18 Conflict resolution
The missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice

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This chapter aims at incorporating the operational capabilities of the field of conflict resolution as part of liberal international relations (IR) practice, and offers a model that incorporates conceptual and practical aspects of liberal approaches to IR, alongside conventional Realpolitik practices. The model is relevant for both analysts (academics, consultants) and “real world” decisionmakers and practitioners, based on the following observations:

- Traditionally, the practice of IR has been confined within the limits of security studies discourse, which offers limited options to practitioners of international relations. Foreign policy officials often perceive the conflict resolution field as a “new age” movement not having much relevance to the conduct of real world issues.
- The lack of operational coherence in liberal approaches often causes a “default” use of realist tools in the making and execution of day-to-day foreign policies, even in situations in which joint interests can be increased through cooperation.
- The current state of the literature in conflict resolution makes it possible to create synthesis between studies of IR and the field of conflict resolution.
- The rapidly changing world necessitates systematic frameworks that capture activities and practices of foreign policy behavior of states in order to understand and formulate foreign policies vis-à-vis quickly emerging new international situations, and then to communicate these options to a wider audience.
- A lack of comprehensive typologies for analysts often causes misdiagnosis about situations, which results in suboptimal foreign policy outcomes.

The issue areas
The above observations address two major issue areas. The first conceptual cleavage is related to the theory and practice divide in international affairs. It would not be wrong to assert that in practice IR students and foreign policy executives (e.g. decisionmakers, diplomats, presidents) belong to different epistemic communities and cross-fertilization between these two worlds is often challenging (Bercovitch et al. 2005; Groom 1984) (see Chapter 30 in this volume by Dennis Sandole). That said, theory is an essential tool of statecraft (Walt 2005). In other words, foreign policy practices could be translated into theoretical frameworks and, in turn, they could be used as operational frameworks for further experiences. This communication, however, is more “natural” with some disciplinary foundations, such as the realist paradigm, and more problematic with some others, e.g. the liberal paradigm. For example, according to Morgenthau (in Schellenberg 1982), the father of the realist theory in IR, the practice of diplomacy should consist of actions used to defend
national security, consisting of the integrity of the national territory and institutions. For that reason, Morgenthau states that the four fundamental rules of diplomacy are:

1. Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit.
2. The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power.
3. Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations.
4. Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.

(ibid.: 164)

Traces of Morgenthau's guidance can be found in many contemporary books on diplomacy and in foreign policy practices. However, it is very hard to quote a liberal IR theorist on the conduct of foreign policy, mainly because, at the conceptual level, the liberal paradigm does not provide daily practical tools for managing the day-to-day business of diplomacy. Whereas decisionmakers find themselves at ease in strategizing foreign policies by taking into consideration principles of realist approaches, such as threats, crises, and strategic alliances, they are not well-enough equipped to add new concepts to their daily policy formulations. In many instances, this produces foreign policy strategies that are identical to national security strategies.

The above argument is also in line with Rapoport's “first order learning” argument. In this view, when problems occur, they are addressed by reference to the “default values,” which are based on commonly used assumptions and become regarded as immutable. “Orderly and creative transformation of social systems, however, depends upon a capacity for second-order learning, which requires a willingness and capacity for challenging assumptions” (Miall et al. 2000: 48). Hopmann (2001) makes a similar observation by addressing bargaining and problemsolving approaches to international negotiations. He claims that:

since most senior diplomats were trained during the period when the realist paradigm was dominant in the field of international relations, it is likely that whatever theoretical analysis of negotiations they might have encountered would have been heavily laden with the content of bargaining theory. Believing it to be valid, along with the realist perspective to which it is closely related conceptually, they have tended to negotiate as if bargaining constituted the only appropriate approach to international negotiations.

(ibid: 22)

The second issue area addressed by the aforementioned observations is related to conceptual limitations in formulating liberal foreign policy practice. The realist and liberal approaches to IR differ from each other in terms of their ability to provide concrete policy tools to policymakers and diplomats in their daily conduct of foreign relations. Whereas the abstract realist theory of IR provides the immediate “concrete tools” to execute daily foreign policies in the form of threat, commitment, ultimatum, strategic alliance, and sanctions, the liberal paradigm seems to offer another set of “abstract frameworks,” namely multilateralism, economic interdependence, relative gains, soft power, democratic peace, and security communities that can only be implemented in the form of medium- or long-term policy. Lack of operational coherence in liberal approaches often results in default use of realist tools in the making and execution of foreign policies, even in situations in which joint interests can be increased through cooperation.2
In a neighboring field, that of conflict resolution, different intellectual efforts are made to operationalize international actors’ peaceful acts or involvements in an attempt to capture variations in international actors’ conflict resolution styles.

