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Global governance and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union

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Introduction

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

(Council of the European Union 2003: 9)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) has been a growth area of the EU since the end of the Cold War. The EU has developed from a regionally focused international organization concentrating on enlarging its membership to include much of the European continent, to an organization that has become a global player in crisis management. The EU has gone from being a consumer of security, to an important actor in providing security and stability across the world. The CFSP is one component of the EU’s foreign policy toolkit which came into being with the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union in 1993. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) primacy as the transatlantic community’s collective defence organization has ensured that the EU has only developed a modest defence component to the CFSP in the form of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As this book highlights, the EU has become very adept at influencing the rules of the game in international affairs. The EU is represented directly, or by EU member states in the major global institutions that define global governance. It is, therefore, useful to examine how global governance both affects and is influenced by the EU through the CFSP.

Efforts to shape global governance have become a central pillar of the EU’s attempts to influence the norms and institutions defining international affairs. The EU’s external affairs are a vast web of overlapping multilateral contacts and commitments with an array of states, international organizations and non-state actors. This range of actors has led one academic to posit whether the EU has developed a postmodern foreign-policy framework (Smith 2003). Largely owing to its economic weight, the EU has become a key actor in discussions on the emerging
shape of global governance. This chapter focuses on what aspects of governance are visible in
the CFSP of the EU. The chapter will argue that the EU’s emergence as a foreign policy actor
since the 1970s has necessitated the establishment of a web of global linkages and has greatly
increased the scope of foreign and security policy commitments facing the EU—a process that
has intensified since the end of the Cold War. The EU has confronted an array of new
challenges since the end of the Cold War, which have forced the organization to develop new
foreign and security policy instruments and to become involved in a range of new projects.

This chapter will proceed as follows. After outlining the nature of what the CFSP is and
tracing the emergence of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor, we will focus on how
governance might be helpful in explaining the rise in importance of the CFSP on the world
stage, particularly in light of developments in recent years.

Strengthening and shaping the norms and institutions of global governance has been an
important means of extending EU influence in the world in the absence of coercive military
power. Literature, such as the normative power Europe school, has focused on the process of
how EU norms are spread and received by the wider international community (see Manners
2002, 2006c). Proponents of this position point to the success of EU enlargement in bringing
stability to the continent and the development of relations with neighbouring regions. In a
similar vein, writing on Civilian Power Europe has also focused on how through primarily
economic and diplomatic means the EU has been able to play an influential role in international
affairs, without the need to resort to military force to achieve its goals (Maull 1993; Orbie
2008). It therefore represents a new type of international actor, one that rejects the primacy of
military force in its dealings with others, despite the scepticism of some writers (Kagan 2003).
Buzan argues that the EU is in many ways well placed to rise to superpower status, due to its
material resources and track record in pacifying its region (Buzan 2004: 116). Yet its lack of
military capabilities, argues Buzan, prevents the EU from rising to superpower status. Mark
Leonard, Ian Manners and others would suggest that this lack of military force within the EU
should not fundamentally restrict the EU’s ability to influence global governance. The EU’s
track record of exporting its norms has proven a much more effective tool of influence than the
use of military force. We will now turn to a survey of the literature on security governance in
Europe.

CFSP and security governance

When examining the CFSP it is important to stress the importance of intergovernmentalism,
particularly in matters relating to defence, which marks the CFSP out from other policy areas
within the EU. It is, however, difficult to disentangle the CFSP from the broad sweep of EU
external affairs, due to the role of the European Commission in much of what the CFSP does.
This interplay between communitarized and intergovernmental aspects of the CFSP is perhaps
why EU officials and representatives of the EU member states prefer to speak of ‘effective
multilateralism’ rather than global governance in outlining the EU’s international presence.

There is a wide range of definitions associated with the term security governance. Webber et al.
outline the following definition:

… governance involves the co-ordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple
and separate authorities, the intervention of both public and private actors, formal and
informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed
towards particular policy outcomes.

