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New Democratic Deficits and Social Injustices

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Introduction

In the past two decades, education systems around the globe have undergone dramatic changes. In large part this is because of changes within and between nation-states, as the stakes increase in the competitive race between nations and regions in the global economy (cf. Cerny, 1997; Held, McGrew, Perraton, & Dicken, 1999). It is also because there has been a reconceptualization of the role of education across the developed and developing world: on the one hand, to tie education more closely to the economy in order to drive economic growth; and on the other, to develop the formal education sectors in such a way that they directly generate income for institutions, national economies, and for-profit firms who are moving into providing services in particular sectors.

Throughout this period there have been major changes in the structures and systems of governance of nation-states, with national states ceding some of their powers of governing to new or reinvigorated “scales” of activity—by scale I am referring to what Collinge (1999) calls “the vertical ordering of social formations”—as in concepts like the national, regional, global, and local (Jessop, 2000). New and invigorated global and regional institutions and structures, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), have emerged, all with important implications for education (Dale & Robertson, 2002; Robertson, Bonal, & Dale, 2002), while the decentralization and dispersal of the state’s functions to local communities and private actors has considerably complicated the terrain of education provision, funding and its regulation (Dale, 1997). In sum, national/subnational education systems—at all levels—from schools to higher education establishments, are being transformed.

These transformations in the governance of education systems, however, raise important questions about how education systems now mediate citizens’ claims-making and thus the terrain of social justice, particularly as education has been such an important institution in attempting to mediate the tensions between capitalism and democracy through redistribution and, more recently, recognition politics (see Carnoy & Levin, 1985). Education has been a key institution for nation-states in constructing citizens, not only in terms of identity, but also as potential workers and members of a polity—often referred to as “nation building” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Education is an important political arena of struggle for members of a polity around who gets taught what, as well as matters of access and equal opportunity. It is also a central strategic platform for political actors, including political parties and the wider public—particularly because of its discursively constructed “public good” ethos. Finally, education systems have been a core mechanism in generating legitimacy and societal cohesion for the capitalist state, in
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part through the knowledge that is transmitted, but also because of the capacity of education systems to propagate ideas like meritocracy, and the values of market economies and societies.

If, however, national systems of education are being transformed as a result of processes of globalization, the questions we must ask ourselves now are these: What form are these transformations taking? How do they alter the nature of national citizenship regimes? And, what are the implications of these shifts for citizens and claims-making in nation-states, particularly for the constitution of rights, responsibilities, identities, and social justice? In this chapter I want to address these questions by first outlining what I mean by ‘citizenship’ and the idea of a ‘citizenship regime’. I will then develop four linked shifts that chart the nature of the transformations taking place in education that both directly and indirectly impinge on citizenship regimes. These shifts, I will argue, are re/constituting citizenship regimes and citizens at multiple scales and, as a result, the sites and parameters for claims-making and social justice. Specifically, I will suggest that as a result of neoliberal policies, programs and practices at multiple scales—from the global to the local—there is a diminution, if not an absence, of possibilities for political claims by citizens, giving rise to a significant democratic deficit.

Defining Citizenship and Citizenship Regimes

“In its narrowest definition, citizenship describes the legal relationship between the individual and the polity” (Sassen, 2005, p. 81). Until recently, the idea of citizenship was commonly associated with the Westphalian system of nation-states, with nationality a key component. This meant that two distinct ideas, that of citizenship and of nationality, tended to fuse. Until more recently, for example, a citizen could normally only be a passport holder in one nation, while dual or multiple passports were firmly discouraged. This reinforced the idea that nationality, such as “United States of America” or “Germany,” and citizenship were the same.

However, while related to each other, nationality and citizenship reflect different legal frameworks. While both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership, until more recently citizenship was largely confined to the national dimension (as in the right of access to state assistance, liability to conscription), while nationality referred to the international legal dimension of citizenship in the context of an interstate system (such as being a passport holder of a particular nation). In other words, being a passport holder (nationality) might not qualify an individual for all of the rights that a citizen of that nation (national and nonnational) might have access to. An example here might be when a UK national, who has been absent from the country for some time, has no recourse to public funds immediately on arrival back in the country, while a nonnational resident might have access to public funds as a result of meeting certain residency requirements. Alternatively, being a national of New Zealand until recently entitled individuals to access public funds in Australia.