The field of conflict resolution and conduct of foreign policy

Since the mid-1990s and early 2000s, several conceptual frameworks have been introduced to illustrate different uses of conflict resolution strategies in a changing world. Michael Lund’s (1996) framework for preventive diplomacy is a comprehensive typology that introduces policies and instruments for preventing violent conflicts. Military approaches, non-military approaches, and development and governance approaches are three broad conceptual categories in which different policy options are elaborated. Lederach (1997) offered approaches that could be used for sustainable reconciliation in divided societies, focusing on actors and approaches to peacebuilding. Similarly, Stern and Druckman (2000) presented a framework for strategies and tools for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. In this approach, power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, and normative change are elaborated as strategies of conflict resolution together with tools that feature these strategies.

One observation regarding the above efforts is that they concentrate on the operationalization of conflict resolution approaches and activities without integrating them with mainstream international relations literature. In other words, the conceptualization of conflict resolution practice is elaborated in isolation from theoretical and practical instruments that classical IR literature offers; therefore, conflict resolution has not been considered as part and parcel of state interactions and conduct of foreign relations.

There are some exceptions to the aforementioned observations. Groom (1988) in his earlier work articulated the role of the strategist, the conflict researcher, and the peace researcher, in terms of their main approaches to the study of conflicts: the realist, world society, and structuralist paradigms of international relations. Another attempt is Hopmann’s (2001) work, which laid out principles of two perspectives of international negotiation, namely problemsolving and bargaining. Hopmann’s categorization illustrates different interaction patterns between states and draws a connection between these approaches and two competing paradigms of international relations: liberalism and realism. Similarly, Kriesberg (2002), who emphasizes convergences between security studies and peace studies, claims that, during the Cold War, security studies emphasized military relations concerning nuclear deterrence. Analysts working in peace studies examined peace movement organizations, the role of mass media, and processes of socialization. In the post-Cold War era, the two domains moved much closer towards each other. Kriesberg sees “early warning” and preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding as new subfields that cut across the domains of security and peace studies. Eralp and Beriker (2005) employed the third party intervention literature of the conflict resolution field to analyze EU foreign policy behavior on the Cyprus issue. In this work, third party roles, structural interventions, and conflict transformation are treated as foreign policy tools that are available to international actors, alongside classical security-based foreign policy measures.

As stated before, this chapter investigates the theoretical and practical bases of foreign policy conduct, examining the contributions of the conflict resolution field in the execution of foreign policy goals, and introduces a classification scheme and a model (Foreign
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Foreign policy circumplex

Foreign policy outputs of international actors are often defined within the confines of the international relations field, and instruments of foreign policy are elaborated in contexts in which the actor is a party to a problem. However, in many instances international actors adopt a third party role to execute their foreign policy objectives. Box 18.1 offers a typology that defines and describes instruments of partisan and third party foreign policy roles of international actors.

Based on the instruments presented in Box 18.1, Figure 18.1 introduces a model called the Foreign Policy Circumplex (FPC), integrating foreign policy instruments of decisionmakers (as a party or third party) in a continuum ranging from cooperation to competition. The FPC has both analytical and diagnostic value. The model has practical value in that it can serve as a toolbox for foreign policymakers and diplomats when deciding on certain courses of action. It can also serve analysts of international relations, journalists and academics, as a basis for conduct post hoc analysis of foreign policy behaviors of international actors. Another value of the FPC regarding theory is the depiction of the underlying theoretical and disciplinary foundations of each action in an attempt to reconnect theory and practice of international relations. In the next section, I describe in greater detail major analytical divides of, and the types of instruments in, the FPC.

Cooperation versus competition divides

Competition and cooperation are one of the major analytical dimensions of the model (the vertical axis of the FPC). They are two courses of actions that a party can choose in dealing with other actors. Conditions for cooperation and competition have been one of the most studied issue areas in the social sciences. In the field of social psychology, Morton Deutsch and David Johnston (Deutsch and Coleman 2000) emphasize two basic ideas in understanding processes involved in cooperation and competition and the factors that contribute to developing a cooperative or competitive relationship. One is related to the type of interdependence that exists among goals, and the other to the type of action taken by the people involved. In this approach, cooperative orientation and reframing are two concepts that are emphasized and elaborated.

