CHAPTER THIRTY TWO

INDEPENDENCE IN IBERIAN AMERICA

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INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of the Iberian empires originated in the external shocks that emanated from the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The first occurred in 1807–1808, when Napoleon dispatched armies into the Iberian peninsula to take control of Portugal. The resulting upheavals hit hardest in the European centres of the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies, where French invasions and occupations led to devastating wars and considerable political upheaval. But dislocation at the centre also spread to the Iberian empires overseas, as the repercussions of Napoleon’s coups reverberated across the Atlantic and, sooner or later, upset the equilibrium of the Portuguese and Spanish empires (Adelman 2006).

THE CRISIS OF THE IBERIAN MONARCHIES

The subversion of the Iberian monarchies began in late 1807, when Napoleon ordered Junot to invade Portugal and remove its royal family. To avoid capture, the Prince Regent Dom João (ruling instead of the incapacitated Queen Maria since 1792), abandoned Lisbon and together with the Braganza royal family and court, fled to Brazil. By this drastic expedient, D. João saved his throne, kept control of Portugal’s richest possession, and left the British to support Portuguese local resistance against the French. Portugal became a battleground but Brazil remained secure, with its territory and trade protected by the British navy.

Crisis in the Portuguese monarchy was swiftly followed by crisis in the Spanish monarchy too. In early 1808, Carlos IV’s prime minister, Manuel Godoy, was removed in a palace coup and the king was forced to pass the throne to his son, Prince Fernando. This did not, however, save the Spanish Bourbons. Fernando VII was lured to France, where he was compelled to abdicate in favour of Napoleon’s brother Joseph Bonaparte, who became King José I. The Bourbons were thus unable to follow the Portuguese example of defending the dynasty by moving to American territory, and, unlike the Braganza Prince João who kept his throne and ruled the
Portuguese empire from Brazil, the Bourbon King Fernando VII lost his throne, was forced into exile in France, and saw his authority pass into other hands.

This decapitation of the Spanish state caused huge political upheaval. Throughout Spain, juntas sprang up to reject the Bonapartist king, claiming that in the absence of the true sovereign, Fernando VII, sovereignty reverted to the ‘people’. They justified themselves as temporary repositories of the king’s sovereignty, invoking Spanish political ideas and an historic Spanish constitution, rather than challenging the divine right of kings and creating republics in the manner of British American and French revolutions (Portillo Valdés 2006). However, although their purpose was to conserve rather than innovate, their actions opened pathways to a political revolution. In September 1808, these juntas united their resistance under the authority of a Central Junta, to which they all sent delegates, and the Central Junta called on the American colonies to send elected representatives to join them. To further strengthen the union of all parts of the Spanish monarchy, the Central Junta decided to convocate a Cortes, or parliament, to express the will of the “Spanish Nation”, now defined to include those on both sides of the Atlantic. The new parliament (inaugurated at Cadiz in March 1810, after the Central Junta had passed its authority to a Regency Council) was to be the instrument of further, more far-reaching change. Its foundational reform was to affirm the principle of representation for Spanish citizens throughout the empire, a principle that promised Spanish Americans the formal share in government they had always been denied. The Cortes that met in 1810 therefore included representatives for all the main American regions, and, although the American deputies were outnumbered by Spanish delegates, their presence and activity at the heart of Spanish government signalled the end of the old regime and a major change in relations between Spain and its colonies (Chust Calero 2007).

Napoleon’s intrusions into the Iberian peninsula thus had very considerable consequences for Portugal and Spain, as the ensuing turmoil broke down barriers to political change. However, the character and pace of change in the Iberian monarchies differed significantly. For Portugal, crisis in Europe changed the location of the monarchy without immediately undermining D. João’s claim to authority or damaging the continuity of traditional rule in Brazil. The Spanish monarchy, by contrast, had much greater difficulty in preserving its unity. The Cortes sought to defend the monarchy by reform, turning the old regime into a constitutional monarchy where the king shared power with the people, parliament prescribed laws and shaped policy, and the American colonies became equal parts of the “Spanish Nation” represented in the parliament. But, as many places had already broken with Spanish rule in 1810, these changes came too late to preserve imperial unity. Spain was, moreover, plunged into a bloody war against French occupying forces, which not only did great social and economic damage but further damaged the relationships that had bound the Spanish world under one monarch. Spain’s political revolution was, then, much less effective in preserving colonial stability than the continuity of absolutist Braganza rule was for Portuguese rule in Brazil. By refashioning Portuguese imperial government around the new focal point in America, D. João kept Brazil relatively united under the authority of Portugal, until in 1817 it faced its first serious threat of regional secession in Pernambuco (Bernardes 2006; Paquette 2013). Spain, on the other hand, saw its empire start to fracture and fail during the interregnum

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The first attempts to establish autonomous governments in Spanish America took place in Quito and Upper Peru, where, in 1809, local elites established juntas modelled on those in Spain. They were quickly suppressed, but the trend towards political change did not stop. For, when Napoleon’s military successes in the peninsula cast doubt on the future of Spain’s government in early 1810, juntas sprang up throughout Spanish America. The movement against existing colonial governments started in the city of Caracas, where leading creoles, drawn mainly from the rich landowning, merchant, and professional elite, overthrew royal officials and replaced them with a junta in April 1810. Many other towns and cities followed, as creole patricians removed royal officials and set up autonomous governments. Most important were those in the capitals of major regions: in May, the Viceroy of Río de la Plata was overturned by a junta at Buenos Aires; in July, the Viceroy of New Granada suffered the same fate in Bogotá; in September, the governor of Chile fell in Santiago. Royal officials were also replaced by juntas in secondary towns and cities throughout these regions, as they followed the example of their capitals. There were important exceptions: the Viceroy of Peru remained in power at Lima, and the Viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City (Hamnett 1978). In Cuba and Puerto Rico, Spanish officials also remained firmly in control, thanks mainly to the powerful interests involved in the sugar trade and plantation economy, reinforced by fears among whites that political division might provide an opening for social rebellion of the kind that overturned slave society in neighbouring Haiti.

