CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN

SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY IBERIAN WORLD

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SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE IBERIAN WORLD: IBERIAN PENINSULA AND BRAZIL

This section identifies the major societal changes that occurred in the Iberian peninsula and Brazil during the eighteenth century through a comparative approach, with the end goal of analysing what these changes meant to these respective societies organised by privilege and inequality. Thus, the text addresses the social dynamics, rather than the ideas proposed by the reformists and critics of the period.

As the 18th century unfolded, Iberia’s political units became peripheral in the European context and the difference was clear. It was a time of “great divergence”, a term that marks the period to this day. A number of reforms developed in the enlightenment context that ultimately aimed to offset the divergence and to modernise Iberia according to the standards set in other regions of Europe. Indeed, there were many social actors in both Spain and Portugal who were conscious of the disparities, and not all of them were estrangeirados (admirer, or cultivator of what is foreign). Economic societies of “friends of the nation”, aware that change was paramount, blossomed in Spain after Campomanes’ 1774 challenge. Foreign travel accounts underscored such backwardness in Portugal and Spain. The publication of which only served to rekindle and nurture the infamous Black Legend concerning Iberia. Certain regions in the Americas, however, were evolving as local elites became increasingly interested in political involvement. Never had social mobility in certain sectors occurred at such a rapid pace as in the Iberian overseas territories, and in Europe itself. Yet, the penetration of these changes was far from widespread in such highly hierarchised societies where inequality was consecrated in law and ingrained in the dominant political culture. Our goal is to capture the ways in which social dynamics generated change vis-à-vis the standard political hierarchy, rather than simply discuss the proposals of enlightened thinkers and reformers of the period. Therefore, we begin with the evolution of society, not the ideas about how it should be.
The key questions within this framework are: what themes of change impacted the diversity of Iberian societies? What did change mean at this time of great transformations in France and North America? How did each social group react to change as they witnessed it? In the following pages we take stock of a number of such realities through the viewpoint of a comparative synthesis. We attempt to scrutinise the particularities, similarities, and differences, all the while aiming to study the reach of the registered changes.

From northern Iberia to the American continent

Contrary to what has been written, Spanish emigration during the 18th century did not dwindle. Although the number of emigrants from the traditional regions of central Spain and Andalusia slowed, emigration from the northern provinces actually increased. Canary Islanders also began to emigrate to the Americas, especially after 1680—according to Martínez Shaw's estimate, 25,000 people left during the 18th century (Martínez Shaw 1994, 167). High population density, land scarcity, and the economic crises of 1690–1695 and 1708–1718 in the provinces of northern Iberia, combined with the takeover of Basque cod fisheries by the English, caused many to leave. Push factors thus prevailed upon Galicians, who up until then had moved mostly inside Iberia (around 350,000 people in the second half of the 18th century). This group also began to emigrate to the New World as evidenced by data compiled by Eiras Roel for the county of Compostela. While in the 17th century only 4% of Galicia's children emigrated and only one out of 15 left for the Americas, in the eighteenth century that number grew considerably. More than 10% of the population emigrated and one out of seven left for the Americas—one out of three from 1792 to 1793 (Eiras Roel 1991, 19). From the 1760s onwards, during the time of the abovementioned agricultural crises, the increasing liberalisation of colonial commerce effectively ended the monopoly held by Cadiz since 1717, thus making it even easier for many Galician and Iberians from the northern coastline to move overseas.

The discovery of gold deposits in Minas Gerais (ca. 1695), Cuiabá (1719), Goiás (1725), and Mato Grosso (1734) broadened the Western Brazilian frontier. These findings became widespread. The newspaper Gaceta de Madrid of 29/01/1732 quoted news from London dated December 1731, with detailed information received from Lisbon. They described the gold and diamonds disembarked at Lisbon by the Rio de Janeiro fleet in great detail, concluding with the following remark: “This quantity of gold is the largest ever brought by any Fleet to this Kingdom.” This Eldorado attracted many people from the North of Portugal. Portuguese America generated noticeable pull factors. The Brazilian population grew considerably during the eighteenth century—it probably multiplied tenfold. The settlement, the foundation of city councils and even of churches/parishes and other structures rapidly unfolded in the central-southern region of Brazil. In this region, the captaincies became more interconnected, and Rio de Janeiro became the main economic centre of the territory in the second half of the eighteenth century (Sampaio 2001; Osório 2001, 117, 121). Meanwhile, the exodus from Portugal was so strong that Portuguese King D. João V was forced to restrict it in 1720. Most people leaving the country hailed from Minho, the Portuguese region with the highest population density. Migration
to Brazil was so massive that the Portuguese law of 1720 underscored the lack of people needed to farm the land in the province of Minho, “which, being the most populated, is now in a such a condition that it does not have the necessary people to farm the land or to serve the people”. The aforementioned law was preceded by similar decrees in 1709 and 1711, both of which had no great effect.

The lure of gold from south-central Brazil that depopulated vast regions of northern Portugal simultaneously preserved the power of Baroque in the altars of many early eighteenth-century churches ranging from the already mentioned area of Brazil to central and northern Portugal, and the islands of the Azores and Madeira. According to the estimates, the rate of departure from the parishes of Minho was quite high, spanning from 20 to 44% of boys, with the most affected age group being individuals ten to 14 years old (Amorim 1999, 36–38). Many left after only achieving basic literacy in their local school. There was often a first phase of migration to Porto, or Lisbon, where relatives or fellow countrymen housed them. In these cities, emigrants frequently became servants or commission tradesmen and store cashiers. The departure to Brazil happened after they gathered some savings and underwent a brief initiation in commercial routines, which most often happened spontaneously while working at the counter of a store or as a merchant assistant. Similar to Spaniards who left Cadiz for Spanish America, a large percentage of Portuguese emigrants were single males.

Some emigrants returned to Iberia in their forties with some money—at times even becoming rich. Others stayed in the colonies, and in the case of Brazil, got married, preferably to the daughters of other Portuguese already born in the colony. Here they enlarged the local elites, challenging the interests of people born in Brazil. Children of Portuguese emigrants in Brazil oftentimes became members of the clergy, and others were sent to study at the University of Coimbra. Contrary to the Castilian colonial experience, Portugal never established universities in non-European territories. This fact strengthened dependence vis-à-vis the metropole. In the 18th century, however, awareness of the place of birth by people born in the territory to the detriment of people from Portugal was consolidated. This trend began at the time of the war against the Dutch.

Refraining exclusion?