The field of international relations looks at the same phenomena in relation to three levels of analysis: individual, national, and structural systemic (Waltz 1959). In this tradition, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the construct used the most to depict the “mixed motives” structure and options of the parties in interactions in which both cooperation and competition are available strategic options. For the realists in international relations, international behavior represents a prisoner’s dilemma that prevents cooperation except in rare cases such as the formation of alliances. In this tradition, the international system is anarchic, there is no central authority capable of creating order, and constant competition among states is the only order of the international system. In this view, peace and cooperation are seen as an absence of war (Stein 1990). For liberals, cooperation is possible through the monitoring mechanism of international institutions, facilitated information flows, and learning. Conflict is costly when international actors fail to choose to cooperate because of shortsightedness and misperception. The rational paradigm portrays cooperation and
Box 18.1 Instruments of foreign policy: partisan versus third party roles. A typology

I Third party roles

A Transformative intervention

Actor intervenes in order to transform the dysfunctional relationship among the conflicting parties, with the aim of creating common intellectual and value space among the parties.

A1 FACILITATIVE MEDIATION

Actor mediates with the aim of helping parties find their own solutions. It can be in the form of facilitating exchange of information and problemsolving processes, and achieved by introducing new resources for the conflict system, and enhancing trust among the parties.

A2 INTERACTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

States indirectly sponsor or help to organize unofficial third party assisted, small-group problemsolving initiatives in order to solve their differences in informal confidential settings.

A3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING

A skill-building exercise conducted by third parties with the aim of preparing participants to be more effective in dealing with their differences.

A4 POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION

Actors initiate or support social rehabilitation efforts in the conflict-torn nation.

B Structural intervention

Actor intervenes as a third party, and carries out activities designed to change the incentive structure of the disputing parties with an expectation that they would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior.

B1 POSITIVE INCENTIVES

Actor as a third party offers financial and/or political rewards to the disputing parties with the aim of changing its conflict behavior.

B2 PEACEBUILDING, PEACEKEEPING

Helping the parties to build and develop democratic institutions such as electoral systems, financial reforms, and constitution writing with the belief that democratic processes will eliminate the structural causes of the conflict. Sending peace forces to contain the dispute.
B3 INITIATING BILATERAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

Actor helps the conflicting parties to foster their bilateral cooperative programs mostly in low-politics areas such as culture, business, education, and sports. (Multitrack framework.)

B4 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES

Actor withdraws economic and/or political rewards from the conflicting parties – or from one of the conflicting parties – with the expectation to change the parties’ behavior, and the course of the conflict.

B5 POWER MEDIATION

Third parties impose a solution on a conflict in order to enhance their national or institutional interests. Pressing the conflicting parties to reach an agreement through the use of force or competitive tactics.

B6 MILITARY INTERVENTION

Actor militarily intervenes to stop or change the course of an already existing conflict.

II Partisan roles

C Problem-solving diplomacy

Actor is a party to an ongoing conflict, and decides to change the existing competitive course of action into cooperation.

C1 UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS/GESTURES

Actor initiates a concession, or offers an olive branch to the “enemy” with the aim of de-escalating the tension and setting a cooperative tone to the interactions.

C2 PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATIONS

Declaring, initiating or actively taking part in a negotiation process that seeks to reach efficient and mutually beneficial agreements.

C3 COOPERATION WITH A MEDIATOR

Actor accepts the assistance of a mediator in the conflict. The state, as a party to the conflict, actively seeks for a third party to start or assist in a peace process.

C4 EXCHANGING VISITS

Enhanced frequent interactions and diplomatic visits between the conflicting states while the tension between international actors continues.
C5 AGREEMENTS

Signing agreements on soft issues or to terminate conflict.

C6 POSITIVE COMMITMENTS

Actor expresses its cooperative stand on policy issues.

D Traditional diplomacy

Actor achieves its national interests by adapting a win–lose perspective to foreign policy.

D1 THREATS, WARNINGS, AND PUNISHMENTS

Actor issues threats and warnings to reiterate its firmness regarding an issue or position. State takes action and punishes the other party.

D2 COMMITMENTS

Actor reiterates its commitments to the already existing competitive positions or opinions.