At first, the Spanish American juntas shared the ideological roots of those in Spain. They acted in the name of the captive Fernando VII, and, rather than claiming independence, justified their claims to self-government by the doctrine that sovereignty reverted to the people in the absence of the king (Guerra 1992). The juntas installed in colonial capitals and leading towns also sought to preserve the territorial unity of the governments they had replaced, by uniting provinces under leadership led from the capital. The junta of Buenos Aires, for example, sought to impose its authority over the whole of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (from Montevideo on the Atlantic to La Paz in the Andes, encompassing the modern countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Bolivia); the junta in Bogotá attempted to do the same for the Viceroyalty of New Granada (modern Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama).

Unity was unattainable, however. For, once the traditional framework of authority was undermined, the urban centres that had been the hubs of government under Spanish rule tended to divide into autonomous seats of power, led by local elites. Sovereignty, in short, became polycentric as claims to power multiplied. The primary divide was between those who remained loyal to Spain’s government and those who supported the American juntas’ claims to sovereignty, and their opposition produced a series of fissures both within and between Spain’s principal colonies. In Río de la Plata, the junta of Buenos Aires met resistance from several cities and regions: Montevideo’s elite recognised Spanish authority rather than cooperate with Buenos Aires; the Banda Oriental (later Uruguay) and Paraguay
wanted independence from Spain but also from Buenos Aires, whose government they rejected (Halperín Donghi 1975; Chiaramonte 1997). Upper Peru was also wrenched away from Buenos Aires, though by different means: armies sent by the Viceroy of Peru prevented Buenos Aires from establishing any alliance with the cities of these Andean provinces. The Viceroyalty of New Granada was another region that quickly fragmented into competing cities and regions (Martínez Garnica 1998). Important pockets of loyalism remained on the Caribbean coast and in the southern interior, which provided bases for attack on the areas that defied Spanish authority. Neighbouring Venezuela split along similar lines. When the city of Caracas moved to independence in November 1811 and claimed to be the capital of an independent republic with sovereignty over the territory of the defunct Captaincy-General, its authority was challenged by the cities of Coro, Maracaibo, and Guyana, which remained faithful to Spain (McKinley 1985).

Division between those loyal to Spanish rule and those who advocated autonomy or independence was the principal, but not the sole source of disunity. There was a strong tendency to identify the "people" with a specific city and its associated jurisdiction, leading to a multiplication of claims to sovereignty among those who broke with Spanish rule. In New Granada, for example, provincial capitals proclaimed their independence and competed with each other; secondary towns asserted their autonomy and broke away from provincial capitals. There was also division between advocates of a single, centralised government, and proponents of a federation of equal and independent governments, based on provinces and held together by a general congress with responsibility for matters of common interest, such as defence and international relations (Gutiérrez Ardila 2010).

This fragmentation of authority led to fratricidal wars. While the Viceroyalties of Rio de la Plata and New Granada both fell in 1810, the loyalist governments of New Spain and Peru survived and fought back against the forces of change, as did royalists in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Viceroyalty of New Spain came close to collapse when, in September 1810, Father Hidalgo and other creole leaders raised a great insurrection that fed on peasant and plebeian discontent and unleashed a struggle with strong racial undertones. However, the Viceroyalty of New Spain survived the threat: Hidalgo was defeated in 1811 and, although insurrection continued in the provinces, Mexico's major cities remained loyal to the Regency and continued to fight against provincial insurgents led by Hidalgo's successor, José María Morelos (Van Young 2001). Spanish rule remained firm in Peru, too. There, the royalist regime faced fewer challenges, possibly because memories of the Túpac Amaru rebellion of 1780–1782 discouraged creoles from political agitation (Walker 1999). Lima and other leading cities sustained loyalty to Spain, and, until the rebellion of Cuzco in 1814, rebellion against royal authorities was localised and easily contained (Fisher 2003). Indeed, the Viceroyalty of Peru not only defended their own territory successfully; they also helped to uphold Spanish rule in neighbouring Upper Peru, Chile, and Quito.

The strength of conservatism in such regions owed much to the loyalty of creole elites, which arose from anxieties about the social risks of overturning Spanish rule. In Mexico and Peru, Spanish American whites feared that political division would weaken their domination of Indian and mixed-race majorities; Caribbean elites were anxious to avoid cracks in the power structure that might provide openings for slave
rebellion. Creole loyalty was also encouraged by fundamental change within the imperial system. From 1810, the Cádiz Cortes sought to strengthen ties to Spain by offering Americans rights to representation in an elected imperial parliament, equality before the law, and the prospect of prosperity through economic liberalism. The Cádiz Constitution of 1812 brought major political reforms, which promised to transform American relations with Spain. It abolished the viceroyalties and turned viceroy and governors into *jefes políticos* (political chiefs) of their territories, and shifted authority to the provinces, which now connected directly with government in Spain. At the regional level, provincial government was given to the *diputació pro-
vincial* (provincial deputation), which included elected members, while towns and cities provided for local participation in the *cabildo constitucional* (the popularly elected town council). Enacted in regions which remained under Spanish rule, the Cádiz Constitution gave Americans a greater say in their own government than ever before, voiced in the Cortes at Cádiz and enacted in the new institutions of home government (Rodríguez O. 1998).

The Cádiz Constitution was not, however, a universal panacea. The reforms enacted at Cádiz failed to satisfy many Americans, and did not win back regions which had broken away. One major source of dissatisfaction was the fact that, although the Cortes promised equality among the members of the “Spanish Nation”, it restricted citizenship in the Americas in order to ensure that Spain, which had a smaller population than its American possessions, retained a majority of deputies, and, with it, control of legislation and policy for the empire. The Cortes’ ability to rebuild a united monarchy under the new constitution was further impeded by a growing sense of separateness among the Spanish Americans who had created independent governments. They began to see a future for separate states which might strike up independent relations within the international community, free from Spanish dominance. Thus, unlike Brazil, which remained relatively united under Portuguese rule, Spanish America fragmented into a mosaic of regions with competing allegiances. And, as division spread and deepened, political conflicts led in turn to violence and war.

