SECTION I

The organizers
THE BIDDERS’ AND PROMOTERS’ PERSPECTIVES

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Introduction

To stimulate, regenerate, or reposition a city, region, or country, hosting a major international sports event can be a much sought after and prestigious commodity (Masterman 2009, Jordan 2011). Such has been the dramatic growth in the political salience of sport within the last decade, that a fiercely fought out global competition exists to bid for the rights to host sport events, such as an Olympic Games, a FIFA World Cup, the America’s Cup, and other international sport events (Walters 2011, Grix 2012). While Emery (2001) suggests that with only one winner, the nature of competitive bidding has long been recognised as being costly, time consuming, and risky, the intensity and aggressive nature of competitive bidding has now reached unprecedented levels (Shoval 2002, Atkinson et al. 2008, Walmsley 2008, Walters 2011). Walmsley (2008) argues that this is for two reasons – first, that bidding processes have been introduced to a greater range of sport events, and second, that destinations perceive a broader range of value being derived from hosting such events.

To this end, this chapter will initially describe the nature and role of the two key players, the event owner and the event bidder, as well as the important relationships the intermediaries and agencies (promoters) play in the bid process. More specifically, through appraising the research associated with this stakeholder group, it will provide an overview of the bidding process from different perspectives, and examine the key factors for success. Furthermore, since sports event management imposes escalating challenges of sustainability (Furrer 2002, Smith 2009, Hayes and Horne 2011), the normative aspects of environmental integrity and social inclusion will be explored, drawing on real-life examples to illustrate current research and industry practice. The chapter concludes with a summary of the bid literature and suggestions for future research for different stakeholders.

Overview of the stakeholder group

The sport event history, scale, ownership, and ultimately demand, dictate whether or not there is a destination selection process, and if so, what it is. For example, some annual major international sport events are historically tied to a destination, such as the Wimbledon Championships. Other sport events by comparison, the Commonwealth Games, an F1 Powerboat World Championship,
a Tour de France stage, or the hosting of a National Football League (NFL) Super Bowl, involve a unique selection process, which can be very diverse in terms of what, who, and how the host is determined.

Where there is an event selection process, the stakeholder group primarily consists of a sports property owner and a potential destination host or bidder. The sport property owner is likely to possess international or national responsibilities, and either involve a multi-sport organisation, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (rights holder of the summer and winter Olympic Games), or a single-sport organisation, such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (rights owner of the FIFA World Cup). At the national level, there can also exist sport event custodians and associations, such as the Australian Commonwealth Games Association (ACGA) and Swimming Australia, who are responsible for hosting their own national events, and additionally act as the conduits through which international bids are commonly submitted.

The potential destination host may be an organisation or combination of organisations that could represent one or more venues, cities, regions, or countries. For example, in the most demanding of all bidding processes, the international stage to host the summer Olympic Games, the 2012 Games witnessed an intense competition between the nine city bids of London, Paris, Madrid, New York, Moscow, Havana, Istanbul, Leipzig, and Rio de Janeiro. Each minimally required backing from their respective National Olympic Committee (NOC), national government, and numerous other delivery networks.

These networks include other intermediaries and agencies that act on behalf of either the owner or bidder. With Gauthier (2011) reporting that unsuccessful Olympic bids costing between $42m and $100m (Madrid and Chicago respectively) and FIFA World Cup bids $23m–$45m (England and Australia respectively), it is little wonder that additional networks, organisations, and consultants are increasingly being used to either assist property owners to maximise their event potential or aid bidders to improve their chances of success. Fulfilling client needs, these public and private agencies largely fulfil specialised promotion and communication roles, and normally focus on pre-event activities. From a bidder perspective, such organisations can be government funded and operate at a national level to invest in world class events, such as New Zealand Major Events (www.med.govt.nz/majorevents), or purely on sport event acquisitions and development, such as Sport Event Denmark (http://sporteventdenmark.com/) or UK Sport (www.uksport.gov.uk/pages/world-class-events/). Similarly, they can operate at a regional level, such as the world-leading events acquisition group Victoria Major Events Company (VMEC) and its associate network partnerships (more details later in the chapter). Furthermore, regional organisations can involve several states, such as the Australian International Sporting Events Secretariat (AISES), a joint initiative of the Australian State Governments of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria which assists event experts, and companies. Alternatively, they could include private public relations agencies that represent no geographic boundaries. Examples include Weber Shandwick (www.webershandwick.com/what-we-do/specialties/sports-marketing) who created strategic business communication advice on the successful Athens, Beijing, and Sochi Olympic bids, and Vero Communications (www.verocom.co.uk/our-record.html), the sport business consultancy whose successful 2022 Qatar FIFA World Cup campaign epitomises their mission, ‘to tell the most compelling, creative and true story to help our clients win, whatever their goal’ (www.verocom.co.uk/about-us.html).

