4.1
RUMOURS, URBAN LEGENDS AND THE VERBAL TRANSMISSION OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES

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Introduction

Despite the growing number of conspiracy theories on the Internet, their verbal transmission remains significant and topical due to their similarly drastic impact, including violence. Exemplary are, for instance, the so-called ‘organ theft legends’ still circulating verbally and implying that certain villains plot to kidnap children or adults in order to harvest their organs for the transplantation industry. Many groups have been accused of such acts, and violence has often been the result. One such example is what happened in the Guatemalan village of San Cristobal Verapaz in 1994, when American tourist Diane June Weinstock innocently said hello to a group of local children. Weinstock’s only fault was that she did not know about the rumour that circulated all over Guatemala and Central America and motivated the assault of many other Americans who found themselves travelling in the region at that time. According to the rumour, Americans and Israelis came to Guatemalan villages to kidnap Guatemalan children, kill them and harvest their organs for transplantation into wealthy North American children. Enraged by these verbally circulating stories, a mob of Guatemalans assaulted Weinstock, inflicting eight stab wounds, several broken limbs and a fractured skull (Samper 2002: 1–2).

Seemingly local, such a plot is global and centuries old. Most infamously, it manifests in the blood libel legend that has claimed that Jews kill Christian children to add their fresh blood into the ritual food (Dundes 1991). Long before the invention of the Internet and mass media, versions of the legend transmitted orally, resulting in killings of Jews and Roma accused of the presumed crimes. Folklorists still record blood libel stories in contemporary Eastern Europe where Jews used to live, such as Latgalia region in Latvia (Amosova 2013). The circulation of these stories is illustrative of how conspiracy theories often manifest in bits and pieces rather than a full-fledged narrative.

This chapter sets out to trace the evolution of research on the ‘word of mouth’ as a mode of transmission for conspiracy theories. A thorough understanding of this evolution is instrumental for reassessing the impact of orally spread conspiracist beliefs and for designing new interdisciplinary analytical tools.
Traditionally, the fragmented conspiracy theories transmitted orally have been mostly studied by social psychologists, sociologists and folklorists, who have come up with their own specific terminology. Social psychologists and sociologists agreed on the term ‘rumour’ rather early and unreservedly, while folklorists could hardly concur on a single term, moving between tall tales (Baughman, Holaday 1944), modern tales (Beardsley, Hanke, 1943), modern folk tales (Hobbs 1966), folk legends, belief legends, belief narratives (Dégh 1971), urban belief tales (Cunningham 1979), exemplary stories, apocryphal anecdotes (Campion–Vincent 2018: 15), contemporary legends (Pettitt et al. 1995), urban legends (Brunvand, 2000), etc. Most widely, they used the terms ‘urban legends’, ‘contemporary legends’ or simply ‘legends’. As a result, a significant amount of research addressed rumours and legends separately, which eventually forced scholars from various disciplines to distinguish between them.

While many scholars argue that the borders between rumour and legend are hazy (Kapferer 1990: 9; Turner 1993: 5; Goldstein 2004: 25; Fine, Ellis 2010: 4), others have come up with two key differences between the genres. One such difference is the complexity of the narrative: A rumour is a short narrative without a particular plot, while an urban legend is longer and has a plot, including introduction, main part and culmination. The other difference is that the definition of the genre depends on the featuring villains: While rumour targets particular protagonists or institutions, legend protagonists are usually anonymous (Smith 1984; Brunvand 2002: xxvii). However, in practice, classifications have not been so simple, as scholars still study what they call ‘legends’ even when they depict, for instance, particular protagonists or institutions as villains. Since the study of oral rumours or legends shows that the same texts mutate in form and motif from person to person and even from one telling to another within the repertoire of the same person (Smith 1984), scholars have proposed the term ‘rumour legend’ to avoid the need to distinguish between the phenomena (Cornwell, Hobbs 1992: 609). This, however, has not become widely used.

