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European Union-United Nations co-operation in conflict and development

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Vassiliki N. Koutrakou
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European Union-United Nations co-operation in conflict and development

Vassiliki N. Koutrakou

Introduction

One might see European Union (EU)-United Nations (UN) co-operation in developmental policy as distinct from EU-UN co-operation in international relations from the foreign policy and security angle. There has been significant growth in both areas since the early 1990s particularly, but it is furthermore the contention of this chapter that they are growing increasingly interlinked and that although one can, on the face of it, distinguish between mechanisms and agreements dedicated primarily to one or the other area, interaction between areas of operation and policy, not just between organizations, is becoming intrinsic in their chances of effectiveness. This chapter, therefore, sets out in tandem the main steps that have been taken, in terms of mechanisms and processes, in the context of the institutional framework of the two organizations, examines a representative sample of the range of joint ventures on which they have been embarking, and seeks some insights as to the effectiveness and future directions in EU-UN co-operation.

Platform of dialogues

Although a large number of regional international organizations mushroomed from the 1950s, their preoccupation was largely geared to domestic concerns of conflict and development and very few dabbled in the domain of resolution or management of international conflict and the synergies between this and development policy. It was via the instruments of the UN that these were chiefly addressed.

By the end of the 20th century and during the first decade of the 21st century, however, several regionally based international organizations, predominantly on the European stage, had started to concern themselves more directly with such issues for reasons connected, in broad terms, with increasingly border-crossing economic and trade imperatives, growing foreign policy co-operation, stronger regional consciousness and transnational activism, changes in the global political and security scene post-USSR, post-Yugoslavia and post the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, which challenged traditional forms of co-operation, global leadership and the primacy of the UN, and countless other, more specific concerns (Halliday 2009).
The EU had, at the turn of the century, the longest history of any regional international organization with mature policies and instruments regarding international aid and development, yet only fledgling common foreign and security policies. Moreover, the platform of dialogues between itself and other international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the UN, was broad and diverse but sparse in essentials, rich in joint statements of intent but lacking in organization and effective co-ordination (Tardy 2007). The late 1990s and early 2000s saw an increase in active co-ordination between Europe-based international bodies such as the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, etc., as well as, just as importantly, with other regionally based organizations around the world and the UN, in a renewed effort to address issues of conflict and development more holistically and efficiently than before.

Literature on the EU is one of the most flourishing areas of politics, reflecting the very nature of European integration as an ongoing ‘process’ which brings, with every year that passes, new member-states, new politico-economic rebalancing, new areas of competence, new directions. This gives EU literature a short shelf life, needing constant updating, but also a considerable wealth of areas constantly developing and offering themselves for investigation. No literature on the EU, however general purpose (see for example, McCormick, Bomberg, Cini, Hix, Hay, Bache, etc.), can afford nowadays to occupy itself with solely an introspective look at the organization’s history, institutions and internal policies, as was the case in the 1960s–80s. The international dimension of the EU as a global actor has been gaining ground exponentially and its interactions with other global actors, organizations and the UN, at the very least, have been included more and more prominently in general publications on the subject, and this increasingly forms the principal focus of publications and debates dedicated to these very aspects (see for example, Cameron, Wouters, Tonra, McCormick, Howorth, Koutrakou, Holland, etc.). Diez and Pace, for example, explore the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and its efforts to find ways to play a role as a force for good in dealing with international conflict, at the same time seeking by way of a by-product, the better shaping of its own identity (Diez and Pace 2007). Hugh Miall argues that the EU does indeed have an important role to play in peace-building alongside the UN (Miall 2007).

Most regional international organizations state, as part of their constitutional treaties or charters, aims and objectives which adhere and commit to the fundamental principles of the UN, particularly with respect to stimulating and preserving peace, security, prosperity and development.

The EU has been at the forefront of these developments and its successive treaties, particularly since the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1991 and right up to the latest Lisbon Treaty, state these very objectives explicitly. Not only is the EU committed to multilateralism and to the overarching legitimizing primacy of the UN, but also it shares the UN’s general understanding in terms of philosophy and modus operandi which combines the use of ‘soft’ (Nye 1990) and military power as a force for good. The EU’s handling of international conflict and development has practically been the blueprint for the term ‘soft power’, using to best advantage its strengths as an area of political stability and a world economic power, by giving financial aid and engaging in development programmes, while leading by example and spreading its gospel of political democratization, human rights and respect for international law, and tying its interlocutors in political dialogue, wrapped up in mutually attractive lucrative trade and association agreements and, on European soil at least, utilizing EU accession as another mechanism for the expansion of its stabilizing influence and prosperity. It has also, however, been developing a military capability since the 1990s suitable to underpin response needs which cannot be addressed by soft power alone (K.E. Smith 2000). Its interests lead it to engage,
particularly in terms of aid and trade but more recently also in peace-keeping, beyond European borders in most parts of the world that face a combination of conflict and development issues, particularly Africa, Asia and South America.