(Webber et al. 2004: 4)
Webber et al.’s understanding of security governance focuses on five central features:

… heterarchy; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private; institutionalisation that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by formal regulations; and finally, collective purpose.…

(Webber et al. 2004: 8)

Krahmann states that security governance has led to the emergence of ‘structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to co-ordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority’ (Krahmann 2003b: 11). Fundamentally, the emergence of security governance literature must be seen in the context of the end of the Cold War and the broadening of the security concept to go beyond state-centric understandings of existential threats (Krahmann 2005). Meeting these new threats has involved a vast range of state and non-state actors which has necessitated procedures to organize relations and, where necessary, regulate behaviour in addressing these new challenges. Here the global dynamic is important, with a greater awareness that states and regions across the world are connected through exposure to shared threats and challenges (Adler and Greve 2009; Kay 2004).

Analysing the impact of emerging modes of governance relating to the EU’s foreign and security policy has both internal and external aspects. Internally, there is a significant body of literature that focuses on how EU member states have established modes of co-operation among them in order to work towards developing a more coherent and effective foreign and security policy (see Krahmann 2003a, 2003b; Kirchner 2006; Kirchner and Sperling 2008; Webber et al. 2004). Working out methods to organize co-operative foreign and security policy among 27 EU member states has been an exercise fraught with difficulties, yet incrementally we have witnessed the growing international role of the EU since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Analysing governance, therefore, is a process of charting the development of the CFSP as a process of negotiation and cautious Europeanization alongside an assessment of how the EU’s international commitments shape internal discussions and deepen the EU’s international responsibilities (Smith 2000). External dynamics of governance and how they impact on CFSP have become more pronounced since the operationalization of the CSDP in 2003.

The EU’s CFSP machinery involves a large number of intergovernmental and supranational components. Oversight of the CFSP rests with the European Council, which sets the tone and scope of what is possible for security and defence policy co-operation. The European Council presidency can have an important agenda-setting role and play a prominent role in presenting the EU’s position in moments of crisis. The German presidency’s role in the first half of 1999, when Operation Allied Force was undertaken over Kosovo, pushed Germany to the forefront of efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. Germany was also, alongside France and the United Kingdom, an important advocate of strengthening the co-operation and effectiveness in the CFSP as a result of the EU’s experiences of the Kosovo crisis in 1998–99 (Miskimmon 2007; Schake, Bloch–Lainé and Grant 1999). The European Council and the Council of Ministers are responsible for negotiating treaty revisions attending to the CFSP, which ultimately codify new rules and norms which emerge through the process of co-operation in security and defence policy. Since the development of the ESDP in 1999, the work of the Council in ESDP has been supported by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative, the Political Security Committee, made up of ambassadors from each of the 27 member states, the EU Military Committee comprising the Chiefs of Defence of the member
states, and the EU Military Staff who provide in-house military expertise for the High Representative as well as supervising the development of EU military capabilities and the deployment of EU troops.

The European Commission’s role in CFSP has risen markedly since 1993. Many aspects of what the European Commission does fall under the rubric of foreign policy—such as trade and humanitarian aid. In the José Manuel Barroso Commission, the Commissioners involved in external policy are as follows: Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy); Joaquín Almunia (Economic and Monetary Affairs); Catherine Ashton (External Trade); Karel De Gucht (Humanitarian Aid and Development Policy); and Olli Rehn (Enlargement). The Commission has, in terms of CFSP, played an important role in the civilian aspects of ESDP. The Commission’s main focus is on conflict prevention. The European Parliament’s (EP) role in CFSP has been historically limited. However, greater efforts by the Council to include the Parliament in discussions relating to CFSP and the EP’s growing budgetary powers in ESDP have raised its profile (Dietrichs 2004). The overlap of competencies in CFSP have often resulted in ‘turf wars’ within and among the Council and the Commission over who sets the agenda on foreign and security policy. Other supranational bodies inputting into the CFSP include the European Defence Agency, which is tasked with planning for the development of capabilities that the ESDP will need in the future. It has four main functions: defence capabilities development; armaments co-operation; developing the European defence technological and industrial base and defence market; and fostering research and technology. The EU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain, is tasked with providing space imagery to assist Council decision-making in CFSP. Finally, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris provides the Council with analysis and forecasting on security and defence.