The wars that broke out in Spanish America in 1810–1811 exposed and reflected conflicts of many kinds, as social and political rivals took advantage of Spain’s crisis to vent their grievances and pursue their own interests. However, the fundamental conflict was between the defenders of Spanish rule and the advocates of autonomy and independence, and was played out in several theatres of war. In the old Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, for example, the junta of Buenos Aires built armies to impose its authority over the interior, especially over the silver-rich Andean provinces of Upper Peru. This led to war with the Viceroys of Peru, who were determined to suppress the challenge from Buenos Aires and restore royal authority there. The juntas set up in Venezuela and the Viceroyalty of New Granada also fought loyalist enemies, who defended royal government from towns and regions where they retained control. In New Spain, the viceroys held Mexico City and other cities, which they used as bases for military campaigns against the various provincial insurgencies which for several years posed a significant threat to royalist rule.

There were also some minor wars within and between the new political entities created by the juntas and their successors. Such wars reflected the many conflicts which surfaced when Spanish rule collapsed: they arose from disputes
over constitutional issues, from local and regional rivalries, and sometimes from social and economic grievances. In New Granada, for example, disputes between advocates of a centralised government based in Bogotá and those who, in cities such as Cartagena, wanted independence within a loose confederation of independent governments, turned into minor wars. Chile was divided by similar conflicts, notably between leaders in Santiago and their rivals in Concepción (Collier 1967; Ossa Santa Cruz 2014).

Warfare varied considerably in scale and intensity (McFarlane 2014). In South America, wars usually began as rather restrained “civic wars”, in which rival cities manoeuvred small armies with the intention of intimidating rather than annihilating their opponents. However, such conflicts tended to become more violent civil wars, in which allegiances cut across social and ethnic groups. In central New Spain, conflict was from the outset driven by social rebellion: the creole leadership of Hidalgo’s rebellion immediately mobilised Indians and castas by promising to improve their condition, and sought to use weight of numbers to overcome the royalist government. In Venezuela, “civic war” was soon superseded by greater violence: in 1812, the republican leader Simón Bolívar decreed a “war to the death” against Spaniards; the royalist chieftain José Tomás Boves retaliated by mobilising his llaneros (mounted herdsmen from the Orinoco plains) in murderous campaigns against whites in towns and cities. Upper Peru was another region where the spread of war destabilised social relations: Buenos Aires sent several major military expeditions to take Upper Peru in 1810–1815, creating circumstances in which disident groups, particularly indigenous communities, were able to rebel against Spanish authorities and create local insurgencies (Soux 2010).

The early wars in Spanish America differed significantly from Spain’s concurrent war against the French, which was fought on a greater scale, was infused with hatred of an occupying power which differed in language, culture, and history, and, as it involved British forces, was part of an international war. Wars in Spanish America, by contrast, were not aimed against a foreign occupier; they started as conflicts among neighbours who mostly shared the same language, institutions, and religion, and did not become arenas for foreign military intervention (the sole exception was Portugal’s invasion of the Banda Oriental from Brazil). They were essentially civil wars (or conflicts over who should hold public authority within a given state), which increasingly became secessionist revolutions, steered by liberal leaders who not only sought release from Spanish rule, but aimed to create modern, progressive societies, based on citizens’ rights.

The first phase of war closed shortly after the return of a general peace in Europe. In Spain, the victory of the Anglo-Spanish alliance against the French brought the restoration of Fernando VII in 1814 and ended Spain’s constitutional monarchy. In Spanish America, the changes inaugurated in 1810 also went into reverse. Between 1814 and 1816, all the alternative governments created during Fernando VII’s absence, with the exception of Buenos Aires and Paraguay, were defeated by royalist forces and replaced by military and civil powers imposed by Spain.

These reversals revealed the weaknesses that undermined the first attempts to break with Spain. Although they deprived Spanish government of the monopoly of violence, the new governments failed to concentrate power. They had experimented with liberal constitutionalism, strongly influenced by Enlightenment rationalism and
the republican models of the United States and France, and most had promulgated written constitutions which proclaimed the citizens’ rights to liberty, legal equality, security, and property, while protecting these rights by the separation of powers between executive, legislature, and judiciary. These liberal forms of government attracted some support outside the elites—among pardos and Indians, for example, who saw the chance for political equality—but popular loyalism was strong in some regions (Guardino 1996; Walker 1999; Helg 2004; Méndez 2005). Belief in monarchy as the “natural” form of government remained widespread, and slaves, Indians, and other subalterns had greater confidence in royal justice than the new governments which claimed to supplant the king (Echeverri 2016). These governments also failed in crucial areas: they did not create states capable of offering obvious benefits to citizens, nor did they wage war effectively. Their military weaknesses were compounded by lack of external political and military support from foreign powers, especially from Britain which, instead of nurturing Spanish American independence, gave priority to supporting Spain against France.

**SPANISH RECONQUEST AND SPANISH AMERICAN INSURGENCY**

In 1814, after the restoration of Fernando VII, Spain seemed set to rebuild the unity of the monarchy. The end of the Peninsular War made available large armies which, no longer needed at home, could be sent to fight against American rebels. Spain also had maritime power, even though its navy was small. Unlike the British North American rebels, who were supported during their war of independence by the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, Spanish American rebels had no such maritime support. Thus, when in 1815 Fernando VII dispatched an amphibious military expedition to Venezuela, led by General Morillo, he had both large forces and the tactical advantage of surprise, since the Spanish navy could strike wherever it chose.

Changes in international conditions also assisted the resurrection of empire. By 1815, the prospects for revolution had receded throughout Spanish America and, with the Holy Alliance intent on restoring the European monarchies to the dominance they had enjoyed before the French Revolution, Spain seemed set to rebuild its absolutist monarchy at home and throughout its overseas territories. Even Britain, which had strong commercial ambitions in Spanish America, was ready to support the restoration of Spanish authority in America, as long as Spain proved capable of reimposing peace and stability.

Spain was, however, unable to sustain recovery for long. Its economy was badly damaged by war, and its American territories had also suffered serious economic disruption. Colonial commerce remained largely in the hands of foreigners, especially the British, and colonial treasuries carried huge burdens of debt incurred in fighting the insurgents (Fontana 1987). The need to sustain a continuing military effort against insurgents placed fresh demands on Americans, who were required to provide money, recruits, and supplies for royalist armies fighting insurgent forces. At the same time, the restored monarchy failed to win back political ground: Fernando VII wiped out the political gains which Americans had made during his interregnum by abolishing the Cádiz Constitution. Thus, although many Americans welcomed
the return of a king who promised political certainty and social discipline, they also felt the loss of the autonomy they had enjoyed during the constitutionalist years. In New Spain especially, where the experience of new political practices and a greater degree of self-government had left a strong mark, Fernando VII’s ultra-conservatism did nothing to strengthen his standing. Indeed, when he was later forced to restore the Cádiz constitution by the Spanish liberal revolution in 1820, the Mexican elites welcomed the return to constitutional government (Anna 1978; Ávila, 2002).