Despite the differences in understanding the terms, the similarities between them are, perhaps, stronger. What definitions of rumour, legend and conspiracy theory genres have in common is the negative connotation of misinformation, lie, paranoia and even pathology (see the critical overviews of such a tendency in Shibutani 1966: 56–8; 62; Harambam 2017: 10–22; Bergmann 2018: 6). In folklore studies alone, the bias towards the study of legends ‘as stories that we know to be untrue, but which the naïve teller does not’ runs deep and feeds the vernacular perception that ‘legend’ and ‘false story’ are synonyms (Lindahl 2012: 141). Although folklorists have acknowledged that a narrative does not have to be false to qualify as a legend, this formal recognition is not really implemented in practice since folklore studies gravitate to narratives that they almost invariably believe to be false (Oring 2008: 159).

Another aspect uniting the understanding of rumour, legend and other forms of conspiracy theories, is their fluidity and inconsistency. Scholars have long agreed that it is hard to define legends or rumours with the help of their formal features, as they lack them (Dégh 1971: 73). The lack of formal features is, in fact, seen as key to their definition (Smith 1997: 493). A related characteristic of legends and rumours is their complete disregard of consistency and facts, or, as the title of Jan Brunvand’s book put it, ‘the truth never stands in the way of a good story’ (2000). An example could be the conspiracy theory documented by Sona Burstein during the Second World War, when she observed how an American soldier was explaining how Jews avoided recruitment (supposedly, via their connections with the highest politicians, also Jews). When facts and figures were put before him to prove him wrong, his answer was, in effect, ‘Yes, and they’re getting all the best jobs in the Army’ (Burstein 1959: 367). This is one of many examples demonstrating how
inconsistent elements contradicting each other may merge into a larger conspiracy theory, in this case, an anti-Jewish one. With every new narrator transmitting the conspiracy theories in multiplicity of their verbal manifestations, they acquire new contradicting details. These peculiarities of rumour transmission were probably the first reason why scholars turned to studying them.

**Transmission of rumours: Observations and experiments before the Second World War**

One of the first researchers to turn to the psychology of rumour was Carl Gustav Jung, who observed how each new narrator cultivates rumour by adding the details dictated by his or her unconscious motivations. Jung based his analysis on the case of a 13-year-old girl who was telling malicious rumours about sexual abuse by her male teacher. The girl was retelling a sexual dream about the teacher to her classmates, and, by repetition and transmission, it grew into the larger conspiracy theory about the teacher committing and concealing improper acts. While every new story about the teacher Jung documented had the same fundamentals, various additions and amplifications demonstrated how the rumour grew by each successive narrator adding a bit of his or her unconscious (Jung 1910).

Influenced by Jung, a lot of research followed on the loss and transformation of information taking place during the transmission of rumour and related folk narratives. Folklorists and social psychologists turned to this topic simultaneously and often independently, making different arguments and reaching different conclusions depending on their professional background. In 1920, psychologist Frederic Bartlett published his first work about the transmission of folk narrative using two folktales: one African and one North American Indian. He deliberately chose these unfamiliar and complicated cases, offered them to British subjects and asked them to pass the tales orally in one-to-one communication. The experiment demonstrated how much of the original content is lost during communication, that memory is never accurate and vulnerable to distortion (Bartlett 1920). Later, Bartlett (1958) attributed his experiment to a suggestion given by Norbert Wiener to make use of a folk game he called ‘Russian Scandal’, also known as ‘Chinese Whispers’ or ‘Broken Telephone’ (Cornwell, Hobbs 1992: 610). In his book on political propaganda, Bartlett applied the results of this experiment when theorising about the natural circulation of rumour (Bartlett 1940).

Drawing on the pioneering work of Bartlett, folklorist Walter Anderson continued the experiments on the transmission of legends. He read a little-known legend to three students and asked them to write it down the next day just as they remembered it. Then he asked each one to read it to another student, who would again write it down the next day. This procedure was repeated 12 times. As a result, Anderson obtained three sets of 12 texts each, and the final texts in these series were all totally distorted and contained major discrepancies between them. After a number of such experiments confirmed the initial result, Anderson claimed that normative elements in the text stabilise while each listener synthesises the variants heard from different sources (Anderson 1951; Oriol 2015: 153). The ‘multi-conduit hypothesis’, formulated by rumour researchers much later, confirmed that the rumour gets transmitted via like-minded individuals that lean towards the conservation of its normative content. Another conclusion the authors of this hypothesis arrived at was that

there is no way to follow the progress of oral transmission in society. Even those who have attempted to track the route of a single story, that before their very eyes became popular overnight, lost the entangled thread in a labyrinth.