The UN, on the other hand, has faced a variety of challenges in the last two decades, ranging from serious financial inadequacies which inevitably curtail its ability to act, to reforming and adapting to the unipolar US-dominated post-1989 world where its responses have occasionally been considered insufficient, outdated and feeble and its authority ignored, as in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq, where the UN was bypassed and UN Security Council sanctioning was not solicited before US-led coalitions undertook military action. Although peace-keeping and conflict management have been the most publicized, traditionally, of the UN’s operations, the majority of its work and budget is in aid and all manner of developmental policies covering most parts of the planet.

Therefore, in terms of broad agenda, areas of operations around the world and supply/demand of economic and other operational resources, the EU and the UN have a lot in common, and many complementarities to exploit (Hansen 2007). This does not mean that developing ways in—and agencies with—which to consult and co-operate has been swift or straightforward. Moreover, although different layers of interdependence and even interaction between the EU and the UN have emerged, as will become apparent, these have often been fragmented and patchy.

**Structures and mechanisms**

The EU is an important partner for the UN (Degrand-Guillaud 2009). Its financial contributions to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other agencies are the most obvious reason; the EU member states and European Community (EC) together are the largest financial contributors to the UN. In 2006 around 36.6% of the UN’s regular budget was provided by EU member states, rising to around 38.9% in 2007. The EC and the EU member states together provide more than half of the official development assistance (55.6%) for global development aid. Furthermore, with two EU countries permanent members of the UN Security Council, and others holding usually at least one other non-permanent Security Council member position, plus all 27 member states of the EU representing more than one-eighth of the 192 equal member votes in the UN General Assembly, consensus among EU members in international affairs could potentially mean that the EU would be a force to be reckoned with within the UN policy-making and agenda-setting structures (UNRIC 2007). Indeed, an insightful paper by Paul Luif, published by the Institute for Security Studies, examines voting behaviour by EU member states in the General Assembly and finds that it displays convergence over time, on many issues, for instance on the Palestinian Autonomous Areas, and this even includes more recent EU member states, indicating a tentative emergence of a regional bloc vote on an increasing number of issues within the UN (Luif 2003). Karen Smith investigates how this applies more specifically in debates on human rights (K.E. Smith 2006a).

The increase of EC contributions to UNDP over the last decade is apparent in Figure 20.1, peaking in 2005 as a consequence of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, and remaining at a significant level since.

Even in the depths of world economic recession, EU spending remained healthy enough, bankrolling its different activities across a variety of hotspots. Table 20.1 shows European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) spending in 2008 across different regions suffering from disasters or ongoing conflicts, some of which will be looked at in more detail below. Moreover, Table 20.2 demonstrates that EuropeAid contributions to the UNDP in 2009 may
have been below the 2004–06 boom years shown in Figure 20.1, but remained on a par with pre-‘credit crunch’ 2007 figures.

In recent years EU-UN co-operation has gained new momentum as the common ground between the two has expanded—notably through a series of agreements and the rapid development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—to broaden its remit across

Table 20.1 ECHO assistance by geographical region in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit/Region</th>
<th>in '000</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>936,642</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/1: Africa, Caribbean, Pacific</strong></td>
<td>551,847</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan and Chad</td>
<td>197,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>167,897</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and southern Africa, Indian Ocean</td>
<td>126,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>39,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>21,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/2: New Independent States, Middle East, Mediterranean</strong></td>
<td>152,635</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, Mediterranean</td>
<td>124,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia</td>
<td>27,775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/3: Asia and Latin America</strong></td>
<td>192,327</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>94,257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East and East Asia</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>34,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-geographic instruments</strong></td>
<td>39,833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building, grants and services, DREF13 decision, other</td>
<td>7,021</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expenditure</td>
<td>7,812</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

matters concerning not only trade and development, humanitarian assistance and protection of
the global environment, but also the tackling of refugees and immigration issues, combating
poverty and diseases, the promotion of human rights and the strengthening of accountability of
governments, the fight against terrorism, drugs-trafficking and international crime, conflict
prevention, crisis management, peace-building and post-conflict development (United Nations
2006). In this context the EU has subscribed to the notion of ‘effective multilateralism’,
capsulated in the European Security Strategy of December 2003, which declares that
‘strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively,
is a European priority’ (European Commission 2003d).

Table 20.2 EuropeAid financial contributions to 10 top UN bodies in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN body</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>269.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>256.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>121.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Organization (UNO)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>892.34</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EuropeAid 2010.

