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Publication details
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Published online on: 21 Dec 2020

Accessed on: 08 Jun 2023
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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COMMUNITY-BASED TOURISM
The case of Pichilemu

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9.1 Introduction
Governments and international organisations promote tourism for its positive outcomes. As a primary example, the United Nations promotes tourism as a poverty-reduction instrument, emphasising key economic indicators as measures of success (United Nations World Tourism Organisation [UNWTO], 2018). Research finds that tourism does indeed produce positive economic benefits and growth outcomes (Balaguer & Cantavella-Jorda, 2002; Rosentraub & Joo, 2009). As such, many governments, at national and local levels, adopt tourism as a tool to assist development and provide local opportunities (Beeton, 2006).

Whilst the intent may be to boost local development and opportunities, adopted processes and measures are often growth focussed and not inclusive of those needing development opportunities (Saarinen, Rogerson, & Hall, 2017). As Dredge and Jamal (2015) discuss, in the 1980s, the government’s role moved from direct involvement in economic and social affairs to a more neoliberal approach of facilitating and enabling economic activity. This new role emphasises active collaboration with private capital, taking an agentic stake in these economic revenue-based projects (Saarinen et al., 2017). The past-notion of government for social good has been replaced with this neoliberal view that economic activity will inherently enhance everyone’s social good. In addition to benefit distribution needing to be actively done, it has been questioned whether the will to equitably distribute those tourism benefits among the population and increase quality of life exists (Freitag, 1994; Cárdenas-García, Sánchez-Rivero, & Pulido-Fernández, 2015).

Hollenhorst, Mackenzie, and Ostergren (2014) highlight the increasingly obvious: that the neoliberal tourism economic development model does not permeate all levels of the community, unsurprisingly leaving behind the less wealthy and those who are more in need (also see Andereck, Valentine, Vogt, & Knopf, 2007). Furthermore, as well as not receiving benefits, their economic opportunities were also limited (Freitag, 1994; Naidoo & Sharpley, 2016). Consequently, an institutional void develops, and the autonomy of local communities is eroded (Beck, 1986). In tourism, some governments’ impartiality is consequently perceived to be compromised, and communities have little power to harness public-private partnerships (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Saarinen et al., 2017).
Higgins-Desbiolles (2006, 2010) convincingly argues that to ensure wider benefits, the dominant neoliberal perspective guiding tourism must be challenged. She further suggests that firmer regulative frameworks must be enacted to harness unethical operations and bring common good and justice to all (also see Beeton, 2006; Saarinen, 2014; Saarinen et al., 2017). In response, different modes of tourism are proposed to centralise communities’ interests, and community-based tourism (CBT) is one of these. CBT is founded on the three dimensions of community involvement, power and control, and outcomes. Mayaka, Croy, and Wolfram Cox (2019) argue that the more these dimensions are evident, the more the CBT is demonstrating an idealised form. Nonetheless, they also argue that all CBT exists within a dynamic context, and it is continued effort towards the ideal form that is important (compared to current demonstration). Indeed, we argue that these dimensions should be common features for any community’s engagement with tourism, not just in CBT cases. However, in many communities, tourism is given primacy, and the community is marginalised in involvement, control, and outcomes.

In this chapter, we focus on social movements as a dynamic contextual element of CBT. Social movements are a community-initiated tool to regain or obtain power and control, via involvement, to better achieve community outcomes. Social movements are traditionally a reaction to an adverse event that mobilises a group in an attempt to modify institutional systems. Adversaries are generally identified as those with power, who are supported by the current system, whereas the demanded change is an attempt to displace, replace, or manage systemised power. In a tourism context, social movements have largely emerged in the event of what is now termed overtourism (e.g., in Barcelona and Venice). We define overtourism as when tourism has exceeded the community’s capacity to cope (Vianello, 2017; Milano, Novelli, & Cheer, 2019; González-Pérez, 2020). Unfortunately, when overtourism occurs, it is often too late to implement any meaningful systemic change; only palliative changes are possible.

