As the leading theoretician of phenomenology as a radical “science of sciences” and as the founder of the phenomenological movement, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Among his innovations are his generalization of Brentano’s conception of intentionality, his account of categorical intuition, the identification of the natural attitude, the application of the procedures of the epoché and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, noetic-noematic analysis, and his conceptions of the horizon, habituality and the pre-given “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt). Husserl’s earlier descriptive phenomenology developed into full-blown transcendental idealism after 1907, causing many of his followers (including Heidegger) to reject his account of transcendental subjectivity.

Husserl was born into a middle-class assimilated Jewish family on April 8, 1859, in Prossnitz, Moravia, then part of the Austrian Empire. His father owned a draper’s store. Edmund initially attended a local school, then the Leopoldstädter Realgymnasium in Vienna and the Deutsches Staatsgymnasium in Olmütz. He graduated in 1876, showing some promise in mathematics, and entered the University of Leipzig to study mathematics, physics, and astronomy. There he attended Wilhelm Wundt’s (1832–1920) philosophy lectures, which made little impression. Another philosophy student, Thomas Masaryk (1850–1937), the Czech nationalist who later became the first President of Czechoslovakia, encouraged him to read the British empiricists and was also influential in converting Husserl to Protestantism. In 1878 Husserl moved to Berlin to study mathematics with the prominent mathematicians Karl Weierstrass (1815–97) and Leopold Kronecker (1823–91). He also attended philosophy lectures given by the Neo-Kantians Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908) and Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–92), but again with little impact. Weierstrass, on the other hand, was inspiring and awoke Husserl’s interest in the foundations of mathematics.

Weierstrass introduced Husserl to the neglected Austrian thinker Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) and his four-volume Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science, 1837). Bolzano’s anti-psychologistic approach to logic was deeply influential on Husserl. He was also drawn more generally to Bolzano’s account of pure logic as the “theory of science,” his conception of science as a coherent intermeshing system of theoretical truths, his account of “presentations” and “truths-in-themselves,” all of which are incorporated into his Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900). In 1881, Husserl transferred to the University of Vienna, where he received his doctoral degree in 1882 for a

Following a short period in Berlin as assistant to Weierstrass and a year’s compulsory military service, Husserl moved to Vienna. Masaryk recommended that Husserl attend the lectures of Franz Brentano (1838–1917), who was advocating a new descriptive approach to psychology. Brentano was an expert on Aristotle who wanted to return philosophy to the kind of exact description practiced by empiricists from Aristotle to Hume and Mill. His *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874, Brentano 1995) aimed to found a new strict science, later termed “descriptive psychology,” a classificatory science of mental acts and their contents based on the apodictic self-evidence of inner perception. Brentano identified intentionality, “directedness to an object” which may or may not exist (Brentano 1995: 88), as the defining characteristic of “mental phenomena.”

Husserl studied with Brentano, from 1884 to 1886, who persuaded him to become a philosopher. He was also particularly stimulated by Brentano’s novel reformulation of Aristotelian logic. Husserl maintained close contact with Brentano, and they corresponded on issues in philosophy and mathematics until Brentano’s death in 1917. Husserl initially followed Brentano’s program for founding the sciences on descriptive psychology in his first publication, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891, Husserl 2003), which aimed at the clarification of arithmetical concepts elucidating their “psychological origin.” He credited Brentano for his revolutionary rediscovery of intentionality but criticized him for failing to understand the true meaning of intentionality. Husserl claims his own “breakthrough” came in 1898, when he realized that there was a “universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness,” as he wrote in his *Crisis* (Husserl 1970: 166n).

In 1886 Husserl moved to Halle, completing his habilitation thesis *On the Concept of Number, Psychological Analyses* (Husserl 2003: 305–56) with Carl Stumpf in 1887. The mathematician Georg Cantor (1845–1918) was a member of Husserl’s examination committee. In autumn 1887 Husserl became a lecturer in the philosophy department at Halle. His first book, an expansion of his habilitation thesis, appeared in 1891 as *Philosophy of Arithmetic, Psychological and Logical Investigations* (Husserl 2003: 5–301). In 1891 Husserl began correspondence with the mathematical logician Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) on various problems in the philosophy of logic, particularly the relation between concepts and objects. Husserl had earlier criticized Frege’s account of number (as applicable to concepts) as well as his notions of definition and identity in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (Husserl 2003: 123–28, 174–77) and, in 1894, Frege in turn reviewed Husserl’s book in scathing fashion (see Mohanty 1982). Frege’s criticisms of Husserl’s approach as psychologistic were partly responsible for Husserl’s change of focus leading to his critique of psychologism in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900), the first volume published independently in 1900 of his *Logical Investigations* (Husserl 2001a). To overcome psychologism, Husserl was careful to distinguish between the psychological and the ideal content of intentional acts such as perceptions and judgments as well as the intentional object on which the acts were directed.