Societies from different Iberian geographies during the Ancien Régime, based on privilege and anchored to confessional political entities of Catholic brand, maintained a number of exclusions as if seeking to protect themselves from threats against their identity and ideology. We can speak about minorities, such as the New Christians and Gypsies. The bottom of the social pyramid in the Iberian world consisted of slaves, almost entirely of African origin. These individuals were easily identified by the colour of their skin and considered property, yet it was understood that they ought to be Christianised. What changes occurred in this framework? What drove social dynamics during the period of enlightened reformism?

Regarding Gypsies, both Spain and Portugal sought to control them and tried to banish them from their territories—a longstanding intention, fed by the character of ideological and religious levelling of these monarchies. In Spain, a 1717 decree tried to compel them to settle (i.e. to make them sedentary and force their integration).
The initial list of 41 cities designated for this effect was enlarged in 1746. This law allowed central authorities to know exactly where Gypsies were located. In July 1749, the Marquis of Ensenada (1702–1781) put in practice what would become known as the “great netting” (gran redada), or general arrest of Gypsies, which was an operation simultaneously carried out in all territories of peninsular Spain. As a result of this initiative, males over seven years old were separated from women and children. The purpose was to provide forced labour for Spanish shipyards. Female Gypsies were also forced to work in the production of manufactures. The overall aim of the program was to occupy Gypsies in the workforce and prevent them from populating. From the program’s inception it became difficult to decide whether to include those enjoying the status of Old-Christians, those who married outside the group, or those who enjoyed permanent residence. An additional law in 1763 attempted to serve as a pardon for Gypsy prisoners. Again, an order adopted on the 19 September 1783 insisted on integration and stated that Gypsies were forbidden from being called Gypsies or New Castilians. It allowed them to choose their place of residence but prohibited their presence at the King’s Court or other “royal places”.

In 1718 the Portuguese government ordered the arrest of Gypsies with the goal of distributing them among different overseas territories. That year’s deportation (around 144 people) was made public; a clear demonstration of the crown’s desire for social control. Unlike Spain, from 1592 onward Portugal wanted its imperial domains to be the destination of these unassimilated populations. Brazil was particularly targeted by these 18th-century measures as groups were expelled from particular regions to others in that large territory. There they maintained their behaviours and were often associated with thefts (namely of slaves), which generated constant protests. The presence of Gypsies in Brazil triggered an important exchange of letters between Bahia and the Overseas Council, especially between 1755 and 1758. Legislation was issued in 1760–1761 that called upon Gypsies to abandon their peculiar and “criminal” lifestyle in Brazil. Punishment for failing to do so was set at permanent exile to the African islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. At the time, around 1,000 gypsies lived in the Bahia captaincy alone. The deportation of Gypsies from Portugal to Brazil continued into the 1780s. Some became slave traders after the gold boom. They also traded in the second-hand market, transporting slaves from the coastal areas to the Brazilian hinterland, along with other commodities, although such occupations failed to dissipate their social stigma as thieves. Their condition, however, was better than that of their coreligionists in Iberia. (B. M. Donovan 1992; Gómez Alfaro, Costa, and Floate 1999; Martínez Martínez 2014).

While socially reviled in Brazil, slaves were even more marginalised than Gypsies. African slaves in Spain were few during the 18th century. Their numbers were bolstered somewhat by Mohammedan slaves, especially from the Mediterranean coast. These individuals arrived as a result of ship seizures. Most belonged to the state and were used as labourers in arsenals, prisons, and road construction. In 1766 around 800 were freed against ransom and returned to North Africa (Domínguez Ortiz 1990, 338).

Contrary to what has been argued, Portugal did not pioneer the abolition of slavery. It forbade the entrance of more slaves in Portugal’s mainland and promoted the release of existing ones since 1761–1773. During that time of gold and economic crises, the purpose was to safeguard the free workforce. The Atlantic traffic however
was stimulated almost single-handedly by the monopolist companies of Grão-Pará-and-Maranhão and Pernambuco-and-Paraíba. These alone transported over 87,100 slaves from the shores of Africa to Brazil. The efforts of these two companies no doubt contributed to the global increase in the African slave trade from the 18th century until the first half of the nineteenth (Caldeira 2013, 220–225, 229–235, 252).

In Brazil’s richest regions, skin colour became an increasingly important social factor that marked one’s rank in society (Furtado 2006, 218). In Portugal, status according to the colour of the skin was slowly reinforced as a mark of exclusion towards the end of the eighteenth century, especially as purity of blood was officially abolished by a law issued in 1773. Twelve days after, the nuncio of Lisbon quickly sent the printed law to the Vatican secretary, saying it had been enacted to “completely erase the remains of an intolerable barbarity” (ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Portogallo, Lº 120, f. 73–86v). In Portugal the importance given to purity of blood had reached its peak in the 1670–1730s. During this period, it was not enough to have pure blood; one had to prove that reputation at all times. The families of this puritan aristocracy would not even allow their children to marry equally historic houses tainted by rumours of impure blood.

When it was abolished by crown law, the purity of blood was no longer a factor of significant differentiation. Many successful New Christians had reached social distinctions, for example obtaining habits in Portugal’s various military orders or becoming members of the Inquisition brotherhood. From 1773 onwards, these insignias and memberships lost social importance, and their demand decreased significantly although families with New-Christian origins still sought to obtain them. Unofficially the status survived until the nineteenth century, especially in the marriage market. It was not easy to eradicate such practices ingrained in society at that time.

Even so, purity-of-blood statutes were only definitively abolished in Spain in 1865 after genealogical investigations were extinguished in 1833. They therefore survived the demise of Inquisition and the equal access of all citizens to civil service proclaimed in 1812. In the second half of the 18th century, however, their segregating power weakened. The chuetas of Mallorca were the only exception. For this reason, royal orders issued in 1782, 1785, and 1788 tried to integrate New Christians by erasing this label, acknowledging their right to live among common folks, and considering them able to apply for every post and occupation. Yet, social integration was not significant until the 19th century (Dominguez Ortiz 1990, 341). With regards to social exclusion, it was not easy to overcome something that was so deeply ingrained in the collective mentality.

**Business elites, social mobility, and new distinctions**

The eighteenth century may have aggravated the “great divergence”, but it sped up the social mobility process inside Iberia’s political entities. Never had such mobility been so strong. Following a 16th-century trend, colonial commerce, or other related businesses, constituted the main opportunity for a usually rapid social promotion—ranking second after service to the crown. This hierarchy of promotion pathways persisted over time since it was inherent to the institutional and political culture of Iberia’s monarchies. It was very clear in Castile, and especially in Portugal—an old political entity, more homogenous and centripetal at the institutional level. Service
to the crown was paramount, but long-distance wholesale trade still secured the largest financial capital gains and short-term capital accumulation for those people with no proven family history. It also had the advantage of not being exclusive to major traders. In the eighteenth century, more than ever, there were opportunities to convert financial capita into social capital.

