Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies

Gerard Delanty

Alternative Histories of Cosmopolitanism

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203837139.ch1

David Inglis
Published online on: 04 Apr 2012

How to cite :- David Inglis. 04 Apr 2012, Alternative Histories of Cosmopolitanism from: Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies Routledge
Accessed on: 14 Nov 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203837139.ch1

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Part I

Cosmopolitan theory and approaches
The intellectual field of cosmopolitanism has developed tremendously over the last fifteen years. There has appeared a plethora of writings on cosmopolitan thought and practice (e.g. Lu 2000; Mignolo 2000; Harvey 2009). These range from formal political and legal theories (Eckersley 2007), to empirically-informed accounts of multiplicitous forms of ‘lived cosmopolitanism’ (Pollock 2002; Nowicka and Rovisco 2009). Although it is a term that was originally strongly associated with European antiquity, cosmopolitanism is now one of the central topics for research, debate and controversy across the social sciences. Having begun as a sense of non-national affiliation – declaring oneself to be a ‘citizen of the world’ rather than of any particular polity – it now encompasses a much wider range of issues, such as the nature of ethics, justice, social responsibility and cultural affiliations, all having to be considered within social conditions of complex globality.

As it develops, each intellectual field narrates its own origins, the growth of each field in part stimulated by debates and disputes as to what those origins may be (Alexander 1987). The field of cosmopolitanism is no exception. There are now readily-available histories which endeavour to trace out the genealogy of cosmopolitan concerns from the ancient Greeks, generally taken as the original source of cosmopolitical reflections, down until the present day (see e.g. Toulmin 1990; Heater 1996; Lu 2000; Mignolo 2000; Breckenridge et al. 2002; Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Cheah 2006; Delanty 2009; Holton 2009). Such synoptic histories have much to recommend them. Their narrations allow the field, and those contributing to it, to come to forms of self-understanding vis-à-vis both valued intellectual inheritances and legacies from the past to be rejected or avoided. But as with all such genealogies, after a while certain orthodoxies in narration can arise, with subsequent authors reproducing, rather than interrogating, the histories offered by earlier contributors. The history of a field can become frozen, reproducing unquestioned verities, instead of regarding standard narrations sceptically (Somers 1996). What is at stake is the self-understanding of the field, and thus future trajectories of thought and research. When standard narrations overly dominate more heterodox understandings of the roots and branches of the field, this threatens to close off opportunities for developing fresh foci and forms of thinking, not least through the recuperation of more neglected or ignored predecessors, and the reconceptualisation of canonised figures (Fine 2003b).
The standard narration of the historical development of cosmopolitanism, primarily as thought but also as forms of practice, exhibits such risks. If we today think that such a history is a simple and uncontested one, then opportunities for broadening and creatively developing cosmopolitan thought will be lost. The standard narration (e.g. Heater 1996) that has started to become an orthodox one identifies the beginnings of cosmopolitanism in Greek Cynicism and Stoicism (Nussbaum 1997); examines the Roman adaptation of these ideas (Pollock 2002); jumps to the eighteenth century, where the name of Kant is above all invoked as the greatest of all Enlightenment philosophers of cosmopolitanism (Schlereth 1977); identifies a decline in the nineteenth century of cosmopolitical concerns, as European thought succumbs to the siren songs of nationalism (Meinecke 1970); sees a rejuvenation of cosmopolitical concerns after World War II, as political theorists and others identify post-war, putatively global institutions like the United Nations as embodiments of Kantian concerns (Friedrich 1947); with the story ending with the remarkable flourishing and diversification of the cosmopolitan intellectual field in recent times (Delanty and Inglis 2010).

All of this is not untrue. Just as something called ‘classical sociology’ operates as a useful constructed canon of works and authors that allows sociologists to narrate their (apparent) past, construe their present and future, and teach students (what are taken to be) the elementary building blocks of the discipline, so too does the standard narration allow for such achievements to be possible in the new field called ‘cosmopolitan studies’. But the narration of Greece/Rome/Enlightenment/1945/now, while useful as a ground-setting fable, threatens to turn into unexamined ‘truth’.

