Oil Rents and Political Power in Africa

Jessica Piombo

“The lived experience of oil-exporting countries over the past several decades tells a story which differs radically from the promise of petroleum. When taken as a group, all ‘rich’ less developed countries dependent on oil exports have seen the living standards of their populations drop—and drop dramatically.”

Africa is a continent of contrast. There are extremes of wealth and poverty, of development and progress as well as underdevelopment and stagnation, and of stunning beauty next to desperate squalor. Based on generous human and natural resource endowments, Africans possess the means to become amongst the wealthiest people in the world, yet instead they tend to rank lowest in most economic and human development indicators, and their political systems tend to rank among the most corrupt and authoritarian in the world. The trends are worst in the countries with the largest mineral resource endowments, and of these, the petroleum-rich countries have the worst records in governance, inequality, and human development. Much of this is due to the ways that the competition for control over, access to and use of oil income has shaped politics (and from this, economics) in these countries. This chapter will analyze the politics of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, arguing that regime concerns with maintaining control over oil rents undermine government accountability and increase authoritarian tendencies, while access to oil rents increases regime stability at the same time as it attenuates the link between rulers and citizens.

Africa has suffered various forms of the “resource curse” over time. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, the continent’s human resources condemned whole regions to exploitation for labor as the international slave trade captured, enslaved and sent millions of Africans to the New World. In the 19th century, natural resource exploitation by imperial powers led to the creation of political and economic regimes designed to facilitate the expropriation of raw goods, rather than the development of internally dynamic systems that benefited residents in the colonial territories. Post-independence regimes have struggled with overcoming these legacies since the 1960s. In these struggles can be found the most recent manifestation of the resource curse: rapacious governments, fuelled by a reliance on the rents from exportable natural resources such as petroleum or copper, have faced little incentive to diversify their economies and develop accountable systems of good governance. As a result, the resources that could have served as
engines of growth have, yet again, condemned many ordinary Africans to lives of exploitation and expropriation. In a handful of countries resources have also given rise to and/or have helped to extend brutal conflicts.

After briefly reviewing oil exploration and production in Africa since the 1950s, this chapter will review the main influence that oil has had in the politics of the largest of the oil exporters. The analysis will focus on the relationship between oil and political regimes, the quality of governance, policy processes, and the institutionalization of the state. The chapter will also review the economic impacts of oil and how the politics of oil affect state-society relations and, in some cases, the incidence and nature of conflict. Overall, the argument advanced here is that in a continent known for poor governance, personalized rule, and tendencies towards authoritarianism, the countries that could perform best (those with abundant oil reserves) in actuality tend to perform the worst on most governance and economic performance indicators.

Unlike the Middle East, where for decades, autocratic regimes were able to maintain power through the strategic distribution of oil proceeds, there is no pattern of oil and autocratic peace in Africa. A few countries have been able to build stable authoritarian regimes through the use and manipulation of oil proceeds, such as those found in Gabon, Cameroon, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. However a significant number of the sub-Saharan oil exporters, including Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo (also referred to as Congo-Brazzaville), and Sudan, have all experienced conflict related to oil. Competition over access to and control over oil resources fuelled large-scale civil wars in Angola and the Republic of Congo, while secessionist or regionally-focused conflicts arose in the Niger Delta and the Cabinda region of Angola. Sudan’s second civil war (beginning in 1983) was fuelled in part by the discovery of oil in the late 1970s, and ongoing tensions over the border between the north and south are tied to the location of oil fields. Sudan’s oil deposits just happen to be located alongside, though mostly just south of, the border between the north and south.4

In order to trace the enduring influence of oil on politics, the chapter primarily considers countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have been exporting oil steadily for at least the past two decades. Countries that began oil exploration and export only in the late 2000s, such as Ghana and Chad, are not specifically included in the analysis.5 The rationale is that oil has not been exploited long enough in these countries to analyze its impact. The chapter therefore focuses primarily on Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan, although other countries will be discussed as well.

**African oil: a brief review**

The African oil sector historically has been located offshore, where oil is derived from capital-intensive drilling platforms located in places where local strife rarely affects production. This only increased in the 1990s as the technology of oil extraction enabled “ultra-deep water” wells to become profitable. In Angola, for example, in mid-2001, onshore oil concessions contributed just 2% of national production.6 In these countries, petroleum drilling forms an enclave economy: governments gain access to oil income with relatively low cost, focusing on capital intensive extraction, with economic activity occurring in a location that is geographically separate and therefore inaccessible to the local population. These countries tend to have higher levels of corruption than others in Africa, since it is relatively easy for governments to hide how much oil is being produced and how much income generated from the general population. In West Africa, many of the new discoveries are also located offshore, while the oil deposits in East Africa that are expected to be brought into production in the coming decades are located onshore. This is likely to affect the influence of the enclave economy and the protection from local contestation that offshore oil enjoys.
As a proportion of the world’s total, African oil accounts for 12% of crude oil exports.7 Several countries have been exporting oil for decades; these are located on the west coast and include Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. Africa’s five largest exporters have historically been Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Angola; if considering just sub-Saharan producers, the largest exporters are Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Table 12.1 lists the main African oil exporters). Nigeria was the first sub-Saharan country to begin exporting oil in 1958 followed by Angola (1968) and then the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (where oil was discovered in the 1960s but not extracted until 1991).8 Two of these countries are members of OPEC: Nigeria (which joined in 1971) and Angola (2007). Gabon had been a member until 1996, when it withdrew on account of the high membership fee.

