhabited by Serbs, the then Head of EULEX Bernd Borchardt said to be ‘very pleased with the meeting with Mr. Janković who has shown a keen interest in the rule of law matters’ (EULEX 2013c).

In another occasion when Kosovo Customs and Kosovo Border Police seized a large supply of heroin during an operation in 2011, the Head of EULEX Customs, Mike Marsden, stated:

> It is very encouraging to see that Kosovo Customs and Kosovo Border Police have demonstrated initiative and enthusiasm in this operation. The amount of drugs seized on this occasion is substantial, representing around fifty per cent of the total heroin seized in Kosovo in the previous year. This successful operation shows how well local law enforcement agencies are progressing. (EULEX 2011b)

This section has shown the diverse concepts EULEX uses to describe its involvement in different contexts and situations in Kosovo. While the various concepts discussed above fit broadly in EULEX’s mission statement (monitoring, mentoring, and advising) referring to its role as ‘partner’ or ‘facilitator’, they also convey an important nuance to understand the way EULEX qualifies its role and the role of local institutions. Since its deployment, EULEX has constantly attempted to tone down its role, activities, and power, which stretch out well beyond monitoring, mentoring, and advising nevertheless. To that end, rather than having the power to do something in the classical sense, EULEX has a Foucauldian type of power: It can establish certain regimes of truth about itself and the reality around it (Foucault 1991). Concretely, depending on the situation, EULEX proclaims the local authorities as partners with a stake in building the institutions of their country, as cooperators in a joint venture with EULEX to build state institutions in Kosovo, or as mere subjects in a race of accomplishing EU standards of state building and rule of law. Similarly, the power of EULEX is to establish itself as a mere observer, a facilitator, or a partner, depending on the situation at hand. In doing this, EULEX advertently proclaims the responsibility and/or praise for the state building processes to the local authorities or to the EU.

**Deconstructing ‘status-neutral’**

In this section I problematise EULEX’s ambiguities in relation to Kosovo’s political status. As mentioned in the introduction, the EU had to find a technical way of deploying its mission due to Serbia’s insisting to deploy EULEX under a UN mandate. Even though the EU and EULEX have been creative to formulate a ‘status-neutral’ position to avoid any attributions or negations of Kosovo’s sovereignty, I show below that the ‘status-neutral’ stance for EULEX never
materialised. What has so far occurred instead is that EULEX found itself continuously entangled in acknowledging Kosovo as an independent country and at the same time silencing this recognition. Successive Heads of EULEX have reiterated EULEX to be a technical mission and that it remains neutral when it comes to Kosovo’s political status. Yet, Kosovo often figures as an independent country in the communications of EULEX. At other times, the independence is silenced from the text and a more generic line of communication takes over.

One way how EULEX deviates from its ‘status-neutral’ mandate is when it engages with structures and institutions of Kosovo as an independent state. The press releases of EULEX are filled with notifications of meetings between (successive) Heads of EULEX and ‘the President of Kosovo’ or ‘the Prime Minister of Kosovo’, members of Kosovo’s Assembly, and the Minister of Justice. For example, reporting on the visits of the EU Civilian Operations Commander Vincenzo Coppola in 2018, EULEX reported ‘…he met with Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, Justice Minister Abelard Tahiri, members of the Presidency of Kosovo Assembly…’ (EULEX 2018a). Following the ratification of the border agreement between Kosovo and Montenegro, EULEX issued the following statement: ‘The ratification of the demarcation agreement with Montenegro by the Kosovo Assembly represents an important milestone for Kosovo and its people’ (EULEX 2018d). Further, in her communication about the redefinition of EULEX, the Head of EULEX, Jeroslava Novotna, declared that the changes of EULEX will also be in line with ‘the new Kosovo law’ (EULEX 2018d). And the report which EULEX submitted to the UNMIK in 2009 stated that ‘EULEX continued the practice of copying commercial invoices…’ and shared them ‘with the Kosovo Customs Service and the Serbian Customs Administration’ (EULEX 2009b). In this particular statement, EULEX differentiates between the two administrations [Kosovan and Serbian], referring to both with their state institutional names, thus erasing its ‘status-neutral’ position towards Kosovo. The same attribution to institutions was repeated in 2018 after the Assembly of Kosovo passed the ratification of the border agreement with Montenegro. In its immediate reaction, EULEX reported: ‘The ratification of the demarcation agreement with Montenegro by the Kosovo Assembly represents an important milestone for Kosovo and its people’ (EULEX 2018d; European Court of Auditors 2012). What we can infer from such statements is that by drawing a distinguishing line between Kosovo and its national authorities vs. non-Kosovan institutions and actors, EULEX implicitly recognises the independent status of Kosovo, which brings the mission at odds with its determination to stick with status-neutrality.