There is in fact much more to be said about cosmopolitanism and its histories (in the plural). There is a ‘long, rich, and varied history’ of cosmopolitical ideas about the ‘whole world’ that remains relatively untapped by the standard narration (Niezen 2004: 11). The Eurocentric bias of that standard narration is obvious, and has not gone unchallenged (Pieterse 2006; Benhabib 2008), with alternative locations and genealogies of cosmopolitical thought and action being offered (Zubaida 1999). Cosmopolitan cultural dynamics can also be discerned in various forms of ‘European’ encounters with non-European others. Thus revisionist historians can narrate the so-called ‘European Renaissance’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries not as a series of developments endogenous to ‘Europe’, but rather as the emergent property of shifting relations between Christendom and different wings of the Islamic world (Inglis and Robertson 2006). But even within what is conventionally called ‘European’ thought, a critical genealogist can discern forms of thinking that are important for the re-telling of the history of cosmopolitanisms in the plural.

This involves two dimensions. First, offering alternative accounts of the nature and significance of ideas and authors already consecrated by the standard narration; and second, the identification of ideas and thinkers not conventionally designated as ‘cosmopolitan’, but inclusion of which in the history of cosmopolitanisms can both enrich the existing canon and help to recalibrate our views of what it is and can do. In what follows, I will indicate certain forms of Western thought which merit inclusion within a broadened understanding of precursors of contemporary cosmopolitical concerns. Here I will mention both early modern jurism, and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economic thought and sociology. I also want to indicate certain neglected or occluded dimensions of canonical schools of thought, notably Greco-Roman Stoicism and Kantian political philosophy. I assert that there is a neglected but important historiographical and sociological dimension to these forms of cosmopolitan thinking, involving endeavours to root more abstract political–philosophical and metaphysical concerns in empirical historical conditions. On this view, even the most apparently abstract and utopian aspects of ‘classical’ cosmopolitan thought – features which it is today routinely
criticised for (e.g. Pollock 2002) – are rooted to some extent in ‘empirical’ concerns as to how cosmopolitan norms and imperatives will or could be brought into tangible existence. These forms of classical cosmopolitanism cannot just be written off as abstract utopianism, for they endeavoured to think through how normative dispositions could be empirically realised. This seems an important focus for re-telling the history of cosmopolitanism in a period when multiple endeavours are afoot to conceive of how cosmopolitical concerns at the level of thought can be brought more fully into the level of practice (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009).

**Between normative and empirical: ancient thought**

Any treatise on the history of cosmopolitan thought contains depictions of its beginnings in ancient Greece and its Cynic and Stoic origins (Heater 1996). Diogenes, founding figure of the Cynic school, ‘declared himself a-polis (without a city), a-oikos (homeless) and kosmopolites (a citizen of the universe)’ (Goulet-Cazé 2000: 329). The Greek Stoics argued that government (politeia) should be coextensive with the whole inhabited world (oikoumene) or the whole universe (kosmos), rather than being limited to a particular city-state (Romm 1992). All people, regardless of race or religion or place of origin, were to be understood as members of one human brotherhood (Baldry 1965). Roman Stoics, notably Marcus Aurelius and Cicero, further developed these within the multi-ethnic conditions of the Roman empire (Revell 2009). For Marcus Aurelius (1995: 19), ‘there is a world-law, which in turn means that we are all fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship, and that the world is a single city’. According to Cicero (1972: 155, 189), the gods treat the world ‘as though it were a single state or city’, and thus ‘have care for all men [sic] everywhere, on every shore and in every country of the earth, however far from our own homeland’.

The history of ancient cosmopolitanism is generally narrated in such a way that it concentrates on metaphysical and political–theoretical ideas. This has been reinforced in the present-day by the fact that it has been political philosophers, especially Nussbaum (1997), who have been primarily responsible for bringing ancient cosmopolitanism into contemporary debates. As a result, there is today an overly narrow appreciation of ancient cosmopolitanism as wholly political–theoretical in nature. It follows that ancient cosmopolitanism seems to involve the abstract and utopian schemes of a tiny group of philosophers, either socially marginal as in the Greek case, or occupying positions of power but mouthing empty platitudes about universal brotherly love, as in the Roman context. The standard narration ignores at least two issues. First, the fact that cosmopolitan notions were rooted in, and helped to develop, broader visions of the world as a complex, increasingly interconnected whole that were common in Hellenistic Greece and the Roman empire, not just among the philosophical minority but among varied social strata (Inglis and Robertson 2004, 2005; Robertson and Inglis 2004).