These two brief examples make a wider point; that there is considerable variation across nation-states as to how citizenship is articulated, how noncitizens are defined, and what rights citizens are entitled to. We can also see that “citizenship is a social construction” (Jenson, 2000, p. 232). That is, how citizenship is understood and practiced varies with place and over time. Where these constructions develop some degree of stability and coherence, and are the foundation for widely understood and endorsed claims-making within a social formation, we can refer to these paradigmatic encodings as a citizenship regime. For Jenson, a citizenship regime can be seen as:
...the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims making by citizens. A citizenship regime encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the “national” as well as the “model citizen”, the “second class citizen”, and the non-citizen. It also encodes representations of the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories, as well as the borders of “public” and “private”. It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition of politics which organizes the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition in each jurisdiction. (Jenson, 2000, pp. 232–233)

Jenson (2001, pp. 4–5) develops four elements of a citizenship regime, each contributing to the setting of boundaries and the constitution of citizenship. The first element concerns the expression of basic values about the responsibility mix; that is, by defining the boundaries of responsibility, differentiating them from those of states, markets, families, and communities. Second, through the formal recognition of particular rights (civic, political, social and cultural, individual and collective), a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of a political community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled to full citizenship status and those who, in effect, hold second-class status. Third, a citizenship regime prescribes the boundaries around democratic rules of the game for a polity. Included in these are rules around access to the state, the modes of participation in civic life and public debates, and the legitimacy of specific types of claims-making. Fourth and finally, a citizenship regime contributes to the definition of nation, in both the narrow passport sense of nationality, and the more complicated notion of national identity and its geography. It therefore establishes the boundaries of belonging. Changes in the wider society challenge and change the encodings of citizenship regimes. However, Jenson’s concept of citizenship regimes is implicitly assumed to be “national/nation”—which takes me to the core of my argument. New dynamics and developments, broadly referred to as processes of globalization, have challenged the primacy of the national scale and the supremacy of the nation-state as sole actor in the governance of education and producer of knowledgeable citizens, so that the citizenship regime of postwar national states is now being re/constructed and transformed.

Enter Globalization

As John Urry notes, when the discourse of globalization really took off “...exponential growth in the analyses of the global began to suggest that there was a putative global reconstruction of economic, political and cultural relationships” (Urry, 1998, p. 2) with transformations in the nature of the state, in turn, transforming the parameters of citizenship (Held et al., 1999; Sorensen, 2004).

Processes of globalization have laid bare the embedded, and socially constructed and produced nature of “citizenship” and the “national state” (Sassen, 2005, p. 80), as each has been challenged and transformed by internal and external pressures, processes, projects, and practices associated with globalization. Key characteristics of this new regime include the liberalization of trade, the freer movement of finance capital around the globe, greater competition within the public and private spheres, increased levels of private sector activity in formerly state dominated monopolies, the privatization of risk, the withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship entitlement, and the reformulation of state-citizen rights/responsibilities relation (Cerny, 1997; Peck & Tickell, 2005; Sassen, 2005; Sorensen, 2004). Politically, the development of new supra- and subregional spaces, projects, and politics, such as the European Union (EU) or new structures of global gov-
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Goverance, have opened up opportunities for rights (political and human) to be negotiated at these different scales. For instance, some indigenous communities and activist groups have sought the support of global and supranational actors in order to progress claims, while citizens in particular national polities have moved to variously use the legal and social structures of the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the European Union, to advance claims around labor rights, human rights, or social welfare and legal protection.

Globalization and the Transformation of Education

There are differing views as to how much education systems have changed as a result of processes of globalization and different accounts as to the form that this is taking (for example, the extent of the globalization of ideas like devolution, internationalization and so on). There is nevertheless broad agreement that there have been significant changes in the rights/responsibilities mix, the borders around public and private, and the nature of the boundaries around education—particularly its public good/public sector and service nature. However, surprisingly, little attention is paid to the way in which these processes are re/constituting citizens and their politics, along with citizenship and citizenship regimes. It is true that in the wake of concerns over the social order attention has reemerged regarding the creation of the entrepreneurial subject, or rather descriptive and normative analyses of citizenship programs, but analysis seems not to have gone further (cf. Lockyer, Crick, & Annette, 2003). It seems to me that four interlinked processes are implicated here in reorganizing the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition, at the level of the national, as well as at other scales of activity (global, regional, local) where education is being constituted.