In other press releases we see how attributions to statehood elements (e.g. Prime Minister of Kosovo, Supreme Court of Kosovo, etc.) are deleted or silenced from the text, getting substituted with generic jargon. The silencing takes place when the primary addressee of EULEX is the non-Albanian audience, or when a particular communication is directly addressed to the Serbian population in Kosovo and/or Serbia proper. In such situations, state-like attributions of Kosovo are deleted. For instance, in a reaction to Kosovan Serbian leaders who accused EULEX in 2014 of working with Kosovo’s security forces in Northern Kosovo, EULEX responded that ‘EULEX does not make any distinction on ethnic lines…as stated by various parties’ (EULEX 2014). In the first half of the sentence, EULEX refutes allegations of working with Kosovo’s security forces without naming them as such. In the second half of the sentence, it refutes allegations of Serbian politicians in Northern Kosovo, without attributing them directly. In other sensitive cases, in which Albanians and Serbians were colliding over an issue, EULEX would opt for a similar strategy of ambiguity in its verbal and written communication: silencing or deleting any attribution which would showcase its implied recognition of Kosovo’s institutions and by extension Kosovo’s independence.

Another example to showcase how the ‘status-neutral’ position remained only declaratory for EULEX is the fact that the mission operated under Kosovo’s law and the court cases were all
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conducted by and through Kosovo’s legal system. What is more, EULEX regularly invokes laws enacted by Kosovo’s Assembly, for example:

EULEX would like to stress that, according to the Kosovo law, the opinions expressed and the positions taken by judges during their internal discussions in reaching a verdict are confidential. (EULEX 2009c)

It appears that EULEX uses and silences state attribution in its communication depending indeed on whether Kosovo or Serbia are the targets of it. When the addressee of a communication is Serbia, EULEX would simply opt for ‘Kosovo’, removing any signifiers demarcating independent statehood such as ‘Government’, ‘Assembly’, or ‘President’:

EULEX has a mandate to carry out its activities all over Kosovo. This mandate has been confirmed in the invitation by the Kosovo authorities and in a letter sent by the President of Serbia. (EULEX 2009a)

The state attribution of Kosovo is silenced by means of using a more generic and technical term such as ‘Kosovo authorities’, whereas in the same sentence Serbia is attributed as state due to the direct reference made to the President of Serbia. The juxtaposition of Kosovo’s standing ambivalently between statehood and non-recognition with the national sovereignty of Serbia determines Kosovo’s in-between ontology in aporetic a manner, to use Derrida’s terms (see also Fanouls and Musliu 2018, Musliu 2014b).

A similar approach is taken by EULEX when its audience is Kosovo Serbs. In these cases, not only state attributions for Kosovo are removed, but the language becomes entirely technical and evasive so as to avoid any attribution:

KFOR and EULEX support a safe and secure environment in Kosovo for all communities. We will continue our actions to support freedom of movement and establish the rule of law, carefully and impartially. (EULEX 2011a; EULEX 2013a)

Interestingly, when the situation becomes too sensitive and prone to inter-ethnic clashes, EULEX removes entirely the signifier ‘Kosovo Police’ from its communication and refers instead to KFOR as the principal security force. This systematically occurred throughout 2011, after Kosovo police took control of the two border-gates 1 and 31 in Northern Kosovo and the local Serbs retaliated by burning the premises. At that time, local Serbs even accused EULEX of having helped the ‘state structures’ of Kosovo. Responding to such accusations, EULEX’s then spokesperson Nicholas Hawton said that ‘EULEX was not involved in any way in the operation carried out by the special units of Kosovo Police’, adding further that ‘EULEX is coordinating closely with KFOR’ to resolve the situation (EULEX 2011c; EULEX 2009d).