Fernando VII’s return to the throne in 1814 promised a new beginning, but could not rebuild Spanish hegemony in America. That had been broken by the experience of greater freedom during his interregnum, whether it was under the Spanish constitutionalist regime or under independent governments. Fernando VII’s regime was also unable to extirpate the remnants of the rebellions which had started in 1810. For, while serious military opposition had been suppressed in most regions, Spanish forces did not have complete control of the countryside. In Mexico and Peru, scattered groups of insurgents and bandits continued to threaten the peace of rural areas; in northern South America, small but important enclaves of insurgency remained in the llanos of Venezuela and New Granada; in the Southern Cone, Buenos Aires and the Río de la Plata remained outside Spanish rule and increasingly committed to independence.

When the armed struggle reignited, it brought a second, decisive, phase of warfare. From around 1816, the challenge of insurgency diminished in New Spain, but took on a new vigour in South America. Despite Fernando VII’s intention to send a military expedition against Buenos Aires, Spain failed to use its maritime advantage in the southern Atlantic, and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata opened a new front for warfare, prepared by General José de San Martín. From Cuyo, San Martín revived ambitions to penetrate the realms of royalist Peru, employing a new army and implementing a new strategy. Rather than continuing to attack Spanish armies in Peru in Upper Peru, he launched a surprise attack on royalist Chile. After victory at Maipú in 1818, San Martín and Bernardo O’Higgins proclaimed Chilean independence and used the new state as a platform from which to attack the royalist stronghold of Peru. After landing on the Peruvian coast in 1820, San Martín began the military campaign that was eventually to prise Peru from Spain’s grasp (Lynch 2009).

The challenge from San Martín in the south was paralleled in the north of the continent by the emergence of another “liberator” and another army. From exile in Haiti, Simón Bolívar returned to Venezuela in 1816, and, from his headquarters in the Orinoco plains, built a well-trained army of volunteers and conscripts who became increasingly capable of facing veteran royalist infantrymen. After uniting disparate caudillos under his command, Bolívar used his new army to implement a fresh strategy. His surprise attack on New Granada produced victory against the viceroy’s army at Boyacá (1819), and allowed Bolívar to found the republic of Colombia as a union of New Granada and Venezuela. Like San Martín, Bolívar had outflanked royalist forces from a rural base, seized control of royalist cities and their regions, then used them as a platform to pursue military campaigns in neighbouring regions. And, again like San Martín, he believed that no revolution was safe until the Spaniards had been defeated throughout South America. He therefore returned to Venezuela to defeat royalist forces at Carabobo in 1821, then carried his campaigns
southwards to Quito and Peru. After San Martín withdrew in 1823, Bolívar became
the supreme commander of forces in Peru and moved to finalise independence. With
an army built around a core of veterans from Venezuela and New Granada and
supported by resources provided by Colombia, he amassed sufficient military power
to overcome the last major bastions of Spanish rule in Peru and Upper Peru, thereby
consummating South American independence (Lynch 2006).

**SPANISH AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE**

The achievement of independence throughout South America owed much to the
extraordinary leadership of the revolutionary generals and their lieutenants. Bolívar
and San Martín played key roles in overturning Spanish power: they created strat-
egies for taking war from the local to the continental level, built armies capable of
combating Spanish forces, forged systems of command, administration and supply,
and formed political alliances which ensured that military advances secured lasting
change. Their activities were important in other ways too. They promoted the devel-
opment of American identities by polarising politics into a conflict of Americans
against Spaniards, turned their armies into symbols of incipient nationhood, and
recentralised authority which had dispersed in 1810–1815 (Thibaud 2003).

Spain also played its own part in the collapse of the empire. The military strategy
pursued by the “liberators” placed sustained constant pressure on Spain, draining
its fiscal resources and damaging its political standing on both sides of the Atlantic
(Anna 1983). Debt and disenchantment led to a reaction against Fernando VII,
and in 1820, army officers who were assembling forces in Andalucía for a military
expedition against Buenos Aires rebelled against his government, and joined with
liberals to force the king to restore the Cadiz constitution. The return of the Cortes
in 1820 opened another phase in Spain’s efforts to unify the divided Hispanic world.
Now, Spanish politicians again tried to bring Americans into the “Spanish Nation”,
by restoring constitutional government in regions under Spanish rule and opening
negotiations with revolutionary governments which had seceded from Spain. Neither
was successful, however, because government in Spain was too politically unreliable
to command authority and too militarily weak to inspire fear.

Spain’s inability to regain control was evident even in regions where threats of
insurgency were relatively slight, such as New Spain and Central America. There,
the return to constitutional government was enthusiastically embraced and elections
held, but Spain failed to solidify new relations. American deputies proposed the cre-
ation of three kingdoms, each a constitutional monarchy with a Spanish prince and
its own Cortes, and bound by special political and economic ties to Spain. However,
to Spaniards this looked too much like independence by another name, and it proved
impossible to find a compromise between Spanish interests and American aspirations.

In Mexico, distrust of the Spanish Cortes’ commitment to liberal reforms, which
threatened the privileges of the Church and army, propelled a new movement
towards independence, directed by the elites with little popular participation.
Some of its leaders hoped to sustain ties with Spain, with New Spain as a dis-
tinctive and self-governing kingdom under a Bourbon prince, but the Cortes refused
to compromise. The Mexican opposition turned to Colonel Agustín de Iturbide,
a renowned army commander, to bring the royalist army to their side, and, in a
political coalition supported by the Church and some surviving insurgents, Iturbide succeeded in displacing the last viceroy and establishing an independent state in 1821. The conservatives aimed at constitutional monarchy and, when the Spanish Bourbons refused to provide a king, they established a Mexican Empire. Iturbide was installed as its first emperor, Agustín I, in 1822, until replaced by a republic in 1823 (Anna 1978).