African petroleum sector activities are primarily upstream, and until the early 2000s a relatively small set of companies were involved in extraction. These were primarily Anglo-Dutch and British (Shell and British Petroleum) and French (Elf Aquitaine, now privatized as Total), followed by American companies (Shell Oil, Chevron/Chevron Texaco and Exxon-Mobil), and the Italian company Agip. Since the early 2000s, this club was joined by a host of smaller companies, particularly from the USA and China, as rising oil prices made the costly investments in exploiting the deepwater reserves, and the onshore reserves in conflict-prone countries more economically viable.9

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Most African countries operate state-owned oil companies in addition to a host of local oil companies, and all licence exploration and extraction rights to the foreign companies rather than granting outright ownership. Examples are the Nigerian National Petroleum company, and Sonangol in Angola.10 Downstream activities in terms of refinery output are relatively low compared to the volume of crude oil exports: in 2009, for example, sub-Saharan countries

### Table 12.1 Top Crude Petroleum Exporters in Africa (Thousands of Barrels Per Day)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>1562</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1811</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>1375</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1652</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2066</td>
<td>2155</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>2103</td>
<td>2238</td>
<td>2431</td>
<td>2499</td>
<td>2420</td>
<td>2305</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>2061</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Africa</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Africa</strong></td>
<td>7583</td>
<td>7804</td>
<td>7897</td>
<td>7990</td>
<td>8386</td>
<td>9324</td>
<td>9921</td>
<td>9925</td>
<td>10238</td>
<td>10219</td>
<td>9705</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

exported 227.1m. metric tons of crude petroleum, compared to just 5.6m. tons of product exports. The major refineries are located in South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria, though many other countries operate small refineries (see Table 12.2). Among the sub-Saharan producers, downstream activities are particularly important for the economies of Cameroon and the Republic of Congo, and with the completion of the Chad to Cameroon oil pipeline in 2003, Cameroon has positioned itself to become a transshipment point. While additional refineries are under development in Mozambique, Sudan, and Uganda, overall African oil sector activities are primarily focused on exportation of crude oil to refineries elsewhere.

Most of Africa’s oil flows into the global market rather than serving domestic or regional customers. Crude exports flow in large part to the USA, Europe and China. In 2009, annual exports of oil from West, East and Southern Africa to the USA totalled 79.2m. metric tons (all from West Africa); to China, 53.9m. tons; and to Europe, 48.4m. tons (all but 0.1m. from West Africa). This trade accounted for 78% of sub-Saharan Africa’s oil exports, and most of it was from West Africa as opposed to East or Southern (217.6m. tons as opposed to 15.1m.). The African Development Bank estimates that by the mid-2000s, China was importing a quarter of its oil from Africa, while Nigeria and Angola respectively ranked the fifth and ninth largest suppliers of oil to America. With this much of Africa’s oil being exported beyond the continent and the global rise in oil prices, Africa is beginning to face an energy crisis of its own. For example, by the mid-2000s, energy supply in Nigeria was so unreliable that most moderately
wealthy homes owned diesel generators, which had to be used at least once per day. In 2008, South Africa experienced rolling blackouts, which are common in many other countries as well. In Dakar, Senegal, state-owned utility companies could not afford to pay for fuel, leading to rolling power cuts in 2006 and 2007, and a near doubling of taxi fares between 2005 and 2007.16

**Economic impacts of oil**

Economically, the countries producing oil have become overwhelmingly dependent on the petroleum industry for government revenue. In Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, oil constitutes over 90% of exports and, between 60 and 90% of government revenue (see Table 12.3). Cameroon is slightly less dependent on oil than the others; this may be in part due to fears that the country’s oil reserves are running out and a subsequent search for alternative sources of income. Additionally, most of growth in exports across the entire continent has been driven by oil: fossil fuels accounted for 65% of the total increase in export values in African countries between 2000 and 2005, while in the oil-exporting countries, since 1990 share of fuels in the total exports increased by about 12%, to almost 90%.17 Given that oil is a non-renewable resource, that the oil industry employs few domestic laborers, and that oil profits accrue to the state rather than to entrepreneurs within the countries, the contraction of the economies and dominance of oil is problematic on multiple levels.

All of the long-standing oil exporters demonstrate the classic economic problems associated with the resource curse: economic growth has been lower than non-resource endowed African countries, income inequalities have become extreme, and non-oil sectors have contracted (particularly the agriculture and nascent manufacturing sectors). Most foreign direct investment (FDI) to the continent now goes to oil and gas projects in Angola, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria and Gabon.18 Since oil began to be exploited, agricultural and other sectors in most of these countries have contracted, and urbanization increased.19 Concerned primarily with doling out the economic rents from the petroleum industry, the African governments that survive on oil revenues have rarely sought to diversify and resist the contraction around the oil economy.

This creates economies in which the majority of the population cannot become involved in the sole productive economic sector. Most labor is left in rural areas, but those are highly unproductive, as little improvements are devoted to the agricultural sectors. In contrast to the enrichment of the elite classes that are allied with the ruling regimes, the masses become even poorer as a result.