Representation

The persona of the EU in terms of its representation as an actor in international affairs is a
confusing matter. Although it is a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with
the European Commission representing all member states, the EU only has observer/participant
status in the G8. Although it does not have single representation or voting rights in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF surveys tend to conduct single surveys of the eurozone
area, and since the euro succeeded both the French Franc and the Deutsche Mark in the IMF’s
basket of currencies determining Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the Single European currency
has had a stronger, more influential impact over IMF operations. Relations between eurozone
countries and the IMF as individuals and as a collective became further tested and entangled as a
result of the Greek banking crisis in 2010. In terms of the EU’s role within the UN, the reasons
for confusion are no fewer with different Commissioners (External Relations, Development and
Aid), Directorates-General, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy,
several European Parliament and other Committees and, last but not least, the Presidency and
the General Affairs and External Relations Council to contend with, but it is true to say that its
role in it as a distinct entity has been enhanced significantly over the last two decades.

The EU has varying statuses at different UN bodies. In the early 1960s as Jan Wouters traces,
the European Commission only just acquired an information office in New York, to be
upgraded, a decade later to the official EC delegation to the UN as the EC was granted
observer status in the General Assembly (Wouters 2007). Nowadays, there are six such EC
deleagations at the UN: one in New York (accredited *inter alia* to the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council, UNDP and the UN Children’s Fund—UNICEF); one in Geneva (dealing with specialized bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights—OHCHR, UN High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR, the International Labour Organization—ILO, World Health Organization—WHO); one in Vienna (accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA, UN Office on Drugs and Crime—UNODC); one in Paris (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization—UNESCO); one in Rome (accredited to the Food and Agriculture Organization—FAO, World Food Programme—WFP and International Fund for Agricultural Development—IFAD); and one in Nairobi (accredited to the UN Environment Programme—UNEP and Habitat, the UN Human Settlements Programme). The EU Council has Liaison Offices in both of the UN’s main headquarters in New York and Geneva as information and support bases for the member states, in particular the EU Presidency, as day-to-day operations at the UN criss-cross with EU business. These offices enable practically and facilitate crucially co-ordination among EU member states.

Despite the proliferation of EU delegations, their formal status is mostly that of observer, with a tendency to move towards membership. However, full membership is limited to FAO thus far, with full participant—if not actually ‘member’—status at UN Conferences on the Environment (such as the December 2009 Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference and the Commission on Sustainable Development), due to the EU’s well-established and especially cohesive policy persona in these global matters, as well as in WHO and UNESCO.

The EU’s Development Fund, as old as the EC itself, came into being in 1958 and is outside the main EU budget. This poses opportunities as well as challenges, as it is not constrained by the usual wrangles between member states over agreeing the EU budget, and is vested with more flexibility, yet is subject to separate wrangling and in difficult times can be squeezed, making planning difficult. ECHO was founded in 1992 and since then has been distributing more than €700m. of aid per year, co-operating with over 200 partners, including other NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN agencies like WFP and UNHCR through annual Strategic Partnerships Dialogues (SPDs) (ECHO 2008).

EuropeAid came into force in the last decade due to the very need for more efficient dispensation of EU aid as well as the need for better co-ordination with other bodies. It identifies needs, carries out feasibility studies, prepares the necessary financial decisions and controls, monitoring and evaluating processes in dialogue with their partners, including the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank (European Commission 2009d).

Well over 1,000 co-ordination meetings take place at the EU’s UN delegations each year on a variety of issues, yet by the end of 2007 the High Representative for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, had only addressed the UN Security Council four times and the European Commission once. Furthermore, the only two European permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, have on the whole felt little compulsion to conduct their policy stance at the UN based on anything other their own national agendas, affording only a weekly informative briefing to the EU’s permanent representation at the UN. As Drieskens, Marchesi and Kerremans (2007) investigate, although other EU member states have frequently occupied the two-year non-permanent Security Council seats, for example Italy and Belgium over the 2007–09 period, their preparedness to use this opportunity to promote a more consistent ‘EU’ position at the UN has varied. Significantly, these last two did undertake initiatives to ‘Europeanize’ their membership of the Security Council somewhat, allowing them to work also as a vehicle for enhanced two-way consultation between the organizations, certainly more than previous members had done.

It is beyond doubt that the frequency in meetings between different layers of EU and UN officials has been increasing. EU representatives now hold annual meetings with the UN
Secretary-General at ministerial level in New York. In addition, it is now standard practice for the UN Deputy Secretary-General and other senior UN officials to visit EU institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg for consultations with, for example, the EU Political and Security Committee or Members of the European Parliament, while daily working contacts between the EU Council and Commission and the UN are also commonplace.