First, there is a transformation taking place in the mandate and governance of education systems (Dale, 1997). The new mandate for education has been significantly influenced by human capital theory, and by neoliberal (economic competitivism, investing in knowledge producers, lifelong learning) and neoconservative ideas (Apple, 2004), while choice, diversity, and markets have emerged as the dominant ideas to guide the new structures of governance. In some countries, more and more of the various activities that comprised the “education services sector” have been unbundled and outsourced, including inspection and audit, curriculum writing, research, management services, special education services, and so on (Mahony, Hextall, & Mentor, 2004). In Britain these developments have been promoted under Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), and given legal impetus under the Private Finance Initiative (PFIs). In spite of widespread and longstanding concerns, PPPs are now found in the public domain of many countries, including the United States, Britain, in national industrial policies in France, as well as in economic development policies in Italy and the Netherlands (Boviard, 2004). In the United States the establishment of charter schools legislation at the state level, and more recently the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation, which has given the federal government an unprecedented role in determining education practices across the country, has opened the floodgates to a range of new providers of education services (Apple, 2004; Lipman, 2006). Trends at the EU level suggest a similar pattern, with PPPs being heavily promoted by the European Commission as the means for involving the private sector in delivering a competitive European knowledge-based economy. Similarly, PPPs are the World Bank’s preferred solution to delivering the Millennium Development Goals for universal primary education and expanding the secondary sector. In sum, education is now becoming much more closely tied to the economy as a sector for industry investment and development (World Bank, 2003), while citizens are being constituted by the state as economic actors and choosers.
Second, education is being constructed as a *private good* and a *commodity*. This process is taking place at all levels of education, from primary to higher. Universities (Marginson & Considine, 2000) and schools (Lewis, 2005) have gone global in search of opportunities for raising revenues and recruiting foreign fee-paying students, while new for-profit firms have moved into the sector (Sachman, 2007; Henschke, 2007). A new language has emerged to talk about this development, and it is the language of importing and exporting education services, while education is increasingly presided over by departments of trade in nation-states. Trade in services is now estimated to be one of the most dynamic growth sectors for the developed economies and a critical means for ensuring continued growth. Importantly for my argument here, industry analysts estimate that the education market is valued to be upward of U.S.$2 trillion (Oxfam, 2002). Spurring on this development is the World Trade Organization, created in 1995 with the specific mandate to promote free trade and to regulate global trade (Peet, 2003). The innovative feature of the World Trade Organization’s mandate was that, for the first time, services (including education) were brought into the ambit of the global trading regime (Robertson et al., 2002). This move has been highly controversial since services like education continue to be regarded by the public as “public goods.”

A third development is the emergence of a new *functional and scalar division in the labor of education* (Dale, 2003; Robertson, 2002). In other words, education and its governance is being reallocated across scales, from the local to the global, now involving a new array of actors—public and private, including for-profit actors. A series of examples can be instanced here: the Bologna Process (BP) within the European Union, which intended to harmonize the structure and content of undergraduate and graduate degrees across the member states of the EU and beyond, so that institutional and national differences between systems were minimized (Dale, 2003; Keeling, 2006); Singapore’s Global Schoolhouse—an initiative that seeks to provide a range of education services across the region and which has assembled in Singapore a range of globally competitive university departments (Olds & Thrift, 2005); the rise of personalized learning in Britain, which is intended to provide community-based rather than institutionally-based learning (Robertson, 2005); Brand New Zealand, which stamps a mark of quality on education providers within the region (Lewis, 2005); and neuroscience research on brains and learning (see OECD, n.d.). The control of learners and definitions of what counts as valuable knowledge is also being distributed across scales, with systems of benchmarking and other forms of assessment (for instance, national league tables, EU benchmarking, and global Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA] 7 scores). An array of old and newer actors are now present at all these scales engaged in promoting these developments (e.g., Microsoft, IBM, Cisco Systems, Sylvan Learning Systems) and who are keen to promote digital learning technologies and new virtual approaches to learning (Robertson, 2002).