In Gabon, for example, a structural shift in the Gabonese economy has indeed occurred. According to the World Bank’s African Indicators, per capita real value added in agriculture, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% GDP</th>
<th>% Exports</th>
<th>% Government Revenue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

manufacturing, and industry declined at an average annual rate of about 2.5, 0.5 and 0.5%, respectively between 1981 and 2002. Meanwhile, the corresponding figure for services (essentially non-tradable) was an increase of over 1%. As a result, agriculture and fishing currently account for less than 6% of GDP, despite Gabon’s significant endowment in arable land and waters rich in fish. The decline in agriculture has coincided with an increase in Gabon’s urbanisation ratio from around 30% in 1970 to over 80% currently.

Similarly, in Angola, extreme dependence on this single commodity (oil) has left the country dangerously exposed to the ups and downs of the international oil market, sometimes with serious consequences for the rest of the economy, as in 1985–86 when the steep fall in oil prices triggered Angola’s debt crisis. Perhaps even more important is the fact that, despite periodic falls in the oil price, the general trend of rising production and rising real oil revenues has tended to lull the country’s rulers into a state of complacency about the decline of the non-oil sectors of the economy. To all intents and purposes, the state has lapsed into living off the revenue from oil. The oil revenue has basically been used to finance large military expenditures and sustain basic government operations, while providing some minimal services and subsidies for the country’s largely unproductive but swollen urban enclaves and thus helping to maintain social peace in the cities. By contrast, very little public money has gone to investments in infrastructure and human capital, which are critical for development and economic diversification.

In the Republic of Congo, only 2% of the country’s arable land is farmed (yet 40% of the population is employed by the agricultural sector); oil provides 70% of the country’s income, 80% of the government’s annual budget, and between 90 and 95% of export revenues.

As oil becomes increasingly dominant in the economies of these countries, it fails to provide broader benefits in terms of increased jobs or complementary industries. For example, the oil industries in both Gabon and Angola employ very few locals, and there are minimal linkages to the rest of the economy in either country. Capital and financial services to support the petroleum industries are often imported from abroad. Therefore, not only do the fiscal impacts of the oil industry make economic diversification more difficult, the insular nature of the extraction process and the dominance of international companies means that developing oil industries rarely leads to ripple effects in the development of supporting economic sectors.

The African twist to this familiar story is that the personalized rule common to most African governments makes these resource-endowed regimes even less supportive of diversifying their economies than the leaders of other rentier states. The reason is that the personalized, patron-client networks that sustain rulers and which are funded by oil rents could be threatened were an independent business class to grow. If there were a path to economic prosperity outside of being a part of the oil-dependent patronage network, the rulers’ influence would decline. In this situation, the power holders become even less inclined to re-invest oil rents in society and to build diverse economies.

Finally, the result of all this is that the over-reliance on crude oil exports has meant that each of these countries has been severely affected by booms and busts in oil prices. During the oil booms, governments engaged in extravagant spending in poorly planned projects, increased the size of state bureaucracies as patronage-jobs were doled out, borrowed funds when oil incomes failed to cover costs, and experienced the inflationary pressures that are typical of “Dutch disease.” Writing about the Republic of Congo, Ghazvinian speculates that: “It’s also not understood why Congo-Brazzaville, like Gabon, has fallen prey to the ravages of the rentier mentality. Successive governments have proven more interested in prestige projects and radio stations than in roads and schools and hospitals. The current President, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, has been particularly fond of the trappings of sovereignty, playing host to such events as the African athletics.
championships or a festival of African film, and opening costly embassies in foreign capitals, all designed to show the world that Congo punches above its weight. In Gabon, President Omar Bongo’s “spectacular mismanagement” of [the] country’s oil boom has left it with ‘little more than a handful of rusting factories, a choo-choo train [describing the Trans-Gabonais railway] and massive government debt’.”

In the bust years, the now-bloated bureaucracies resisted cutbacks, wasteful projects continued, agricultural sectors failed to rebound, credit ratings declined while deficits increased (leading to more inflation and damage to the economy), and poverty increased.

Far from serving as the engine to drive economic development and national wealth, therefore, the discovery and exploitation of oil in Africa has led to a broad set of economic problems. In turn, these economic woes have contributed to and been increased by the politics of oil. Access to oil rents has enabled governments to separate themselves from society, linking only through elaborate networks of patronage that are financed through oil wealth. State institutions have withered, use of public resources for private gain increased, and governance decreased in all of these countries. Finally, a complex relationship between oil wealth and conflict has emerged in the sub-Saharan African oil exporters.

The impacts of oil on politics

Hodge’s description of Angola is typical of how scholars of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria all describe the impact of oil in each of those countries. The political and economic impacts of the oil industry are closely related; access to oil rents has enabled these countries to develop an extreme form of the personalized, disconnected political regime that manifests in many sub-Saharan African countries.