Except for certain regions in Spanish America and the mining areas of Brazil, Cadiz and Lisbon were the key places to watch such quick trajectories unfold, precisely because they were the nuclear poles of transoceanic Iberian commerce in the 18th century. Around 1729–1730 a French traveller, referring to Cadiz, said that “this city has a lot of people and commodities. There is no other place in Europe where money is more common, or flows more abundantly” (Silhouette 1770, III: 91). This status resulted from the move of Casa da Contratación and the Consulate to Cadiz in 1717, where it stayed until 1778—when it became unnecessary to have the trade with the Indies based there. In the case of Lisbon, bidding for key crown contracts (assientos), both from the kingdom and overseas, took place in the city, which further increased its importance for the groups of the business elite (Salvado 2014, 134). In the second half of the eighteenth century, Lisbon traders benefited from 61.2% of the contracts awarded by the crown’s Finance Council and Overseas Council, representing 87% of the revenue awarded. They were the principal holders of nearly 75% of the revenue entering the royal vaults: 62.6% of annual contracts up to, or exceeding, 50 million réis were held by a Lisbon businessman (Pedreira 1996, 360; Pedreira 1995, 122–123). At times these contracts also involved services to the monarchy, thus enabling them to strengthen their capital of social promotion and negotiate with members of central government, generating relationships based on the exchange of favours and dependencies. In truth, contracts were essential in defining the Portuguese trading elite in the second half of the 18th century, and as such, a small group of rich traders kept these monopolies firmly tied to their houses as if these were their “own assets”. This “innovation”, among others, was visible at the end of the century in the tobacco contracts. The prevailing seventeenth-century trend that most businessmen were of New Christian descent also changed. By the mid-18th century some of the most distinguished businessmen still belonged to the managing boards of the state-owned Pombal-created companies, or the royal Trade Board (Junta do Comércio). They were also the main providers of state credit in the final years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth century (1796–1803).

As in Cadiz, most major traders in Lisbon were from elsewhere; foreigners being more numerous in Cadiz than in Lisbon, in relative terms. Despite the earthquake of 1755, Lisbon remained the greatest city in Iberia at the end of the Ancien Régime, attracting many from the Minho and Trás-os-Montes provinces. At the turn of the 18th century the city boasted around 125–150 individuals, not including 50 foreign houses (W. M. Donovan 1991, 86–87). In 1772, the city had around 640 traders, and between 1790 and 1800 that number varied between 308 and 402, most of them Portuguese (between 49 and 60%). Outside this metropolis, Portugal had no medium-sized cities; only small towns. Never was this so consequential in social terms. The second most important commercial centre was Porto; during the same period, it had a concentration of around 133–217 traders listed in the almanacs,
with foreign ones not exceeding 11.8–18% of that group (Pedreira 1995, 130; Cunha 2014, 31–32). At Cadiz the traders were around 138 in 1713, 529 in 1753 (46% foreigners) and possibly 907 in 1773 (45.7% foreigners). They did not exceed 2% of the population, with the same percentage more than likely mirrored in Lisbon (Bustos Rodríguez 2005, 126–128, 138–139).

Rapid social climbing in the eighteenth century was made possible mostly by increased venality. In Spain, it had already become accentuated in the reign of Philip IV, and especially of Charles II, but in Portugal this increase happened later. It became a striking phenomenon in the 18th century, especially in the 1750–1760s. It created opportunities for the wealthy on both sides of the Iberian peninsula who were eager to secure important positions and distinctions. The acquisition of regidors, that is, municipal ruling posts, was essential in many Castilian towns. Wealthy people already bought noble titles in the seventeenth century, such as Colaret from Cádiz who bought the seigneurie of El Pedroso along with the title of Marquis. Noble titles even became part of the agreed terms of some seventeenth-century royal loan contracts negotiated in Castilian lands. This top distinction, that Portuguese traders could almost never reach until the late eighteenth century (exception made to the family Castro do Rio, who were made Viscounts in 1671, and Gomes da Mata, who became Count of Penafiel in December 1798), concluded a process that began with the acquisition or construction of noble houses and a change of lifestyle. This first stage was followed by the acquisition of membership in the Inquisition (familiars), the insignia of a military order and a coat of arms, as well as the foundation of an entail. Excluding the status of “grande” and nobility titles, the remaining pathway was generally identical to Spain’s. These social actors aimed to achieve nobility, not to alter the social hierarchy.

Regarding Spain, the work of García-Baquero, Bustos Rodríguez, Carmen Sanz, Francisco Andújar, Enrique Soria, Alberto Marcos Martín, and María del Mar Felices informs us of widespread venality in the field of honours. The phenomenon was more circumscribed and globally less evident until the final quarter of the seventeenth century in Portugal. It virtually did not include membership in the Inquisition (familiars) and did not touch upon noble titles and grandeur. Old nobility being poor in assets strongly depended upon crown reward as the management of venality in Portugal was conducted in such way that it did not question the grant-awardling economy. Caution was taken to secure such situations at that time and the practice of venality, when directly vitalised by the crown, tended to occur in the empire (India, Azores, and Brazil).

In Portugal one could not buy municipal posts, but it became possible to acquire offices, or years of service to the crown, for requesting the due reward to the political centre. In other cases, one could even buy the right to a habit of the Order of Christ from a military officer (or from his widow) or from people living in Mazagão before they confirmed such grant. During the period, those who received a grant sometimes also got the ability to sell it. Since the trader who acquired it was generally an Old-Christian, the only obstacle he faced regarding genealogical inquiry for the Order of Christ was the contamination of craftsman descent, an objection often applicable. Since the mid-18th century there was also a solution for this problem, that is, paying a penalty to the Court of Military Orders or having previously acquired at least ten original shares from the so-called Pombaline Companies that were created in 1755.
Initial shareholders enjoyed the privilege, as from February 1757, of automatically excusing buyers of such a number of original shares from the “manual worker” objection, as a means to promote the sale hindered by the 1755 earthquake. This prerogative was extended to later Pombaline commercial companies, to the sons and grandsons of the founding shareholders, and had retroactive effects for people who had already been reproved. This was another propelling mechanism for the quick rise of people with available funds.