In this chapter we first discuss the role of tourism in communities and the impact on communities from changes in tourism, especially efforts to grow tourism in regional and peripheral areas. Second, social movements are introduced and the stages from initiation to success (or not) are outlined. Third, we provide an overview of the events of Pichilemu, demonstrating the case of a successful tourism social movement. Finally, we draw out the main points in the conclusion.

9.2 Tourism and communities

As noted, tourism is often adopted to provide development opportunities in both developed and emerging regions. However, tourism is more complex than just an economic tool (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2006; Saarinen et al., 2017). Tourism is extensively interconnected with the systems of international business, politics, and culture (Thurlow & Jaworski, 2011), which are then enacted at the community level (Beeton, 2006). Some countries and regions are able to expertly manage and plan for these complexities, though these are often not the ones that need to turn to tourism as a development tool. The challenge is greater where, in addition to limited tourism management expertise (Simpson, 2008), there is a history of power imbalance and marginalisation still at play. In these contexts, multiple studies have found that tourism reproduces neo-colonialist trends, forcing destinations to change their social fabric and local culture (Scarles, 2012; Heller, Pujolar, & Duchene, 2014; Jingyi & Chung-Shing, 2018; Sharma, 2018).
To those familiar with tourism studies these challenges are not new or unanticipated (Saarinen et al., 2017). Three influential models from the 1970s and 1980s clearly demonstrate the consequences of tourism when a laissez-faire approach to tourism management is adopted. These models are Plog’s (1974) tourist typology, Doxey’s (1975) resident irritation index, and Butler’s (1980) tourist-area cycle of evolution. A common theme in all studies is the idea that, as tourism grows, it creates pressure, eventually reaching an inflection point at which it surpasses the respective tourists’, community’s, or destination’s capacity to cope. However, instead of a laissez-faire approach, when tourism is adopted as a development tool, it is often adopted within a boosterist/advocate or economic approach (Beeton, 2006; Saarinen et al., 2017), actively accelerating or magnifying the modelled changes. Whilst these models have attracted critical attention, they do provide very good illustrative outlines of the various perspectives of tourism change in a community.

First, Plog (1974) posits that tourists’ desires for local experiences and engagement decrease as a destination changes to cater to tourist needs. He states that the centric-venturer/allocentric tourist type is the inflection point, after which tourist demand decreases as the destination has changed so significantly that it appears similar to many others. Second, Butler (1980) focusses on the destination and demonstrates that the community is actively engaged in tourism development only in the early stages. As further growth occurs, they lose control as external tourism businesses gain greater levels of influence. For example, in less-developed countries revenue captured by non-national corporations is estimated to be on average between 40% and 50%, and in some cases, it is in excess of 95% (Hollenhorst et al., 2014). In Butler’s (1980) model, the destination reaches the inflection point where there is no desire to provide further infrastructure or capacity, much of the destination profile is perceived as ‘second rate’, and a number of capacity indicators would be reached or exceeded.

For tourist and destination models, once the inflection point is reached damages are usually irreparable (Córdoba Azcárate, 2019), and while palliative efforts to rejuvenate the destination can be enforced, it will eventually decline (Plog, 1974; Butler, 1980). Such palliative efforts might include the creation of artificial, generic attractions in pursuit of revitalising a destination (e.g., shopping centres, amusement parks, casinos, aquariums, convention centres, etc.), often empty-shell geographical spaces or non-places that tourists and locals cannot relate to in any meaningful way (Augé, 2009; Saarinen et al., 2017).