In the largest sub-Saharan oil exporters, there are some general characteristics of how access to oil rents in an enclave economy has affected politics. First of all, fundamental aspects of state building were affected by the access to oil rents in an enclave economy, which led to a set of political regimes with similar characteristics. Most African states are poorly institutionalized, but in the oil-dependent regimes, there is an element of intentional de-institutionalization. Because a strong, well-institutionalized state would curtail the ease with which oil rents are used for personal purposes, rulers in Africa’s petro-states intentionally invert the state and stymie institutional development. Second, regimes have tended to be stable and authoritarian, though not conflict-free. Nigeria is alone in the sub-Saharan oil exporters in the degree of executive instability it has experienced over the years. The rest, despite challenges that escalated to civil war in Angola and the Republic of Congo, have enjoyed relatively stable executive administrations. Third, policy processes have reflected the personalized networks that sustain these regimes: rather than creating policies that foster broad social and economic development, policies and the provision of public goods and services are oriented towards rewarding those within the patronage network. As a result, these countries perform poorly on all indicators of governance, corruption, transparency, and political accountability (see Table 12.4). Being financed by oil revenue and less reliant on foreign assistance, these regimes are less influenced than other African countries by the governance and anti-corruption campaigns of international donors.

A second set of factors relates to oil and security concerns. These states also tend to prioritize the security apparatus, as the military is needed to keep resistance suppressed. As a result, these states tend to become less able to process conflicts over time. When conflict does break out, it tends to have characteristic hallmarks: fighting is for control over the central state and it is likely to occur in short bouts, unless there are other resources, like diamonds, that can be used to finance
the operations of the competing/rebel groups. The remainder of this chapter will discuss each of these dynamics in turn.

Oil and state building

It is almost a cliché to discuss the weakness of African states. Most authors who discuss “state building” in Africa begin with colonialism and describe the challenges that faced would-be state builders in the post-colonial era. In the standard accounts, African states have been unable to extend control over their territories because they inherited territories that were skewed towards extraction: capital cities were located close to the coasts, while populations tended to reside farther inland; public transport infrastructure was designed to link sites of resource extraction to points of export, rather than facilitating movement within the country. These two dynamics created governments physically distant from most of the governed, and a situation in which it was difficult to physically move around the country’s territory. As a result, newly independent regimes were unable to extend control and expand the state apparatus into the rural hinterlands of their countries, resulting in an “uncaptured peasantry” that lived largely outside the reach of the modern state.29 Politics therefore reflected an urban bias, since these were the citizens most closely tied to the national elites in capital cities, and a tension between state elites who wished to extend their control and the peasants determined to preserve their autonomy.

Authors who have studied economic influences on state building, and particularly those who have examined natural resources and state building, see a different dynamic at work. Unlike the classic theorists who describe a would-be nationalist elite that is unable to incorporate the entire territory into the ambit of state control, others argue that state elites have chosen not to seek to control the entire territory of the country. Instead, they focus their energies on gaining access to and control over commercial networks and the geographic areas where natural resources are located.30 As part of this process, elites in these resource-rich countries intentionally subvert the development of strong, independent and capable bureaucratic institutions, because they threaten the use of state resources to finance the personalized networks that are critical to the survival of these rulers. State weakness is not accidental but intentional: it is the byproduct of the adaptive strategies of African leaders who attempt to build political systems that support the maintenance of power.

In the oil economies, these processes were made easier by the location of oil deposits and the nature of the oil industry. In West Africa, the offshore location and capital-intensive nature of the extraction technology limited the degree to which rulers needed to control both territories and populations in order to maintain control of and exploit the resource. Unlike diamond or timber resources, which require control over specific areas within the territory and some mobilization of labor to extract the resource, rulers in the West African petro-states focused on maintaining control over central governments, because that granted control of the oil contracts. In Angola, this meant that the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has historically focused on retaining control over the capital city of Luanda and the Cabinda territory, the area adjacent to the most productive offshore oil fields.31 In Nigeria, competition centered on obtaining or maintaining control over the seat of national power (first Lagos, then Abuja), and allowing state institutions that should have integrated this vast country to wither. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, in contrast, rival politicians competed for control of geographically distributed sites where diamonds and timber were located.32

The offshore drilling platforms are easily defended from domestic unrest, so that even when citizens mobilize against the regime, incumbents maintain access to a steady and reliable stream of income.
Oil and governance

Related to the nature of state building, and owing to many of the same mechanisms, the oil states have tended to have more closed governments that govern poorly. In terms of political openness, in 2011 none of the petro-states were ranked as free by Freedom House, and only one (Nigeria) rated as “partly free.” The rest scored as “not free.” In terms of government performance, the Failed States Index classifies these states as failing, their public services scores all lie on the extreme of poor performance, and most fall in the bottom quartile of the World Bank government effectiveness (see Table 12.4 for scores/rankings and sources).

Ruling elites in these countries are less inclined to allow political competition than rulers in other African countries. In large part, this is because once the economies contract, oil becomes the only game in town. Access to oil revenues only comes with possession of the central state. This is due to the nature of the oil industry, in which international oil companies negotiate contracts directly with governments, and the international legal regime, which specifies that only a country’s sovereign ruler can gain access to oil rents. Therefore, losing control of the state means being set adrift in an economic system with no opportunities outside the oil industry. In this scenario, control over the central state apparatus becomes even more important than in other economies, and controlling the central state for long periods of time becomes the primary goal of incumbents. In their pursuit of power maintenance, rulers close the political system, militarize society, and further personalize political networks. As part of this personalization, leaders further undermine state institutions as they populate them with political cronies who support the ruling elite.