The second volume of the *Logical Investigations* containing six Investigations, entitled *Investigations in Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledge*, appeared in two
parts in 1901 (the long Sixth Investigation being the second part of the second volume). The first volume, *Prolegomena*, was enthusiastically reviewed by senior philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Wundt, and Paul Natorp (who reviewed it in *Kant-Studien*). Wundt accepted the *Prolegomena*’s arguments against psychologism, but criticized Husserl’s second volume as proposing an extreme “logicism” or Platonism about ideal entities. In general, there was some puzzlement about the type of descriptive psychology advocated in the second volume of the *Investigations* as this appeared to fall back into the very psychologism criticized in the *Prolegomena*.

In 1901, Husserl moved to Göttingen University, a world-renowned center of mathematics under Felix Klein (1848–1925), David Hilbert (1862–1943) and Richard Courant (1888–1972), and with a developing reputation for empirical psychology (under G. E. Müller). Husserl joined a renowned circle of scientists and his students included Ernst Zermelo (1871–1953), who worked on set theory, Paul Bernays (1888–1977), and the physicist Herman Weyl (1885–1955), who later attempted to integrate phenomenology into mathematics and physics. In Göttingen, Husserl focused on epistemological problems and on the descriptive phenomenology of conscious states, including perception, memory, imagination, picture-consciousness or “pictorial awareness” (see Husserl 2005), and inner awareness of time (see Husserl 1990), on which he lectured in 1904/5, criticizing Brentano (who explained temporal awareness of the past and future as activities of the imagination).

Around 1902/3, Husserl began to distinguish sharply between phenomenology as an eidetic science of “pure” consciousness studied in “immanence,” and psychology as an empirical, factual science of the psycho-physical states of animals. This led him to an overall critique of naturalism; expressed first in his 1906–7 lectures on Logic and the Theory of Knowledge (see Husserl 2008). The Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert invited Husserl to contribute an essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (Husserl 1964) to Rickert’s new journal *Logos* in 1910–11. This programmatic essay offered a sustained critique of naturalism and historicism as leading to relativism. Husserl’s former critique of psychologism (in the *Logical Investigations*) as an incoherent position was now applied to naturalism. But Husserl also criticized historicism as leading to relativism and thence to the collapse of the mission for science. In particular, Husserl singled out the “philosophy of world views” (*Weltanschauung-philosophie*), associated primarily with Dilthey, as denying the objective validity of cultural formations.

At Göttingen, Husserl attracted gifted students. An informal “school” of Husserlian phenomenologists had formed in Munich around the psychologist Theodor Lipps, an admirer of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. This group included Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941), Adolf Reinach (1883–1917), and, from 1906, Max Scheler. Husserl visited Munich in 1904, and the following year, some of Lipps’ students travelled to Göttingen to study with Husserl. Reinach, who wrote his habilitation on the theory of judgment with Husserl, became his teaching assistant. Sadly, Reinach died in the Great War in 1917, and Husserl wrote several moving obituaries. The Munich school understood phenomenology as a realist philosophy which focused on essential description and did not follow Husserl’s path into transcendental idealism.
Husserl’s thinking underwent a profound change of direction around 1905, a turn
first publicly revealed in lectures given at Göttingen University in 1906–7, but
explored in manuscripts written during the summer of 1905 while on vacation in
Seefeld, Austria, where he speaks of excluding “everything that is merely meant and
not given in the phenomenon” (Husserl 1990: 245). In April and May 1907 Husserl
delivered five important lectures at Göttingen, later published as The Idea of Phen-
omenology (Husserl 1999) on the phenomenological reduction as a way of over-
coming the modern epistemological problem of how the mind reaches external
objects and replacing it with a new conception of “transcendence-in-immanence.”
From this period on, Husserl deliberately characterized his phenomenology in
transcendental terms with explicit reference to a radical rethinking of the Kantian
critique of knowledge. In these years also, Husserl began to lecture on Descartes and
to rethink the radicalism of the latter’s discovery of the transcendental ego (which
Descartes completely misunderstood by treating it as a substance or “a little tag-end
of the world,” Husserl 1967: 24). New themes that emerged in Husserl’s Göttingen
years include the problem of the recognition of the other person in empathy (in
confrontation with Lipps), and the intersubjective constitution of objectivity, themes
that would dominate his later work.