Fourth, the pluralizing of *identity* or identities is a reflection, in part, of the rise of identity politics, and, in part, of the breakdown of older forms of hegemonic identity (around social class and nation; e.g., British working class). A new terrain of identity claims has opened up (for example, in the United Kingdom by the Welsh, Scottish, and Northern Irish), while old identity claims are being reformulated. New political projects, such as the creation of the European Union (EU) and the “European citizen,” are being advanced by the structures of the EU (European Commission, Council and Parliament), so that identity projects and claims are operating at multiple scales. In this latter case, education systems located at the national scale, as well as a parallel sector of learning at the European scale, are explicitly charged with the creation of the European citizen (Dale & Robertson, 2006). Identity claims are increasingly turning on cultural particularity.
rather than principles of universalism, as in the challenge by the French North African community that their young women have the right to wear the “foulard” (veil) in school, or where particular groups have asserted the right to state funding to establish schools which protect and promote their cultural and political interests. The upshot, however, of this process has been to privilege identity claims over redistribution (Fraser, 2005)—a matter I will come back to when assessing the implications of these transformations for education and citizenship regimes.

Education, National Citizenship Regimes, and Claims-Making

Globalization and the transformation of education continue to have important consequences for national citizenship regimes, claims-making, and the possibilities for social justice. To begin, the combination of changes in governance, processes of rescaling (global, national, and local), and commodification mean that citizenship regimes are being encoded at a multiplicity of scales, and that it is no longer exclusively the provenance of the national state. This does not mean that transformations being driven by processes of globalization are exclusively taking place out there, which is what David Held is suggesting with the idea of global governance (2002), or Nancy Fraser’s press for new forms of global dialogue and political representation (2005). Rather, I am arguing that there have been significant transformations of education and the ways in which it is encoded in each of the four elements of contemporary citizenship regimes, as they operate within as well as beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. As Jayasuriya argues, “the changing architecture of power both globally and within the state serves to rupture and fragment the institutions and processes of governance; from this perspective, globalization is as much an internally as an externally driven process” (2001, p. 442).

As I have been suggesting, there has been a dispersion and dissolution of powers of governing into institutions in civil society, as well as the economy, within the boundaries of the nation-state as a result of the move from government to governance, for instance, with public–private partnerships, quangos (a UK regulatory agency outside the civil service, but financed and appointed by the government), outsourcing, and so on. However, there is also greater porosity in the boundaries around scales of governing and contestation over jurisdictions (for instance with the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity, and its interventions into national education systems with the Bologna process).

Recall Jenson’s (2001) first element of a citizenship regime; that is, the nature of the boundaries around the responsibility mix between the state, market, community, and family. As I have argued, a mix reflects a particular set of values about social and political life. At present this mix is shaped by neoliberal ideas as to the precise role of the state, market, community, and family. Processes of globalization have also significantly altered the sites and scales at which actors might be located, including whether some scales take precedence over others. This has resulted in new struggles over all four boundaries and the terms of political debate.

Two consequences have followed from this. One is that neoliberalism has dispersed greater power and responsibility to the market, rather than the state, in the coordination of public goods and services, signaling the dominance of economism. The result of this is “...a form of economic constitutionalism that gives a juridical cast to economic institutions, placing these institutions beyond politics” (Jayasuriya, 2001, p. 443). Jayasuriya argues that not only is sovereignty transformed, but that the very nature of these governance changes results in a transition from political constitutionalism to a kind of economic constitutionalism (p. 443). Put another way, contracting out public education services to the private sector and community not only constructs them as economic
relationships, thus depoliticizing them; but they are legally protected “beyond” politics. Mahony et al.’s (2004) research on the way private contractors in the education sector in Britain claim commercial sensitivity, thereby blocking public scrutiny, is an example here of this.