While they close the political system, the ruling elite in these countries head off potential opposition by co-opting emerging rival politicians and enmeshing them in patron-client relationships. This has been a pattern in Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. For the most part, the rulers have been able to effect these goals through manipulation, coercion and co-option. It is rare for them to hold on to power through violent repression, however. “Bongo may have had a poor head for development economics,” Ghazvinian writes, “but there is no denying that he is one of the shrewdest and most skilled politicians in Africa, if not the world. Using a combination of strategic alliances with foreign leaders and an impressive ability to buy the loyalty of potential opposition figures at home, Bongo has managed to remain Gabon’s president for nearly four decades, without resorting to brutality or violence.”

The rulers of these countries further attempt to buy social peace by influencing the media and the intellectual community, that is, societal opinion makers, to support the regime, and by providing some degree of public services to these and other influential communities. The most stable of the authoritarian oil regimes have been Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and Gabon; followed by the Republic of Congo (before the civil wars of the 1990s).

When they cannot co-opt resistance, these leaders attempt to repress it. The human rights records in each of these countries are relatively poor, and active resistance in the Niger Delta and Cabinda region of Angola have been dealt with harshly by regimes in each country. Respect for civil liberties, political and economic freedoms have been on the rise in Africa since the mid-1990s, yet the ones that show the most significant increases are those without oil or other valuable mineral resources. When they can, leaders suppress electoral competition or entirely legislate it away. For example, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo were all de jure one party states for significant periods of time. When they could not prevent opposition parties from forming and contesting elections, the rulers undermine the electoral process by purchasing votes or buying the voices of public opinion makers. They sustained this repression by buying off political elites and reinforcing their tactics with military strength.
Table 12.4 Governance in African oil exporters

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
3 Data derived from the 2010 Failed States Index, accessible at Failed States Index: www.foreignpolicy.com. Ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable/best performing) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable/worst performing). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0–120.
4 World Bank Governance Indicators for 2009: info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi. These percentiles are from the top performing to the least performing countries; a percentage ranking of 20 means that 80% of countries surveyed performed better on that measure.
5 Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International: www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010. Corruption perception scores range from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). The rank is out of 178 countries.
Oil and policy process

Part of the process by which the rulers attempt to maintain power involves manipulating public policy processes, both to help provide patronage and to provide a cloak for illicit activities. As discussed previously, part of the state inversion process involved the compromise of the integrity of state institutions in order to facilitate the maintenance of personalized networks of power. This same dynamic also affects the quality of governance when considered in terms of policy process and outcomes.

Political decision-making is centralized in these countries, and the bureaucracies are staffed with cronies of the regime. Public goods are provided primarily to the clients of the state, rather than to the society at large, further impacting on the quality of life for the average citizen in these countries. To give just one concrete example, “Under Obiang, Equatorial Guinea became a classic criminal state, with many top-level institutions involved in various illicit behaviors. … Few oil rents have been invested in programs to improve the quality of life for the people, with spending on health care services averaging a mere 1.23% of GDP.”

This is part of the reason that oil proceeds distort economic development: the leaders direct resources to the communities that keep them in power. The mass of citizens are not within those networks, and therefore do not benefit from most of the goods that the government provides. There is little incentive to provide broad-based development because it could lead to the development of an independent entrepreneurial class that might demand reform.

Finally, the regimes seek to reduce transparency by cloaking the policy process (budget allocations, spending decisions, awards of government contracts, etc.) because transparency would undermine their ability to dispense patronage. The end result, as Hazel McFerson describes it, is that the combination of mineral resources and patrimonial regimes has made these regimes virtually synonymous with bribery. Public services are unevenly provided and of extremely poor quality; civil servants are so poorly paid (by design) that they have to resort to petty corruption in order to survive; the institutions intended to provide checks and balances within the system are badly under-resourced and totally lacking in independence; and the judicial and law enforcement systems function by bribes or as agents of the regime.

Corruption

The above statement is borne out by comparing governance indicators across African countries with different resource endowments and different types of resources. Table 12.5 shows that governance indicators are not much worse in countries rich in resources as compared to those

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Category</th>
<th>Voice and Accountability</th>
<th>Political Stability</th>
<th>Government Effectiveness</th>
<th>Regulatory Qualities</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Control of Corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource-rich countries</td>
<td>–0.8</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
<td>–0.8</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
<td>–0.9</td>
<td>–0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-exporting countries</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
<td>–1.0</td>
<td>–1.0</td>
<td>–1.0</td>
<td>–1.1</td>
<td>–1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral-exporting countries</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-scarce countries</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, p. 108 (AfDB is drawing on World Bank governance indicator analyses from 2007). The governance scores range from –2.5 to +2.5.
without, with the exception of the corruption indicators. Oil-rich countries, however, perform distinctly less well than mineral-rich countries on all the indicators, whether of the openness of the political system, the quality of government performance, or the measures of corruption. The data shows that the oil-producing countries score lowest in voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The differences are stark.