Finally, Doxey (1975) focusses on the community. In modelling the community’s response to tourism, he notes an initial euphoria. However, as tourism grows everyday life is disrupted, and the quality of life is diminished, generating negative responses from the community towards tourists. The community soon reaches the inflection point, turning their view of tourism from irritation to antagonism as the number of tourists increase. As an added complexity, the community’s response to tourism can vary. Ap and Crompton (1993) describe four concurrent community responses to tourism, including embracing and celebrating it, tolerating it, adjusting their behaviours to avoid high-tourist areas/times, or withdrawing from the community altogether. The diversity in responses is not surprising, given the heterogeneity within any community (Blackstock, 2005) and, importantly, given the diversity of engagement with tourism and tourists in a community (Andereck et al., 2007; Muler Gonzalez, Coromina, & Gali, 2018).

Nonetheless, what is not obvious from these three models is that the inflection points are not synchronised. The community indicatively reaches their inflection point much earlier than the destination or tourist, though tourism and tourists do not necessarily see nor appreciate the disturbance. Behind the staged cultural communion offered in brochures, there are disruptions and displacements that force locals to renegotiate their identity in a constantly
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changing economic environment (Freitag, 1994; Heller et al., 2014; Jingyi & Chung-Shing, 2018; González-Pérez, 2020). So, if managing for tourism or tourists (which the focus often is on, Higgins-Desbiolles, 2010), then development would still progress well after a community’s capacity has been exceeded (Cheer, Milano, & Novelli, 2019). As such the inflection point is often reached and exceeded, beginning the phenomenon of overtourism (Arias-Sans & Russo, 2017; Milano et al., 2019).

From the community perspective, overtourism occurs when tourism forces permanent changes in the community’s lifestyles and general well-being (González-Pérez, 2020). This is often characterised, amongst other things, by rapid growth in tourist numbers, commodification of culture, privatisation and/or overcrowding of public spaces, servitude employment, and the loss of purchasing parity power (Muler Gonzalez et al., 2018; Sharma, 2018; Milano et al., 2019). Though, as tourism is often driven by economic goals, these aspects, including crowding and inflation, are seen as a normal phenomenon, and planners tend to neglect the need to support and strengthen the community’s resilience (Cheer et al., 2019). Furthermore, global tourism has steadily increased (UNWTO, 2018), indicating that more communities will have to live with the outcomes of tourism while tourists enjoy a short-term luxury (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2006).

A common community concern highlighted in overtourism cases (e.g., Valencia, Spain; Byron Bay, Australia; Exarchia, Greece) is that tourism often acts as a force for the gentrification of neighbourhoods, driving up the prices of property and making housing unaffordable for locals (González-Pérez, 2020). Notoriously, Airbnb and private holiday homes/rentals are seen as the agents of this. More critical studies describe these gentrified spaces as enclaves for tourists, demanding an absence of locals in the touristic experience since they disrupt the landscape of luxury and exclusivity (Thurlow & Jaworski, 2014), turning the destination into a place managed by and for the wealthy (Harvey, 2008; Sassen, 2015). For even more critical commentators, gentrification represents neoliberal, neo-colonising management through extraction, exclusion, and expulsion (Banerjee, 2011). The most emblematic examples of such a situation are Barcelona and Venice; regrettably, in both cases, the damage seems to be irreversible (Arias-Sans & Russo, 2017; Vianello, 2017).

Critiques of tourism do not demand that it stop; critics suggest a bottom-up strategy, a non-damaging version that is beneficial for the community. The problem seems to lie in planning and regulation frameworks (Saarinen et al., 2017). On one hand, it is a matter of establishing governance that includes all stakeholders’ voices and interests (Aas, Ladkin, & Fletcher, 2005; Saarinen, 2014; Hardy & Pearson, 2018). On the other hand, it is a matter of involving voices with legitimate claims to reframing tourism goals that have typically been silenced (Andereck et al., 2007; Thurlow & Jaworski, 2014; Naidoo & Sharpley, 2016; Vianello, 2017). Dredge and Jamal (2015) contend that participation in hegemonic discourses is limited to the middle and upper classes and excludes others, which guarantees a biased production of knowledge where public bureaucrats become the experts and gatekeepers of planning knowledge. Restricted knowledge inputs affect information sharing and reproduction dynamics, and, consequently, the way such information is appraised by stakeholders (Blackstock, 2005; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2010; Dredge & Jamal, 2015).