D3 ACCUSATION AND BLAMING

Condemning the other party for its actions, positions, and attitudes. Expressing disagreement.

D4 ARMAMENT

Building up arms technology or increasing the quality and the number of weapons.

D5 STRATEGIC COALITIONS

Forming military alliances with like-minded states to preserve and enhance the state’s power.

D6 MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Actor sends its troops to achieve its strategic goals.

D7 LEADERSHIP

Taking initiatives or offering collaboration to build an international coalition to act collectively on world issues.

D8 REWARDS AND PRAISING

Actor uses “carrots” to change or maintain the other party’s position in accordance with its own preferences. Actors express their satisfaction with an already existing development or outcome.
competition as products of choice and circumstance and treats strategic interaction as a level of analysis. Payoffs, perceptions, and decision criteria interact to lead the actor to make a strategic choice. In the normative tradition, however, peace is the norm.

In international interactions decisionmakers very often have to choose between cooperative and competitive courses of actions. As Figure 18.1 shows, cooperative orientation to foreign policy is supported by a set of foreign policy instruments (top half of the FPC). Instruments of the field of conflict resolution and most of the practices of peace and diplomatic studies fall into this category. A competitive approach to international relations, however, employs power-based instruments (bottom half of the FPC). Coercive diplomacy and strategic studies constitute disciplinary foundations of such orientation.
Partisan roles versus third party intervener roles

The horizontal axis of FPC shows two major roles that international actors could adopt in a course of action. Partisan roles and third party roles constitute one of the major analytical divides of the model.

Partisan roles

An actor becomes a party when s/he has a direct stake in a relationship with an “other” and takes a series of actions – ranging from mild to aggressive – to achieve his/her goals (right half of the FPC). In other words, the actor adopts a partisan role to deal with a situation in which his/her direct interests are challenged. Bilateral contacts are the simplest formats of such relations. At the international level, bilateral relations could be conducted through the use of classical diplomatic tools. In this context, issuing threats, warnings and punishments (D1), commitments (D2), accusations and blaming (D3), and taking leadership (D7) are foreign policy instruments that are widely used, especially with adversaries. The early stages of the current US–Iran relationship bear examples of such activities. In January 2002, President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union Address, placed the Islamic Republic of Iran in the “axis of evil” along with North Korea and Iraq (Office of the Press Secretary 2002). On a similar note, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Iran that “If the regime does so [maintains its current course], it will incur only great costs. We and our European partners agree that path will lead to international isolation and progressively stronger political and economic sanctions” (BBC News 2006).

In an international environment in which military strategic concerns dominate decisionmaking processes, the party could decide to take actions by increasing its military capabilities (D4), building strategic coalitions (D5), and invading other territories (D6). US policy in Iraq contains a number of excellent examples of such activities.3

At the cooperative end of such bilateral diplomacy, exchanging visits (C4), agreements (C5), positive commitments (C6), and rewards and praising (D8) may be cited as foreign policy instruments. Examples of the employment of these foreign policy instruments can be found in current US–British relations. With regard to the war on terror, the military intervention in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq, the leaders of the two countries have exchanged numerous visits, and on many occasions have praised the special historical ties that the two countries have. In November 2001, President Bush explicitly stated that the United States had no better friend in the world than Great Britain (CNN 2001).

Problemsolving diplomacy is a special type of bilateral interaction employed when a party wants to end an already existing animosity. Unilateral gestures (C1), initiating problemsolving negotiations (C2), asking for third party assistance, and cooperating with a third party (C3) are types of actions geared to improve existing hostile relationships. Examples of such foreign policy behavior can be generated from recent Turkish–Greek relations and the Cyprus conflict. The Turkish–Greek rapprochement began when a major earthquake hit Turkey in August 1999. The earthquake allowed both governments to make face-saving gestures and initiate high-level official visits. Similarly, in January 2005, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met with the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in Davos to ask the Secretary-General to revive his “good will mission” to find a solution in Cyprus (Turks.US 2005). President Tassos Papadopulos welcomed the initiative and announced that the Greek Cypriots were willing to start negotiations under UN auspices (Southeast European Times 2005).
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Third party roles

In order to achieve their foreign policy goals international actors often adopt third party roles to shape their environments and influence other actors. Actors may decide to intervene in others’ conflicting interactions in order to facilitate the communication process, or to change the structure of the conflict environment (left half of the FPC). In this context two types of third party intervention strategies are defined.