Why is this? Easy access to oil rents acts as a substitute for quality governance, and the regimes undermine political openness in order to help retain control over the central state. When they do not have to rely on taxation to support government expenditure, and when they do not have to please international donors, these countries are more free to shirk their governance duties and manipulate the political system for their own ends. The key issue is that natural resource revenues tend to replace more stable and sustainable revenue streams, exacerbating problems of transparency and accountability. With sizeable resource revenues, the reliance on non-resource taxes and other government incomes decreases. This tends to free natural resource-exporting governments from the types of citizen demands for fiscal transparency and accountability that arise when people pay taxes directly to the government. Thus, natural resource export earnings actually sever important links between the people and their governments, links related to popular interests and control mechanisms. The larger the public purse, the less noticeable the leakage to interest groups. Rent seeking is greater in resource-rich countries because wealth is concentrated in the public sector (or possibly in a small number of companies). Therefore, the bulk of the rents created in these economies are channelled by bureaucrats, the majority of whom are members of the politically dominant groups.39

The ease of access to oil rents without any effort from the government is one aspect of the classic rentier phenomenon; governments earn revenue without engaging in any productive activities.

Not only does this substitution of oil rents for taxes sever the accountability link, it also reduces the need for governments to operate effectively or efficiently. The governments become less concerned with developing alternate revenue streams and regulating their own spending, leading to the cycles of overspending on inappropriate projects discussed previously. “Politically, the regimes need tight control in order to appropriate the resource revenue. Economically, they have no need to free up their economies to attract foreign investors, nor do they need foreign aid or have an interest in sound economic policies. This contrasts with resource-poor but well-managed countries (Lesotho, Namibia, Senegal, and others) which recognize the need to create an investment- and business-friendly environment to boost economic performance.”40 In effect, oil rents insulate the governments from social pressures, weaken the accountability link to citizens, and skew the distribution of public goods. These governments substitute popular legitimacy with purchased loyalty, and they undermine state institutions in order to guarantee the perpetuation of this system.

In contrast, countries without such revenues are either reliant on foreign aid or their own economies to generate revenue. In both cases, the resource-poor countries are more vulnerable to external and internal pressures to increase government efficiency, improve services, and reduce corruption and mismanagement. It must be acknowledged that for a limited time and under certain conditions, foreign aid can have the same effect as oil revenue: access to income with little effort, through channels that are largely hidden from the general public. Foreign aid, however, is more likely to be subject to political or other conditionalities than oil rents, and this is a critical difference. Foreign aid flows are fickle; they ebb and flow with international attention, donor whims and priorities. Additionally, while donors will impose political and economic conditionalities on aid recipients, they almost never pressure their national oil companies to stop
doing business with governments that perform poorly or behave badly (obviously there are exceptions like the divestment campaigns for companies operating in South Africa in the 1980s and oil embargoes against Iraq in the 1990s). Overall, however, oil income is less subject to the laws of political supply and demand than foreign aid.

**Oil and conflict**

Despite these strong links between oil and authoritarianism, corruption, and the insulation of the state from societal pressures, the oil industry does not necessarily make the African petroleum exporters more peaceful than other countries. Four of the largest oil exporters have both been relatively authoritarian and experienced significant conflicts that range from low-level insurgencies to outright civil wars: Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Angola and Sudan. There is no set pattern for the type of conflict that they experience. Oil rents triggered conflict in the Niger Delta and the Republic of Congo, while they facilitated and lengthened conflict in Angola and Sudan.

In Nigeria, the insurgency in the Niger Delta began in the 1990s as localized movement to protest environmental degradation in the mangrove swamps through which run the oil pipelines. Over time, the movement developed into a multi-ethnic insurgency that agitates for an increased share of oil revenue and compensation for environmental destruction. “Oil bunkering,” the illegal siphoning of petroleum from the miles of pipes that crisscross the delta, helps to finance the insurgents (as does ransom from kidnapped oil industry workers). Political power in Nigeria has historically been centered in the executive, but it has been one of the least politically-stable countries, experiencing multiple rounds of coups, counter-coups, and short-lived civilian regimes. Nigeria is currently in its longest period of civilian rule (beginning in 1999), though because fiscal control is still centered at the national capital, the insurgency remains.

In the Republic of Congo, a 28-year period of one-party rule under Dennis Sassou-Nguesso came to a close when multiparty elections were held in 1992. The elections were highly contested, as control over the country’s patron-client network was at stake. Congo-Brazzaville then experienced three short conflicts (1993, 1997, 1998 and 2002), as elites vied for political power and access to oil rents outside of the new political system. Each of these was short, and the goal was state capture, rather than a push for regional autonomy or asymmetric revenue sharing as experienced in Nigeria. This was because while ethnic and regional rivalries factored heavily in the conflicts, the combatants desired to control the state and its access to oil profits. The oil industry in the Republic of Congo is entirely offshore, and the enclave nature protected it from the fighting. It also meant, however, that fighting focused in the capital city, Brazzaville, rather than penetrating into rural areas.