*(Dégh, Vázsonyi 1975: 178)*
The experiments on the folk narrative transmission and the distortion of communication inspired by Bartlett and Anderson are still repeated, and their modifications show, for instance, that people transmit rumours that produce the strongest emotions, such as disgust. For instance, in one experiment, the rumour about finding a rat in a soda can was more likely to be passed on than other rumours (Heath et al. 2001). Whether one calls this the unconscious (see Jung) or the emotional, certain components in rumour effectively motivate a better transmission or they completely change the original text in accordance with one’s emotional needs.

While experiment-based research prevailed before the Second World War, after the war started, scholars did not need to design experiments on rumour anymore: Plenty of real-life field materials fostered by bloodshed and economic instability emerged soon enough.

Rumours in the Second World War: The real-life experiment in the circulation of misinformation

Despite previous scholarly interest in rumours, their purposeful and systematic study was spurred by the Second World War and the preoccupation of politicians with the wide circulation of frenzyed misinformation (Bordia, Difonzo 2017: 87). This preoccupation and the desire to control rumours resulted in the spate of rumour clinics instituted at colleges and universities across the U.S.A. The clinics were specialised groups of professors and students who researched the most popular rumours and reported back to the Office of Wartime Information. A seminal formula for rumour popularity was invented based on this real-life fieldwork: \( R = I \times A \). According to this formula, the amount of rumour in circulation varies with the importance of the subject (I) and the ambiguity (A) of the evidence. The relation between importance and ambiguity is not additive but multiplicative: If either importance or ambiguity is zero, there is no rumour. Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, who came up with the formula, illustrate this relation by arguing that an American citizen, for instance, is not likely to spread rumours concerning the market price for camels in Afghanistan because the subject has no importance for him. Similarly, they say, if one has personally experienced an issue, for instance, breaking a leg, no matter how important the issue is, one will not foster the rumour (Allport, Postman 1947: 502–3). Later, Schachter and Burdick (1955) set up an experiment by which they proved that the same rumour spreads twice as fast in situations of ambiguity and uncertainty. Other experiments showed that rumours do not reduce uncertainty, but may even create it (Bordia, Difonzo 2017: 90).

Moreover, the analysis of thousands of wartime stories indicated that nearly all of them expressed either hostility, fear, hatred, economic bewilderment or a fusion of these (Knapp 1944). Paradigmatic is, for instance, the conspiracy theory of ‘Eleanor Clubs’, which synthesised numerous rumours in southern states of the U.S.A. in 1943. According to these stories, Eleanor Roosevelt started off a secret spiritual union of black women with the ultimate purpose of rebellion against the existing social order (Odum 1943). The conspiracy theory combined xenophobic sentiments, fear of the superior villain and poverty at the same time. These elements also merged in the conspiracy theories, hinting that U.S. allies were purposefully misusing the aid provided by the U.S.A. Some examples are the tales of Russians using Lend-lease butter to grease their guns, or the British using the aid to purchase nylon stockings and other scarce and luxurious articles in the U.S.A. (Allport, Postman 1947: 512).

The context of the Second World War in which the study of rumours emerged in the U.S.A. predetermined the thematic focus for the research on rumour for many decades. The legacy of the Second World War research was particularly useful for the study of rumours about other dramatic events, for instance, those surrounding the Chernobyl catastrophe (Fialkova 2001), the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Miller 1985), the outbreak of A.I.D.S. (Goldstein 2004) and the 9/11 attacks (Marks 2001). Based on the example of rumours about another war, that in Vietnam, scholars showed that ambiguity causing rumours could emerge not only from the lack of news, but also from its abundance. When different information sources in a society with a free and divided press contradict one another, this inevitably adds to the confusion and increases the feelings of anxiety and fear (Rosnow, Fine 1976: 116).

**Post-war research on rumour: Folklorists take over**

After the Second World War, social psychologists and sociologists largely lost interest in rumours. Folklore studies, however, took over the research on the verbal transmission of rumours, which, as clarified above, they mostly called ‘urban legends’ or ‘contemporary legends’. As early as the war years, folklorists started to record such stories on the university campuses where they worked (Beardsley, Hankey 1943; Dorson 1958). However, the inception of the systematic study of contemporary legends by folklorists owes to the informal school that developed at the Indiana University folklore department under the supervision of Linda Dégh, who brought together graduate students and scholars interested in the issue.