The first are interventions related to conflict transformation and third party involvement concerning conflict prevention. Conflict transformation is described as “the effort to reach accommodation between parties in conflict through interactive processes that lead to reconciling tensions, redefining interests, or finding common ground” (Stern and Druckman 2000: 5). They are mechanisms used to transform dysfunctional relationships among parties and aim at creating common intellectual and value space among the parties. In this context, third party involvement in the form of facilitative mediation (A1), problem solving workshops (track two diplomacy) (A2), training in conflict resolution (A3), and post-conflict rehabilitation (A4), are the tools available for international actors. These initiatives require a non-partisan third party role in the conflicts and are designed to deal with trust and perception related matters that cripple relationships. So far, numerous track two efforts and conflict resolution trainings have been made within the context of US foreign policy as regards to the Israeli–Palestinian, South African, Northern Irish, and Cyprus conflicts.4

Third party interventions related to structural prevention make up the second set of intervention behavior. “Structural prevention involves creating organizations or institutionalized systems of laws and rules that establish and strengthen non-violent channels for adjudicating inter-group disputes, accommodating conflicting interests, and transforming conflicts by finding common ground” (Stern and Druckman 2000: 6). In this approach, “the propensity of violence is diminished by democratization, demilitarization, de-alignment, socioeconomic development, and expansion of human rights, humanitarian law, and socio-cultural openness” (Clements 2002: 83). Interventions related to structural prevention are designed to change the incentive structure of the parties with an expectation that they would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior (left quadrant of the FPC). Therefore, issuing economic and political incentives (B1), e.g. investing in socioeconomic development, institution building, and sociocultural openness, is a form of political and economic structural intervention. The European Union (EU) demonstrated an interesting performance in this regard. In relation to its policies toward the newly emerging democracies, the EU initiated Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), Action for Rehabilitating the Economy in South Eastern Europe (PHARE), and PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programs (PDTP) (van Tongeren et al. 2002; Ackerman 2003).

Similarly, withdrawing rewards, e.g. imposing embargoes and hindering economic and political (B3) development, is a punitive form of structural intervention. In using punitive and integrative sets of actions, the actor, generally, has a clear idea about who is right and who is wrong and what type of outcome is desired. Therefore, the intervener attempts to change the incentive systems of the conflict environment accordingly. For example, in April 2006, the European Union, which traditionally sided with the Palestinian authority in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, cut off direct aid payments to the Hamas-led Palestinian government because of its refusal to renounce violence and to recognize Israel (International Herald Tribune 2006). Sending peacebuilding and peacekeeping forces (B2), initiating
bilateral cooperative programs (B3), and engaging in power mediation (B5), are other forms of third party interventions geared to changing the social structure of conflict. The US involvement in the Bosnian war in 1994–1995 is an example of power mediation, since the US changed the power structure in the field through the NATO air strikes, and then offered its mediation service to the parties (Beriker 1995). Current peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Lebanon are examples of humanitarian third party engagements. Similarly, the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004, is a practice to start bilateral cooperative programs with EU’s neighbors to build a zone of stability and security. In this program, the implementation of the reforms is supported through various forms of EU-funded financial and technical assistance.

The most competitive (i.e. confrontational) form of third party involvement is military intervention (B6). The actor takes this action when s/he aims at changing the strategic balances in favor of one of the conflicting parties. Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 to end the violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and to empower the Turkish community qualifies as an example of such foreign policy conduct.

Disciplinary foundations of foreign policy outputs

A third major analytical divide of the FPC is related to the disciplinary foundations of the foreign policy instruments. The next section presents epistemic foundations of four neighboring disciplines: conflict resolution, peace studies, diplomatic studies, and security studies. The four quadrants of the FPC in Figure 18.1 illustrate disciplinary divides.