In Angola, in contrast, a long-running civil war was tied more directly to regional and ethnic rivalries, rather than competition to control the state and the oil empire it would bequeath. In this case, oil revenue helped to fuel the war, enabling it to persist past the end of the Cold War and the attendant reduction in foreign patronage. Southern Africa’s parallel case of civil war, Mozambique, negotiated an end to its civil war in 1992, in large part because the combatants had run out of means to fund their fight. The comparison between Mozambique and Angola is instructive, because without mineral resource of any kind, in Mozambique the rebel movement did not have the ability to re-engage in conflict when it lost elections in 1992. In Angola, however, both the government and opposition had access to commodities that could sustain their war machines (oil for the former and diamonds for the latter). In this case the negotiated settlement failed when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the rebel União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), refused to accept defeat in the transitional elections of 1992. Fuelled by access to diamond revenue, Savimbi re-launched the war rather than cede power to Eduard dos Santos and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA – People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

Unlike in the Republic of Congo, the Angolan civil war was not instigated by competition to control the access to oil revenue. Oil proceeds were critical, however, for example in enabling the MPLA government to wage a brutal, destructive and unpopular war. The MPLA enmeshed the Angolan military in a web of lucrative oil concessions, ensuring their loyalty and continued willingness to fight to support the MPLA regime. In a similar vein, access to diamond revenue helped the rebel UNITA to finance its war efforts. UNITA, however, had to rely on conscripted labor to extract the diamonds from the alluvial fields and diamond mines, rendering UNITA more vulnerable to population pressures, displacements and more reliant on coercion than the MPLA. The oil enclave economy was rarely affected by the conflict itself, while UNITA had to retain control over the diamond fields in order to maintain the ability to fight. This affected both the goals of the organizations and the patterns of the fighting. Finally, reflecting the fact that while the combatants did wish to rout each other and claim leadership of the whole country, after a while the MPLA and UNITA settled into a somewhat stable division of power and territory delineated by their resource bases. Once this happened in the mid-1980s, most of the fighting occurred in the borderlands between the territories where each held sway. When attacks ventured farther, UNITA would aim to take the capital city of Luanda, while the MPLA would hit out at both the rebel headquarters and the diamond fields.44 Aside from the civil war, Angola also faces a secessionist movement in the far-northern Cabinda region, which is physically separated from the rest of Angola and is the location whose offshore oil fields generate approximately 70% of Angola’s oil exports.

The last case of oil-related conflict in the countries surveyed in this chapter is the Sudanese civil war. Here, an extremely complex conflict between the northern and southern regions of the country began in the 1960s (the Anya Nya rebellion), died down by 1973, and erupted again in the early 1980s into a larger war that pitted a united south against the northern ruling regime. In the second phase of the war oil was a factor, though not the only one: while oil deposits had been discovered along the line demarcating the north and south in the 1970s, the conflict prevented the full development of an oil industry as few companies would risk the capital investment. What was critical to aspects of the conflict was that most of the oil deposits were located just south of the border between the north and south. Southern secessionism was revitalized by the knowledge of potential oil proceeds, even though actual development of the oil industry only began in 1999. Once exploited, the new oil industry further complicated an already complex conflict, and added an international dimension whereby self-interested third parties (companies and governments) aided the various sides in return for being granted lucrative oil concessions.45

Writing in 2002, as the final negotiations were beginning, the International Crisis Group assessed that the expansion of oil development had complicated the search for peace, raised the stakes of the war and given both sides an increased commitment to the battlefield. Any equitable peace deal would require oil revenue sharing. The government enjoyed a rapidly increasing defence budget since 1999 and improving relations with countries eager to develop lucrative oil contracts. Despite strong rhetorical support for religious fundamentalism, maintaining the unity of the country and keeping control of the oilfields was not its predominant objective. Oil rents did not directly impact the conflict, although they were part of the strategic calculations in why the north did not want to allow the south the right to
choose to secede, and why the southern Sudanese were confident that they could be economically viable when they achieved independence. Once the conflict began its final phase of negotiations in the early 2000s, the process of oil development complicated the process.46

The relationship between oil and conflict in Sudan, therefore, represents a fourth distinct dynamic. While control over oil rent did not ignite this longstanding conflict, knowledge of the resource and the anticipated spoils helped to entrench the fighting and complicate the peace process.

Conclusion

Overall, the relationship of oil to politics and economics in African countries so far has not been a positive one for the average citizen or the quality of governance. The sub-Saharan African oil exporters demonstrate a set of state-society relations that are deeply affected by their governing regimes’ reliance on oil rents. As described throughout this chapter, access to oil revenue in an enclave economy undermines the links between state and society. Without the need to tax, the governments have no obligation to citizens. They govern, therefore, in the interests of those within the patron-client networks and leave the rest behind. While this inevitably creates social unrest, most of the leaders are insulated from social pressure and discontent because of their close relationships with their military forces, who are part of the patronage networks, and because of the strategic use of oil revenue to co-opt opposition. This leads to a pattern of politics in which oil rents are distributed to specific groups and public goods provided on a selective basis, all in the effort to maintain political, and hence economic, power.

In these countries, control of the central state for long periods of time becomes the main and overriding goal of incumbents. This is because the nature of the extraction technology (capital intensive and requiring huge investments in exploration, platform development and pipeline construction) and the international political regime that requires contracts be made with representatives of sovereign states, concentrates oil revenues at the national tier and in the central government. The enclave economy associated with oil production further focuses attention on maintaining control of the state and makes it easier to maintain such control through corruption and state inversion.