The Cortes did no better in other regions, where Spain’s military weaknesses undermined its effort to revive loyalty by compromise and negotiation. In Peru, the attempt to negotiate with San Martín not only showed the insurgents that Spain’s strength was ebbing; it also divided the royalist generals, leading to a coup against the viceroy which further weakened a royalist regime already in military retreat. The royalist cause lived on, with a new capital at Cuzco and an army capable of defending the southern Andes, including Upper Peru. However, Peru’s viceregal government became increasingly vulnerable when Bolívar advanced from the south, having refused to accept any agreement short of independence. In 1820, Bolívar had accepted a truce with Morillo in Venezuela, but did not contemplate re-joining the Spanish monarchy under the terms offered by Spain’s liberals. For Bolívar, the truce simply provided a chance to regroup and rearm, and, after defeating the Spaniards at Carabobo in 1821, he turned all his attention to defeating Spanish forces in Peru. Faced by a divided royalist army, he accomplished this goal at Junín and Ayacucho in 1824, and then consolidated his hold on the continent by eliminating the vestiges of the royalist army in Upper Peru. These victories cleared the ground for the foundation of the republics of Peru and Bolivia, where Bolívar aimed to reproduce his preferred political model of a centralised republican state governed by an enlightened elite.

Thus, by 1825, the defiance of Spanish government that had started in 1810, without any clearly articulated sense of national identity or intention to create nation-states, had brought into power a group of independent governments which demanded recognition as separate states in the international concert of nations.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BRAZIL AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS, 1808–1822

The events that led from crisis in Spain to independence in Spanish America were paralleled by a similarly decisive phase in the history of Portugal’s Empire. Following the flight of the Portuguese royal family from Lisbon to Brazil, events on both sides of the Atlantic created conditions that eventually allowed Brazil to become an independent sovereign nation state, a possibility that virtually no one had envisioned at the beginning of the century.

The events taking place in the Spanish Empire provided the Portuguese Empire with both warnings and lessons. One of the great challenges facing the government of Prince Regent D. João when he established his court in Rio de Janeiro, was to avoid the trajectory followed by the Spanish American colonies, where the creation of the first juntas in 1809–1810 opened up the possibility of independence (Pimenta 2015). From its new headquarters, his government promoted changes within the political-administrative-economic structure of the Portuguese Empire intended to
maintain and strengthen the integrity of the Portuguese dominions throughout
the globe. In general, these changes followed the lines laid down by Portuguese
enlightened reformism since the last decades of the eighteenth century—to trans-
form the empire in order better to preserve it—but in circumstances where European
wars and the monarch’s exile placed Portugal and its dominions in a very vulnerable
position (Alexandre 1993; Lyra 1994).

Before they were definitely installed in Rio de Janeiro, D. João and part of his
Court spent almost a month in Salvador where, in January 1808, he opened Brazil
to trade with countries other than Portugal. In practical terms, Great Britain was the
biggest beneficiary of this measure (later formalised by a cooperation and friendship
treaty with Portugal in 1810), as it helped to compensate for the losses to its industry
and trade caused by Napoleon’s Continental System. In Brazil, the greatest and most
immediate changes occurred in Rio de Janeiro, a city of around 45,000 people which
suddenly had to accommodate 3,000–4,000 émigrés, including the Royal Family,
their servants, and many high- and middle-ranking Portuguese officials (Schultz
2011). Their arrival initiated a period of urban reform, a rapid increase in commer-
cial activity, and many improvements in communications between Rio de Janeiro
and other parts of Portuguese America. The Royal administration also required
institutions that did not exist in Brazil (Alexandre 1993; Malerba 2000; Gouvêa
2005). One was the government press. Brazil’s first newspaper, the Gazeta do Rio de
Janeiro, was founded in September 1808. In London, the Correio Braziliense, another,
more independent journal, circulated, and had great impact on Luso-American pol-
itics until its extinction in December 1822. The press played a vital part in the devel-
opment and dissemination of political discussion throughout Brazil, and helped to
intensify the politicisation of public spaces that had been taking place, to a limited
extent, since the end of the eighteenth century (Jancsó 1997; Morel 2001).

In this new context, Portuguese rulers in Brazil closely followed events in Spanish
America, fearing that the weakening of Spain’s monarchical power would be
replicated in the Portuguese Empire. In public, the Portuguese Court contrasted the
stability of Brazil to the turbulent situation in Spanish America, but at the same time
it took steps to ensure that instability did not spill into Brazil from its troubled con-
tinental neighbourhood. The court of Rio de Janeiro thus attempted to interfere in
the political situation of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata through diplomacy,
espionage, and the strengthening of networks of interest. Between 1808 and 1814,
the Court also endorsed the claims of Carlota Joaquina—wife of the Portuguese
Prince Regent, and sister of the Spanish King Fernando VII—to be recognised as
ruler of Spanish America. In 1811 the Portuguese court sent a military expedi-
tion to the territory of the Banda Oriental, to take advantage of conflict between
loyalist Montevideo and independent Buenos Aires; it also acted on other borders,
strengthening its military outposts, and in 1809 organised an expedition to conquer
the French colony of Cayenne (subsequently returned to France in 1817). In order
to reinforce its position within the complicated arena of European politics, the gov-
ernment of Rio de Janeiro also kept diplomatic representatives in Spain and Britain
(Pimenta 2015).

The Portuguese empire based in Brazil faced new tensions and conflicts in both its
internal and external relationships. The signing of treaties with Great Britain, on 19
February 1810, caused dissatisfaction and protests in Portugal—then ruled by British
forces fighting against France—and in Brazil, where the new treaties undermined an emerging industry and some local trades (Alexandre 1993; Slemian 2006). Regarding the slave trade between Africa and Brazil, which had increased since 1808, powerful interests came into play, involving groups in Brazil whose actions would be decisive in the immediate events of South American history (Marquese 2005; Alencastro 2006). Portuguese diplomats had always demonstrated goodwill towards the British anti-slavery movement, trying to preserve the alliance established in 1807. However, in 1815, the Court of Rio de Janeiro yielded to British pressures and agreed to sign a treaty that limited the slave trade to regions south of the Equator. This agreement did not diminish slave imports, however; the trade moved to Angola, outside the banned area. Meanwhile, in the regions near Rio de Janeiro, the government of the Prince Regent João carried out a policy of extermination of the indigenous population, of groups generically called the botocudos. Other tensions and struggles emerged from the regions of Brazil that were forced to pay taxes to the government of Rio de Janeiro, but whose political-economic groups felt they had not benefited from the presence of the Court. The news from Spanish America and the convulsed political situation of Spanish territories bordering Brazil exacerbated these differences.