In the eighteenth century, converging circumstances made social assent easier, even along the span of only one generation—although two or three was more common. Furthermore, we should stress the “en noblement” of certain occupations which occurred in Portugal. For instance, in 1722 low-rank offices in the king’s household ceased to generate the manual worker descent objection per se in the Board of Military Orders. In 1723 any farmer who farmed his own land was considered noble if he did not have any other “mechanic” descent objection, which vitalised the rise of many people who were sons and grandsons of farmers. In 1762 it was the turn of bookkeepers and cashiers, while in 1771 it was decided that the performing arts did not bring infamy to those practicing them (Moreau 1999, I: 22). In Spain, a royal order dated 18 March 1783 made the jobs of tanner, blacksmith, tailor, shoemaker, and carpenter honest and honourable: they no longer debased the family, nor disabled it for municipal offices (Real cédula de S.M. y señores ... 1783).

The trade-off for disciplining and promoting certain practices was often to grant a dignity inducing social ascension. Let us consider two examples. When the system of payment of the royal fifths on gold was altered in Brazil, a bill dated 3 December 1750 promised rewards to those who made deliveries of a minimum eight arrobas of gold in a single year at any mint, regardless of the ownership of the gold or the type of delivery, partial or total (Collecção das leis, decretos ... 1797). Usually those who complied would be given the habit of the Order of Christ and a pension of 12,000 réis. An order dated 20 February 1752 also promised manual workers who planted mulberry trees and produced three arrobas of silk the possibility of being considered fit “for holding any office in those towns and cities of the kingdom that require nobility”.

People nearly always took advantage of these opportunities, in particular the first one, as the range of social honours was more limited in Brazil than in the Portugal. The habit of Christ was the highest honour available, contrary to what happened in Castilian America where fortune could buy noble titles (Raminelli 2015, 126–127). In Brazil most people who received habits by way of gold deliveries were from Portugal’s mainland—43% of whom were traders, followed by those holding administrative jobs, many of them officers at the foundry house itself. Few owned mines and many achieved the minimum annual amount by convincing third parties to deliver gold in their name (Stumpf 2014, 276–278, 331–333). This means that people also competed and bargained in the exploitation of these opportunities, especially since venality was less common than in the neighbouring territories colonised by Spain.

Be it in Andalusia or Galicia, be it in the Cantabrian coast or Lisbon, wealthy traders were characterised mainly by having several active debts and investing little in the processing sector. Manufacturing plants were nearly always considered less

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profitable than colonial commerce. In all those places, the capital available for lending vitalised their relationship with a wide range of people.

Concerning social honours, one change occurred in 18th-century Iberia military orders, that is the appearance of grades, hierarchy, and, consequently, promotion. The orders even developed *numerus clausus* at some levels, emulating what existed in other European knighthood orders. Military orders, born in the Middle Ages, just as they were in the last decades of the eighteenth century, with many knights with the same insignia, did not reflect social differences as Iberian societies required. It was not possible to create a new institution in Portugal, as happened in Castile (Order of Charles III, in 1771), but in 1789 the three Military Orders (i.e. Avis, Christ, and Santiago) were reformed under the sponsorship of the monarchy. In both Spain and Portugal, projects were developed at the king's initiative as the reigning monarchs became the Grand-Masters of the military orders. They strengthened their power, vis-à-vis the Holy See and the orders board (the order of Charles III did not even depend on it). Notwithstanding, the order of Charles III received the pope's confirmation (February of 1772). The king's founding decree imposed strict requirements in matters of purity of blood (going as far back as the great-grandparents on both sides) and demanded noble descent of the paternal lineage; it was only negligent regarding the occupation, but not for long. From March 1787 it also required the absence of manual worker descent up to the great-grandparents (Villalba Pérez 1990, 678). The order's highest dignity of the Great-Cross, whose bearers were called Excellency in both Castile and Portugal, only reinforced hierarchy inside the nobility. It reinstated the aristocracy of the orders and symbolically reorganised the bonds of loyalty between aristocracy and royalty. It is also in this context that we must interpret the creation of the Spanish *Royal Order of Noble Ladies of Queen Maria Luísa*, in 1792, the first feminine order recorded in Iberia; as from 1796, both its members and their husbands could be titled Excellency. When people recently awarded the order of Charles III received the insignia, their mandatory oath to the king was “to live and die in our Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion: never engage directly or indirectly against our Person, Household or States: serve us well and loyally in everything that we may see fit (if they are our vassals)”.

In their conception, these initiatives were themselves a reaction against societal changes and increased social mobility. They meant to impose order over social disorder. It was not by mere chance that the order of Charles III was no less noble than the others and, despite inflated membership during the reign of Charles IV, it did not accept nobles involved in commerce or industry (Moreta i Munujos 1981, 331). These efforts however did not last for long, especially in the Portuguese case.

**New sociability and the development of “public opinion”**

The field of sociability also changed in the eighteenth century. Along with the academies and the traditional places (confraternities, taverns, markets, parish and religious festivities, fountains and squares), new ways of association and social interaction (cafés, salons) cropped up in the late eighteenth century, whether legally accepted or not (i.e. masonic lodges).

Cafés, as shops for enjoying a cup of coffee or other drinks and sweets, were only beginning to develop in Iberia during the period. In Lisbon they seemingly appeared
at the time of Pombal (Ruders 1981, 227). They were almost identical to pubs or liquor stores. In 1792 foreign and Portuguese newspapers could be found at some of these shops and cafés and, according to that year’s report by the General Chief of Police, they were the basis for “speech writing and plotting”. According to the same source, this was why “everybody now begins to murmur that you can speak freely at the cafés” (ANTT, Intendência Geral da Polícia, Secretarias, Lº 3, f. 290v–291v—apud Lousada 1995, 214, n. 96).

Aristocrats, traders, and administration officers and their families avoided attending cafés, as well as women. Female attendance was more significant in Madrid. In 1796 Jovellanos described the cafés as “public houses for conversation and daily entertainment”, serving as a refuge for the unemployed to spend their time gambling and reading “public papers and magazines”. He also considered them somewhat educational for young people who lacked proper education at home and could receive it from the world (Jovellanos 1858, 494–495). In the 1790s foreigners, among others, attended the tables of the capital of the Bourbons. Some individuals gambled there, while other people organised literary or politically oriented discussion groups. In Madrid, as in Lisbon, the police considered these places potentially capable of disturbing public order. In 1791 there were 27 cafés in Madrid, particularly in the districts of Maravillas (7) and San Jerónimo (11). They had to be located at the ground floor with doors opening to the street, so as to be more easily controlled. People were not allowed to read “gazettes nor other public papers”. At the same date, card games, conversations about government or anyone were also unauthorised. It was also forbidden to smoke (López-Cordón 2004, 349–355).