The extent and pace of increased consultation at different policy-making levels between the two organizations is partly subject to the demands for and processes of reform that they are both undergoing. There have, in recent years, been as many demands for reform of the UN as there have for the EU. At the UN lower levels, committee reshuffles are happening and more are afoot, but different visions of fairer representation at Security Council level remain irreconcilable, on the issue of an EU seat, as on others. The EU suffers from its own perennial problems of lack of consistent consensus on foreign policy, some of which are played out in public, in the full glare of publicity, like the Iraq war imbroglio, which in technical terms is also reflected in the multiplicity and complexity of organs conducting the EU’s foreign and security policy. There is, nevertheless, a growing number of cases where there is consensus and this, in turn, is likely to be reflected in the more streamlined CFSP mechanisms which, despite still requiring a case-by-case decision-making consensus, bring into being an EU President and a stronger High Representative for CFSP as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in 2007 and came into force in December 2009 after a lengthy two-year ratification process.

**Framework of agreements**

On the development front, the EU’s experience in developmental aid, in its own neighbourhood as well as in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean, and beyond, has meant a succession of agreements and instruments (Lomé, Cotonou, PHARE, TACIS, etc.). Along the way, lessons learnt from practice highlighted the limitations of hitherto EU models of developmental aid policy and its inefficiencies, as well as a broadening agenda which could no longer separate economic from socio-political goals, particularly with the rise in consciousness of issues such as human rights, refugee fallouts from conflicts, and terrorism (Maxwell and Engel 2003). The voices from the ‘Third World’ were becoming increasingly audible by the WTO’s Doha Summit in 2001, and it was obvious that despite a tapestry of strategies by nations and organizations like the EU world-wide, results were unsatisfactory and one of the most pressing needs was better co-ordination.

In September 2000 some 150 heads of state and government met at the UN Millennium Summit in New York and established the UN Millennium Declaration, setting out an agenda for international politics based on recognized global challenges. This conference also resulted in the eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with a rather ambitious 2015 deadline, which have since embodied the focal point for co-ordination of development policies, not just for the UN but for all international actors engaged in the process.

More recently, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 2008 Accra Agenda for Action are international agreements signed by over 100 ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials committing their countries and organizations to continuing to increase efforts in harmonizing, aligning and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators (www.oecd.org).

In the same year the EU’s Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness adopted the Paris Declaration. Indeed, the design of the Declaration was, at least in part, a result of the strong input provided by the EU. On 15–16 December 2005 the European Council presented the European Consensus on Development. A joint statement by the European Council, the European Parliament and
the European Commission, it reiterates a framework vision for EU development co-operation at both member state and community levels for poverty reduction, development based on European democratic values, good governance, human rights, and political, economic, social and environmental aspects, and the idea that developing countries are primarily responsible for their own development (European Union 2006).

The Consensus specifically identifies co-operation with the UN as a primary objective, with MDGs at the centre. In transition situations the EU commits to the linkage between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development within the framework of multilateral programmes such as the UN Peace Building Commission and pledges to enhance co-operation with the UN system, international financing institutions and other international organizations in order to increase the effectiveness of multilateral aid. A system of measurable goals and targets for the Consensus’s implementation are the responsibility of the European Commission.

On the foreign and security policy front the EU was still a novice in the 1990s when, with the ink still wet on the Maastricht Treaty parchment that launched the process of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU embarked on its first crucial adventure in the former Yugoslavia, quite unprepared for its many challenges (Nuttall 1993). Yet it is challenges such as these that reinforced the need to co-operate in these matters also with organizations like the UN, the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others. It is also conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia and further afield, in the Caucasus or in Africa, which highlight the need for foreign and security policies to work in tandem with development policies, as the causes and effects of the two areas can rarely be separated.

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Petersberg Tasks into the EU’s CFSP. These concerned humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management and peace-making. Part of this was the creation of a 60,000-strong ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ (RRF), pooling national units under joint command.

As the EU formulated its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), preparatory phases for EU-NATO co-operation began in parallel in the early 1990s and, after much negotiation, the relationship was properly formalized with the Berlin Plus agreement, signed in 2002 (Misiroli 2003). As it has evolved, the agreement consists of 15 sub-agreements, which essentially set out arrangements for NATO support to EU operations when NATO as a whole does not wish to be engaged. Meanwhile, the EU’s 2000 Treaty of Nice highlighted the ‘value of co-operation between the Union and the United Nations … as the Union develops its crisis-management and conflict-prevention capabilities’, and stated also that the ‘efforts made will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN or the OSCE’ (European Council 2000b).

The year 2003 saw the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Solana 2003) and the Battlegroups Concept, which, among other things, included military operational collaboration

Box 20.1 Millennium Development Goals
Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger
Achieving universal primary education
Promoting gender equality and empowering women
Reducing child mortality
Improving maternal health
Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Ensuring environmental sustainability
Global partnership-forging for development
between EU security forces and organizations such as the UN and the African Union (AU) in targeted joint deployment activities for peace-keeping, election monitoring, aid dispensation, etc.