Aligned with CBT’s three dimensions of community involvement, power and control, and outcomes (Mayaka et al., 2019), one response to lost community voice and overtourism is greater degrees of community empowerment (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Scarles, 2012; Cheer et al., 2019). All the same, this can only be done if the voice of the local communities is present, actively guiding what the community itself considers to be development and what is perceived as exploitation (Aas et al., 2005; Hardy & Pearson, 2018). Unfortunately,
as indicated, often, this opportunity is not provided, and so must be obtained. Social movements are a means to acquiring the opportunity to participate in generally closed systems. As is about to be highlighted, social movements can be effective in challenging the hegemony and power of those driving negative change on a community, in this case overtourism.

### 9.3 Social movements

Social movements have emerged across a wide discourse of activities. Holland and Pyman (2012, p. 556) argue that “the rise of resistance and opposition to, and contestation with local and global institutions in a variety of social and political forms has rapidly become one of the most significant geo-political forces of the twenty-first century”. To get a sense of the power of protest, and the broader ambit of movements, we just need to look at the activism of the Extinction Rebellion, Black Lives Matter, and the climate change champion Greta Thunberg, peacefully causing major cities to come to a standstill and bringing issues to the attention of the world. A more localised campaign attracting global attention is the campaigning in Hong Kong over civil and human rights. The focus of the campaign(s) “can involve opposition to the dominance and power of multinational/transnational corporations and governments over national states and citizens” and resources (Sadler, 2004b, p. 853). Theoretical and empirical research supports the perceptions of injustice as providing powerful catalysts and predictors of behaviours, and the success of campaigns (Bryne & Cropanzano, 2001; Buttigeig, Deery, & Iverson, 2007).

The core of a social movement strategy is to deliberately target one primary organisation, or institution (an adversary), and seek to persuade them to reconsider their position(s) over a single or range of issues (Sadler, 2004a), with the underlying threat of major financial or reputational damage in the process of fighting the campaign (Holland & Pyman, 2012). The contemporary origin of these campaigns emerged in the mainstream mobilisation of individuals into movements as diverse as environmentalism, women’s rights, and anti-war rallies in the 1960s (Doyle, 2001). Since then, these movements have been found in social movement unionism and are now emerging in tourism.

The genesis of social movements is often focussed on a local sense of injustice felt by individuals, groups, and communities in response to the globalisation of trade, capital, and industrial developments (Brown & Chang, 2004; Almeida & Chase-Dunn, 2018). The catalysts for social movements are varied, though they are generally typified by a realised grievance (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Kelly, 1998; Tarrow, 2011; Holland & Pyman, 2012). However, and crucially, the critical ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell, 2000) comes when the sense of injustice coalesces into a social group with a collective identity and leadership (Kelly, 1997). The social movement’s sense of injustice and identity are in direct opposition to the adversary, broadly conceptualised as a social institution. Importantly, as the adversary is integrated with society, and through its diverse and multiple stakeholders, it can also be influenced by these stakeholders (Sadler, 2004a). It is the ability of campaigners to mobilise stakeholders against these (social) institutions that provides the power base for effective campaigning. Furthermore, the growing emphasis on corporate citizenship and the ability to refocus injustices using these citizenship terms also provides a new strategic approach to social movements against corporations (Sadler, 2004b).

Social movements are often instigated by those with fewer resources than their adversary. As such the key to these ‘David and Goliath’ campaigns, as they are often portrayed, is the agility of these movements to adopt and change strategies, combined with the element of surprise. Therefore, the nature and extent of campaigning and activism can vary
significantly (Juska, 2010). Wills (2002) argues that social campaigners have to develop a multi-scalar approach in order to tackle the challenges of dealing with an often larger and better resourced adversary. The lack of resources may be seen therefore as a key difficulty in assessing the development and management of such campaigns. However, mobilisation theories provide a useful way of understanding the process of such a campaign (Kelly, 1998). Mobilisation theories are particularly useful as these campaigns are increasingly played out in a global context through technology. This approach is seen as a way of understanding how to negate the increasing power imbalance between the ‘David’ social movements and the ‘Goliath’ multinational/transnational corporations/governments, and as a means to develop powerful coalitions (Holland & Pyman, 2012; Almeida & Chase-Dunn, 2018).