Second, the standard narration omits mention of a different stream of thought that draws upon, but is irreducible to, Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitical notions. This alternative current adapted cosmopolitical philosophy for historiographical purposes. A new kind of historiography, called ‘universal history’ by its practitioners, grew out of the social conditions of the Hellenistic age. This was a genre for its time. It provided a view of history which was capable of giving an account of the entire new world opened up by the conquests of Alexander [the Great], of incorporating the experiences of the barbaroi as something less than exotic, and of providing … a sense of unity within diversity.

*(Mortley 1996: 1)*
The guiding aim of this war of writing history was ‘to acquaint people with the ... meaning of the international experience which they were living out’ (Mortley 1996: 1). Universal history took as its subject matter not particular political entities such as city-states or empires, as previous historiography had, but rather the whole ‘inhabited world’ (oikoumene), endeavouring to narrate the intermeshed affairs of the whole world, not just parts of it. For Diodorus of Sicily in the first century BCE, historiography regarded the ‘affairs of the entire world ... as if they were the affairs of some single city’ (Diodorus 1968: 17). The most ambitious and sophisticated of the universal historians was Polybius, writing in the middle of the second century BCE. Tracing the history of Roman overseas expansion, he described the shift from an oikoumene made up of relatively disconnected places and nations, towards one characterised by increasingly inter-penetrating forces:

[I]n earlier times the world’s history had consisted ... of a series of unrelated episodes, the origins and results of each being as widely separated as their localities, but then [after the Roman expansion had begun] history becomes an organic whole [somatoeides]: the affairs of Italy and Africa are connected with those of Asia and of Greece, and all events bear a relationship and contribute to a single end.

(Polybius 1979: 43)

As a later interpreter noted, Polybius’ vision held that ‘the differences between different states and different cities disappears ... the world increasingly resembles a single place’ (Fustel de Coulanges 1893: 161 [author’s translation]). Thus while he drew upon Stoic political–theoretical and metaphysical conceptions of the ‘whole world’, part of the common intellectual currency of the time, he moved beyond its understanding of that world being constituted of naturally and eternally separate places and polities, towards a focus on the historical construction of the somatoeides oikoumene, the whole world being characterised by increasingly dense connectivity, a condition of complex globality (Inglis and Robertson 2004). Here, then, is a very significant move beyond Stoic metaphysics and political theory, where the world is merely like one single state, but empirically made up of multiple polities, and where universal human brotherhood is just a theoretical abstraction. For Polybius and other universal historians, the empirical world is moving in concrete directions towards concretely making it a single polity and all the people within it citizens of one state.

Of course, this is in part propaganda for Polybius’ patrons, the Roman elite. But it still signifies a major empirical shift in Stoic–influenced thought, a shift ignored by the standard narration of the history of cosmopolitan thought. Such a shift can also be seen in the Roman historian Plutarch, another figure not usually included in the cosmopolitical canon. In his account of Alexander the Great, Plutarch (1936: 327) depicts standard, abstract Stoic themes of universal brotherhood: ‘we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity’. But to these considerations is added a strongly empirical dimension. Alexander is represented as that apparent anomaly, an activist Stoic, who endeavoured to relinquish hitherto unbridgeable divides between Greeks and non–Greeks, bringing into actual existence the world-state that had previously existed only in abstract potential:

he brought together into one body all men everywhere, uniting and mixing ... men’s lives, their characters, their marriages, their very habits of life. He bade them all consider as their fatherland the whole inhabited earth ... [and] as akin to them all good men, and as foreigners only the wicked.

(Ibid.: 329)
Thus Alexander creates at the level of empirical socio-political affairs the hitherto purely metaphysical cosmopolitical condition. As Stoic political philosophy is transformed into – and through – historiography, the focus radically shifts from potentials to actualities. It is wrong to regard ancient Stoicism as a purely abstract, non-empirical affair, as the standard narration alleges (Pollock 2002), for when we broaden the horizon to include Stoic-influenced historiography as well as political theory, we see that the normative and empirical could be fused together and were not always wholly separated.

**Between empirical and normative: Kant’s philosophy**

Regarded in this light, later thinkers who took up the mantle of ancient cosmopolitanism cannot be regarded as simply prisoners of a tradition which was thoroughly non-empirical in nature. This point applies to Kant’s famous appropriation of Stoic themes. In recent debates, stimulated by interventions like Nussbaum (1989, 1997) and Habermas (1997), Kant has generally been portrayed as operating at a primarily political–theoretical level, just like – indeed implicitly because of his indebtedness to – his ancient antecedents. That has meant that the historiographical, anthropological and sociological dimensions of his cosmopolitical vision have been seriously underplayed.