Conflict resolution

The field of conflict resolution in its broader sense involves studies that deal with social conflict. The field has developed over the years as a natural consequence of many tasks that academics and practitioners have sought to accomplish as a reaction to their changing social environments (Kriesberg 2001). Conflict resolution is not a homogeneous field in terms of its assumptions, issues, and methodologies (Mitchell 1994; Tidwell 1998; Kriesberg 1997). That said, some general observations can be made to describe basic features of this approach. First, the field is interested in both structural and perceptual factors affecting conflict systems. One understanding in this regard is that parties are bound to their perceptual frames in evaluating their interactions with their opponents. Therefore, all conflicts can be reframed given that the perceptions of parties change. Second, the field treats social conflicts and conflict resolution techniques as dynamic processes. In this context, it is also suggested that third parties can have crucial roles in conflict transformation. In other words, third parties may help conflicting parties to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes in cases where parties cannot reach an agreement through their own efforts. A third characteristic is that all parties to the conflict affect the relationships. The field does not take a partisan attitude to conflict situations. In other words, instead of attributing the cause of the conflict to the other side’s characteristics, the field is interested in what parties can do to influence the conflict process. In this context, the role of third parties constitutes an important part. The field is interested in conflicts at all levels of human interaction, e.g. interpersonal, intergroup, and international, with the understanding that conflicts are subjective phenomena. Therefore, in order to help the parties to find their own solutions, intelligent analyses of conflicts have to be made, and creative intervention designs have to be developed to enhance trust between the parties and to overcome
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prejudices and stereotypes that hinder problemsolving processes. The role of the third parties often involves attempts to help disputants to reframe the conflict situation in such a way that mutually acceptable creative solutions are reached. Among the major conceptual and practical contributions of the conflict resolution field are integrative bargaining, problemsolving workshops, conflict assessment frameworks, stages and dynamics of conflict, and third party intervention (see top quadrant of FPC).

Peace studies

Peace studies, on the other hand, are interested in the structural aspects of peace in conflict situations. The positive peace tradition started with the realization that the causes of war were related to oppressive economic and social conditions (Jeong 2000). Similarly, concern for human rights, gender inequalities, and environmental deprivation became an integral part of the peace research tradition. Peace studies take a normative stand to research and practice. Change and social justice are two main motivations that drive peace researchers to conduct their investigations. In that sense, the researcher is, at the same time, an activist, and a party to the conflicts. The abolition of war and violent structures are the policy goals. The resolution of the conflicts can only be achieved by restoring justice and eliminating structural inequalities underlying conflict situations. Interventions should be made to redress economic, political, and social inequalities. Direct and structural violence, cultural violence, negative and positive peace, prisoner’s dilemma, stable peace and culture of peace are the concepts and method of peace studies. They were introduced by such prominent scholars of the field as Johan Galtung (1985, 1990), Anatol Rapoport (1960), Kenneth Boulding (1978), and Elise Boulding (1992). Understanding war and violence from a feminist view as well as environmental concerns are other particular issues of the peace research tradition.

The field of peace studies is interested in structural preventions and interventions that are related to conflict transformation. The field adopts a critical and constructive approach to the social sciences, and peace research is an applied and normative discipline with a strong commitment to social change. Structural inequalities are the main concerns for peace researchers. Therefore, amelioration or deterioration of conflict structures can make a difference in the incentive systems of the parties, which, in turn, may affect their conflict behavior. Creating awareness about the structural constraints on individuals (through peace education, peace activism) and intervening to change the structures (i.e. issuing political and economic incentives, peacemaking) are among the basic peace studies practices (see left quadrant of FPC).

Diplomatic studies

The literature on diplomacy rarely makes a connection between international relations theory and the practice of international relations (Steiner 2004). The discussion of diplomacy is somewhat marginal in international relations theory. Diplomacy “exists” within IR theory, but is rarely analyzed or extensively explored. The current body of literature on diplomacy supports this argument. The emphasis of the existing work on diplomacy is generally confined to the historical account of the profession, description of the institutions, and the listings of diplomatic skills (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Berridge 1995; Marshall 1997; Freeman 1997). More specialized literature on diplomacy comprises different types of diplomacy such as preventive diplomacy (Lund 1996), coercive diplomacy
Beriker (George 1991), and multitrack diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1996). This latter work is more analytic than the former, and identifies different conceptual components of diplomatic activity. That said, in this body of knowledge, the connecting link between international relations theory and diplomacy is still missing. The practical implications of this literature are related to the actor’s proper use of rules and procedures and diplomatic maneuvers to protect national interests and gain advantage in political, economic, and military matters (right quadrant of FPC).