In September 2003 the UN Secretary-General and the EU Presidency signed the ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’ which envisaged EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations and specific elements of implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, taking note of recent developments in EU-UN co-operation and identifying four main areas where further co-operation should be explored: planning, training, communication and best practices. A ‘joint consultative mechanism’, called a Steering Committee, was established at working level to enhance co-ordination in these four areas and to follow through with implementing the Joint Declaration.

**EU–UN co-operation in action**

The EU’s development policy finds itself at a crossroads particularly as its foreign and security policy persona strengthens and as it becomes apparent that a large number of developmental aid needs around the world are intrinsically linked with existing or potential inter-state or civil conflicts. Rising EU spending on development amounts to little if this is not managed effectively and for that reason the EU has embarked on multilateral co-operation in development alongside co-operation in peace-keeping, conflict prevention and post-conflict management. Some 15 of the 22 members of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD that signed the Paris Declaration are EU member states and therefore the Paris Declaration and the European Consensus together reflect to a great extent a new European thinking about development aid and the conditions required for it to be utilized efficiently.

In practice, although the destination of EU development aid remains overwhelmingly the same as before, predominantly African, Caribbean, Pacific and certain Asian and South American regions which have had long historical—post-colonial and trade—ties with European countries, the changes are mainly in the philosophy of the policy. This has most recently focused on operating in a more openly multilateral environment, addressing the inadequacies created by the huge variation in actual aid-giving principles and practice among EU member states, and an effort to reach a better commonality of approach, as well as in encouraging better coherence in goal-setting between donors and recipients, and enhanced co-ownership of processes, financing, monitoring and results by the recipients.

Operating in the field of peace-keeping and peace-making alongside aid-giving has been the newest frontier for the EU’s co-operative ventures with the UN. There follow some examples.

**Former Yugoslavia**

The early 1990s were a formidable testing ground for the fledgling, yet perhaps misguidedly over-ambitious CFSP. When the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia erupted, the EU tried its hand at deploying observers, initially withholding, then distributing massive amounts of aid in a variety of damage limitation efforts, instigating peace conferences in The Hague and Geneva, subsequently co-operating with the UN in putting together promising, yet quickly and easily unravelling cease-fires and a variety of peace-keeping and joint mediation initiatives. Overall its efforts were met with half-hearted backing and therefore limited success in the Croatian and Slovenian independence campaigns, with much criticism on Bosnia crisis action and Kosovo crisis inaction, and the eventual need for NATO action to end the fighting in Bosnia and later in Kosovo (Ginsberg 2001). By contrast, the later re-evaluation of the EU’s strategic capabilities and objectives led to more specifically targeted operations (Van den Broek 1996) in the
aftermath of the Yugoslavian conflicts, operations like CONCORDIA, the EUFOR ALTHeA and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EULEX in Kosovo, PROXIMA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, etc.

CONCORDIA in 2003 was the first instance where EU troops took over from NATO forces in maintaining peace in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and was essentially a conflict prevention operation. By contrast, successful post-conflict peace-building missions included: operation PROXIMA, which succeeded CONCORDIA in 2004 to ensure law and order as well as interior ministry reforms in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. EUFOR ALTHeA, the EU force which succeeded NATO peace-keeping forces in Bosnia in 2004; and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), born out of a decision by EU foreign ministers, in 2002, to take over policing and the oversight of justice and home affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, relieving the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), over the period 2003–05 (Osland 2004). EULEX, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, is one of the more recent operations deploying police and civilian manpower by way of continuing international civil presence in Kosovo as envisaged by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Extensive inter-institutional co-operation between the EU and the UN was necessary in the planning phases of these operations, the collocation of EU and UN teams in Sarajevo, information sharing, and the double-hatting of leading officials like Sven Christian Frederiksen, IPTF Commissioner and Head of the EUPM Planning Team, and then also EUPM Commissioner, as well as the subsequent post-handover maintenance of co-operation through liaison officers.

These, among other successful operations in the region, were accompanied by a range of developmental aid instruments, substantial investment and widespread engagement in political, economic and cultural dialogue between the EU and the emergent independent republics, association agreements, and roadmaps to eventual membership of the EU (Coppieters and Huysseune 2003), the latter of which reached completion in 2004 for Slovenia, with Croatia being the next impending new member (Kamov 2006).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Outside European borders the most notable successful test of EU-UN co-operation is Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Derblom, Hagström and Schmidt 2008). Artemis was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003 and by the Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003. Based on this UN mandate, an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) was created and the EU was asked by the UN to undertake it, on its behalf. Thus Artemis was a subcontracted autonomous military operation in the north-eastern part of the DRC (Ituri, city of Bunia), conducted at the request of the UN, and planned and deployed in close consultation with it (Major 2008). The leadership of the force undertook to report to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the mandate, and Javier Solana addressed the Security Council on behalf of the EU to that effect. It is noteworthy that as part of this new modus operandi, one or more EU countries undertake a special responsibility for these collaborative ventures between the EU and organizations such as the UN, and for Artemis it was France that acted as ‘framework nation’, playing a crucial role in terms of planning, political control, strategic direction and implementation of operations (Tardy 2005).