Thus, the transformation of a colonial territory into the headquarters of the Portuguese empire—an unprecedented experience in the history of the modern age overseas empires—created a contradictory situation. On the one hand, it reinforced the unity of the empire; on the other, it increased tensions and conflicts within that empire. Other factors sharpened these contradictions. First, the Portuguese Court decided to stay in Brazil after the official end of the Peninsular War in 1814 (due in part to well-grounded fears that, in the absence of the Prince Regent, Portuguese America could follow the same course of Spanish America); second, the elevation of Brazil to the status of Kingdom, on 16 December 1815, and the consequent transformation of the empire into the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve ended the traditional political hierarchies on which the empire had been based for nearly 300 years; third, a new military intervention in the Rio de la Plata region in 1816 resulted in the occupation of Montevideo and the establishment of an enduring Portuguese government in the region, placing Brazil even closer to the political struggles of its Spanish American neighbours; fourth, in northern Brazil, the Pernambuco Revolution of 1817 established a republican government that opposed the monarchical government of Rio de Janeiro for three months before its violent repression by royalist forces; and finally, in the same year, the conspiracy led by Gomes Freire de Andrade in Portugal clearly echoed the discontent of Portuguese political and economic interests caused by the perpetuation of the Portuguese Court in America and the establishment of an imperial management perceived as biased towards Brazil (Araújo 1992; Bernardes 2006). Portuguese discontents were further aggravated by the acclamation in Rio de Janeiro of King João VI in 1818, and in such circumstances, conflict between Portugal and Brazil seemed increasingly unavoidable.

Nevertheless, in the late 1810s, the idea of independence for Brazil was still not taken entirely seriously. The examples of, and contact with Spanish America were still very alive, and were part of a broader historical experience that included the independence of the Thirteen American Colonies, the French and other European revolutions of the time, as well as the Haitian Revolution. From public spaces that
were increasingly politicised and facing the internal contradictions of the Portuguese United Kingdom, the need for future projects and plans became increasingly urgent and complex, amidst a general perception of an acceleration of historical time, an anxiety about the unknown, and a concern to address troubling uncertainties (Jancsó 1997; Araújo 2008; Pimenta 2015). However, the idea of a political separation between Brazil and Portugal would only effectively materialise with the Porto Revolution of 1820.

The Porto Revolution acted as a political catalyst because it merged several key discontents, concerning the permanence of the Portuguese Court in Brazil, the maintenance of the British influence over the Portuguese United Kingdom, and the effects of an economic crisis that particularly affected Portugal. Like the Spanish liberals of 1810 and 1820, the Portuguese Revolution demanded a constitutional monarchy that subjected the monarchical power to a congress of elected national representatives, who would be responsible not only for legislating, but also for drafting a constitution (Ramos 2010). The liberal movement quickly gained strength in the peninsula and spread to Brazil. In February 1821, the *Cortes Gerais, Extraordinárias e Constituintes da Nação Portuguesa* (General, Extraordinary, and Constituent Cortes) were installed, composed of representatives from Portugal only. In the following month it approved a decree calling for the election of representatives in Brazil. Several juntas of government were formed and joined the revolution, as had previously happened in Spain and Spanish America. In Brazil, the first was formed in Pará, in January 1821, even before the opening session of the Lisbon Cortes. It was followed by the juntas of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, Montevideo, São Paulo, Maranhão, Goiás, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Norte, Piauí, Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Ceará, and Paraíba. The election process for the representatives in all these regions increased political unrest everywhere (Berbel 1999). At the same time, the decrees of the Portuguese Cortes of 21 September 1821, 13 October 1821, and 2 March 1822 established the freedom of the press in the United Kingdom, significantly increasing the number of regular and periodic publications devoted to political issues in Brazil (Morel 2001; Neves 2003).

In obedience to the Cortes, in April 1821, King João VI finally returned to Portugal. As a precaution, D. João left behind his son, Prince Pedro, in the hope of sustaining dynastic unity and preventing Brazil from following the Spanish American example. Between 1820 and 1822, Brazil was still not a political unit. The deputies to the Cortes in Lisbon were elected by each province separately, and for different reasons not all provinces sent representatives to Lisbon. Nevertheless, the works carried out in the Cortes soon created antagonisms between peninsular and American deputies, crystallising a difference of identities between the “European Portuguese” and the “American Portuguese”. These divergences were rapidly politicised, demonstrating that the deputies were able to support different political projects, which, although previously existent, were now made much clearer (Jancsó and Pimenta 2000). The decrees issued by the Cortes on 29 September and 1 October 1821, contributed to this antagonism because they demanded the immediate return of Prince Pedro to Portugal, and ordered the replacement of all government institutions created in Rio de Janeiro since 1808 with new forms of government. These measures met with strong opposition in Brazil, especially among economic interest groups that had benefited from the installation of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808.
and become increasingly active in the political sphere (Dias 2005; Oliveira 1998). The idea that the Cortes were aiming at a “recolonisation” of Brazil spread quickly and, widely used as a rhetorical weapon at the time, would later be uncritically accepted by many historians (Barman 1988). On 9 January 1822, in a clear demonstration of his political prestige, Prince Pedro publicly announced his decision to disobey the Cortes in Lisbon and to stay as head of a government in Brazil. The prince reorganised his ministers on 16 January, including José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva at Foreign Affairs: he would subsequently become a central character in the process of independence (Dolhnikoff 2012). On February 16, the prince called a Conselho de Procuradores das Províncias (a board of Provincial Attorneys) to review all decisions concerning Brazil made by the Portuguese Cortes; on June 3, he announced the upcoming establishment of a Constitutional Assembly in Brazil; and on 6 August, he issued a manifesto addressed to the “foreign nations”, in which he justified his conduct in government and called for supporters (Oliveira 1998; Souza 1998).