On the contrary, when the addressee of its communication is Kosovan Albanians, EULEX uses directly terms that reaffirm Kosovo as an independent state:

Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Mr. Kuçi pointed out that the Government and the EULEX will work together in this process to rebuild a police service that is truly multi-ethnic and that reflects the composition of the Kosovo society and that will work in the interest of all communities. (EULEX 2009d)
In cases like these, EULEX is not status-neutral as it unequivocally refers to the ‘Republic of Kosovo’. Its ‘status-neutral’ position towards Kosovo’s independence has enabled EULEX – at least in a declaratory aspect – to operate without taking sides. However, in its day-to-day work, this situation is far more complex as EULEX has been continuously working based on the legal infrastructure deriving from Kosovo’s Constitution whose legal authority draws on an independent Kosovo.

Conclusion

Following Derrida, ‘text’ as in discourse, is never empty, neutral, or pre-given. To the contrary, a text is always imbued with meaning; it is political, contextual, and socially constructed. Even the ordinary language involves certain metaphysical presuppositions about the world. To that end, it only seems natural to go beyond the text, deconstruct it and de-totalise the self-enclosed totalities and uncover patterns and relations of power. Particular in Derrida’s fashion of deconstruction is that ‘…in all conversations, there’s a hidden patterning of power’ (Derrida 1974). For him, power is not the name of something we possess; rather it emerges out of social situations. In both sections in the chapter we saw that when silencing or pronouncing an institution or a category in its communication, EULEX denies or proclaims Kosovo’s sovereignty. What is more, the power of EULEX is to do both [denial and proclamation] at the same time and address two diametrically opposite audiences [the Serbians and the Albanians] with the message they separately need to hear.

In the first section, we saw how EULEX shifts and changes concepts to describe what it does depending on the context and the situation. EULEX has the power to establish that it is a technical mission that only monitors, mentors, and advises, even though – as I have shown above – its powers and authority stretch out well beyond that. Further, EULEX can be a supporter, a facilitator, a partner, or a coordinator depending on the context, and by extension, the local institutions in Kosovo (Ministry of Justice, the President, the National Assembly, etc.) can acquire respective subject positions as mentee, partner, or party depending on how EULEX sees it fit. The power of EULEX to establish the common sense about itself and about Kosovo reaches to the practical aspects of how the mission functions. First, despite working with and through Kosovo’s legal system, EULEX has sovereign powers. For instance, in case of EULEX staff’s breaching procedures or committing a crime, they can only be judged in the legal systems of their countries of origin, and are immune to Kosovo’s jurisdiction (see for more, Visoka 2013). Further, irrespective of its progress and performance, EULEX – through the EU – is the only subject that can renew its own mandate. Local authorities in Kosovo, including the government, the President, the National Assembly, or the civil society at large, do not have a say to the format, the longevity, or the scope of the mission.

The narrative continued by demonstrating how the independence of Kosovo – a contested issue at the international stage and for the Serbo-Albanian relations within Kosovo – can be both denied and affirmed in the communication of EULEX. The power embedded within the discourse of EULEX has continuously both silenced and acknowledged Kosovo’s independence. When silenced, Kosovo is referred to as a mere territory or landscape, the peoples and ethnic groups living in it are referred to as ‘communities’, whereas open conflicts between ethnic subjects are merely referred to as ‘parties’ or ‘sides’. In this setup, it is not merely the independence of Kosovo that is silenced, but rather an entire set of conflicts, relations of power, and disputes are made technical and generic.

Moreover, EULEX was established and deployed in the middle of a complicated political stalemate as it had to be acceptable from both Kosovo and Serbia. For Kosovo and its political
elites, the deployment of EULEX has been consistently justified by invoking the invitation issued for EULEX in Ahtisaari’s Plan and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. For Serbia and its political elites on the other side, EULEX has been consistently justified by invoking its ‘status-neutral mandate’ regarding Kosovo’s independence. In other words, for Kosovo, EULEX was operating in a sovereign state, even though it is not explicitly said so by the latter, whereas for Serbia, EULEX was operating in a non-independent state, thanks to its ‘status-neutral’ position. Local civil society organisations in Kosovo have called EULEX in this setup a ‘pragmatic chameleon’ (Kursani 2012). We have evidenced how EULEX can communicate such diametrically opposite messages to two separate audiences that wish to hear one preferred attribution only. Research has shown that the EULEX Communication Office is the mission’s largest department, producing daily content in English (for the international audience and Brussels), in Albanian (for the Albanian majority), and Serbian (for the Serbian minority in Northern Kosovo and Serbia proper) (Ferati 2012; Peters 2010). The content has been framed in such a way to be deemed acceptable for all three audiences, even reinforcing their respective narratives on what EULEX does and what Kosovo is.

References