Of the limited research undertaken on the sport event bidding process, most has focussed on one-off multi-sport mega events such as the Olympic Games (Hiller 2000a, Persson 2002, Shoval 2002, Swart 2005, Falcous and Silk 2010, Booth 2011, Hautbois et al. 2012). Furthermore, scarce
empirical research exists to inform us of the main driver and the actual decision-making processes of the event owner (Gauthier 2011). This has meant that understanding this specialised market context is usually based upon anecdotal evidence (Persson 2002), and is likely to be characterised by mutual uncertainty and imperfect knowledge (Getz 2004).

However, whereas a decade ago, the sport event bidding process was commonly based on a chairperson’s political whim (Emery 2002), fortunately, the nature and process of bidding has significantly matured since then (Walmsley 2008). This has led SportBusiness and the Sports Consultancy (2013) to build on earlier UK Sport documentation and propose five significant bidding trends:

1. Increasing competition (especially from Eastern European countries)
2. Increasing lead times
3. Increasing specification levels
4. Increasing rights fees
5. More international federations are requiring advanced contracts.

More open competition has meant increased expectation and bid quality, resulting in a more scientific evidence-based bidding process, where greater emphasis is placed upon a host’s Unique Selling Proposition (USP) (Walmsley 2008).

The primary event owner challenge appears to relate to the creation of a fair, objective, and transparent bidding process (Gauthier 2011). In comparison, the key challenges of the event bidder are to understand the critical success factors of winning the bid, and to justify the benefits of potentially very expensive and high risk competitive investments on the local communities they serve. The highly political and often secret nature of these bidding processes creates a market for specialist intermediaries and advising agencies to operate. Acting in largely short-term economically driven promoter roles, the private independent agencies operate in a high-stake and intensely competitive scenario. In this environment where there is often only one winner, a major challenge is to ensure that all advising agencies adhere to appropriate ethical practices. For instance, the global business, sport, events, and facilities consultancy Rushmans promotes its portfolio of services to the full range of event stakeholders from ‘major enterprises, business owners, governments, cities, bidding committees, governing bodies, local organising committees, and media organizations’ (http://rushmans.com/). Multiple stakeholder representation inevitably creates situations where conflicts of interest occur and issues of information disclosure are prevalent. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing promoters and advising agencies is to ensure that they act with due diligence and avoid violating the most fundamental principle of servicing client needs, namely the obligation of ‘undivided loyalty and the duty to act in good faith at all times’ (Shropshire and Davis 2003: 79). But as suggested by the law professor Walter Champion (1997: 359), this is not always easy and can provide an ethical conundrum, since the ethical code of the well-established legal profession ‘may not perfectly fit the emerging, evolving and dynamic relations that are inherent in the sports arena’.

**Literature review**

Expanding Getz’s (2004) conceptual framework of the generic event bidding process, Figure 2.1 provides a useful overview of the stakeholder group relations as well as the nature of current research applied to sport events.