As in many other European cities (Bordeaux—1746; Nantes, Montpellier, Nîmes—1745–1760, etc.), Lisbon had a “public promenade”. In 1764 construction began north of the Rossio square in an area where the rubble from the reconstruction of the city had been dumped after the 1755 earthquake. This avenue had a central road and five rows of symmetrically aligned trees, some of which were ash-trees donated by a rich French trader who lived in Portugal. The venue had benches inside and was surrounded by walls with windows. There was a homology with the salon “in which everybody may and must be shown off” and its symmetry underscored the notion of dominion over nature, transforming it in a tamed and civilised environment that penetrated the city (Turcot 2009, 647). Urban parks for leisure were also designed as gathering places during the period to bring social groups into closer proximity to each other. In 1766, however, Charles François Dumouriez wrote that Portuguese people do not communicate much, and their sociability is poor, particularly in Lisbon. Government, which remains suspicious at all times since the plot against the king, has forbidden any gathering … the city of Lisbon has no entertainment. A few balls are held, more for entertaining the foreigners rather than the nationals.

(Dumouriez 2007, 121)

Porto, remaining the second most important city of the country at the end of the eighteenth century, also had its public promenade built at Cordoaria in 1786, followed by others in the 1790s. In Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, capital of the territory since 1763, also built its public promenade between 1779 and 1783. Although these
urban promenades were fashionable in eighteenth-century Europe, the promenade of Lisbon was not very attended during that time. People wearing cloaks were not admitted in order to prevent the presence of the common people, yet the upper groups also avoided the space, save foreigners and possibly dandies—called *peraltas* at that time. A 1778 leaflet commented on these: “Their burps are: Ladies, Floret, Counter-dancing, Public Promenade and Lisbon quay of Ribeira, Tea, cafés and Pool”. These characters were poor but pretentious, always dressed according to the latest fashion. The closing hours (it was not open at night), the garden profile, the lack of hygiene of the city streets, along with the custom of keeping women at home, all explained the low attendance of that garden by the Portuguese (Le Cunff 2000, I: 14–32). In Spain these tree-sided avenues were already traditional and their impact much stronger.

In Madrid and other Spanish cities (Málaga, Murcia, Zaragoza, Valladolid, etc.) which had their public promenades and avenues built or restructured (Alameda de Hércules, in Seville, 1764; Paseo del Prado, in Madrid, 1767 and 1775; Écija in 1769 and 1774, etc.), these spaces open to everyone were livelier, although the lower groups were not welcome there. Madrid’s urban sociability moved from Plaza Mayor / Puerta del Sol to these promenades (Delicias, Atocha, Prado, Recoletos), that often separated the urban space from the suburbs or the disorganised countryside (García Gómez 1993, 15). In some Spanish cities, avenues were a source of pride to the residents as the business elite tried to have their mansions built there (*verbi gratia*, Málaga). This model was even transposed onto Castilian colonial cities. Madrid’s Prado de Atocha was turned into an Illuminist and Neo-classic avenue of sciences. Public buildings were built there, including the Botanical Gardens (1774–1781), the Museum or Office of Natural Sciences (1785–1811), and the National Observatory, whose works began in 1790.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century it became fashionable among the elites to entertain at home, whether to socialise, or talk, or, in the Portuguese case, celebrate any kind of anniversary. After the 1755 earthquake, while Lisbon’s nobility had scattered themselves in the suburbs, the great traders lived close to each other, grouped downtown and in the western districts (Lousada 1995, 115–116). It was they who energised the broadening of the range of socialising or the “sociability and refinement”—according to Jacome Ratton. It was a change with the help of the Marquis of Pombal, who offered seats in the audience of the Ópera do Tejo to traders and their wives, alongside the British community and the effects of the earthquake. The great traders played a key role in breaking down the aristocracy’s exclusivist sociability in Lisbon and other Iberian cities. In Lisbon, opera and instrumental music left the closed and selected world of the royal court, aristocratic houses, or parties hosted by foreigners, and conquered a broader public in the second half of the 18th century. In Cadiz and Lisbon, it became fashionable for ladies to ask their husbands for a harpsicord, as well as music and dance teachers (Romero Ferrer 1989, 404–405; Lousada 1995, 285). In Lisbon, the first public concert with a paid entrance regardless of their social status was held in the first half of the 1780s (Lousada 1995, 289). The same principle was already applied to theatre. Public theatres already existed in Madrid in the seventeenth century, although only two survived until the eighteenth century, together with the newly founded theatre Caños del Peral. In Cadiz, a city of many wealthy men, three public theatres coexisted in the 1760s and 1770s, with varied programmes including Italian opera, French comedy, and Castilian models such as the “sainete” comic opera.
Four public theatres were built in Lisbon between 1756/1759 and 1792 and the São Carlos opera house opened in 1793. From 1771 to 1775 a commercial company managed the Lisbon public theatres, whose funds were obtained by selling shares. According to the regulations of this monopolist company, women did not pay to attend the shows, neither did the valets or servants of patrons who rented loges (Moreau 1999, I: 22). Lisbon’s São Carlos Theatre, although sponsored by the king, was built and financed through an agreement signed by the General Chief of Police and the shareholders of the aforementioned company, all of them large traders (Joaquim Pedro Quintela, Anselmo José da Cruz Sobral, Jacinto Fernandes Bandeira, António Francisco Machado, António José Ferreira, and João Pereira Caldas) who immediately began to manage it. Quintela himself gave the necessary land and demanded as compensation a noble loge, with adjoining chambers and an independent entrance. In Porto the importance of wealthy traders was also critical to theatre construction and maintenance, even though these pragmatic men received little literary education and did not travel abroad. When they did so, they almost exclusively travelled to Brazil to settle business affairs.

Theatre, particularly in Spain, allowed some sociability between the nobility and middle groups. Diversified social interaction also existed in Spain’s various economic societies. The same happened in Portugal in the few masonic lodges that were clandestinely created in the eighteenth century, nearly always by foreigners, namely the English. The presence of these lodges slightly increased in the 1790s. In Spain, Freemasonry had less of a social impact during the eighteenth century.

Censorship notwithstanding, reading of newspapers in public spaces, theatre, and mundane interactions allowed a diversification of contents and spaces for creation (outside the royal court, the academies, and aristocratic palaces) and expansion of the profile of social agents who gave their opinions about the res publica and influenced public opinion. These actors helped to cement the role of the individual in Iberian society, as well as the role of public and private spheres in social life and their differences. This was a subtle but meaningful change.