Second, economic constitutionalism is not confined to the national level. The World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), by transforming education into a global service industry and locating its governance in global regulations that protect investors and profits rather than citizens and knowledge, also constitutionalizes the economic over the political at the global scale. Similar processes have taken place at the regional scale, for instance with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Not only is education and its transformation into a commodity removed and insulated from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability within the political realm, but the regulatory instruments, such as the dispute settlement processes, work in favor of particular agents and their projects (Gill, 2003, p. 132); that is, the transnational for-profit firms, and the powerful countries or blocs such as the United States and European Union, as well as those countries with a vested interest in trading education services globally.

The transformation of education through commoditizing and rescaling has direct implications for the rights of citizenship. On the one hand, rights are constructed in consumer terms; for example, as information in the marketplace to facilitate choices about which education provider to choose in the local, global or regional marketplace. The only “right” that can be protected by nation-states is the right to choose, not an equal ability to realize this choice (Ball, 2003). Paradoxically, while the right to (free primary) education is recognized in several international instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) to which all countries are signatories, there is no way to force a particular government to meet its commitments. However, if a company trading in education services were to lose the right to trade in a particular country (e.g., because it was renationalized or because of a change in policy at the level of the nation-state), the country where the company is based will have, according to the WTO rules, the right to compensation. These kinds of global initiatives have thus narrowed the policy space for national states and their economies, in turn reducing the scope for national actors and nationally located citizens to determine policies and programs. It would seem that rules concerning free trade are much stronger in international law than rules concerning human rights (Fredriksen, 2004, p. 422) or laws that might protect national sovereignty.

Finally, transformations in education as a result of globalization also affect identity construction/production, particularly national identity. The picture is complex because the processes of rescaling generate not only possibilities of multiple postnational identities (Welsh, British, European, cosmopolitan), but also an array of means of identification following the collapse of class and nationality as the primary identities. The acceleration of processes of migration, together with issues of security as a result of September 11, have given rise to new or renewed efforts at generating identification. New curriculum initiatives are being mobilized, such as “My Europe,” a European Schoolnet initiative funded by the European Commission and available to the member states of Europe to help create and embed a European set of values and identity. The nongovernmental organization Oxfam has been promoting its global citizenship curriculum in those countries where it funds education. Finally, Microsoft has been developing its own global learner initiatives. However, generating a coherent “identity” and securing forms of identification will be much more complicated in this new regionalizing and globalizing era. If we take the European Union and the idea of European citizenship as a specific case, two developments may well mediate the success of these initiatives. First, there has been rapid
cultural diversification as a result of the growing multiethnicity of European societies due to the breaking down of old identification structures and migratory flows. Imposing a single identity is likely to be resisted, especially if the imposed identity appears to deny issues of religion and religious rights. Second, there is increased cynicism directed at the European project, in part because of a popular perception that the EU structures are not sufficiently open and democratic (Smith, 2004), but also because of the increasingly neoliberal nature of the EU’s project.

However, these are dynamic processes, and there is emerging evidence that the growing economic competition between regional blocks (European Union, the United States, and Japan) and emerging nations (India, China) that is driving the integration of higher education across Europe (under the Bologna Process and also the Lisbon Agenda, which work to promote Europe as a globally competitive region (Corbett, 2005), and responses in other nations* will have important consequences for forming identities. At the more global level, it is not yet clear the extent to which the accelerating globalization of education under GATS (in particular through the expansion of e-learning and cross-border supply) will mediate ideas of citizenship and identity production. However, it is a matter of serious concern for nations like South Africa, whose fledgling democracy is dependent upon using its systems of education to promote national interests and national identities. Despite this fluidity and the potential for contradiction in identity projects, there is an evident convergence in the discourses and projects to construct the model citizen across these scales. The model (private) citizen is conceived of through the lens of neoliberalism and human capital theory. These citizens are responsible for their own welfare through workfare, their success through entrepreneurialism and competitivism, and their future through lifelong learning for the knowledge-based economy and society (Kuhn & Sultana, 2006). However, this model is being contested, not only at the global level (for instance, progress of the GATS has been very slow because of organized campaigns), but also through new sites of innovation in education, such as Venezuela’s higher education reforms and the creation of Bolivarian Universities enabling all citizens to attend university free.