As is well known, Kant’s (1963b) endeavours to reground political philosophy on a cosmopolitan basis tried to avoid the utopianism of previous world-state plans, such as that of the Abbé Saint Pierre, instead looking to a league of sovereign states which would respect the law of ‘universal hospitality’, allowing individuals to travel and trade as they wish and not to be subjected to arbitrary uses of power. Kant (1963a, 1963b) claimed that this situation was eminently practicable, for human history was inexorably moving in that direction. The end-point of human societal evolution was a condition where different human communities had learned to live together without conflict arising between them.

Against a Hobbesian view of the eternal nature of inter-individual and inter-state strife, Kant contended that it was conflict itself which drove historical development towards its eventual permanently peaceful outcome. Humans learn over time from the experience of incessant warfare that the best means of meeting their interests, individual and collective, is to engage in peaceful association, not just within states but between them too. One important empirical reason why this cosmopolitical condition eventually appears concerns the geographical limits of the planet. All humans have ‘common possession of the surface of earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each other’ (1963b: 103). Literally ‘world’ history involves initial human dispersal across the planet, followed by increasing interconnection between geographically disparate parts. It was warfare between groups which pushed some of them into even the most inhospitable icy and desert regions of the planet (1963b: 110). The next stage is that nature, by placing ‘each people near another which presses upon it’, compels each group to ‘form itself into a state in order to defend itself’ (1963b: 111). Two cultural factors further provoke inter-state hostility: ‘differences of language and of religion … involve a tendency to mutual hatred and pretexts for war’ (ibid.). Eventually each group becomes so sickened by war that it wants to enter into the pacific league of states. In addition, international trade develops over time, and different states ‘unite because of mutual interest. The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state … states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to promote honourable peace’ (1963b: 114). The tendency of world-level trading relations is that ‘understanding, conventions and peaceable relations [are] established among the most distant peoples’ (1963b: 110).
In sum, the unintended consequences of geographical dispersal, warfare and trade all combine as mechanisms generating ‘a universal cosmopolitan condition’ (1963a: 23). These are the empirical means by which a world-level moral community is beginning to appear, within which ‘a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world’ (1963b: 105). Regardless of where violations occur, the condemnation that follows is literally global, in that it is the moral response of the whole world itself, understood as a single moral entity (1963b: 103). Such a position, simultaneously normative and empirical, allows Kant the grounds to condemn European states which failed to observe the evolving world-level moral codes in their empire-building activities. Some European powers have gone to ‘terrifying lengths’ (1963b: 103) to subjugate other peoples and steal their lands. The downsides of international trade are also criticised from this vantage point. In Hindustan ‘under the pretence of establishing economic undertakings, [the British] brought in foreign soldiers and used them to oppress the natives, excited widespread wars among the various states, spread famine, rebellion and perfidy, and the whole litany of evils which afflict mankind’ (1963b: 104). If colonialism is a facet of what we today call globalisation, so too is the very world-spanning moral culture that provides grounds for colonialism’s condemnation. Globalisation simultaneously produces both imperialism and the moral norms and means (e.g. newspapers of global reach) that condemn it. Here Kant anticipates contemporary notions, themselves both empirical and normative, of the opinion-forming capacities of ‘global civil society’ (Keane 2003).

The broader point here is that in Kant there is a combination of the abstract cosmopolitical claims of Stoicism, together with a historiographical attempt (that in fact owes something to ancient historians, especially Polybius) to ground these in emergent world-level historical developments. Kant is both cosmopolitan philosopher and early theorist of globalisation. Cosmopolitan political and moral conditions are not abstract ideas but the emerging expression of an ever more densely-connected world-condition. This aspect of Kant’s theorising needs to become much more acknowledged in the standard histories of cosmopolitanism than it is currently. In this regard it is worth noting recent endeavours to present Hegel – apparently an anti-cosmopolitan thinker because of his alleged fetishisation of the national state as the ground of morality – as offering a more substantially empirically grounded cosmopolitanism than does Kant (Fine 2003a). While the recuperation of Hegel exemplifies very useful rethinking of the cosmopolitical canon, it should not do so through the means of caricaturing Kant as an abstract political thinker devoid of empirical orientations and sensitivities.