Getz’s (2004) original model adopted a destination marketing approach and offered exploratory research on a small sample size, to investigate the bidding scenario of Canada’s hosting
of convention/exhibition events. Based upon Crouch and Ritchie’s (1998) earlier conceptual research on the event owner perspective of convention site selection, Getz (2004) introduced the notion of a bilateral exchange process between an event buyer and seller and recognised their respective antecedent and selection factors. While this model made reference to destination marketing organisations (DMO), who were often assigned responsibility to bid for an event, the nature of these intermediaries and advising agencies are often much more complicated in the international sport event scenario, and hence have been included as a separate entity in Figure 2.1. For instance, in the London 2012 Olympic bid, Walters (2011) makes reference to the essential political support for a competitive bid from at least four government agencies, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), local authorities, regional development agencies, and UK Sport with its World Class Event Program. However, it is not just the quantity of partnerships that create management complexity, but often the temporary nature and change of relationships over time. In reviewing the selection and sanctioning processes of hosting a major international sport event, Emery (2001) noted that there are commonly three competitive approval processes, namely at the organisational, national, and international levels. Each level may involve very different selection criteria, sanctioning processes, and partner relation roles. For example, Swart (2005), with reference to hosting major international sport events in South Africa, and Hautbois et al. (2012), who appraised the French bid Candidature Cities of the 2018 Olympic Winter Games, make reference to the need for highly competitive city bid roles converting to a more collaborative and supportive role as the national bid progresses to the international level. Similarly, where the national approval body moves from a position of selector (high power) to bidder (low power) (Emery 2002), the Candidature City in the Olympic scenario legally changes its organisation form, governance structure, and physical location across the event lifecycle. Parent and Deephouse (2007) elaborate with reference to the Olympic Games, where the Candidature City Bid Committee ceases to exist, and if successful, need to be constituted to form an Organising Committee.

To better understand the nature of the sport bidding process let us appraise the literature pertaining to each element of Figure 2.1. In the mega-event category, the event or sports property owner drives the exchange process since they determine the selection and sanctioning (approval) process. More specific detail will be provided on this stakeholder in Chapter 5, but suffice to say

Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework of the sport event bidding process
(Adapted from Getz, 2004)
The bidders’ and promoters’ perspectives

Mega sport event owners possess considerable power (Getz 2004). In essence, these owners can directly influence the competitive nature of the bidding process, by influencing the entry barriers as well as the bargaining power of bidders and hence competitive rivalry (Porter 1980). By comparison, the owner of small sports events such as the annual European Association of Sport Management (EASM) conference, possess limited bargaining power and cannot insist on a rigorous annual bidding process. In the EASM case, bids to host the conference and accompanying masters’ student seminar merely consist of an open call and a letter of intent. Where there are more than two competing letters of intent, the decision is made by member voting at the next EASM annual general meeting.

In other cases, event owners need to proactively approach new venues and offer them incentives for the future of the event. Crouch and Ritchie (1998) and Getz (2004) refer to these factors as the owner’s antecedent conditions and these affect the search for an event host. In the convention event bidding setting, these conditions were suggested to be influenced by the owner’s needs and preferences, their capability to build relationships, and effectiveness in disseminating information. They also suggested that the final decision to determine which host(s) was selected, related to how the Candidatures met the essential or desirable bid criteria. This bid criteria may be implicitly or explicitly stated, and in the sport event scenario, the exact nature of how the host selection factors are used to determine the winning bid has been the subject of some considerable debate.

With secret ballots still dictating sport event bidding processes, it makes it virtually impossible to know exactly who voted for who and why (Persson 2002, Booth 2011). It is probably for this reason that, of the limited research carried out on the sport event owner, it has largely focussed on the nature of power, the relationship between owner and bidder interactions, and the greater levels of transparency being demanded of the bidding process. For example, a case study approach was used by Hautbois et al. (2012), who applied an analytical framework of power, legitimacy, and urgency to the 2018 Olympic Winter Games French national bid. Focussing on the city bidding stakeholder perspective, but also considering their relationship with the French Olympic Committee and other city competitors, their findings suggest that to increase a Candidature city’s chances of success, no city stakeholder alone should possess a definitive status, the sport stakeholder should minimally exude an expectant status, and no strategic stakeholder should possess low stakeholder salience.

Since there are still some hosting decisions that defy all forms of logic (Gauthier 2011) and it is in the best interests of event owners to ensure a more transparent and objective bidding process, some research has been undertaken to propose bidding process best practice. For instance, Jordan (2011) refers to a number of critical success factors that were used by the International Cricket Council (ICC) (event owner) to determine the success of the 2007 Cricket World Cup. Documenting these requirements under the headings executive management, collaboration and communication, community participation and involvement, and best practices has been the first step in establishing a consistent and sustainable event management process.