By the late eighteenth century, we can longer describe society as tripartite, as a consequence of these recorded changes. Traders and other intermediate groups increasingly imposed themselves within the social classifications. Despite the existence of entities such as trade boards, traders were not a coherent group with an alternative social vision. For the most part, the increasing financial requirements of the modern Iberian states allowed these ambiguously composed groups, elbowing with nobility, to consolidate their power. Although these modern states needed the décor of nobility and its military, as well as courtly and diplomatic services, they also needed the financial services of the wealthy. The same applied to the skills of university graduates and the military, both in Iberia and the Empires. All this, despite the pull factors of such territories as Brazil in which their echo reverberated loudly among the popular social layers and in some intermediate groups. The interaction between central government and society played an important role in this process. Individual merit, along with the inherited merit, became increasingly preponderant, as well as the respect for the individual versus family descent. The individual and private spheres began to differentiate themselves from the public sphere. Notwithstanding censorship, more people gave their opinion about political and social changes.
In short, all of these changes described were mere discontinuities in the general picture of a society that mimicked the upper ranks, and in the conceptual frameworks of neo-scholastic origin that still existed at the beginning of the 18th century, such shifts in social mobility were not viewed favourably. To these, social mobility meant disorder. As the century progressed, such changes were increasingly accepted as the process itself became a recurrent symbol of change. Change did not put an end to privilege, but it did bridge the behaviour gap between business elites and the aristocracy. They mingled at certain venues and contexts, but that did not mean there was a great deal of integration, especially in Portugal, where the grandes and title-holders lived closed in on themselves for a long time.

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COLONIAL ELITES: BETWEEN IBERIAN IDENTITY AND AMERICAN ASPIRATIONS

The process of colonisation in the Americas gave rise to an Ancién Regime society characterised by social relations that were structured, on the one hand, around a series of oppositions—between victors and the vanquished, the indigenous and the settlers, Creoles and peninsulars—and on the other by ethnic mixing and a dependent economy. These were, broadly speaking, the features that distinguished the Americas from the contemporary European world, the focus here being on changes that affected the colonial elites in the eighteenth century.

Two elements are central to understanding these changes. The first is the issue of social mobility. While skin colour and legal status continued to be seen as markers of social identity, the reality of mestizaje served to undermine the hierarchies constructed on this basis. Even more so, the preoccupation with wealth in the Americas all but invalidated contemporary classifications. On the other hand, the question of identity in the Americas, which is increasingly the focus of attention from scholars, is being considered in terms of sociability and social relations. With regard to the elites, this involves untangling the contradiction between, on the one hand, horizontal or “class” solidarities, understood in terms of “rulers” and “the ruled”, and, on the other, vertical solidarities that acquired far greater importance in the American context. Thus, while in Iberian America the elites replicated contemporary European social norms and hierarchies, more specifically those of the Iberian peninsula, they were nevertheless obliged to adapt the criteria to the American social reality, characterised by a relatively small nobility, and the demographic imbalance between the so-called “Spaniards” and the rest, as well as the prevalence of mestizaje. This American reality substantially altered the meaning of peninsular categories on which colonial society was founded, especially that of purity of blood (Bertrand 1999).

From the uniquely American context, two principal issues emerge. The first pertains to the question of social mobility. Was it more important in the colonies than in the metropole? The other refers to the emergence of an American identity under peninsular domination. What were the attitudes of the American elites to the metropole? These are the central questions analysed here by looking at both the Spanish and the Portuguese cases.
Defining the elite in Spanish America

The social group that was culturally Iberian was made up of those who were, legally speaking, members of the so-called “Republic of Spaniards”. It was essentially urban and distinguished by several other salient features. Among the most important of these was the firm adherence of its members to the sociocultural model that prevailed in the peninsula itself at the end of the fifteenth century. Two different elements of this model stand out above all. In the first place, the seigniorial framework, and the significance of interpersonal relations that offered protection within the client networks that coalesced around a feudal lord (señor). The other element was the importance given to blood purity, which took on a radically different aspect to that which it had in the metropole (Zuñiga 1999). This invariably entailed the privileging of Iberian ancestry through exclusive forms of sociability, such as lay religious confraternities whose members were recruited very selectively. This late-medieval Iberian culture was also marked by the symbolic overestimation of landownership, not in the economic sense but as a symbol of social rank, crucial in demonstrating one’s ability to live “nobly” or exercise “lordship”. Another key aspect was the diffusion of feudal culture among the members of this social elite, which manifested itself chiefly through the affinity for the so-called literature of chivalry, the inclination towards arms and warfare, and everything associated with knightly life and art, all that was proper to every “caballero”. Much of the colonial literary production reflects this affinity for the medieval aristocratic and feudal heritage, whether chronicles of the conquest — like the one authored by Bernal Díaz del Castillo — or histories of cities and their founders, such as the Recordación Florida by Francisco Antonio de Fuentes y Guzmán published in the seventeenth century, extolling the virtues of Santiago de Guatemala.

These were then the elements that marked out the American elites as members of the nobility, although this had a different meaning from that which it had in the metropole. The American elite did not take long to begin emphasising its role in the process of conquest, systematically predating its belonging to the nobility on this military background. This conception led them to petition the king for titles, coats of arms, and honours as reward for “services” rendered to his majesty by their conquistador forbears.

This martial concept of nobility, directly inherited from the period of the Iberian Reconquest, manifested itself in America in the unbridled hunger for all forms of distinction that symbolised or demonstrated belonging to the nobility. The habits of the military orders or offices of familiars of the Inquisition thus performed an identical function: they were incontrovertible evidence of the incumbent’s purity of blood, since they required the presentation of a genealogy, albeit often partly fictitious. Moreover, these honours often entailed exemption from ordinary justice and the right to the fueros associated with the titles in question. In the same vein, the generalised use of the titles of Don and Doña in America also point to this obsession with nobility. The same logic explains the attraction felt by the American elites for the mainly—if not exclusively—honourific local offices, even though these did not confer nobility on their holder, as was sometimes the case in France. In sum, in Spanish America nobles and hidalgos were all those members of the elite who...
managed to live in keeping with the model of nobility brought from the metropole and adapted to local reality, which combined ostentation, generous religious legacies and chaplaincies, investment in an urban residence-palace, as well as the purchase of lands, all of it crowned by titles and honours.

The emergence of an American identity

On these Hispanic foundations, a sense of “Americanness” was progressively built, its privileged sphere of expression being the Church from a very early stage. This American identity nourished itself on the disdain with which the peninsulars treated the Creole elite, who were invariably suspected of the taint of “mestizaje”, and thus seen as degenerate members of the Spanish “race”. More to the point, the peninsulars were in competition with this native-born elite for the most prestigious royal appointments in the Americas, and thus their disdain was an obstacle to the attainment of honours for the Creoles, a state of affairs that was not mitigated to a significant or lasting extent by the venality of offices and/or titles. It is notable that two-thirds of the titles of nobility granted by the crown in the Americas went to peninsulars who had enriched themselves through their economic activities in the New World (Ladd 1984; Rubial García 2005; Zárate Toscano 2005, 2000).