One of the major foci of the process of treaty reform since the Treaty of Nice in 2000 has been the issue of the EU and the world. A number of innovations contained within the Treaty of Lisbon are designed to enhance the EU’s external presence and streamline decision-making within the EU in foreign affairs (see Whitman 2008; Wessels and Bopp 2008). Cosmetically, the ESDP will be renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but there will now be a solidarity and mutual defence commitment on behalf of EU member states to one another. What was originally to be the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been renamed the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This post will be responsible for EU external affairs, in an attempt to avoid the turf wars in CFSP between the Commission and the Council. This role will fuse the roles of the High Representative (Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations in the Commission (Benita Ferrero-Waldner). A European External Action Service will be established to work towards improving the diplomatic presence of the EU. A Foreign Affairs Council will come into being, which will be separate from the General Affairs Council. Replacing the rotating presidency of the European Council, a President of the European Council will be appointed for a period of two and a half years. Despite these changes, an effective CFSP rests on the willingness of EU member states to co-operate and forge common policies on matters of shared interests. Controversies such as the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 have shown that in matters related to defence, the rules that define security governance can be put to one side when no commonality of views exists (Puetter and Wiener 2007).

The development of CFSP: Forging effective multilateralism

The European Community’s (EC) foreign policy machinery emerged for the first time in 1969 in the form of European Political Co-operation, ushered in by The Hague Summit.
Communiqué of December of that year. In the words of Simon Nuttall, ‘Political Co-operation was a private club, operated by diplomats for diplomats’ (Nuttall 1992: 11), rather than the integrated foreign and security policy apparatus we have today. The EC’s foreign policy was characterized by the ‘piecemeal’ development of machinery—keeping the political and economic separate proved unworkable and the European Commission became involved, and ‘Political Cooperation has often seemed introspective’ (ibid.: 282). However, despite the ad hoc nature of European Political Co-operation (EPC), it played an important role in socializing member states in foreign affairs and raising the profile of the EC in the world. The role of West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is notable in arguing for forging regional dialogues with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Central America (Nuttall 1992: 289–91). EPC, nevertheless, was limited due to the lack of resources at its disposal, the dominance of the USA and NATO in foreign and security policy, and the difficulty of decision-making as a result of the demands of unanimity.

Due to the primacy of NATO and the pressures of the Cold War, EPC focused on developing political and economic links with regions across the globe and shied away from discussions on security and defence. Developing links with other states and organizations was part of an effort to forge a presence for the EC in international affairs, during a time dominated by the Cold War stand-off and the role of the USA and the USSR. The constraints on the EC caused by the Cold War, coupled with the reluctance of member states to pool sovereignty in foreign policy, ensured that EPC remained a relatively modest policy area, which only achieved treaty status in the Single European Act, Article 30.

With the end of the Cold War, pressure on the EC to take greater responsibility for regional stability and the removal of the structural constraints of the Cold War facilitated the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty on European Union (Hyde-Price 2006). Much of the history of the development of the CFSP since the early 1990s focuses on the difficulties of the internal organization of foreign and security policy and despite some closer co-operation, the problems associated with the Europeanization of national foreign policies that are reluctant to adapt (Jopp and Schlotter 2007; Meyer 2005). The EU’s inability to stabilize the Balkans and act when needed in Africa chastened policy-makers and focused attention on the need for more effective co-ordination with partners to address foreign policy challenges. Manners contends that:

The transformation of EU conflict prevention policy during 1995 was largely the result of dialogue between the Commission and NGOs with respect to Africa and development policy, as well as south-eastern Europe and post-conflict rebuilding in Bosnia after Dayton. (Manners 2006c: 187)

Most notable in this regard have been the difficulties in EU-NATO relations, which continue to complicate security governance in Europe (Howorth and Keeler 2003; Sloan 2003; Winn 2003). The difficulty of untangling the highly complex CFSP decision-making process involving national and supranational actors hampered the EU’s ability to play an effective role in the world (Everts 2002). The emergence of the ESDP in 1999 to equip the EU to undertake crisis management operations across the globe from 2003, and the streamlining of foreign policy decision-making in the Treaty of Lisbon have been two major developments in security governance within the EU. Security in Europe is a complex web of interlocking institutions and different cultures of national security and defence policy. The added transatlantic dimension of defence co-operation within NATO further complicates efforts to forge cohesive policies and responses to the challenges facing the European states.
The development of the EU’s foreign and security policy apparatus since 1970 is perhaps the best example of a sustained effort to forge governance structures among state and non-state actors. In many cases the CFSP has been considered on different terms from the communitarized policies of the EU due to the prevalence of intergovernmentalism and the lack of involvement from the Court of Justice of the European Union to enforce co-operation. Nevertheless, Kirchner argues that:

… the presence of multiple actors and the deployment of various instruments in EU security policies reflects the characteristics of EU governance with the absence of hierarchical structures and different but overlapping competences between EU institutions and Member States.