Early modern cosmopolitics

Having re-narrated two dimensions of canonised cosmopolitanism, ancient philosophies and Kantianism, I will now turn to areas less recognised by the standard narration. Although generally ignored by the latter, medieval European thinking was not wholly devoid of cosmopolitan dimensions. It would be worthwhile to reconstruct the certain kinds of cosmopolitical vision embodied in notions that Christendom was a single entity, with all individuals within it being an interdependent brotherhood. We should also note the nascent cosmopolitical theory of Dante Alighieri, whose anti-papal treatise De Monarchia posited the need for a world-level government that would bring wars to an end, and which expressed his personal Cynic and Stoic conviction that ‘the world is [my] native country, just as the sea is to the fish’ (Peterson 1994).

However, an even more fertile ground for re-narrating cosmopolitanism is early modern Europe, even though at first glance it may seem unlikely. The early modern movement towards centralised states is well known, involving as it did the centralisation of wealth and military might by states increasingly defined as ‘national’. The territorially bounded state was well on the
way to becoming the dominant type of polity in Western Europe by the mid-seventeenth century (Tilly 1975). Political theory, beginning with Machiavelli and developing through the works of Bodin and Botero, lost its medieval theological trappings, and became ever more concerned with state sovereignty and the nature of relations between sovereign political entities. For this imaginary, embodied most forcefully in Hobbes, warfare between sovereign states was inevitable. The inter-state system exhibits the state of nature: ‘in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another’ (1968: I:13). As each state was absolutely sovereign, there could be no legitimate international authority which would guide or control inter-state relations.

But for some contemporary thinkers, appalled by the bloody warfare of the times, it was imperative that some sense of balance be struck between state autonomy and means of achieving peace. Jurists began to work out means by which relations between states could be established on some sort of at least minimal legal and ethical basis (Pound, 1925). The early modern jurists have had a poor reputation in cosmopolitan theoretical circles ever since Kant (1963b) dismissed the efforts of thinkers like Grotius and Pufendorf towards building international legal frameworks, as the works of mere ‘irritating comforters’. But there are other legal thinkers of early modernity who can be viewed as contributing in important ways to cosmopolitan conceptualisations of the world.

In the treatise of the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez called De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore (Treatise on Law and God the Legislator) of 1619, it is admitted that ‘a human legislative power of universal character and world-wide extent does not exist and has never existed’ (Murphy, 1982: 496). But even in a system of sovereign states, there could exist a minimal sort of ‘society’ between states which regulated their interactions. Each state was part of a ‘universal community’, the human race, considered both as an animal species and as a moral entity, joined together by natural ties of love and mercy. State sovereignty cannot be absolute, for all human beings rely on each other, and each state is ‘a member of that universal society’ called humanity. Minimal ethical obligations between states – such as not killing other states’ ambassadors – thus rest on, and express, a sense of common humanity. Saurez thus resuscitates the older Christian concept of ‘universal humanity’ within a context of state sovereignty, taming the latter through the former. At a more empirical level, he also insists on how all states need each other’s assistance in one way or another: each state requires ‘some mutual assistance, association and intercourse, at times for [its] own greater welfare and advantage, but at other times because also of some moral necessity or need’ (Murphy 1982: 479). Saurez thus provides an embryonic account of an inter-state division of labour, which itself is seen as necessarily regulating states’ behaviour towards each other. Some early modern jurists were more alive to the dynamics of inter-state trade and commerce, and how these might transcend considerations of pure raison d’état, than were their political theorist counterparts, such considerations opening up certain cosmopolitical vistas, as we will see.