Whilst there are several theoretical constructs that attempt to explain how these strategies are organised, Tilly’s (1978) approach arguably still provides the best overview. Tilly (1978) states there are five key components to collective action: interest, organisation, mobilisation, opportunity, and action (also see Holland & Pyman, 2012). Interest looks at the difference in the focus of goals of the two opposing sides. Organisation concerns the critical issue of building the capacity of the group(s) to coordinate and organise around an issue. Mobilisation is the action whereby the group or coalition of groups amass the resources needed for engagement and refine the action into a clear and concise message or collective voice. Opportunity focusses on the cost-benefits of achieving a successful outcome and the maintaining of a unified position in the often-considerable reaction of those who are the focus of the campaign and are often better resourced. Action is the overall outcome of the activities taken and perceived outcomes and results from those groups who were aggrieved (Tilly, 1978).

This five-stage approach or framework of interconnecting concepts focusses on the strategy to manage, draw awareness to, and maintain an audience’s attention on a particular (social) issue or injustice (Kelly, 1998). This focus on injustice, as Edwards (2003) argues, is an important advancement in the theoretical development of the maintenance and success of campaigns. In terms of assessing the success or otherwise of such a campaign, Broad and Cavanagh (1999) argue that it is the degree of change in corporate or institutional behaviour that is the ultimate litmus-test of success both in the short and in the long-term. They further note that the tangible and sustained reputation damage to the corporate or institutional image can be revisited by the social movement if change is superficial or transitory.

However, despite the interest in social movement campaigns and strategies, fewer studies have been undertaken within tourism, and especially in regard to when this mobilisation is enacted, sustained, and is successful. In part, as previously discussed, by the time a tourism grievance is realised (i.e., the community inflection point is reached), and sufficient people coalesce around it, the ability for the community to be involved, take control, and deliver community-determined outcomes is significantly limited. As such, examples of successful tourism social movements are anticipated to be very few. We have however identified an exceptional case study in Pichilemu, Chile. Pichilemu is a community that initiated a tourism social movement and sustained it to deliver community-determined successful outcomes. The successful outcomes were primarily captured within a newly created community-based tourism enterprise (CBTE).

### 9.4 Pichilemu social movement and CBTE case study

In this case study of Pichilemu’s successful social movement we present the context and key events leading to this outcome. Pichilemu is a commune (local administrative district) on the coast of Chile, located 160 km south-west of Santiago, and has a population of 16,394
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile, 2017). The region extends over approximately 6 km of coastline between Punta de Lobos (PL) and La Puntilla.

Around the same time that Pichilemu was granted the status of a commune (1891), local entrepreneur and politician Agustín Ross Edwards acquired 300 hectares of Pichilemu’s land to develop it as a beach resort in the image of European destinations. After Ross’s death in 1926, the estate, including a hotel, a park, and forest lands, was donated to the local government to be a public recreational area. During and since this time, the community has traditionally depended upon fishing and small-scale tourism for its livelihood.

As a first taste of social movements, in 2007 there were plans for a new pipe releasing sewage into the surf. Ramón Navarro, son of a local fisherman and professional surfer, initiated and led the social movement. Navarro understood the dependence that the community’s lifestyle had on the surrounding natural resources and was determined to preserve them. He also had the profile to draw others to the cause. As such, community involvement in the local government decision was relatively easy, as was the ability to wield collective power to deliver successful community outcomes.