On the other hand, only 5% of the habits of the military orders were granted to American residents. The image of America based on the geographic determinism that was in vogue in Enlightenment Europe—in the works of Buffon, Raynal, and Voltaire among others—only served to reinforce this negative vision of the Ibero-American world.

In response, the Creole elite elaborated a discourse of American distinctiveness, refusing to accept the image of America as a pale, incomplete, or unfinished imitation of Europe, reclaiming the indigenous past as the basis of a new, unique identity. This discourse may be glimpsed in the various forms of expression and representation produced by the colonial elite, but it is within the confines of the ecclesiastical world that it undoubtedly flourished most beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century. From this point onward, the clergy was in the forefront of every dispute with the crown, whether over its progressive assertion of direct control through administrative reforms culminating in the second half of the eighteenth century, or its perceived disregard for the descendants of those whose deeds had contributed decisively to the territorial expansion of the Catholic monarchy (Lavallé 2014).

There is no doubt that the contrarian role of the Church in America was given added impetus by two decisions, which came late but were of singular importance. The first was the expulsion of the Jesuits (1767), motivated by the Spanish state’s desire to exert control over this institution. In many parts of the empire the expulsion led to abrupt “stirrings” (“emociones”), such as, for example, those of Michoacán, where the faithful, many of them indigenous, attacked all the symbols of royal power in America within their reach: the offices of the different trade monopolies, or the Spaniards (Gachupines) who held posts associated with those monopolies. The consolidation of the vales reales (royal bonds) introduced some years later (1804–1805) by a monarchy always looking for ways to cover its debts was seen as an act of plunder whose negative impact, although it affected the Church
most directly, was felt by all those who relied on loans issued by the ecclesiastical institutions (through tithes).

Beyond the Church, the feeling of discontent was diffused widely across the colonial societies, giving rise to a series of revolts over the course of the eighteenth century, albeit vastly different in scope and objectives. These uprisings fell into two broad categories (Bertrand et al. 2016, I: 795–800; O’Phelan Godoy 1985; Katz 1990). On the one hand, in common with other predominantly agricultural early modern societies, there were uprisings of the lower social orders—around 90% of the population—in periods of dearth. These popular tumults were characterised by their lack of organisation and leadership, often by their brutality, and in most cases by their brevity. Their immediate cause was invariably the shortage of grain that resulted in sudden and dramatic price rises. These subsistence revolts were the inevitable accompaniment of even modest crises resulting from an unfavourable agricultural conjuncture and affected the rural as well as the urban world. Nevertheless, despite their ubiquity, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, these periodic upheavals had no political character in the sense of being an attack on the colonial regime itself. They represented no more than the regular breathing rhythms of a social body that was heavily dependent on agricultural production and could not count on sufficient or reliable reserves of food.

These “emocciones” have little in common with the more organised rebellions with clearly defined goals, in most cases directed against the reforms imposed by the colonial authorities. These were invariably a form of opposition to the colonial administration and attempts to reinforce its power by increasing the fiscal burden. They represented a vehement defence of “custom” or local autonomy, both of which were perceived to be under threat from the reforms. Although in many cases, such as the great Tupac Amaru rebellion that shook the central Andean region in the 1780s, these revolts attracted widespread popular support, the leadership of these movements invariably came from the colonial “comfortable classes”, usually mestizos or Creoles, who lived in the urban centres, and who saw the reformist policies of the metropole as a threat to their own wealth and power. Although independence was not on their agenda until well into the nineteenth century, by clashing with the new colonial system that was taking shape in the second half of the eighteenth century and articulating a nostalgic view of the past as a period of “local freedom”, these social movements prepared the ground for a more radical challenge to the system that was to follow. At the very least they contributed to the construction of a specifically colonial identity contrasted to that of the metropole.

The features of the Hispano-American colonial elite identity

Two principal features stand out as the essential elements of a Spanish American elite identity as distinct from a European Spanish one (Análisis 2000). Common to both was the role of wealth. There was one ineluctable requirement for belonging to the social elite in America: the possession of an estate. Indeed, the first colonial elite in Spanish America were the first to establish themselves as landowners, which was the most easily accessible form of wealth, much more so than the gold for which so many of the conquistadors yearned, and in the pursuit of which so many of them had squandered their lives. These conquistadors were inevitably the first to divide
up amongst themselves the vast American expanses, dispossessing the previous owners over whom they had triumphed militarily. But they were not alone. They were soon joined by the *encomenderos,* not all of whom were conquistadores, as well as the representatives of the fledgling imperial administration: viceroys, judges, royal officials, treasurers, urban magistrates, and governors (*corregidores*). By the end of the sixteenth century, the upper class of great landowners in Spanish America included all the above groups, whose rights over the land were confirmed by a royal decree (*cédula*) of 1591. This process of land appropriation, the legacy of the conquest, had one enduring consequence for Spanish America: from this point onward, and until well into the twentieth century—and to some extent still evident in the twenty-first—the near-conflation of membership of the social elite and landownership. For an American elite whose values had been shaped by the conquest, the ownership of a landed estate was an essential requirement, even though the value of the land as such was never particularly high in the Americas, due to its sheer abundance. In other words, in America unlike in Europe, where since the Middle Ages membership in the social elite was associated primarily with access to luxury products whose value was precisely in their rarity—spices, silks, ambrosia—belonging to the upper social echelons was based on a paradox: the accumulation of something within reach of anyone able to take it by force.

Nevertheless, just as this model of a landowning elite established itself in Spanish America, the great demographic catastrophe among the indigenous populations meant that this model was already becoming less profitable in monetary terms. Thereafter, due to the lack of cheap labour to work the land, and in the absence of large-scale importation of slaves as had been done in Brazil, landownership largely ceased to be financially lucrative, although it retained its symbolic value as the supreme mark of social status and political authority.