Jurists were also concerned with what might constitute a ‘just war’. The late sixteenth-century thinker Alberico Gentili drew explicitly upon Stoic notions of universal brotherhood amongst all people, to argue that if a sovereign monarch was treating his subjects excessively unjustly, it was right for another state to intervene. For Gentili, ‘the subjects of others [are not] outside of that kinship of nature and the society formed by the whole world. And if you abolish that society, you will also destroy the union of the human race … [T]here must … be someone to remind [rulers] of their duty and hold them in restraint’ (Meron 1991: 115). Here are the beginnings of a legal justification of international humanitarian intervention, grounded on explicitly Stoic cosmopolitical principles.
Another key figure is the early sixteenth-century Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria. He is perhaps the first Western legal thinker systematically and explicitly to have thematised the ‘whole world’ (totus orbis) as an object of concern (Ortega 1996: 100). Vitoria wrote about the legal and ethical aftermath of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, which, along with Portuguese imperial expansion east to Asia, had profound effects on contemporary understandings of the ‘world as a whole’ as an increasingly interconnected entity (Ingli 2011). Vitoria was concerned with relations pertaining between all peoples on the earth, not just within Christendom as had been the focus of earlier thinkers. Horrified by the brutal treatment meted out by the conquistadors to native peoples, Vitoria stressed the Stoic theme that, because they were possessed of reason, the ‘Indians’ were fully as human as Europeans, and thus entitled to retain their land and properties. Vitoria’s vision was of peaceful coexistence between different peoples across the planet, regulated by natural law. Peaceful coexistence was possible through communication between different groups: the ius communicationis involved the freedom of all people to ‘travel over the world’s land and sea, freedom of trade, freedom of entry and settlement for foreigners, and … the duty of rulers to respect these rights’, all rules that Vitoria was painfully aware had been ignored by the Spanish in the Americas (Ortega 1996: 105).

Although Vitoria’s was an isolated voice at the time, he is noteworthy because of his novel analytical focus on the notion of the totus orbis which he takes from Stoic political theory and (importantly) historiography, his understanding of this as a legal entity in itself, and his prefiguring of later visions of a world-condition characterised by open trade and other forms of free intercourse among all people. It is also worth noting in this regard that, even if the ideas of Grotius as to international law were dismissed by Kant as containing an excessively limited notion of ethical obligations among participants, it remains the case that Grotius’ works are also describable as part of a certain ‘cosmopolitan vision’, because as a young man he had worked for the Dutch East India Company, a key player in international commerce at that time (van der Mandere 1925). In the case of both Vitoria and Grotius, we see how the dynamics of early modern globalisation, especially in terms of burgeoning trading networks, both impacted upon, and were understood through, reconfigured notions of the world-as-a-whole that were inherited from Stoic theoretical and historiographical cosmopolitanism (Ingli and Robertson 2006).

**Economic and social cosmopolitanism**

If the emerging realities of embryonic world-level commerce – and imperial plunder – informed appropriations of Stoicism by early modern jurists, so too would the increasing importance of cross-planet trade be reflected in the cosmopolitical visions of the eighteenth century, as we have already seen in the case of Kant. It is wrong to limit the history of cosmopolitan thought only to the canonised eighteenth-century political–theoretical writers. The cosmopolitical responses by other sorts of authors to what were viewed as the increasingly cosmopolitan conditions of global trade should also be mentioned.

Tom Paine – not usually included as part of the cosmopolitan canon – echoed much radical and liberal thought of the time when he argued that ‘if commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent to which it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war and produce a revolution in the uncivilized state of governments’ (Schlereth 1977: 103). Likewise, a more obviously cosmopolitan figure, Voltaire, discerned in the workings of the bourse the dynamics of inter-state, inter-cultural and even inter-religious cooperation and harmony:

> In the stock-exchanges of Amsterdam, London, Surat or Basra, the Gheber, the Barián, the Jew, the Mohametan, the Chinese Deist, the Brahmin, the Greek Christian, the Roman

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Christian, the Protestant Christian, the Quaker Christian, trade with one another; they don’t raise their daggers against each other to gain the souls for their religion.

(Schlereth 1977: 102)

In this vision, burgeoning world trade greatly facilitates international peace and religious tolerance. Commercial self-interest is distinctly cosmopolitan in nature because it leads to peaceful interaction between different states, cultures and religious groups. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith noted that the development of the wealth of a particular country should for people in all other countries be a matter for ‘emulation, not of national prejudice or envy … each nation ought not only to endeavour itself to excel, but from the love of mankind, to promote, instead of obstructing the excellence of its neighbours’ (1976 [1776]: iv.iii.9). Such benefits of free trade are regarded from a cosmopolitan point of view in Smith, even though he retained the hard-headed position that in empirical situations, what should be the case need not actually be so: the wealth of a particular nation can excite jealousy and antagonism among those abroad, leading to war and imperialist expropriation.

The complicated relationship of Karl Marx to cosmopolitan thinking and practice has already been laid out extensively (e.g. Cheah 2006). But it is also noteworthy that nineteenth-century liberal ideas as to free trade can be construed as particular sorts of cosmopolitan thinking. Richard Cobden, leader of the British Anti-Corn Law League, remarked ‘Free Trade! What is it? Why breaking down the barriers that separate nations; those barriers, behind which nestle the feelings of pride, revenge, hatred and jealousy’ (Kauppi and Viotti 1992: 208). For Cobden and many others, free trade would come over time to be seen by governmental leaders the world over as a more efficient way of generating national wealth than warfare. Military organisations would be made redundant in a commercially integrated world, as the main dynamic of world-level interactions shifted from politics to commerce.