(Kirchner 2006: 962)

Drawing on Hedley Bull, Friedrichs outlines overlapping authority and multiple loyalties in the new Europe, which he describes as a form of new medievalism (Friedrichs 2001). This is reflective of the overlapping institutions and differentiated membership of the security institutions in Europe—EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Specific to the EU, closer co-operation, and particularly the development of ESDP, has necessitated developing innovative means to ensure policies do not become hamstrung by procedure (Reynolds 2007). The constant difficulties of balancing internal cohesion and international effectiveness have been a major challenge for the CFSP (Delacourt and Remacle 2009). As the CFSP has become more developed the roles of the Commission and the Parliament have grown, which is reflected in the decision-making process in CFSP across its main areas of activity. Kirchner asserts that different areas of the EU in the CFSP competence reflect different dynamics of governance—policies that are primarily focused on conflict prevention witness involvement from a wide array of actors within the EU, resulting in a modest role for the EU member states. However, in the areas of peace enforcement and peace-keeping where military force may be deployed there is a clear dominance exerted by the member states (Kirchner 2006). Under the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the CFSP was formally established as the second pillar. Since the coming into force of the TEU in 1993, the rigidity of the pillar structure has lessened as the scope of the CFSP has grown with the resultant dynamics of cross-pillarization becoming the norm (Stetter 2004; Maurer, Kietz and Völkel 2005). Brian White’s delineation of foreign and security policy-making in the EU along the lines of community, union and member states still remains useful, but has come under pressure from the rapid development of the CFSP in recent years (White 1999).

The EU’s emerging global foreign and security policy role

Since the end of the Cold War, pressure has grown on the EU to play a greater role in international affairs. The broadening of the security concept has greatly widened our understanding of what can be considered a security threat from the Cold War fixation of conventional and nuclear forces and balancing (Krause and Williams 1996; S. Smith 2005). Biscop argues that the EU has redefined how we understand security through its international engagement (Biscop 2005). Globalization and a shared sense of responsibility have altered our understanding of how to tackle threats on the global level (Kay 2004; Murphy 2000). According to Solana, ‘[t]he world today is more complex and interconnected. Our approach of bringing together member states into collective positions which are stronger than the sum of their parts, is the only realistic response. It is in our interest to continue on this path’. Public opinion in EU member states has
supported the growing global role of the EU (Krotz 2009: 559–60; Schoen 2008). Support for a more visible EU foreign and security policy is in marked contrast to criticism of EU internal policies and attempts to reform the EU’s treaty base. With this in mind, the development of ESDP and the publication of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 signalled the EU’s intent to play a greater role in global security. The ESS of 2003 mentions governance five times—twice in terms of the threat of bad governance which can contribute to state failure, and three times concerning the EU’s role in ensuring that good global governance is established and maintained. The ESS states that in addition to states:

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world. (Council of the European Union 2003: 9)

The growing role of the EU in crisis management has necessitated forging closer relations with international organizations (Jørgensen 2009). The example of the EU’s mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006, when the EU was asked by the United Nations (UN) to support its efforts to hold free and fair elections in the country is indicative of the EU’s co-operation with other organizations.

The EU has consistently favoured a multilateral, rules-based approach to international affairs. Former Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has described the EU as ‘instinctively multilateral’ (Mandelson 2006: 16). The High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, has outlined this by stating that ‘the European approach to international relations is characterised by the primacy of international law; the search for consensual solutions; and a commitment to making multilateral institutions effective. This is the European way. What we do abroad is shaped by who we are’ (Solana 2008a). To a large extent the EU has viewed itself as an exporter of norms and governance to areas of the world where governance is patchy or absent. However, there are potential pitfalls to such an approach, which the European Commission has recognized. In a report from 2001 the European Commission stated:

Without falling back on moral relativism or complacent inaction, governance seems to us to require a new modesty and more nuance concerning possible action and likely consequences. This implies a world where we not only accept, but also seek to manage better, diversity, thereby achieving greater coherence in the long term than we have managed in the past. This seems to us to be the description of a world where the EU can feel more comfortable than other players and therefore play a strong role. (European Commission 2001b: 16; cited in Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002: 783)