While in Lisbon some of the deputies from America abandoned the Cortes in protest against actions considered harmful to Brazil, events were evolving towards the implementation of a project for independence, that is, not only a project of self-government in relation to Portugal, but the creation of a sovereign state. The famous “Proclamation of Independence” of 7 September 1822, which occurred in the province of São Paulo, would later be elevated to the greatest moment of Brazilian independence. However, in practical terms, the acclamation of D. Pedro I as Emperor of Brazil on 12 October and his coronation on 1 December 1822, were more important for consolidating independence (Oliveira 1998; Souza 1998).

In all regions of Brazil, societies were strongly marked by miscegenation, and it is thus not surprising to find native Indians, African slaves, and their descendants participating in the struggles that characterised the process of independence. There are clear examples of the strong presence of Afro-descendants in the conflicts that occurred in Bahia and Pernambuco, and of indigenous people in Maranhão and Pará (Kraay 2001; Machado 2010), fighting either in favour of independence or against it, or even defending alternative political projects. Although there have been many recent historiographical advances, the traditional and mythical image of Brazilian independence as a supposedly peaceful and conservative process still hampers a more profound understanding of this type of social activity.

By the end of 1822, the independence of Brazil was not yet fully assured and the infancy of the new empire would be troublesome and violent. Nonetheless, 15 years after the events that led the Portuguese Empire to take a radically different road from that of the Spanish Empire, their paths converged again, when, like almost all its continental neighbours, Brazil became a national State, separate from its former European metropole.

**IBERIAN AMERICA AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

The establishment of independent states in Iberian America during the 1820s was one of the most significant political events in the Atlantic world. The emergence of independent sovereign states ended two historic empires, relegated Spain and Portugal to the ranks of minor European powers, and created a group of new states
which, as they were mostly republics, stood in strong contrast to the reactionary monarchies of Europe. Neither Spain nor Portugal had withstood the shocks of war and revolution in Europe, and, although their monarchs managed to survive in a changing world, neither was able to sustain unity between the old metropoles and their American territories. Portugal did better, perhaps: it shared monarchs from the same dynasty and, although it became increasingly dependent on African colonies after Brazilian independence, continued to share a powerful economic connection through the slave trade. Spain, on the other hand, refused to recognise the new states and harboured hopes of restoring parts of its lost empire, through schemes for retaking colonies which came to nothing and gradually forced it to reconfigure the empire around Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (Fradera 2005).

The independent states in Spanish America and Brazil showed both resemblances and differences. Brazil was perhaps more coherent as an independent kingdom than it had been as separate provinces under Portugal, and in this it also differed sharply from most of the new states in Spanish America. Nonetheless, in Brazil, independence also gave birth to a national unit that was built on the desires and actions of specific groups from certain provinces, rather than on the will of the majority of the population. Disagreements were found even within the provinces that had immediately become part of the empire—Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul—but the most serious conflicts would be in regions such as Bahia, Maranhão, Ceará, Piauí, Pará, and the Cisplatine Province (the region governed by the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental since 1821). These conflicts resulted in wars that were fought over two basic positions: either allegiance to the new Empire of Brazil, or the maintenance of political ties to Portugal and the Lisbon Cortes (Holanda 1962; Jancsó 2005; Frega 2015). Although the wars of independence in Brazil were smaller and less destructive than those in Spanish America, they were nevertheless episodes of collective violence that left important marks on the new nation. By the end of the independence wars in 1824, the territorial definition of the empire was well underway, though not fully resolved.

Another essential aspect of consolidating the empire concerned its legal foundations. In April 1823 in Rio de Janeiro, representatives from various provinces of Brazil met for the first time. They were responsible for honouring the promises made by D. Pedro I in the previous year—when he was still Prince Regent—and for drafting a constitution for Brazil. After all, although it opposed the Lisbon Courts, the empire had been created under constitutional guidelines. During seven months, the Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil (General Constituent and Legislative Assembly of the Empire of Brazil) legislated and produced a draft for the constitution. However, conflicts between the Assembly and the emperor, especially concerning the definition of national sovereignty and of boundaries between national authorities, led D. Pedro I, who was being publicly accused of despotism, to violently dissolve the Assembly. As a result, the monarch himself and a select Council of State drew up the first Brazilian constitution, promulgated on 25 March 1824. The detailed definition of the legal and legislative framework of the Brazilian empire would be designed in subsequent years (Carvalho 1980; Mattos 1987).

The so-called First Empire (1822–1831), under the government of D. Pedro I, faced serious opposition from the revolt in Pernambuco and adjacent provinces,
They demanded that D. Pedro I kept his constitutional commitments made in 1822, which were partially broken when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Silva 2006). Between 1824 and 1825, however, this internal instability was compensated by recognition of Brazil’s independence, necessary for the admission of Brazil into the international relations system of the time—first by the United States, followed by Portugal and Britain. Even so,
the situation deteriorated again during the Cisplatine War (1825–1828) between the Empire of Brazil and the government of Buenos Aires, which had refused to recognise the incorporation of the Banda Oriental into the United Kingdom of Portugal, and did not recognise it now as part of the new empire. There was no clear winner in this war. It aggravated the economic crisis caused by the empire’s internal wars, and when British mediation went against Brazil, resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Uruguay, the empire entered another political crisis. D. Pedro I, accused of being a despotic monarch, more “Portuguese” than “Brazilian” (after all, he was a member of the Portuguese dynasty of Bragança), fell on 7 April 1831, reflecting a process of political nationalisation of the empire that took place as it also adjusted and consolidated its institutional bases (Ribeiro 2002; Pimenta 2002).

It is not surprising that many regional revolts occurred in Brazil during the Regency periods (1831–1840), before the recognition of the young Pedro II as the new emperor. Although these events were violent and impactful, they did not present clear separatist contours or challenge the national project put in place at independence. Independence would thus produce a profound, lasting, and revolutionary legacy: the creation of a sovereign Brazilian state and nation that did not exist before 1822. For decades, the nation would retain Brazil’s slaveholding social basis, for both slavery and the slave trade were reconfigured at independence. In economic terms, Brazil kept close to Britain, in a relationship established at the beginning of the century. However, it also diversified its production, trade, and partnerships, and consolidated an unfavourable insertion into the expanding capitalist world. In the Americas, relations between Brazil and its neighbours continued to foster reciprocal influences, as they had in the independence period.