Following the formal end of Operation Artemis the EU’s involvement continued in the DRC in the form of developmental assistance and aid for civilian crisis management: a programme of strategic support amounting to €205m. adopted in 2003, and the creation of a Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) in 2004. The EU also responded to UN calls
for reinforcing its Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) force, by providing it with access to the EU Satellite Centre’s capabilities, without, however, deploying further EU member states’ assets on the ground. EU-UN co-operation on Artemis and its aftermath was considered a success by both organizations and formed a solid precedent for further co-operation. Nevertheless, it highlighted certain boundaries in the framework of this kind of co-operation. The initial request clearly originated with the UN and the EU accepted the invitation, though maintaining control of the subcontracted mission, retaining political and military leadership, and offering developmental aid and limited targeted operational support once the UN force took over, stopping clearly short of accepting to volunteer EU forces to be deployed under UN command. Nevertheless, in 2005 the UN again asked the EU to help safeguard the first elections to be held in the DRC for 45 years, in 2006, and the European Council approved a further EU contingent of 1,500–2,000 (EUFOR RD Congo), which effectively succeeded EUPOL KINSHASA and successfully supported the 16,000-strong UN Blue Helmets force over a period of four months (Górka-Winter 2007; Arloth and Seidensticker 2007). In parallel to this gesture, which has nevertheless attracted criticism for having been ‘symbolic’ and lacklustre due to its small size and delays in deployment, the EU also supported UN initiatives financially through, for example, shouldering 80% of the cost of the 2006 elections, and in terms of development planning and guidance, through the office of its Special Representative of the EU for the African Lakes Region (SRSR) (Bures 2006; Hoebeke, Carette and Vlassenroot 2007). Throughout these phases, communication between the two organizations was deemed to have worked well overall at all levels, after initial hiccups, rendering the prospect of further collaborations of this kind an attractive one for both.

The Palestinian Autonomous Areas

The Middle East has long been a cauldron for conflicts involving strongly entrenched political, economic, cultural and religious interests by a variety of domestic actors—states, homeless nations in search of a state, tribes—but also one where international rivalries have been played out, from the colonization era of European empires, to the years of the Cold War East–West stand-off.

Since the end of the Cold War, with the USA as the only remaining superpower influencing the region, the EU has made repeated attempts to participate in multipartite dialogues over, in particular, the Arab–Israeli conflict. Apart from the general attractiveness of increasing the CFSP’s influence in international relations as an incentive, the elusive achievement of a peaceful resolution on the issue of the Palestinian Autonomous Areas is a long-standing thorn in the side of the EU. It implies considerable political instability in its ‘back yard’, with implications on trade, refugees and asylum seekers from the region, financial bleeding in terms of endless humanitarian assistance, etc. Despite many attempts by the EU to play the honest broker, aside from the humanitarian aid donor, the USA and Israel have generally frowned upon any EU involvement, seeing any balancing or neutral position as a pro-Arab stance.

Nevertheless, the EU has persevered, at least in bankrolling the peace process, by investing sizeably in the Gaza-based new Palestinian state and supporting the Palestinian Authority through a variety of instruments. The broadest of these are the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, which have both included the Palestinian Autonomous Areas, but there have also been more specific initiatives. In 2005 EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner announced €250m. in support to the Palestinians, to help rebuild shattered infrastructures and contribute to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the Palestinian Autonomous Areas, while 2006 saw the signing of a Financing Agreement with the Office of
the President of the Palestinian Authority to provide a three-year capacity-building programme for projects like financial information management, the improvement of the justice system, the creation and operation of credit guarantee funds for small and medium-sized enterprises, etc.

On the political front, the breakthrough for the EU’s involvement in the Middle East came after the 2002 Madrid Conference when the diplomatic Middle East Quartet of international actors was formed to promote the peace process in the Middle East (Dumper 2007). It was composed of the USA, Russia, the UN and the EU. Despite consultations with the other members of the Quartet, and representations to the Israeli Prime Minister and the President of the Palestinian Authority by the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, the practical progress achieved on the political front by the Quartet has thus far been almost negligible. As Jarat Chopra puts it: ‘Multiple actors and narrow considerations of a third party role have resulted in a convoluted set of relations and distorted proposals that can neither respond to realities on the ground nor effectively contribute to resolving the conflict’ (Chopra 2003: 36). However, the last decade has certainly seen closer collaboration between the UN and the EU beyond the ongoing humanitarian assistance front (Mohammed and Shahine 2008). Specific initiatives have included joint EU-UNDP electoral assistance, as well as promotion of civil society and good governance practices combating corruption, strengthening the rule of law, etc., through a governance strategy group which acts as the international aid co-ordination structure between donors and Palestinian Authority bodies.