In 2010, Pichilemu was hit by an earthquake and a tsunami, leading to widespread destruction of infrastructure. Almost 600 people were left without housing (Grez Cañete, 2014). In addition to the range of other initiatives and efforts, Nicholas Davis, the president of Euro America, a family-owned insurance company and one of the largest in the country, visited Pichilemu and made donations to buy equipment for the local fishermen. Davis also developed an emotional connection with the area and community and bought land with the idea of developing a hotel.

The following year, various levels of government introduced a surf-tourism development project for Pichilemu. The project included developing better regulations in the coastal areas to increase anti-tsunami security measures and the creation of a surf-focused image to promote the area, featuring PL as Pichilemu’s iconic surf spot (Define nestrategias para impulsar el turismo surf enPichilemu, 2011). PL is a privately owned area, covered by virgin scrub and adjacent to the point two crags emerge from the ocean, creating a spectacular touristic area and a sunset viewpoint. The point dominates the landscape of Pichilemu and offshore has the biggest surf waves in the broader region.

In 2013, as part of the continued efforts to grow tourism, a portion of PL called El Mirador was purchased to be developed as a resort. El Mirador directly faces Pichilemu and is the access point for surfers to the PL waves. The community gained access to the resort plan and became concerned about the impacts it would have on the environment and existing small-scale tourism, particularly the recently promoted surf tourism. This was the interest spark (Tilly, 1978). Different groups within the community coalesced around the shared concerns, which led to the loose creation of the Comite de Defensa PL (PL Defence Committee). During this early stage of organizing against the resort, Navarro again emerged as the ‘champion of the cause’. By this time, his international profile had grown further, particularly after he won the 2011 ‘Eddie Aikau’ Hawaiian surf tournament, became involved in other conservation initiatives, and was later profiled by National Geographic (Malloy, 2015).

The emergent social movement used different strategies to attract new members and attempted to organize a single entity that represented the interests of the whole community. Nevertheless, the Comite de Defensa PL was largely typified by a small group of very passionate participants and a larger group of other variously interested locals. To help formalize the movement, Navarro contacted the California-based non-governmental organisation Save the Waves Coalition (STWC), dedicated to coastal conservation projects around the
world. STWC helps communities protect waves against development threats and turn them into protected areas called World Surfing Reserves. STWC agreed to support Pichilemu’s campaign and assisted in the creation of an action plan. Navarro also sought help from the outdoors company Patagonia, which was already involved in conservation projects in the south of Chile (Villadangos, 2017). Patagonia endorsed the social movement, becoming an active participant and donor.

In 2014 Davis too began rallying for the protection of PL, emerging as another ‘champion of the cause’. Whilst he was aligned with Comite de Defensa PL goals, Davis was not embedded in the movement. This brought community concerns as he was perceived as an enigma, on the one hand supporting conservation and on the other hand developing a hotel of his own (Thiermann, 2018). Davis’s role was nonetheless crucial in terms of the human and social capital he brought to the campaign, adding a greater capacity to coordinate and organise around the issue. He also became a broker who helped to bring power and influence to the movement, a mediator that spoke the institutional language. A hotelier of Davis’s reputation supporting the idea also signalled that this campaign was not an antagonistic expression against tourism but rather calling for a different approach to it.

Using the institutional language of money, in July 2014, STWC released a study that demonstrated the economic value of waves based on the income generated through surf-related business and tourism in Pichilemu (Wright, Hodges, & Sadriouurtz, 2014). The study highlighted the fact that the economic benefits were dependent upon preserving the environment. The social movement mobilised, engaging the local government. This action changed the local government’s perspective to the long-term benefits of a preservation project. Nonetheless, whilst supportive, the government remained neutral, given that the resort area was private property, and there was no appetite for land expropriation.

Unlike with the sewage pipe experience, the social movement’s involvement in the system and wielding of their power gained attention, though not their desired outcome (i.e., stopping the resort). In the absence of organising and mobilising capabilities, the institutional system dismissed the movement’s demands (Tilly, 1978; Melucci, 1996). As such, and as is common in many emergent social movements, the Comite de Defensa PL faced coordination and agreement difficulties. During 2014 it was dissolved due to members’ differing visions and interests.