To ensure greater transparency and efficiency, Gauthier (2011) analysed a broad range of international sporting events bidding processes and similarly proposed recommendations of best practice. While recognising the uniqueness of each sporting context, these generic recommendations proposed that, minimally, the bidding process should be written, not be subject to easy alteration, should account for regional balance, be accompanied by a technical report, and possess a viable ‘exit strategy’ in case of host failure.

Clearly, the mechanics of the bid process across the sport event spectrum can be very diverse. Walmsley (2008), for instance, suggests that this may vary from the very formal and traditional processes of the international federation’s constitutional membership bodies (such as the IOC and
FIFA) to the ad hoc basis of commercial sporting properties (such as UIM Powerboat P1 World Championship) that bid for a tour or series of events and only involve one or two senior figures. Whereas the most demanding approach is the top-down Olympic bidding process (Masterman 2009), the Union Cycliste International (UCI) Cycling World Championships involve a bottom-up approach. As Walmsley (2008: 131/2) explains, ‘Either a commercial race promoter will approach a local authority and then the two partners seek the blessing of the national federation or the federation itself decides it wants to bid and then seeks a promoter to put on the event’. In this instance, the UCI deals directly with the promoter, relying on the international governing body expert opinion from two site inspections and not the bid book documentation and formal presentations of other bidding processes. A hybrid version of these two extremes was the awarding of the 2007 Cricket World Cup. First, the event was awarded to the West Indies Cricket Board (region) in 2003, due to the ICC event hosting an unofficial rotational policy. Second, an internal competition ensued in 2004, guided by the 300 page ICC Bid Book constituting 24 deliverables. On this basis, 8 of the 12 independent country bids were selected to host different aspects of the event (Jordan 2011).

Rotational policies are similarly used for multi-sports events, such as the Commonwealth Games, and other single sport events, such as FIFA’s recast of its policy to simultaneously grant hosting rights to the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. In this latter case, only 4 of a potential 6 continental football confederations are permitted to bid, since the last two hosts are rendered ineligible. Gauthier (2011) argues that while these rotational policies are founded upon good intent, namely to spread the hosting benefits between its members, the policy may inhibit competition, resulting in sub-optimal bids and reducing the leveraging potential of the event owner.

In trying to better understand different international major single-sport event bidding processes and timescales, Walmsley (2008) used event size and significance to classify major sport events into three tiers, namely:

- Tier 1 – The ‘blue riband’ sports world championships typically awarded 3–5 years out e.g. Cricket World Cup; International Association of Athletics of Federations (IAAF) World Championships.
- Tier 2 – World championships in other Olympic sports, continental championships or ‘blue riband’ circuit events that are awarded 2–4 years out e.g. European Athletics Championships.
- Tier 3 – World championships in niche sports or Paralympic sports and continental championships in Tier 2 Olympic sports that are awarded 1–3 years out e.g. International Paralympic Committee (IPC) Alpine Ski World Cup.

His findings revealed that after mega-events, Tier 1 single-sport major events are likely to be the most expensive, involve the longest lead times, and require the greatest detail in terms of formalised documentation.

Where formalised documentation is used in the bidding process, Getz (2004) suggests that the following sequential activities are normally undertaken:

- Proposal request
- Discussions
- Formal bid submission
- Site inspections
- Bid presentations
- Site selection and negotiations.
The highest profile multi-sport event is the Olympic and Paralympic Games, and given that this mega-event is the most copied bidding model (Walmsley 2008, Masterman 2009, Smith 2009), let us briefly review it. Governed by strict rules and timescales of both the Olympic Charter (IOC 2011a) and the respective Games Candidature Application Procedure (see IOC 2011b that illustrates the 2020 Games requirements), Table 2.1 provides an overview of the three phases of this international bidding process of the event.

In summary, an Applicant City needs to determine whether or not they seriously wish to bid to host the Games at least 10 years in advance (Masterman 2009). This is to ensure that they are the approved NOC nomination and can fully commit to the two-year international bidding process and if awarded the Games, the seven-year preparatory phase before delivery. Through the Applicant City questionnaire data (Phase 1), it is the IOC Executive Board that decides each Candidature City by assessing its bid concept, plan, motivation, and stakeholder support. In comparison, through a detailed analysis of each Candidature File and IOC Evaluation Commission report (Phase 2), it is the IOC Session (all active IOC members) that elects the Host City. Similar in nature to FIFA’s World Cup awarding process, the IOC Session uses a multiple-round exhaustive secret ballot system to determine the Games host, with all eligible members possessing one vote. The Candidature City that receives the least votes in each round is eliminated until a single city is chosen by the majority. While the collective scores of each round are published, the transparency surrounding this final phase of voting is the source of considerable debate.