It was first and foremost the transmission of contemporary legends and the emergence of their multiple versions that continued to capture the attention of folklorists. By that point, the so-called historic-geographic method of folk narrative research had formed and become really influential in folklore studies. The method implied the collection of as many versions of any given narrative as possible, the aim being to observe how its versions differ in various cultural settings and to find the narratives’ hypothetical archetype, geographical starting point and historical travelling routes. The method was initially applied to the study of fairy-tales: Folklorists were searching for their multiple versions from all over the world to reconstruct the supposed proto fairy-tale. In a similar vein, contemporary legends with their many versions provided the materials for the further development of the method. This also coincided with the development of scholarly interest in migration and interethnic relations.

The comparison of multiple versions of one legend allows researchers to see how different the meaning they acquire may be, as each new version may mean something new in the given circumstances. The search for an implicit meaning has become a major endeavour for folklorists: They have been deconstructing legends in order to find the moral or secondary message, which supposedly allows concealed sentiments to enter public discussion (Fine, Ellis 2010: 8). Perhaps most baldly, folklorist Alan Dundes searched for the psycho-analytical meaning of contemporary legends. For instance, in his analysis of the Hookman urban legend popular in the U.S.A. (about a killer with a hook for a hand attacking couples in parked cars), Dundes employed Freudian interpretation to claim that the hook embodies a phallic symbol and its amputation projects a symbolic castration. The legend, according to Dundes, epitomises the fears of the first sexual contact as well as the marginalisation of disability in society (Dundes 1971). Swedish folklorist Bengt af Klintberg (1986) added that the Hookman legend projected a conflict between people who follow the rules and norms of society and those who deviate and hence threaten the ‘normal’ group. Most recurrent, however, has been the discovery of xenophobia in the contemporary legends.

In her book *I Heard It Through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture* (1993), Patricia Turner examines legends that circulate among African Americans in the U.S.A. about white enmity toward blacks. She argues that there is a congruity between some of these factually false legends and certain more realistic concerns of African Americans based on the historical realities of racism. Following other folklorists, Turner offers a comparative discussion of how similar
rumours circulate in both black and white communities, arguing that differences in perceptions on each side of the colour divide are based on differences in cultural and historical circumstances. For instance, The Kentucky Fried Rat legend, in which consumers discover that a piece of their chicken is in fact fried rat, reflects white American anxieties about abandoning traditional family food rituals and eating fast foods. In the African-American community, however, the legends about contaminated foods express anxieties about the owners of K.F.C. being members of the Ku Klux Klan and targeting blacks by putting substances into the chicken, causing sterility (Turner, 1993; Prahlad, 2003: 495).

‘Even minor variations can reveal culture specific concerns’, as folklorists say (Goldstein 2004: 36), and many more (oftentimes xenophobic) legends are illustrative of this. One example is the organ theft legend described at the beginning of this chapter and known internationally as ‘The Kidney Heist’. It is not only in the Guatemalan case that the legend accuses a particular group (Americans and Israelis in the Latin American version) of plotting the organ harvesting. In a German version, this happens to an unfaithful German husband who goes to Istanbul and is seduced by a Turkish woman (Campion-Vincent 1997: 4); in addition to distributing anti-Turkish sentiments, the legend bears a moral condemning infidelity. In Italy, the stories about organ harvesting blame the Roma (Campion-Vincent 1997: 6). In a Spanish version I overheard in 2014 in Zaragoza, organ theft almost happened to a woman in one of the small local Chinese stores. She was looking around the Chinese store with her husband, who, tired of shopping, eventually went out of the store to wait for her outside. As the wife did not come out after a while, he returned to the store to fetch her. He could not find her in the store, and then noticed a ladder leading into the cellar. He found his wife down there, sitting on a chair with her hands tied: There was a Chinese man with a scalpel prepared to cut her kidney out. Along with the story, the narrator expressed his indignation with the expansion of Chinese businesses coinciding with the Spanish financial crisis and the falling incomes of Spanish households. As such, urban legends easily change details and protagonists in order to transmit xenophobic sentiments topical for various localities.