Throughout Iberian America, change was tempered by strong continuities with the past. Neither the Spanish nor the Portuguese empire was overthrown by revolutionaries who aimed at a completely fresh start. Spanish and Portuguese remained the primary languages and Roman Catholicism the dominant religion throughout the successor states, and, although new political leaders aimed to replace traditional institutions, their Iberian antecedents continued to affect social, cultural, and political life. In Spanish America, some key resemblances remained. In the first place, the new governments aimed to retain the territorial structure of Spanish America, even as they changed its institutions. Leaders of new states invoked the legal principle of *uti posseditis* to claim that independent states should have the same borders as those of previous rulers. Thus, the Spanish Viceroyalties provided templates for Iturbide’s Mexican Empire, Bolívar’s Republic of Colombia, the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and the first Republic of Peru. These all subsequently split into smaller entities, usually along lines caused by competition among regional social, and economic elites: Bolívar’s Republic of Colombia (Gran Colombia) split into three republics in 1830 (New Granada, Ecuador, and Venezuela); Mexico lost Central America in 1823; the Provincias Unidas del Centro de América subsequently became the independent states of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Peru was initially based on a truncated version of the old viceroyalty, though without Upper Peru, Chile, and Quito: their status as autonomous units of Spanish government underpinned claims to become separate republics. But the shape of Spanish jurisdictions still marked the political geography of Spanish America: at the end of
the nineteenth century, the borders of most republics matched the boundaries of colonial audiencias and major provinces.

The persistence of Iberian influences is also evident in other areas of political life. Post-independence innovation drew on Enlightenment ideas and attitudes nurtured under Pombal in Portugal and various ministers in later eighteenth-century Spain: these provided inspiration for post-independence reforms in administration, public order, education, the dissemination of news and “useful knowledge”, as well as in policies aimed at stimulating economic activity (Gallo 2006). On the conservative side, Catholicism was universally acknowledged by all new constitutions as the religion of the people, and the institution of the Church remained a key institution, often in ambivalent relations with republican governments (Lempérière 2004). Spanish law remained in force, too, in varying degrees, just as parts of colonial legislation persisted in Brazil for decades after independence.

On the other hand, the Spanish American republics broke with the political systems of the past, by introducing modern institutions and policies that were conducive to the goals of promoting the liberty of citizens and the security of their property. Most post-independence political leaders embraced modernity, embodied in a liberal agenda of constitutional government, equality before the law for all citizens, freedom of speech, and freedom for production and commerce. Some liberal intellectuals and statesmen regarded the United States as a paradigm, and had high ambitions for social change: they hoped for economic progress through freedom to trade, and, amidst greater prosperity, aimed to create an educated, responsible citizenry, free from slavery and other forms of racial inequality. Such goals suggest that liberal standards were higher than in much of Europe, where many states were still deeply conservative, repressive monarchies.

If Spanish American political leaders generally embraced the idea of constitutional government, they differed widely over the forms it should take. A few (in Río de la Plata in 1815–1818, Chile in 1818, and Mexico in 1821) wanted constitutional monarchies headed by Spanish Bourbon or other princes recruited in Europe, but such schemes gained scant support. None followed Brazil along the path to constitutional monarchy, except for the very brief experiment in Mexico. Nonetheless, the major constitutional formulas adopted by the early republics show the shadow of monarchy, especially the Napoleonic-Bolivarian republic invented by Bolívar and embodied in his Bolivian Constitution of 1826. Based on British constitutional monarchy and Napoleonic consular constitutions, this constitutional model aimed at a “republicanised monarchy”, a paternalistic republican government of elected legislatures curbed by life-presidents and hereditary senates. The other major constitutional blueprint came more directly from Spain: the centralised republic, similar to that framed by the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, was adopted in the Río de la Plata in 1826, Chile and Peru in 1828, and New Granada, Venezuela, and Uruguay in 1830 (Safford 1985).

Throughout Iberian America, considerable obstacles still stood in the way of social and political change during the transition to independent statehood. In Spanish America, war had undermined respect for old hierarchies, brought new groups into politics, and turned violence into an instrument of politics, all of which made it difficult for new states to stabilise. Second, the removal of Spanish economic monopoly did not inaugurate a new era of prosperity: British investment soon dried.
up, and international markets remained generally unfavourable until the later nineteenth century (Halperín Donghi 1975). Without the support of economic growth, new institutions and liberal reforms struggled to overcome the drag of the Spanish past. Poor communications, deep cultural divisions, widespread illiteracy, and the influence of corporate identities and clientelist networks undermined respect for law and citizenship, and authority frequently moved from elected representatives into the hands of strong, personalist leaders ready to use armed force. “Caudillos” of this kind (who might be military officers, local chieftains defending their own power and representing local elites, or leaders of subaltern groups who wanted citizenship on their own terms) appeared in several regions, including Mexico, Central America, Peru, Bolivia, and the Río de la Plata, complicating the functions of the republican legal-constitutional order (Lynch 1992). And, as privileged groups clung to their wealth and power, republican constitutions did not benefit all citizens: republican and liberal values were not incompatible with deep social inequality and even slavery, which persisted in Venezuela, New Granada, and Peru until mid-century. On the other hand, subaltern groups—Indian communities, blacks, and free coloured—entered into political debate and action with an unprecedented vigour, claiming their rights as citizens and struggling to shape the republics to their advantage (Méndez 2005; Lasso 2007; Sanders 2004).

Everywhere in Spanish America, the empire had given way to successor states that faced difficult transitions. The tensions between liberal and conservative politicians that emerged in the 1820s and 1830s were generally unresolved; economic growth was invariably very limited; governments had heavy debts and small incomes, which induced several to revive colonial taxes and even the quintessentially colonial Indian tributes. The achievement of independence had started some great political projects—republicanism, federalism, ideas for continental cooperation—but the Spanish colonial past continued to weigh heavily in some key respects: the persistence of racial hierarchies; values of honour, patriarchy, and paternalism; the Catholic Church; illiteracy, and a limited public sphere (Brown and Paquette, 2013; Zahler 2013). In Brazil, the colonial past was even more evident in the persistence, indeed the continuing expansion of slavery. So, as Bolívar sensed when he commented that he and his compatriots had achieved independence but little else, the successors to Spain and Portugal faced great challenges and considerable conflict as they moved beyond independence into the modern world of the nineteenth century.

NOTE

1 Professor Pimenta’s contribution translated by Juliana Jardim de Oliveira.

WORKS CITED


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