Husserl’s researches on time consciousness had brought him to the realization that
he had neglected the syntheses that uni
fie
ed conscious acts such that they became acts
of the same enduring subject. In particular, he realized that the ego had a temporal
structure and his earlier treatment of it in the Logical Investigations had been ser-
iously inadequate. He had originally accepted Brentano’s Humean view that the ego
as the source of psychic acts could be bracketed in order to describe the nature of
the acts themselves, their structure, their real and ideal contents, and their essences,
but he came to realize that the ego played a crucial role not only in generating these
acts and stamping its unifying syntheses upon them, but in structuring the mean-
constituting functions of the acts themselves. Gradually Husserl developed his con-
ception of the “pure” or “transcendental” ego found in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (Husserl 1983, hereafter
Ideas I).

In 1907 a group of Husserl’s students founded the Göttingen Philosophy Society,
led by Theodor Conrad, and including Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Jean Héring, Fritz
Kaufmann, Winthrop Bell, and Alexandre Koyré. Later Edith Stein and Roman
Ingarden joined this group. In 1913 a new Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenom-
ological Research was founded, edited by Husserl, Reinach, Scheler, Geiger, and
Pfänder. This Yearbook became an outlet for brilliant phenomenological studies,
including Husserl’s Ideas I, which appeared in the first issue, and, later, in volume 7,
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927).

Husserl’s Ideas I was a programmatic work aiming to introduce the “general doc-
trine of phenomenological reductions” (Husserl 1983: xxi), which give access to the
domain of pure consciousness, and also give a general account of the structures of
pure consciousness. Phenomenology is here understood as an a priori science of
essences, where the a priori is understood in terms of essence (to avoid the legacy
inherent in traditional philosophical terminology, Husserl prefers to employ the
Greek term eidos and the corresponding adjective “eidetic”). In Ideas I Husserl
introduces the notion of the natural attitude both of everyday life and also of the theoretical sciences ("the natural theoretical attitude," Husserl 1983: §1). The natural attitude must be suspended through an epoché or "bracketing," which puts out of play the "general thesis" of consciousness (which relates to its objects as really existing) in order to grasp its very essence.

Immediately after Ideas I, Husserl hastily wrote another manuscript for what would eventually be continually revised by Husserl (initially with the assistance of Edith Stein up to 1918) until 1928 and which was posthumously published in 1952 as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book (Husserl 1989a, hereafter Ideas II). Edith Stein, as Husserl’s assistant (1916–18), also worked on Husserl’s time manuscripts. This edition was eventually published in 1928, edited by Martin Heidegger, with only the slightest reference to Stein’s labors. Ideas II begins with the discussion of the “idea of nature” in general as the correlate of the theoretical attitude of the scientific inquirer. The whole work is a study in noetic-noematic constitution, although it does not explicitly discuss theoretical issues concerning the reduction or phenomenology as a transcendentical science of pure consciousness. Rather the aim of the work is to identify and describe the various levels or “strata” involved in the constitution of entities in the world as material, animal, and human natures, including the realms of personhood and communal and cultural life, which Husserl – following German tradition generally – calls “spirit” (Geist). The spiritual world is the world of cultural products, practices, and institutions. The cultural world must be understood in terms not of natural causation but of “motivation,” a conception discussed originally by Dilthey but which Husserl made central to the intentional life of persons (and indeed higher animals). We do not just causally interact with objects in the world but we deliberately turn our attention towards them, they “motivate” our interest: “The room’s stale air (which I experience as such) stimulates me to open the window” (Husserl 1989a: 229). Motivation, for Husserl, is a form of spiritual causation; it is intimately tied in with the subject’s personal history and habits rather than being a matter of universal causation (as in the natural sciences).