**Security studies**

Traditionally, the field of security studies takes nation-states as the unit of analysis. The statist assumptions of security studies define the field as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991: 211–39). In this context, the field is primarily confined within the intellectual preoccupation of the survivability of states and regimes. Following the developments in world politics, security studies went through different stages (Prins 1998). In the early stages of security studies, theoretical developments in nuclear deterrence, concepts of rationality, arms control, crisis management, and limited war were introduced. Later, criticisms were raised, and attempts were made to come up with an emancipated, that is conceptually richer, interdisciplinary and inclusive definition of security studies (Kolodziej 1992). In this context, the expanding scope of security threats included population growth, environmental degradation, energy shortages, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and the destruction of indigenous cultures. Following 9/11, terrorism ranked at the top of the security agenda. Be that as it may, the intellectual search has continued for a non-military, non-statist conception of security, and human agency has been explored as the referent for security (Bilgin 2002). The concept of human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of violence including hunger, disease, natural disasters, and terrorism.

As mentioned before, traditionally security studies are about statist, violent, military, zero-sum practices. As Groom (1988: 83) points out, war and violent coercive activities are at the extreme end of security studies and in the domain of strategic studies. Strategy “is concerned with the manipulation and application of threats either to preserve or change the status quo.” In this tradition, decisionmakers often use the term national security strategy interchangeably with foreign policy\(^5\) (bottom quadrant of FPC).

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced a framework and a model for articulating the foreign policy behavior of international actors and the analytical and practical tools that the conflict resolution field and peace studies traditions offer. For this purpose, operational capabilities of the field of conflict resolution, peace studies, and diplomatic studies has been incorporated as part of liberal international relations practice. This aim stemmed from the observation that the practice of IR has been confined within the limits of security studies discourse, which offers limited options to IR practitioners. Therefore, in this chapter, it is claimed that the field of conflict resolution together with its neighboring fields, the peace studies and diplomacy fields, could provide concrete tools for daily formulation and execution of liberal foreign policy.

Achieving national goals through cooperation is mainly a premise of the liberal paradigm of international relations. For liberals, cooperation is possible through the monitoring
mechanism of international institutions, facilitated information flows, and learning. In the FPC cooperative orientation is represented by the instruments of the fields of peace studies, conflict resolution, and diplomatic studies. Activities presented in these categories, such as facilitative mediation, problem-solving negotiations, interactive conflict resolution, cooperation with a mediator, initiating bilateral cooperative programs, exchanging visits, offering conflict resolution training, post-conflict reconstruction, unilateral gestures, peacebuilding, positive incentives, agreements, positive commitments, and rewards and praise are presented as instruments of liberal policymaking. In terms of third party roles, the liberal paradigm is mostly interested in constructive engagements (structural or transformative) in which actors adopt either partisan or non-partisan roles.

At the competitive end, diplomatic studies and security studies are the two fields mostly concerned with procedural and strategic dimensions of foreign policy behavior. The difference between peacetime diplomacy and coercive diplomacy can be explained by the dual presence of diplomatic studies in both the cooperative and competitive realms.

At a practical level, the FPC emancipates the foreign policy toolboxes of the decision-makers. It highlights the importance of constructive third party roles in international relations and formulates this role as part of the diplomatic practice. The FPC helps to bridge the theory/practice rift in international relations and locates the field of conflict resolution as an essential foreign policy tool for real-world practices. In terms of theory and research, the heuristic value of the FPC needs to be further analyzed by conducting comparative case studies. Similarly, future research may concentrate on the relationship between liberal foreign policy tools (the top and left quadrants of the FPC) and the existing partial theories of international relations such as democratic peace, regime theory, soft power, and security communities.

Notes

1 For further details on experiential learning, see Cheldelin et al. (2003).
2 For a detailed debate on the relationship between theory and policy in international relations, see Walt (2005) and Palmer and Morgan (2006).
3 The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003, with the aim of “disarming Iraq, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free Iraqi people” (Office of the Press Secretary 2003). The United States supplied the majority of the invading forces. Supporters of the invasion included a coalition force from more than 35 countries.
4 Among other initiatives, conflict resolution and training workshops were held in Cyprus by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, and conducted by the Cyprus Consortium, a group that consists of the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, the Conflict Management Group of Harvard University, and the National Training Laboratory based in Virginia (Broome 1998). Similarly, the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, the Organization of Inter-Tajik Dialogue, and the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE are some engagements in which scholars have acted as peacemakers (Aall 2002). The initiative taken by the Norwegian Institute for Social Science (FAFO) and in their contribution to the Oslo Accords is another example of peace processes started by scholar-practitioners.
5 Labeling the EU’s foreign policy principles as “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” may contain similar inherent premises.

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