Global governance has therefore become a central pillar of the EU’s CFSP. Indeed, the process of agreeing shared rules among states is perhaps the main goal of the CFSP, which is a key contention of scholars from the Civilian Power and Normative Power schools (Manners 2002, 2006c; Pace 2007). When asked to consider the ESDP’s record over its first 10 years, Solana asserted that:

I am more convinced than ever before that the objective of diplomacy is to create agreed rules. Rules on political participation, the demarcation of borders or movements of military equipment. Rules to tame the passion of states and individuals, to end conflicts within or
between states. Rules to help us address the mega-issues of our time. The accumulation of rules, procedures and institutions sounds like dreary work. But this is what global civilization is made of. Agreed rules make states secure and people free.

(Solana 2009b)

In the first 10 years of the ESDP, the EU has conducted 22 missions on four continents (see Figure 11.1). These include, which are currently underway, in the Western Balkans—EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the EU Policy Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (EUPM); the EU rule of law mission in KOSOVO (EULEX Kosovo); in the South Caucuses—the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM); in the Middle East—EU Policy Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah); EU Integrated rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX); in Asia—EU Police Mission in

![Figure 11.1 Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union, July 2009](image-url)
AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL Afghanistan); in Africa—EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia); EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau); EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) and EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo). The majority of the 22 missions undertaken have been civilian in scope. The deployment of EU military forces has been modest in scope. Nevertheless, experience working with NATO, the UN and other actors across four continents has widened the scope of the CFSP and put greater emphasis on the EU’s ability to operate effective multilateralism.

Challenges for the future

One of the central issues of global governance in security is the major asymmetries of power and patchiness of governance in the system. Robert Cooper sums this up well when he states:

Among ourselves (EU member states), we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era—force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state. (Cooper 2002a)

Cooper argues that the EU should develop robust capabilities, both civilian and military, in order to compensate for times when the EU is dealing with actors who reject efforts to establish governance. Even in cases when the EU co-opts partners in a system of governance, as a major player and shaper of the rules defining global governance, the EU must be prepared to take on what David Lake refers to as the costs of governance: ‘the resources and efforts devoted to creating and maintaining the relationship’ (Lake 2001: 137). The global financial crisis that emerged in 2008 will have an impact on the amount of resources available from member states for security and defence policy, which may limit the aspirations of the ESDP in the near term. Despite this, the challenges facing the EU will not disappear and ‘global problems require global solutions’ (Solana 2008b).

Another challenge ahead lies in the democratic accountability of the EU to its citizens in this area of foreign policy. If the ESDP continues to develop and EU forces are deployed across the globe, the EU and its member states must ensure that the scope of the CFSP does not outrun public opinion. The problems associated with the potential for the emergence of a democratic deficit in global governance could run the risk of losing the domestic support for the CFSP (Keohane 2003; Koenig-Archibugi 2002; Wolf 1999).

Finally, the EU’s strength of attraction will be tested as the competition to shape the rules that shape global governance grows (Leonard 2005). Solana sums up the potential predicament that could unsettle the EU’s international influence in the following terms:

So here we are: power shift, multipolarity, new security threats. A world where other narratives and other ways of doing things are gaining ground. This is the geo-political landscape in which Europeans have to live.

(Solana 2009b)
The former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband echoed these words in outlining his thoughts about the coming international order, which could be shaped by new great powers such as the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil:

I don’t know about great powers, but there is a superpower, and that’s the US, and I think it will remain larger and more powerful than any other country in the world for a long time to come. However no one country any more can be sure it will get its way, and that is a big change, and that’s why I think that neither a hegemon nor a balance of power model will be able to deliver the stability and order that we want—and that’s what puts a premium on building the rules-based system. Will we succeed? It’s an open question …

(Miliband 2008)

If the EU is to continue to remain influential, it will need to develop a strategic narrative that can shape discussions on the emerging format of global governance in the coming decades (Antoniades, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2009; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2007). Kaldor, Martin and Selchow (2007) as well as Matlary (2006) have argued that defending human rights should be the organizing principle of the EU’s diplomacy into the future, to which the spread of global governance can contribute. The organizing principles of global governance, which have been heavily influenced by the USA and the EU, may come under pressure to change from challengers such as China (Ikenberry 2009; Legro 2007; Zakaria 2008). The transformative power (Leonard 2005) often attributed to the EU in international affairs will come under increasing pressure to continue to shape the norms underpinning global governance.