The end result of these dynamics is to make the attainment and retention of political power the ultimate goal for the oil exporters. Once in power, leaders attempt to stay there, so that several of the regimes are characterized by extreme longevity in the executive and further manipulations of governance to maintain that power. These manipulations lead to trends towards authoritarianism, militarization, and the further personalization of office as strategies to retain power.

Over time, these states become less able to process conflicts. With the regimes heavily invested in maintaining the status quo, and with bureaucracies that have been sapped of all independent capacity, rulers lose their ability to process conflicts. When oil busts hit, and patronage resources are scrapped, these regimes become particularly vulnerable to popular uprisings. In these times, even those within the patronage networks may seek to realign them, and those outside of the networks are more likely to attempt to change the power regime altogether. In some ways, the Niger Delta is an example of a bottom-up challenge that successive regimes have been unable to quell. Over time, it has developed and evolved and become a much more significant challenge to the Nigerian state than it was in the early 1990s, when the movement was limited to a few mobilized, yet localized, ethnic groups demanding more rights (the Ogoni People’s Movement, for example).
When conflicts break out, they are often centered around obtaining control of the central state. This means that conflicts where oil is a decisive factor will tend to be shorter than when other resources are present. If it becomes obvious that the insurgents cannot take the capital, they become more amenable to accepting concessions from the government (being bought off with oil rents) as the successive combatants in the Republic of Congo demonstrated. When oil is present with other resources, as in Angola, then the dynamic shifts entirely and conflicts are likely to rage for longer. In these situations, the various groups are less vulnerable to international sanctions and economic pressures, as long as they can export their saleable resource.

This also points to a difference in the politics of oil that is related to whether the resource is located onshore or offshore. Onshore oil is more difficult to hide from public scrutiny (not impossible, of course), and is more vulnerable to local conflict. In the future, many of the new oil fields that are under exploration are located onshore: within Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia, for example. It is possible that the extractive industries in these countries may be less cloaked from the public and therefore less inimical to good governance, transparency, and democracy. The failed attempt to prevent the misuse of oil revenue in Chad (see endnote 13) does not provide a positive example, however. It remains to be seen how the new oil states will develop.

Notes

1 The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s own and do not reflect official positions of the United States Government.
4 In July 2011, Southern Sudan became an independent country, splitting from the north. Because this chapter largely refers to events preceding this, it uses “Sudan” throughout.
5 In the coming decade, a significant number of newly-discovered oil deposits are expected to be brought into the production line. As new technologies for oil extraction and rising prices of oil make previously inaccessible, or economically unfeasible, deposits exploitable, many more African countries are expected to begin oil exports. These include discoveries in East Africa, where deposits are both onshore and offshore (Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, and potentially even Somalia), West Africa (Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Mauritania). See Nick Wadhams, “Is East Africa the Next Frontier for Oil,” *Time* March 10, 2010 (www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1970726,00.html), and John Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil* (New York: Harcourt, Inc, 2007), particularly chapter four, “Instant Emirates.”
8 For brief reviews of the oil sector in each of these countries, see “Oil and Gas in Africa,” compiled by Mbeni Information Services: www.mbeni.com/index/oil/ga/p0005.htm.
10 In 2007 the NNPC was ranked the eighth-largest oil company in terms of reserves and production and Sonangol the 24th. See www.petrostrategies.org/Links/Worlds_Largest_Oil_and_Gas_Companies_Sites.htm; the website is drawing from data provided by the *Oil and Gas Journal*: “OGJ 200/100”,*Oil & Gas Journal*, September 15, 2008.
13 The Chad to Cameroon oil pipeline was an innovative attempt to create a socially-responsible, conflict and corruption-free extraction industry in landlocked Chad, widely thought to have failed in its goal to prevent the Chadian government from using oil revenues to procure arms and maintain a corrupt and authoritarian government. For a variety of resources on the pipeline, see the case study prepared by J. Paul Martin at the University of Columbia: www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/martin/chad-cam.html.

14 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, p. 29. Total exports for West, East and Southern Africa (in million metric tons) were 232.7; 217.6 MMT of this was from West Africa. North Africa sent 59% of its oil to Europe and 20.6% to the USA. Only 6% of North African oil went to China.

15 AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, p. 70.

16 AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, p. 73.

17 AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, p. 59.

18 AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, p. 97.


23 Hodges, p. 150; Soderling, p. 118.


25 Ghazvinian, Untapped, p. 119.

26 Ghazvinian, Untapped, p. 108.

27 Shaxson, "New Approaches to Volatility."

28 See Herbst for the modern "standard" on state building in Africa; Jackson and Rosberg are the original.


31 In 2001, the Cabinda oil fields accounted for 70 percent of Angola’s crude oil production (Hodges). Cabinda, which is geographically dislocated from the rest of Angola, has a separatist movement that, unsurprisingly, demands either complete independence or increased autonomy and a greater share of the oil revenues stemming from the region.


35 Ghazvinian, Untapped, p. 108.


39 AfDB and the AU, Oil and Gas in Africa, pp. 105–6.


41 For a concise review of the relationships between resources and conflict, see Philippe Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts (New York, NY: Routledge, March 2006).

43 Englebert and Ron, “Primary Commodities and War.”


References


Wadhams, Nick. “Is East Africa the Next Frontier for Oil?” *Time* (March 10, 2010); accessed at www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1970726,00.html (February 8, 2011).