In March 1916 Husserl’s son died in the Great War, and shortly afterwards Husserl moved to Freiburg to take up the chair of philosophy as successor to Heinrich Rickert. Freiburg was a center of Neo-Kantianism through Windelband and Rickert, and, in a letter to Rickert, Husserl expresses sympathy with the aims of the neo-Kantians to establish true science and overcome naturalism. Towards the end of the war, in 1917/18, Husserl delivered a series of three lectures in Freiburg to wounded soldiers on “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity” (Husserl 1995). German idealism has now fallen into neglect and misunderstanding but will return, given that a “one-sided naturalistic mode of thinking and feeling is losing its power” (Husserl 1995: 112). Husserl draws a historical parallel with the situation in Germany after Napoleon’s victory at Jena. It was Fichte who was able to find spiritual resources in that defeat. Fichte offers more than theoretical philosophy; he offers the true critique of practical reason, putting Kant’s philosophy on the secure footing by genuinely uniting theory and practice, and ridding it of obscure “things in themselves.” Husserl briefly sketches how Descartes and Kant overturned the naive belief in the world, by showing that the world is “posited by us in our thought” (Husserl 1995: 114), and that space,
time, causality, are “the basic forms of a thinking which belong inseparably to our kind of mind” *(ibid.:* 115), leading to the Kantian view that “subjectivity is world-creative, shaping the world from out of the pre-given materials of sensation in accordance with its firm laws” *(ibid.:* 116).

Shortly after his arrival in Freiburg Husserl met the young Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and was instrumental in getting Heidegger’s habilitation thesis published for which he is thanked in the dedication. The two philosophers corresponded during Heidegger’s military service, and they became close companions after Heidegger returned to lecture in Freiburg in January 1919. Heidegger taught in Freiburg until 1923 when he moved to a professorship in Marburg. In 1922 Husserl was invited to England (the first German philosopher to visit after the war) by his friend, Professor George Dawes Hicks, and gave a series of four lectures at University College, London, entitled “The Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy” in June 1922. These lectures sketched a system of transcendental first philosophy, a rigorous science that would have universal impact and play a role in the development of universal humanity. These lectures laid the basis for Husserl’s Paris Lectures of 1929, presenting the “Cartesian way” of entering into transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology, as Husserl would repeat in the first draft of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article of 1927, must begin with self-experience with the performance of the “egological reduction,” as first preliminary indicated by the Cartesian *ego cogito*.

In 1923/24 Husserl contributed three articles on the theme of “renewal” to a Japanese intellectual journal, *The Kaizo* (“Renewal”), to which Ricke and Bertrand Russell had also contributed (see Husserl 1981: 326–34). Here Husserl advocates the renewal of philosophy and the surpassing of narrow nationalisms in order to found a true international community of shared interests. Husserl believed in a spiritual retrieval of the human sense of purpose through a renewal of the ideals of the European Enlightenment (which culture, in his opinion, Japan had recently joined). Developing his theme of the nature of phenomenology as the most radical grounding science in the system of science, Husserl delivered an important series of lectures, *First Philosophy*, in two parts in 1923/24 (now Husserliana VII and VIII). Here he gives an extremely rich and sophisticated account of his own philosophy in relation to the history of philosophy, especially in relation to ancient skepticism and the philosophical founding of Descartes.

Through the 1920s Husserl and Heidegger were in close communication, even spending holidays together. Husserl published Heidegger’s *Being and Time* in his *Yearbook* and supported him as his successor to the Chair in Freiburg. In late 1927, Husserl sought Heidegger’s cooperation in writing the article “Phenomenology” for the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. They exchanged several drafts between September 1927 and February 1928, but their views diverged radically and, in the submitted version, Husserl dropped most of Heidegger’s contributions.

Husserl retired at the end of March 1928. In 1929, a *Festschrift* was prepared as a special issue of the *Yearbook* for Husserl’s seventieth birthday. In the same year Husserl finally carefully read Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927) and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), and Husserl’s annotations bear witness to his critical
appraisal of these works. For Husserl, Being and Time was essentially an anthropology written from the naive standpoint of the natural attitude. Relations between the two deteriorated and Husserl wrote to Pfänder in 1931 admitting his “blindness” in regard to Heidegger.

After his retirement Husserl embarked on a burst of writing and lecturing. He traveled to Amsterdam in April 1928 to deliver two public lectures on “Phenomenology and Psychology” (Husserl 1997a). Emmanuel Levinas, who had attended Husserl’s seminars in Freiburg in 1928 and 1929, assisted Husserl for his invited talks in Paris and Strasbourg. In Paris, on 23 and 25 February 1929, Husserl delivered four lectures entitled “Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology” in the Descartes Amphitheatre of the Sorbonne. The audience included Levinas, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Jean Cavaillès, Jean Héring, Alexandre Koyré, Gabriel Marcel, and, possibly, the very young Maurice Merleau-Ponty (who would have been just twenty at the time). Husserl also wrote Formal and Transcendental Logic, published in 1929 in the Yearbook, essentially a sustained rethinking of the structure of logical judgment.