With this breakdown of the community movement, and despite the initial distrust of the community, Davis organised and mobilised his capabilities and own team to fill the void; ‘governing for the commons’ (Ostrom, 2000; Simpson, 2008). Davis is characterised as a nature-lover rather than an activist, though he brings the belief that when facing a dilemma there is always a market solution (Alcalde, Personal Communication, 16 October 2019). He financed a social feasibility study to identify various campaign actors and their respective levels of power. Alcalde (Personal Communication, 16 October 2019) explains that Davis’s team now “had every ingredient for the [social movement] project to be successful”. By identifying and involving the leading actors they all “learnt much and... began to work with the community, to design everything with the community”.

Nonetheless, the early stages of Davis’s initiative was a very difficult time for the team (Alcalde, Personal Communication, 16 October 2019). Whilst the social movement had community goals in mind, the community was feeling uninvolved and like their power and control was being further taken from them. There was strong opposition from various segments of the community, and those within the newly formed movement “were very lonely”. Alcalde (Personal Communication, 16 October 2019) also notes that “the generation of trust with the local community... is the first thing, it is everything”, and this trust building
importantly included addressing a key community concern distinguishing between Davis’s hotel and the social movement.

For the social movement, one early action became apparent: the only way to stop the resort was to acquire the privately owned land, at a cost of nearly US$1 million. First, the movement lobbied the government to freeze any developments in El Mirador until they had enough funds to buy the land, which the local government agreed to. This was a demonstration that Davis’s added capacity brought with it the power to take advantage of opportunities for action, unfortunately missing from the initial efforts. Then, in 2014, championed by Navarro, Davis, and STWC, the social movement implemented a campaign to raise funds to buy the land. As part of the fundraising strategy, Patagonia sponsored a short film about Navarro’s life (Malloy, 2015). The film was used to attract new supporters by linking Navarro’s surfing fame to the campaign (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Meanwhile, STWC directed a crowdfunding campaign called Lobos por Siempre (Lobos Forever).

In 2014, Davis’s hotel Alaia opened. While Alaia is a symbol of sustainable accommodation, reflecting initial community concerns about Davis, some questioned why the hotel was built in the first place. Adding to the tension about the social movement, Patagonia and STWC’s involvement created a sense that a group of foreigners would end up controlling PL and not provide community outcomes (Alcalde, Personal Communication, 16 October 2019). With time pressing, Davis took the opportunity and action to buy El Mirador and hold it until the social movement was able to buy it from him. Again, doubts about Davis’s true intentions emerged as the community feared he would keep the land. However, with no better options available, they agreed to progress (Thiermann, 2018).

The fundraising continued. The capacity and profile of the external partners gained large fundraising support. Patagonia matched US$100,000 from crowdfunding donations and contributed another US$150,000 profits from a patented flotation device. In the following two years (2015–2016), other NGOs and 900 donors from around the world made contributions of more than US$750,000 to the social movement. Davis’s also pledged over US$100,000 to support the fundraising.

Outcomes were evidently being achieved in 2015, when the social movement was institutionalised as a CBTE, the Fundación Punta de Lobos (FPL). FPL is a foundation set up by Davis to hold and manage the natural reserve, and, importantly, it adopted the original conservation and access goals of the community’s initial social movement. FPL, in a tourism context, stopped a key phase in destination and tourist growth (Plog, 1974; Butler, 1980; Saarinen et al., 2017), instead providing community involvement, power and control, and outcomes (Mayaka et al., 2019).