Table 2.1 IOC Olympic and Paralympic Games international bidding process

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase (duration)</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Event owner process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Registration Phase</td>
<td>• Guarantees compliance to key stakeholders</td>
<td>• Receipt and confirmation of acceptance of proposed dates (if outside of normal July 15 – August 31 period) and signed letters regarding World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) compliance and acceptance of Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) jurisdiction</td>
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<td>(approximately one month)</td>
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<td>• Applicant questionnaire examined by Olympic experts and IOC may commission their own studies of appraisal</td>
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<td>Phase 1 – Candidature</td>
<td>• Determines the Applicant City’s potential to host</td>
<td>• Expert Group provides recommendation report to IOC</td>
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<td>Acceptance Procedure</td>
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<td>• IOC Executive Board makes final decision on Candidature cities</td>
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<td>(approximately nine months)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cities complete volumes 1, 2, and 3 of the Candidature File and provide binding guarantees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2 – Candidature</td>
<td>• Evaluates detailed plan and implement feasibility study and risk assessment of each Candidature City.</td>
<td>• IOC may commission external studies to analyse bids</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td></td>
<td>• IOC Evaluation Commission reviews submission, visits cities and makes report to IOC Session</td>
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<td>(approximately 14 months)</td>
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<td>• IOC Session elects host city through a secret ballot of all its members</td>
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(Adapted from IOC, 2011b, and IOC, 2011c)
Persson (2002), for example, compared sport and non-sport organisation decision-making processes according to both the number of different nationalities involved and the secrecy of voting. He found that, although sport may involve comparative numbers of different nationalities relative to non-sport organisations such as the United Nations, Rotary International, and the European Union, the sport organisations involved individual confidentiality whereas the individual decisions of the non-sport organisations were open for public scrutiny. This led Persson (2002) to assert that secrecy and insufficient knowledge of previous bids is likely to cause bidder confusion and lead to anecdotal claims of malpractice.

To alleviate such claims, some event owners have taken the initiative to educate and more clearly communicate elements of the bidding process by providing key documents that guide and inform the process for future hosts. This can be illustrated by the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) with its publically accessible details of the 2018 Commonwealth Games bidding process (www.thecgf.com/games/bid.asp). First, it details the legal, technical, financial, and timescales requirements of the event bidding and delivery procedures, by providing the Candidature City Manual (CGF 2011a). With the event bid requiring government guarantees and the need for candidatures to submit a 240-page bid book that addresses the 15 delivery themes identified in Table 2.2, a consistent and hence more objective comparable framework of candidate bids is possible.

This is very similar to the IOC bidding process, but the CGF website (www.thecgf.com/games/bid.asp) goes one step further by publishing not only the complete documentation files and external website of each Candidate City, but also their own 140-page Evaluation Commission Report (CGF 2011b) of the outcome. Such comprehensive and publically available documentation, which includes candidature-specific feedback against each theme, provides an excellent benchmark standard from which future event bidders can seriously contemplate the merits of establishing a bid.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Candidature City delivery themes</th>
<th>Additional CGF documents on top of the Candidature City Manual</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Games vision and concept</td>
<td>1) Constitution – establishes roles and policies</td>
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<td>2) Political and economic climate and structure</td>
<td>2) Regulations – contains procedures and controls</td>
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<td>3) Legal aspects</td>
<td>3) Code of conduct – details standards of conduct to preserve the integrity, image, and reputation of the owner and the event</td>
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<td>4) Customs and immigration formalities</td>
<td>4) Host city contract – defines relationships and the legal, commercial, organisational, reporting, and financial obligations</td>
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<td>5) Environment, legacy/sustainability, and meteorology</td>
<td>5) Commonwealth Games manuals – define the technical obligations and organisational processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Finance</td>
<td>6) Commonwealth Games Knowledge Management Programme (CGKMP) – provides access to past information to assist organising committees and Candidature cities</td>
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<td>7) Marketing and communications</td>
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<td>8) Sport and venues</td>
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<td>9) Commonwealth Games village</td>
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<td>10) Medical and health services</td>
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<td>11) Security</td>
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<td>12) Accommodation</td>
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<td>13) Transport</td>
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<td>14) Technology</td>
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<td>15) Media operations</td>
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(Adapted from CGF, 2011a)
Organisations and the networks that operate in the event bidder role possess their own agenda and hence antecedent conditions to bid. For example, Chappelet (2005: 20/21) categorises bid types into ‘real bids’ (serious and competitive submissions), ‘alibi bids’ (no realistic chance to win but used for promotional purposes), ‘warm-up bids’ (leverage development opportunities), ‘tacit bids’ (few bids where candidate interest can be used at a later time), and ‘replacement bids’ (substitute venue bids). Limited by resource constraints and their own strategic goals, cities and nations select one or a series of activities or bid types that meet their needs. Primarily focussed on the most appropriate return on investment and added value to themselves, hosting events are just one means, although a highly popular and significant medium to achieve their policy goals (Walmsley 2008).