The liberal vision of a global future marked by peaceful relations between states characterised the nascent discipline of sociology as much as it did political economy. As sociology reconfigured economic ideas about the division of labour, a specifically sociological set of cosmopolitan dispositions were formed from the early nineteenth century onwards. We can see this in the work of Herbert Spencer, who predicted a universal movement from ‘military society’ to ‘industrial society’, a condition where economic and political autarky were laid aside in the universal evolution towards world-level economic interdependence (Sztompka 1993: 103).

Just as much as economic liberalism, utopian socialism – another important influence on embryonic sociology – also espoused such a vision. Saint-Simon and his followers argued that the end-point of human history ‘is universal association … the association of all men [sic] on the entire surface of the globe in all spheres of their relationships’ (Iggers 1958: 58). The Stoic idea of ‘humanity as a whole’ is here recalibrated to become a product of the emerging global division of labour, such that over time ‘the various nations, scattered over the face of the earth, shall appear only as members of one vast workshop, working under a common law for the accomplishment of one and the same destiny’ (ibid.: 85).

The same sentiments were echoed by Comte and his school. The analytic object of Comtean sociology is an explicitly cosmopolitan one, again indebted to Stoicism:

the mass of the human species, whether in the present, the past or even the future … [which] increasingly constitute[s] in every respect, both in space and in time, an immense and eternal social unity, whose diverse individual or national organs, which are continually united by a close and universal solidarity, inevitably cooperate … in the fundamental evolution of humanity.

(Pickering 1989: 457–58)
Here we see very clearly one of the most explicitly cosmopolitan dimensions of classical sociology, before the sociological imaginary was sequestrated into the ‘methodological nationalism’ characteristic of the thinking of twentieth-century ‘national sociologies’ (Chernilo 2007).

Comte’s sociology also involved the development of the ‘religion of humanity’, a new secular religion which was to provide the newly-industrialised nations with a common cultural bond akin to that which Catholicism had provided in medieval Europe. As Boas (1928: 151–52) summarises:

[Comte] believed that human beings could be educated into acting with the same pacific motives toward other nationalities that they seem to have towards their fellow-citizens … nations would learn to gather for mutual support. A by-product of this arrangement would be universal peace, for war can be organized only for one’s country, whereas labour becomes an instrument for humanity as a whole. The industrial state makes all nations spontaneously converge by assigning to each an end which can become universal because it always remains external to any one nation. The exploitation of the natural resources common to all nations involves a division of labour equivalent to what one sees within separate societies. Such exploitation would be impossible without international cooperation.

Such Comtean sentiments are found in another key sociological work, Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society (1893), which can be viewed as that author’s first attempt to propound a specifically sociological – as opposed to an economic or political–theoretical – cosmopolitanism, attuned to the socio–economic–political conditions of the day. In the famous account of burgeoning social complexity (‘organic solidarity’), Durkheim (1964: 369) notes that within one (national) society under conditions of organic solidarity, ‘the fusion of the different segments [of production] draws [hitherto separate] markets together into one which embraces almost all [of national] society’. He then notes that this process

   even extends beyond [national frontiers] … and tends to become universal, for the frontiers which separate peoples break down at the same time as those [boundaries disappear] which separate the segments of each of them [within each polity]. The result is that each industry produces for consumers spread over the whole surface of the country or even of the entire world.

Thus ‘national-level’ organic solidarity develops at the same time as ‘international-level’ organic solidarity, leading to an ever more complex web of world-wide socio-economic integration. Although generally unremarked upon until recently (Turner, 2006), it is clear that Durkheim’s mature socio-political project was to formulate a brand of cosmopolitanism which would develop Saint-Simonian, Comtean and Kantian ethical dispositions, grounding these empirically in the emerging tendencies of world-level socio-political order. His position is summarised in an address given at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1900:

   Doubtless, we have towards the country in its present form, and of which we in fact form part, obligations that we do not have the right to cast off. But beyond this country, there is another in the process of formation, enveloping our national country: that of Europe, or humanity. (Lukes 1973: 350)