In October 2017, El Mirador’s ownership was transferred to the FPL with the mandate to conserve it. FPL began working on a conservation plan for the coastal areas (FPL, n.d.). The three main threats identified in the plan were: real-estate developments, unregulated economic developments, and loss of biodiversity and environmental degradation. Each of these threats was transformed into action-axes, which, in turn, were subdivided into concrete activities assigned to specific members of FPL. Whilst FPL’s role in tourism is largely to sustain the environment, land, and access upon which local tourism is dependent, it also supports the community’s tourism enterprise practices in engaging with the area. Furthermore, through FPL’s continuing efforts and successes, it has become a model for CBTE and conservation for other areas of the Chilean coast.

The series of events highlights important similarities and differences in social movements within tourism. Apparently unique to Pichilemu, this social movement in particular was initiated prior to the community inflection point being reached. Indeed, in contrast to
previous social movement studies, this one was initiated with the threat of a grievance, as compared to an actual grievance being felt (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Kelly, 1998; Tarrow, 2011). Likely the earlier sewage pipe social movement experience laid the groundwork for an early initiation of this tourism movement. All the same, despite early success and passionate and wide interest, the initial attempts to organise the movement largely failed. Whilst there was involvement, the necessary capability to gain power and control was missing. With the intervention of STWC and Davis, each bringing formalisation and institutional capabilities, the social movement was able to further organise and mobilise. This very much reflects Tilly’s (1978) theorised stages of social movements. With the added capabilities, the movement then had the power to more effectively mobilise and seize the opportunity of local government support to temporarily stop the resort-building. The movement then transformed into the CBTE foundation, the land was purchased, and strategic conservation efforts were initiated. The social movement had regained full power and control, and was then able to focus on achieving the longer-term community outcomes. In regard to the initial goals and the current actions, the social movement was successful; the resort was stopped, and the beach, its access, and the place of surf tourism was protected. The emphasis is now on how the CBTE demonstrates beneficial outcomes to the community, which it is doing, and even beyond to other communities.

Of note, within the constrained capacity and time context the social movement did not demonstrate the idealised CBT form of high levels of community involvement, power and control, and outcomes throughout. However, Navarro, STWC, and Davis’s intervention brought further capacity to the movement, enabling it to achieve its overall outcomes. Through the social movement process, FPL has transferred greater levels of involvement and power and control to the community (though not completely). Currently, capacity is being developed in the community, including in the board of directors, to enable further transition of involvement, power, and control to the community.

9.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, tourism is often adopted as a tool for delivering community goals of economic development, with the hope that this will also address a range of other needed opportunities. Unfortunately, tourism has the capacity to quickly escape the control of the community and, hence, lose focus of the goals it was initially adopted to achieve. Instead of the community being central to goal-setting and future selection, they become marginalised. This generally occurs as tourism planning focuses on tourists and the destination, missing the community inflection point where their capacity to cope becomes overwhelmed, and they do not receive beneficial outcomes. In this overtourism context, communities coalesce against tourism. However, with limited opportunity for involvement, as well as a lack of power and control, efforts against tourism only achieve palliative outcomes.

Community-based approaches, including CBT, are argued as a means to centralise the community within tourism planning. However, involvement access is often not given and instead needs to be taken. Social movements are a way to become involved, obtain power and control, and ensure community-determined outcomes. In general, and in tourism, social movements are initiated when a grievance is realised and shared by a substantive group. Waiting for the tourism inflection points to start the movement means that appropriate change will likely not be possible, and any solution will be too late.

Pichilemu presents a unique case of a tourism social movement. The social movement was initiated early, prior to an actual grievance being realised. It also (eventually) attracted the
formalisation and institutional capabilities needed to achieve the desired outcomes. The social movement was, in the end, formalised into a CBTE to become the dominant institution, with a mandate and focus on achieving conservation and community goals. Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that laissez-faire or boosterism tourism approaches soon limit community involvement and outcomes by eroding power and control. Social movements are an effective means to obtain power and control to ensure community involvement and outcomes. It is also evident that social movements can be initiated early in the tourism growth stages, prior to inflection points being reached; however, the success will rely on having the organising, mobilising, and action capabilities built in or brought into the social movement.

References


The case of Pichilemu