In reviewing the sports events bidding perspective literature, Walmsley (2008: 15) proposes that ‘the golden rule of bidding was quite clear: know why you are bidding’. He further summarised that six main motivations provide the reasons why hosts aspire to bid for a sport event or series of events, namely:

1. Political ambition
2. Economic gain
3. Promotion and branding
4. Preparation and experience
5. Sports development

Indeed, Glasgow based their successful 2014 Commonwealth Games bid on a framework of recognising that event bidders, their likely competitors, were likely to possess at least one of four common motivations – economic repositioning, political repositioning, nothing to prove, or mismatch motivations (Casey 2006). Economic and political repositioning motives are primarily based on the premise that major sports events possess the potential to be a catalyst for change (O’Brien and Chalip 2008). Examples of economic bids include the 1992 Barcelona and 2000 Sydney Olympic Games or the more recent 2014 Glasgow CG bid, which possess a strong planned legacy to raise the international profile and grow inward business investments. By comparison, politically centred bids are usually planned to communicate a message, with legacy often being an afterthought. With Cornelissen and Swart (2006) proposing that developing countries tend to use sport mega-events differently from developed countries, Black and Peacock (2011) and Grix (2012), suggest that the developmental countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China have recently staged international major events to convey a message that they have arrived as a modern, legitimate, and international community, signifying a rite of passage. In referring to national image management motives of both developed and developing countries, Grix (2012: 7) asserts, ‘Germany (holocaust), South Africa (apartheid), India (inequality, poverty) and, in the future, Qatar (previous history of human rights issues) are examples of states using sport mega-events to persuade others that negative perceptions or stereotypes about their nations are misplaced’.

A nothing to prove philosophy of strengthening global status (Shoval 2002) is more associated with developed countries. This is illustrated by Victoria’s (Canada) 1994 Commonwealth Games or London’s 2012 Olympic Games bids, where the rationale was a mixture of legacy, personal ambitions, political, and sport motivations. On the other hand, miss-match motivations are characterised by a lack of fit between the event and host capabilities or a lack of understanding of the event, as was the case with Sheffield’s 1991 World Student Games hosting which witnessed
‘muddling through without a formal plan’ (Bramwell 1997: 174) and a subsequent classification as a ‘£658 million debt “disaster”’ (BBC 2011).

Whereas the value of an event was historically considered on the basis of short-term economic gains, the growing recognition of additional long-term benefits has meant that legacy and leverage motives underpin many contemporary bids (Casey 2006, O’Brien and Chalip 2008, Leopkey and Parent 2012). For example, in appraising Olympic bid documentation, Leopkey and Parent (2012) found that 13 interconnected legacies were associated with hosting the Olympics. Presented as positive long-term gains, these ranged from cultural through to psychological, social, educational, and environmental benefits. Similarly, Walmsley (2008) suggests that recent event hosting motives have not been confined to bidding for a one-off event but rather an event leveraging hosting strategy that can provide forward and/or backward linkages (warm-up bids – Chappelet 2005). On the one hand, a successful bid can provide leverage to higher profile events, such as Doha’s hosting of the Asian Games in 2006 as a preparation for their 2016 Olympic Games bid and then their successful 2022 FIFA World Cup bid. On the other hand, hosting a successful mega-event may act as a magnet to attract lower profile events. This is illustrated with London’s hosting of the 2012 Olympics and the subsequent establishment of the UK Sport’s Gold Event Series (UK Sport 2013). In 2015 alone, this has resulted in the UK being awarded the IPC World Swimming Championships, the European Eventing Championships, the EuroHockey Championships, the World Canoes Slalom Championships, and the World Artistic Gymnastics Championships.