This last example also illustrates how multi-faceted contemporary legends may be, combining xenophobic implicit meanings and critique of the expansion of certain businesses. Some stories, known as mercantile legends, primarily target certain trademarks and inform about the harmful activities of corporations. Such is the legend that emerged in the 1980s, claiming that Procter & Gamble’s trademark logo contained satanic symbolism and reflected the evil essence of the trademark. Research sponsored by the company found that the rumours were transmitted primarily through informal communication networks beyond the reach of lawsuits: In small town church newsletters and word-of-mouth conversation (Koenig 1985). The persistence of the Procter & Gamble satanist rumour stories demonstrated the power and pervasiveness of the religious traditionalist communication network (Victor 1990: 65–6).

As the previously cited manifestations of Eleanor Club, K.F.C./Ku Klux Klan and other narratives also demonstrate, many legends would combine mercantile and xenophobic implicit meanings. Certain businesses may be associated with a despised ethnic group. For instance, some versions of the previously mentioned Kentucky Fried Rat legend target the migrant minority owning an exotic (e.g. Chinese) restaurant and allegedly contaminating the food of the majority group on purpose (Campion-Vincent 2018: 21). Similarly, the legend about urine found in Corona beer blames Mexicans for peeing into the drinks designed for Americans (Brunvand 2002: 461–2). A Dutch version of urban legends internationally known as ‘Masturbating into food’ tells the story of Dutch friends who end up in a hospital after having a kebab in a Turkish restaurant. After examination, the doctor asks if they had oral sex that evening, since sperm of several different men is found in their stomachs. Very soon, according
to the legend, the commodity inspection department closes the Turkish restaurant down, having discovered that the garlic sauce they serve contains the semen of seven different men (Meder 2009: 257). Legends of this kind may often serve as a reason for the incipient rejection of certain products and brands associated with particular ethnic groups (Turner 1993: 174–9; Donovan 2007: 67).

As such, contemporary legends are often conservative and chauvinistic: They may epitomise distrust, hostility and hatred towards foreigners, and justify anti-immigration sentiments (Campion-Vincent 2018: 31). The war period research already showed that a rumour not only vents the prejudice, but justifies it as well, ‘rationalizes what it relieves’ (Allport, Postman 1947: 37). Rumours and legends become a fertile ground for clichés, as people tend to reproduce stereotype-consistent rather than stereotype-inconsistent messages (Kashima 2000). As Timothy Tangherlini argues, the telling of legends is a deeply political act, as legends are deployed to sway others’ actions, according to the narrator’s own goal (2007: 7–8). The motivation the narrators have in creating and spreading the rumours should not be underestimated, as religious and political leaders have been using rumours and legends to shape people’s moods, often based on ideological preconceptions people may already have (Victor 1990: 79).

The ubiquity of seemingly unbelievable legends of different kinds as documented by folklorists raises the question of what makes them so appealing and credible? To answer this question, scholars have paid a lot of attention to the rhetoric of belief in legends, or the way their performers establish their credibility. Elliott Oring (2008) summarised these studies in terms of Aristotle’s categories of persuasion: Ethos, logos and pathos, illustrating how these tropes work in the performance of legend. For instance, when using the ethos tropes, narrators of a legend may appeal to the authority of the source, demonstrate how much they risk by uncovering the story, distance themselves from the presumed source of the narrative, perform demonstrative reluctance to believe the story, confess of ignorance of the facts, etc. In addition to the role of belief and credibility, scholars acknowledge the role of sceptics and their disbelief in the spreading and evolution of rumours, finding that far from being squelched by widespread debunking activity, rumour simply regroups and then re-emerges as if it had never been dispensed with (Morin 1970; Suczek 1972; Donovan 2007: 66).

A significant milestone in the explanation of why legends spread has been the discovery of ostension. Borrowed from semiotics and first used in folklore studies by Grider (1984), the idea of ostension was most famously described by Linda Dégh and Andrew Vázsonyi in their analysis of the American Halloween legends about poisoned candies and apples with razors allegedly discovered in the trick-or-treat sacks. Dégh and Vázsonyi showed that people may often perform the legend: Having heard the stories of the apples with razors, they can pretend to have received an apple with a razor and then perform the prank on their friends. As such, not only can facts be turned into narratives but narratives can also be turned into facts (Dégh, Vázsonyi 1983). In addition to the deliberate re-enactment of a legend as a hoax or a practical joke, ostension may manifest in a case when a narrator transforms a rumour into a personal experience story (an act known as proto-ostension), or when pre-existing legends lead to false readings of normal facts, a mistaken interpretation of ordinary events on the basis of narratives in our heads (known as quasi-ostension, or later – confirmation bias) (Dégh, Vázsonyi 1983; Meder 2009: 261–2).