However, despite all these efforts, ultimately the EU’s strong point in terms of the Arab–Israeli conflict remains its strong economic role in the region. As far as Israel is concerned this translates into a close and deepening trade partnership encapsulated by the EU-Israel Association Agreement, whereas in terms of the Palestinian side the bulk of it is expressed by the numerous aid and investment initiatives funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Office, increasingly in co-operation with, or even through, UN agencies.

**Darfur**

Rooted in age-old tribal and ethnic conflicts aggravated by the colonization/decolonization legacy, the Darfur conflict is a multi-causal one, stemming partly from the earlier conflict between Muslim northern and Christian (Animist) southern Sudan, spreading to the even more divided Arab/African north-sympathizing Darfur region, the situation of which was compounded by remoteness from and neglect by the capital Khartoum, and a host of grievous social and economic problems of poverty and backwardness (Tar 2005). By 2003 the re-inflamed armed conflict was reaching genocide proportions but international actors were slow to decide on a way to react. With the international community’s spotlight on the war in Iraq, the world attention did not seriously address the issue (Miller and Bock 2004) until, with nearly 80,000 dead and 1m. displaced people later, the conflict was declared the ‘world’s greatest humanitarian crisis’ by the UN’s Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, in March 2004. The UN Security Council finally passed Resolution 1564 in September 2004 and initiated a ‘Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’, but the Sudanese Government resisted any kind of outside interference by UN or other diplomats or peace-keeping forces. Thus it was not until 2007 that a UN-AU force (UNAMID) was finally deployed to address desperately needed humanitarian aid for the over 5m. people by then affected (Mubiala 2007). As little progress was made in terms of the conflict itself, the aid distribution has been conducted under extremely perilous conditions and with no end in sight.

Aside from peace-calling declarations, the EU’s initial involvement was tentative, welcoming the cease-fire agreement in 2004 and mobilizing €12m. from its Peace Facility in the same year
to support the AU’s peace-keeping operation (AMIS), followed by the sending of EU observers to the region. The collaboration between the UN, the AU and the EU strengthened over the following two years, the EU assuming mainly the role of humanitarian aid donor and deferring to the AU for leadership in the diplomatic effort (Reeves 2005). However, Louis Michel, EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, established direct contact with the Sudanese authorities and acted as a vehicle for conveying concerns and pressure by the EU for ending all violence and for reparations according to the UN Resolutions (Cazelles 2007). By the end of 2005 the EU was monitoring closely the peace talks in Abuja through its special representative, Pekka Haavisto, and in 2006 it pledged a force to support the AU, while urging the Sudanese authorities to accept the UN offer of peace-keeping (Aboagye 2007). It has, nevertheless, been criticized for being half-hearted in its offerings, in terms of decisiveness and magnitude of action (Sadoux 2006). It has since increased its own humanitarian aid to the region annually, exceeding €135m. in the year 2008 alone (ISIS Europe 2007; Michael 2005).

Although the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan, and particularly in Darfur, is of proportions that render it difficult to consider what constitutes success, it is unarguable that this tripartite collaboration between international organizations has borne fruit in this case, whatever the inevitable fits and starts in the beginning and through the duration of the last five years (United Nations 2007; UNMIS 2008).

**EU-UN co-operation reflections and prospects**

Over the past 20 years UN-EU co-operation has grown substantially and appears on track to increase and diversify further on the strength and experience of a growing number of mostly successful operations.

As the EU improves its foreign policy and security capability and re-evaluates the underlying principles and strategy of its developmental policy deployment, particularly in the sphere of conflict situations, its joint operations with the UN seem to gain momentum (Blockmans and Wessel 2009). Continuous consultation and communication between the two organizations has become increasingly institutionalized and regularized as a result of mechanisms, processes and agreements which have been put in place over the past 20 years since Maastricht, and can only become more consistent and coherent in the second decade of the 21st century as the first EU President, Herman Van Rompuy, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, take office.

Thus far, the following characteristics can be identified in EU-UN co-operation in action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Nature/status of deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>ALTHEA, EUFOR: post-conflict, post-NATO, ongoing partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>CONCORDIA: preventive, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX: post-conflict, current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>ARTEMIS: pre-UN, complete, followed by development support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Autonomous Areas</td>
<td>Multi-faceted, mainly economic, ongoing, multilateral (Quartet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Support to UN and AU, post-conflict reconstruction, ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation of information presented in text.
The UN is generally the initiator, so it is the UN that addresses requests for special financial contributions, or seeks to engage the EU in missions involving operational, organizational or military support, and the EU considers the request and responds accordingly.