In 1931 the Paris lectures were published as the Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1967) in the French translation of Levinas (and Gabrielle Peiffer). This work was enormously influential, but Husserl himself was dissatisfied with his account of the constitution of intersubjectivity and held back the German edition. It was eventually published in 1950 as Husserliana I. Husserl himself saw his Paris lectures as offering a sketch of the breadth of transcendental life, an overview of the domain of transcendental phenomenology.

The Cartesian Meditations is presented by Husserl as an exercise in “solipsistic philosophizing” (Husserl 1967: 3). As such it stands in sharp contrast to the approach to phenomenology through the communal lifeworld to be found in the Crisis of European Sciences (Husserl 1970). In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl explicitly labels phenomenology “neo-Cartesianism” although it explicitly rejects almost all of Descartes’ own tenets and applauds Descartes for abandoning naive objectivism and returning to “transcendental subjectivism” by beginning with the “I think,” ego cogito. Descartes, however, failed to make the genuine transcendental turn and fell back into naive substance metaphysics. Husserl embraces the Cartesian epoché, the “putting out of action” of all one’s previous opinions and convictions. Through the epoché I reconfigure my whole worldly life as the achievement of my intentional conscious experiences. Everything in the world is there for me because I accept it, perceive it, deem it real, think about it, and so on: “I can enter no world other than the one that gets its acceptance or status in and from me, myself” (Husserl 1967: 21).

Meanwhile Husserl was finally achieving international recognition. In 1930 he was invited to Oxford for the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy but declined (Schuhmann 1977: 364). In 1931 he gave an invited talk in Frankfurt to the Kant Society on “Phenomenology and Anthropology” (Husserl 1997a), repeated in Berlin and Halle to large audiences. In 1934 he was invited to the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, to speak on the topic of “the mission of philosophy in our time,” but as a Jew he was officially prohibited from taking part in the German delegation to the Congress. Instead Husserl sent a letter that was read out at
the conference and an accompanying manuscript on his vision of the nature of philosophy that praised the singular breakthrough of Descartes (Husserl 1989b: Husserliana XXVII, 184–221).

In January 1933 Hitler’s National Socialist party came to power in Germany and, in keeping with that party’s promises, on April 7, 1933 a new law on “the re-establishment of a permanent civil service” was promulgated prohibiting non-Aryans from holding positions in the state service. Indeed, Heidegger, now Rector of Freiburg University, countersigned this official decree of enforced leave of absence. Husserl was devastated, having always counted himself a German nationalist, whose sons had served in the German army and whose daughter had worked in a field hospital in the Great War. Husserl’s surviving son Gerhart also lost his position in the Law Faculty at Kiel (a university at the forefront of the Nazification process).

In spite of official restriction, Husserl continued his research, focusing increasingly on the crisis of the sciences and the growing irrationality. He also investigated genetic phenomenological issues relating to history and culture. He lived in increasing isolation, supported by a few loyal friends, notably Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. Life became increasingly difficult, but, although he was offered a professorship in the University of Southern California, he decided to stay.

In May 1935, on the invitation of the Viennese Cultural Society, Husserl delivered a lecture entitled “Philosophy in the Crisis of European Humanity” in Vienna, generally known as the Vienna Lecture. Soon after, in November 1935, on the invitation of the Philosophy Circle in Prague, he gave two lectures, entitled “The Crisis of European Science and Psychology.” Landgrebe, Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, and Jan Patočka, among others, were in attendance. This lecture was later incorporated into the Crisis of the European Science as published in Belgrade in 1936 in the new journal Philosophia, founded in 1936 by the exiled German Jewish philosopher, Arthur Liebert.