The folklorists’ interest in studying the transmission, implicit meaning and credibility of legends has culminated in the contemporary legend conference that was first held at Sheffield University in 1982 and is still held annually, in the newspaper Foaftale News (F.O.A.F. is an abbreviation for ‘Friend of a friend’, usually defining the rumours spread verbally) and in the Contemporary Legend journal. As a result, when the interest towards the study of rumour re-emerged in social sciences again in 1990s, folkloristics had a lot to offer. At that point, sociologists, social psychologists and
folklorists started an intensive research collaboration on rumour, writing several comprehensive handbooks, monographs and collections of articles together (Fine, Turner 2001; Fine, Ellis 2010; Bordia, Difonzo 2017). This cooperation still continues, even though the scholars’ interest has shifted away from the study of verbal rumour to the study of the Web-produced forms of conspiracy theories.

**Conclusion: Word-of-mouth research in the age of the Internet**

The research on conspiracy theories transmitted orally first peaked in social psychology research during and immediately after the war. Although the interest in this discipline declined in the post-war period, the study of rumour (mostly called legend now) was taken over by folklorists and then interdisciplinary, by folklore, sociology and social psychology, towards the end of the century. Before the war, these disciplines engaged in research on rumour transmission. Grounded in the war situation, the study of rumour in social psychology often focused on ambiguity and anxiety as the key factors conditioning rumours. In the post-war years, folklorists searched for implicit meanings in what they called legends and often discovered these to be chauvinistic in nature. In addition, folklorists paid a lot of attention to the content and form of the genre, in particular the fluidity of legends and the belief factor defining their transmission. The discovery of ostension has allowed researchers to observe that legends can be transmitted by re-enacting, which bolsters new legendary narratives about such re-enactments.

The 2010s saw a resurgence of research on rumour similar to that of the Second World War, except that this is the analysis of rumours on the Internet, spurred by the phenomena of information warfare, fake news, populism and post-truth (see also Chapters 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10). As a result, the verbally transmitted conspiracy theories are now mostly overlooked by scholarly literature. The takeover by the Internet has shifted scholarly attention away from the fact that conspiracy theories still manifest far beyond the Internet, in text, speech and images, in fiction and non-fiction, in popular and official discourses, mass media and oral communication. Only the observation of conspiracy theories as the combination of these representations, replete with contradictions, inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies (Heathershaw 2012: 612), allows for their comprehensive analysis. Intuitively, scholars have lately noticed this when developing the idea of ‘conspiracy talk’, implying that this is the recorded public discourse, spoken, written or otherwise expressed, which seeks to discuss or spread conspiracy theories, and that conspiracy theories are not monolithic narratives, but something dynamic and open-ended (Uscinski et al. 2017). Interestingly, the direct meaning of the term ‘conspiracy talk’ also implies the primary verbal nature of conspiracy theories, which gives hope for the rediscovery of verbally transmitted narratives.

After all, for many conspiracy theories, word-of-mouth remains the compelling information source. Social networks (real rather than those on the Web) may sometimes be much more impactful for the transmission of conspiracy theories than the information transmitted via the Internet. Among many others, anti-vaccination conspiracy theories demonstrate how powerful the sway of local word-of-mouth communication remains, as anti-vaccination sentiments tend to group around certain neighbourhoods or schools (such as Waldorf schools or Silicon Valley in the U.S.A.) (Reich 2014). Similarly, different localities may be exemplary of other off-line clusters of rumours, such as those about satanic rituals allegedly practiced by local cult organisations; the stealing of body parts, or the rumours about H.I.V.-infected syringes purposefully left in certain places to spread the disease there (Victor 1990; Heller 2015). As such, the verbal transmission of conspiracy theories is essential for understanding their complexity and for responding to many unanswered questions on their contents, spread, implicit meaning and impact.
References


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