Other sources of wealth thenceforth assumed far greater importance in Spanish America. By the end of the sixteenth century, when the colonial miners had mastered the mercury amalgamation process of extracting silver ore, mining was the basis of some of the greatest fortunes from Potosi to Zacatecas, although this was always a precarious form of enterprise (Salazar-Soler and Herrera Canales 2010; Bertrand et al. 2016, I: 795–800). The other great path to riches in the Americas was transatlantic trade, controlled by the great merchant guilds (*consulados*) of Lima and Mexico City (Ponce Leiva and Amadori 2008). Although not without its own risks, the commercial route gradually enabled the accumulation of vast fortunes, especially in the eighteenth century, which became the fulcrum of the economic life of the colonies. These great merchants, the owners of most of the capital, invested their profits in other economic sectors which thereby came under their control: they acted as financial backers of mine owners, in expectation of large returns on their investment, and purchased land as a means of securing their fortunes, as well as adding a certain social lustre and prestige to which they aspired, in some cases obtaining titles of nobility. As a result, by the eighteenth century the foundations of the family fortunes of the American elite show the tight integration of the different sectors of the colonial economy. In Spanish America, it seems clear that having the resources to live as a noble, a lord of the manor, was key to being perceived as a member of the nobility. The Spanish American nobility thus had an essentially plutocratic dimension.
On the other hand, the very importance given to wealth and estates is a sign of the enduring preoccupation with securing fortunes gained in more venturesome economic sectors. The Spanish American elite was consequently obsessed with safeguarding the transmission of patrimony and to avert the risk of decline, thus giving the lie to the proverb about the supposedly transient nature of American fortunes: “padre comerciante, hijo caballero, nieto pordiosero” (“father a merchant, son a gentleman, grandson a beggar”). To protect their wealth and possessions, the Spanish American elites massively resorted to the mayorazgo (entail), a legal means of keeping family fortunes intact. From this standpoint, the true colonial elite were those who over time were capable of overcoming the risks inherent in the conditions of the acquisition and transmission of fortunes in America. The mayorazgo was an instrument that reduced the risk associated with the passing of generations, and the equal division of property between heirs envisaged in Spanish law. Yet this solution did little to hinder downward social mobility experienced by the Spanish American elite, most of whom were unable to maintain their high status beyond the second or third generation.

This in turn is closely related to the second distinguishing feature of the colonial elites: their desire for social stability, and adoption of strategies with that overriding goal in mind. Belonging to the world of the colonial elite brought with it a strong sense of social group/class identity. One of its concrete manifestations was the importance accorded to lineage, especially through the transmission of the family name and the manor house associated with it. This omnipresent preoccupation explains the prevalence of endogamy and inbreeding, or the strategic preference for social and ethnic fellows in the choice of marriage partners. It is no surprise then that during the period covered here, marriages of convenience predominated. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, and in order to preserve the purity of blood of their Creole subjects, the Catholic monarchy issued a royal pragmática (edict) in 1776 whose stated objective was “to prevent the abuse of contracting unequal marriages”. The decree expressly reinforced paternal authority, as well as making it easier to obtain marriage dispensations for consanguinity. Thus, while the nuclear family had, ever since the Council of Trent, been enshrined in law as the basic family unit, the extended family was a lived reality. The cohabitation of several generations—up to three or four—under the same roof, or in close proximity, was therefore fairly common among this Spanish American elite. Moreover, this extended unit frequently also included other close relations and dependents—cousins, indirect relatives, and distant kin—many of whom had journeyed from the family’s village or town of origin in Spain to the Americas in order to work in the family business. It also sometimes included poor relations whom one was duty-bound to assist, for instance by providing a dowry that would help them settle down—entering a convent or getting married—and above all by offering protection.

This living arrangement presumed the overall authority of a patriarch—or someone who exercised that function, which could be one of the sons—with a view to ensuring the survival of the kinship group. This extended family unit thus became synonymous with a high degree of coercion, above all associated with the exercise of patriarchal authority. As a consequence, this elite family structure was not free of tensions, violence, and conflict. It was an environment conducive to extramarital
relationships that resulted in a relative abundance of illegitimate offspring within this social group. The children born of such unions lived as part of the same family unit, mingling with the rest of the household staff. They frequently appeared in testaments as the recipients of a portion of the family fortune, usually a minor one. But it is precisely when it came to the subdivision of the family patrimony that these tensions and conflicts were most likely to boil over. These virtually endemic disputes represented the main threat to the stability of elite families. This was true to such an extent that in order to contain the destructive effect of such family feuds, the elites developed a number of broad strategies, which followed a number of rules that can be summed up more briefly:

- Forging alliances through the marriage of daughters. It was common in such cases to accept a socially or economically inferior match, especially when the proposed marriage was to an official recently arrived from Spain and of humbler social origins, or a relative from the patria chica (hometown, village, or local region).
- Encouraging the participation of young men in family affairs at an early age, and the preference for contracting marriages with relatives or with other Creole families of comparable social standing.
- Limiting the risk of the dispersion of family property by imposing celibacy or a career in the clergy on younger sons. The latter option also had the advantage of giving access to ecclesiastical sources of credit in the form of pious bequests and tithes.
- The inclusion of illegitimate sons in the family “business”.
- The systematic resort to godfathership (padrinazgo), either by seeking the protection of the more powerful or wealthy, or the latter using it to forge ties with those below.

The colonial elites of Spanish America were the product of all these strategies and practices: they were constituted by a dense network of social relations that combined different kinds of ties: marriage, godfathership, clientelism, friendship, and shared economic interests, all of which combined resulted in the formation of complex “social relational networks”. The significant thing about these systems of relations was that while they were naturally entrenched in the urban spaces where the main family group resided, they also extended far beyond these limits. They might cover the local region, but they often extended across the entire viceroyalty, or even the empire, if they were able to take advantage of its institutional framework. The social life of the colonial elites was thus structured around great relational networks, which were engaged in a struggle for power and wealth at the local, regional, and imperial level. Each relational network that structured the world of the colonial elites strove to attract the recent arrivals who had something to offer: newly disembarked officials who could open the doors of the colonial bureaucracy, a successful merchant on the make ... Thus, the system was able to keep regenerating itself thanks to the controlled assimilation of new members. From this perspective, what stands out is the proximity—both in terms of identity and interests—between the two components of the Spanish American elites (Bertrand 2007).
NOTES

1 This chapter has two different sections. The first section (Social change in the Iberian world: Iberian peninsula and Brazil)—authored by Fernanda Olival—identifies the major societal changes that occurred in the Iberian peninsula and Brazil during the eighteenth century through a comparative approach. The second section (The eighteenth-century colonial elites: between Iberian identity and American aspirations)—authored by Michel Bertrand—is devoted to the formation of colonial identities across eighteenth-century Spanish America.

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ABBREVIATION

ASV Archivo Segreto Vaticano

WORKS CITED


Real cedula de S.M. y señores del Consejo, por la qual se declara, que no solo el oficio de curtidor, sino tambien los demas Artes y Oficios de herrero, sastre, zapatero, carpintero y otros á este modo, son honestos y honrados, y que el uso de ellos no envilece la familia, ni la persona del que los exerce ... 1783. Madrid: Imprenta de Don Pedro Marin.