The Crisis of the European Sciences (Husserl 1970) was originally planned as a work in five sections, but only the first two parts (§§1–27 of the present edition) appeared in 1936, with the third part completed but not published. Husserl was still editing it when he died. In 1954 Walter Biemel published a selected edition (Husserliana VI). The Crisis is a “teleological-historical reflection upon the origins of our critical scientific and philosophical situation” (Husserl 1970: 3n1). It attempts what Husserl elsewhere calls a “historico-genetic” explanation of the way in which our culture and scientific outlook have evolved into a situation where they are even in conflict. Husserl proposed nothing less than a critical investigation of the whole of history, of history approached from the inside and as a unity:

Our task is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy, especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intentions. We are attempting to elicit and understand the unity running through all the projects of history that oppose one another and work together in their changing forms.

(Husserl 1970: 70)
Husserl is trying to develop a kind of intellectual reconstruction of the original establishment of the theoretical attitude of the ancient Greeks in their founding of the sciences. A particular feature of the Crisis is Husserl’s characterization of the essence of modern mathematical science in his discussion of Galileo which led to the “mathematization of nature” (Husserl 1970: 61):

One can truly say that the idea of nature as a self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. (Husserl 1970: 60)

Another innovation of the Crisis is Husserl’s discussion of the “lifeworld” as the pre-given, universal framework of pre-theoretical experience on which the scientific conception of the world is founded. Husserl proposes a new way into transcendentalist philosophy through the exploration of the lifeworld which complements the usual “Cartesian way.” Husserl’s researches on the lifeworld interested many sociologists (e.g. Schutz), anthropologists, and those interested in relating human culture to the natural world. Husserl himself thought that the investigation of the lifeworld could form the basis of a new science, a science of the much-disparaged world of common opinion or doxa (Husserl 1970: 155). In one of the Crisis texts, written in 1935, Husserl laments that, in light of the growing irrationalism in philosophy, the ideal of philosophy as a science has been forgotten: “Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science – the dream is over” (Husserl 1970: 389). Husserl himself is not renouncing the ideal, as this statement is often interpreted, but simply acknowledging that interest in existentialism and life-philosophy had supplanted interest in his phenomenology.

A short text from the late Husserl entitled On the Origin of Geometry, published by Husserl’s assistant Eugen Fink in France in 1939, was commented on by Merleau-Ponty, and most famously by Jacques Derrida. This text offers a revision of Husserl’s account of the constitution of ideal mathematical objectivities which acknowledges the role of written signs for securing transtemporal ideality.

In his final years Husserl suffered both from illness and discrimination. In the summer of 1937 he was forced, for reasons of race, to move house. He died on April 27, 1938, soon after his seventy-ninth birthday. No one from the Freiburg Philosophy Faculty, except Gerhard Ritter, attended his funeral. Heidegger was sick with the flu, as he later insisted. In August 1938, shortly after Husserl’s death, a Belgian Franciscan priest, Fr. Hermann Van Breda, who had just completed his licentiate in philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven, arrived in Freiburg with the intention of researching Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts. Through his efforts he was able to arrange for the passage of Husserl’s manuscripts to safe keeping in the University of Leuven, where today they are stored in the Husserl Archives which oversees the complete edition of his works.

Husserl’s work exerted an enormous influence on twentieth-century philosophers including Heidegger, Patočka, Levinas, Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Derrida, Gadamer, and Habermas. In the United States, Husserl’s followers, including Aron Gurwitsch, Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, Herbert Spiegelberg, Marvin Farber, and Dorion Cairns, were influential in promoting Husserl’s
phenomenology. The publication of the Husserliana edition of Husserl’s works has stimulated renewed interest in his phenomenology, including in relation to the cognitive sciences.

See also Franz Brentano (Chapter 1); Intentionality (Chapter 11); Evidence (Chapter 12); Perception (Chapter 13); Truth (Chapter 14); The subject and the self (Chapter 15); Intersubjectivity (Chapter 16); Time (Chapter 17); Space (Chapter 18); The world (Chapter 19); The body (Chapter 20); History (Chapter 21); Husserl’s method of reduction (Chapter 22); Eidetics and its methodology (Chapter 23); Genetic phenomenology (Chapter 24); Art and aesthetics (Chapter 26); Metaphysics and ontology (Chapter 34); Epistemology (Chapter 35); Philosophy of mind (Chapter 36); Philosophy of language (Chapter 37); Moral philosophy (Chapter 38); Logic (Chapter 40); Philosophy of mathematics (Chapter 41); Philosophy of science (Chapter 42); Analytic philosophy (Chapter 51); The social sciences (Chapter 57); Literary criticism (Chapter 58).

References and further reading


Husserl, E. (1950–) Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke, Dordrecht: Springer. (Over forty volumes have been published in this series.)