This view was elaborated in lectures Durkheim (1992) first gave in Bordeaux between 1890 and 1900, where he considers the apparently contradictory notion of ‘world patriotism’,
endeavouring to take into account the apparently rigid realities of the contemporary international system, while trying to raise this system to a certain ethical level, à la the efforts of the early modern jurists and Kant. World patriotism does not involve modes of affiliation to a putative ‘world state’, which he admits could only arise in the very distant future (1992: 74). Instead, it refers to a situation where each state encourages the highest moral sentiments among its citizens. Each national government endeavours

not to expand, or to lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and to make the widest appeal to its members for a moral life on an ever higher level … Civic duties would be only a particular form of the general obligations of humanity.

(Ibid.)

Durkheim points toward a ‘world culture’, constituted of certain general moral codes, which is contributed to by particular states and which is observed by all of them, with specific national colourings, as regards the education of their citizens. Turner (2006: 141) claims that ‘in equating what he called “true patriotism” with cosmopolitanism, Durkheim anticipated the modern debate about republicanism, patriotism and cosmopolitanism by almost a century’. He seems to anticipate, for example, Appiah’s (1996) argument that a sense of belonging to a particular national community is necessary for actors to achieve more cosmopolitan political goals, and Habermas’ (2001) idea of ‘constitutional patriotism’ as a way of reconciling actors’ orientations and responsibilities towards ‘cosmopolitical’ institutions like the UN with their feelings of national identity.

Durkheim, like Kant before him, wished to root his political–philosophical position in empirical world-level social conditions, this involving a move from political philosophy alone to historiography and sociology. This is what the late masterwork *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (2001 [1912]) set out to achieve (Inglis and Robertson, 2008), with an embryonic theory of globalisation underpinning the account of world moral culture and political cosmopolitanism he had outlined elsewhere. In the book’s later chapters, there is an account of the sociological reasons whereby a world-spanning cosmopolitan moral culture has developed at the present time. Durkheim argues that the case of the emergence of inter-tribal ‘international life’ in aboriginal Australia mirrors the emergence of a global moral culture in his own time. As different tribes (or nation-states) interact ever more closely in conditions of organic solidarity, they create shared moral forms – such as commonly-held divinities, totems and taboos – to which they all become obligated. Those who break the rules of this emergent global moral order are shunned, just as the civilised nations condemned the aggressive imperialism of Germany during the Great War (Durkheim 1915). It is particularly through common rituals and shared ceremonies that this moral culture is created, developed and reinforced. The inter-tribal social dynamics discernible in the aboriginal case are mirrored in the inter-national dynamics of the present day, with new senses of cosmopolitan morality being created through, for example, the participation of multiple nationalities at international expositions and congresses. The upshot is that today

there is no people, no state, that is not involved with another society that is more or less unlimited and includes all peoples … There is no national life that is not dominated by an inherently international collective life. As we go forward in history, these international groupings take on greater importance and scope …

(2001 [1912]: 322)

Here again can be discerned a concern not just to unite the normative and the empirical realms, but to ground the former upon tendencies in the latter, in order to avoid accusations of
abstraction and utopianism. In this sense, Durkheim was more profoundly Kantian than he has often been given credit for, when we regard the Kantian project in the manners proposed above.

Conclusion

The case of Durkheim illustrates the twin purposes of this re-narration of the history of cosmopolitanisms. First, it is only very recently that he has been seriously considered as a major cosmopolitan thinker. His ideas about patriotism and world moral culture are still only recognised by a few specialists, and not yet integrated into mainstream debates in the cosmopolitanism studies field. The same can also be said for numerous other figures examined above. Second, his project to integrate thoroughly the normative and empirical aspects of cosmopolitanism points to similar, earlier examples of this, including those of Kant and Stoic-influenced ancient historians. It is important in our ongoing interpretations of the history of the field to place emphasis on the ongoing theme of normative/empirical integration in Western cosmopolitical thought, because otherwise the latter can be represented in too narrow a fashion, understood as the preserve of political philosophers engaged in abstract discussions devoid of empirical affordances. Previous attempts to think about and instantiate cosmopolitan conditions prove to be more interesting and perhaps more useful and relevant for us today, once we have both widened and deepened our retrospective visions of them. The developing field of cosmopolitanism studies must in future think in more open and creative ways about the materials from which it is, or could be, constructed.

References


Alternative histories of cosmopolitanism