- EU involvement can be employed as a precursor to UN deployment, alongside it, or take over from/relieve a UN operation.
- EU-UN co-operation can take the form of peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, humanitarian and developmental aid, and most usually a combination of both.
- EU-UN co-operation ventures can be launched during a conflict in order to facilitate conditions for peace-making, in times of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, or in a preventive capacity where the eruption of a conflict is threatened and confidence-building measures are required.
- Whatever the circumstances, EU involvement tends to take the form of a finite operation, of a specific size and time frame, functioning under its own political and military strategic control, in close consultation with the UN and strictly under its mandate. So-called 'double-hatting' occurs occasionally, as in Artemis, but is thought to complicate operations and the EU generally frowns upon it and remains thus far reluctant to place EU forces under UN operational command.

The absence of European states from UN-led operations is certainly compensated for by a proliferating presence in UN-mandated operations. EU military contributions are reasonably high, and coupled with even higher developmental aid contributions (Biscop et al. 2005). Nevertheless, Thierry Tardy argues that: ‘For the UN, cooperation with the EU is a necessity, but should be developed with a clear understanding of what can and cannot be expected from the EU. The UN-EU relationship is an unbalanced relationship: the UN must beg for increased European involvement in peace operations. But it is the EU that will most likely lay down the conditions for cooperation. It is in this context that the UN must identify where cooperation can most realistically be developed with the EU’ (Tardy 2003). However, a prominent feature of this increasing complementarity between the two organizations is their willingness to broaden the platform of dialogues and co-operation with other international organizations, as with NATO in the former Yugoslavia and the AU in Darfur, but also with local or international civil society organizations. This is not always straightforward and the issue of leadership and credit for operations—the ‘beauty contest’—becomes ever more complex the more organizations become involved.

In any case, considering UN increasing overstretch and EU continuing ambivalence on large-scale involvement, Thierry Tardy identifies three possible scenarios for the future of EU-UN co-operation in conflict situations: first, the national contributions and ‘clearing house’ model, whereby the EU member states respond to a UN request by internal consultation and consideration of voluntary offers or itemized contributions such as the lending of the services of the European Satellite Centre to MONUC in the DRC; second, a ‘stand-alone’ model, the one already mostly in use, where an operation is mandated by the UN and wholly subcontracted to the EU as an independent mission; third, the 'bridging model', in other words an operation designed to smooth the way for later UN involvement, such as with Artemis (Tardy 2005).

Admittedly, in the broader field of crisis management, the developmental and humanitarian aid component has been the best tried and tested one and, therefore, the one to have been accomplished with the smoothest of interactions and/or transitions between organizations. However, global principles attached to development aid change over time, and alignment between the UN and the EU requires prior alignment within the UN itself. However, as the ‘Western world’ insists on attaching issues of democratization, the combating of corruption and...
terrorism, and the human rights agenda to aid package agreements, China, Russia and other actors are favouring a decoupling between these objectives and the combating of poverty and underdevelopment (Wanlin 2007). It is, therefore, important for these collaborative ventures to acknowledge that there is no homogeneous political agenda world-wide in ways and conditions for addressing conflict and development, and true multilateralism will require finding ways to work, if not with, then alongside these different approaches. Failure to do so would cause EU influence in the UN to decline (Gowan and Brantner 2008).

Improved internal consensus remains a challenge for the EU itself and is crucial for its credibility in interacting with other international organizations. In certain areas like environmental policy there is tremendous strength in the EU’s visibility as a driving force within the UN, but in economics, or issues of foreign and security policy consensus achievement varies. Limited intra-EU consensus discourages the upgrading of the EU’s status as an actor in the UN with respect to UN agencies and processes. However, it is not just EU outsiders that are reluctant to see this upgrade. Some EU member states also see moving in this direction as an erosion of the sovereignty of EU member states as actors on the international scene, and a threat too far. Nevertheless, as stated earlier in this chapter and supported by Jan Wouters, voting alignment has increased noticeably in recent years and ‘the coordination process has intensified over the years and has now become well-entrenched in the practice of EU Member States’ (Wouters 2007). It is important to mention that when the EU appears united it tends to also carry with it votes from closely aligned or associated states belonging to its ‘sphere of influence’, which further increases its leverage in the UN. The EU’s growing status as an international actor in its own neighbourhood, which allows it to settle conflicts via a combination of its growing clout, soft power (Popescu 2005) and newly found security partnerships with NATO and the UN, bodes well for an ever broader global role in the future (Haugevik 2007).

Given the totality of global parameters at the start of the second decade of the 21st century, including the election of President Barack Obama into the White House and the dawn of China’s, India’s and Russia’s era as major international actors, the world order appears to favour multilateralism more than it has in a very long time. In this context, and despite the constraints highlighted above, the potential for EU-UN co-operation is immense.