Neo-Liberal Citizenship Regimes and Spaces of Social Justice

So far I have argued that four intertwined shifts have taken place since the early 1980s, as a consequence of processes of globalization, that challenge the role of education systems in the re/production of postwar national citizenship regimes. These were (1) shifts in the mandate and governance of education; (2) the growing commoditization of education; (3) rescaling the labor of education; and (4) the pluralizing of identities. Taken together, these shifts have disturbed the embedded and once tightly bound categories of the national state and notions of national citizenship, in turn reconstituting citizenship and citizenship claims in new ways. However, what I have also argued is that, though there is a pluralizing of identities and processes of identity production, citizenship regimes have become dominated by neoliberal discourses and projects, and that this has resulted in the constitutionalization of the economic at multiple scales. This depoliticizes education as an important site of power/knowledge and a resource that is mobilized by particular social classes. However, there are no adequate framings for claims-making at the global or supraregional levels (aside from ideas like global cosmopolitanism, references to education as a human right, and a weak, if not unconstitutional, mandate for education at scales like the European Union). Nor are there sites of legally institutionalized power that might enable a system of multiscalar claims—corresponding to the encoding of citizenship regimes across scales. For the moment, then, the current state of affairs is
more likely to privilege transnational capital and other powerful political actors at the expense of citizens, or those citizens who are successfully able to reconstitute themselves as entrepreneurial subjects. There has in response been a call for reclaimed citizenship (Magalhaes & Stoer, 2006).

Sassen (2005) and others are confident there has been an opening up of citizenship and thus possibilities for claims-making through the unraveling of the nationality–citizenship relation. Indeed, Fraser (2005) has gone so far as to call for new transnational politics of representation, arguing that claims-making is still largely located in nation-states. However, given that there has been a redistribution of the labor of education across scales, moving claims-making upward to the transnational scale simply relocates the space for claims-making to the global. This would overlook the distribution and transformation of the elements of citizenship regimes across scales. What follows from this insight is the importance of interrogating more closely the politics of the reconstituted spaces for claims-making that are now emerging, for these seem to me to be rather limited in their possibilities for delivering social justice and democracy.

In conclusion, I want to argue that what is important here is that we are able to reveal the way neoliberal governance and processes of rescaling have enabled new boundaries to be drawn, and new encodings to be constitutionalized that will depend on more than calls to action. It will require a new level of juridical literacy amongst sociologists of education (especially given the complex legal architecture of global and regional agreements), as well as a more global outlook on questions of education, and sites of knowledge production, distribution and consumption. Furthermore, in the development of a multiscalar chain of spaces for claims-making that could be at the heart of this project, the ideological content and the mechanisms of governance must be shaped by dialogue and debate in order to generate a stronger sense of the conditions for realizing social justice, and a remix of the boundaries around state, market, family and individual in order to move it away from excessive economism and the poverty of neo-liberalism. This would offer a far more robust platform for citizenship and social justice, and might provide both the content and the impetus for such a program in education.

Notes
1. By education systems, I am referring to the formal education sector—elementary/primary and secondary/high schools, along with further and higher education.
2. Newman (2006) argues that in the postwar period, the state has been regarded as the traditional embodiment of public values and the defender of a common conception of public interest (in opposition to the market)—reproduced as an ethos of public good. See Newman (2006) for a valuable discussion of the difficulty, as a result of changes in governance, in defining the public realm.
3. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, in their book Activists Across Borders (1998), provide numerous examples of activist groups targeting actors who operate beyond the boundaries of the national state in order to advance claims for social justice. Makere Stewart-Harawira (2005) provides an excellent account of the way indigenous Maori tribes in New Zealand were able to use the UN Declaration of Human Rights to advance their case against the New Zealand government.
4. For example, Hargreaves (2001) argues that schools have changed little in more than two centuries, while there is a huge literature on the transformation of education systems since the early 1980s.
5. For interesting work that looks at the discursive, practical, and performed aspects of this, see Pykett (2006).

7. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial worldwide test of 15-year-old schoolchildren’s scholastic performance, developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1997.

8. For instance, Australia has responded to the Bologna Process by reviewing its own higher education structures to bring them more into line with the EU’s Bologna Process, while the EC has been promoting the Bologna Process in Latin America as part of an initiative called Tuning America Latina.

References


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