The important point is that once the purpose and motives to bid are clear, the event(s) selection decision can follow. Influenced by the antecedent conditions of the destination’s resources, goals, strategies and relationships, Getz (2004) argues that the most important selection factors are likely to be the event fit, its availability, bidding and hosting cost, required support, competitive advantage, and potential impact on the host community.

To determine the best event or portfolio of sports events for the host, Walmsley (2008) suggests a six-step process:

1. Initial overview of available events
2. Identify best fit priorities
3. Match with rights holders’ priorities
4. Select relevant level of competition
5. Assess win-ability
6. Finalise target.

While high profile events may create greater publicity and involve greater costs and higher risk, lower profile events are likely to be more winnable and sustainable (Gibson et al. 2011). Additionally, lower profile events usually involve more opportunistic practices (Getz 2009) than Walmsley’s (2008) rather linear and systematic approach suggests. This approach further assumes that event information is readily available and ideally in a comparative format. In practice, this rarely occurs, with many event owners producing no or very little documentation to inform the bidder on the nature and merits of their event(s). One exception to this is the International Masters Games Association, the rights owner of the World Masters Games (see also Chapter 18 of this Handbook). Recognising event bidder needs, they have produced a useful document entitled ‘Why bid for the World Masters Games?’ (IMGA 2012). This document summarises both the nature and unique selling proposition of the event, in this case identifying it as a major sport and tourism event that typically attracts 28,000 athletes (90+ countries) and provides an event visitation profile that includes an international athlete average stay of 15.8 days, a direct
economic spend of $60.2 million, no costly venue expenditure, and media coverage attributable to $13 million (IMGA 2012).

Clearly, strengths and weaknesses of event bidder competence need to be objectively assessed against likely competition (if known) and matched with the targeted event(s). Where it is lacking, a decision needs to be made as to either not bid or bid but strengthen the team by appointing key individuals and/or commission specialist advising agencies.

A number of authors have investigated the critical success factors of bidding to host sports events. For instance, Emery (2002), in adopting a major sport event local organising committee perspective and a largely UK sample frame, reported five key success factors – professional credibility, understanding the formal and informal decision making processes, not assuming rational or expertise in decision making, ability to exceed expectation, and knowing your strengths and weaknesses relative to your competition. Using an international sample frame of event owners and organisers, Westerbeek et al. (2002) proposed eight critical success factors of a successful bid. These constituted the ability to organise, the bid team composition, political support, communication and exposure, accountability, relationship marketing, infrastructure, and existing facilities. More recently, Parent and Smith-Swan (2013) summarised the key success factor findings and categorised them into internal factors (such as bid team composition, facilities and experience), process factors (such as understanding event owner decision making processes), and external factors (such as competitive advantage and stakeholder networks).

As the bidding process has matured and more bidders have entered the competitive marketplace, greater emphasis has been placed upon the uniqueness of the bid (Getz 2004, Walmsley 2008). As Walmsley (2008: 17) elaborates, it is now expected that all bidders will minimally meet the technical requirements of the bid, so ‘a unique selling point that is married to the aspirations of the targeted event and its owner can prove decisive in a close contest’. Being politically connected and fully supported by effective stakeholder networks have become increasingly important success factors in the bid process. Indeed, as the profile and international scale of the event increases so does the importance of leveraging a highly specialised network of highly committed experts and networks (Hanlon and Cuskelly 2002).

No more is this apparent than at the mega-event sport level where, Walmsley (2008) argues, the three key intermediaries to event success are the government (for its underwriting and commitment to the event), the sport (for its approval and drive to enter the bid process), and the public (for its interest and enthusiasm to make the event a memorable experience). Indeed, in focussing on mega-event case studies, considerable research has been undertaken to substantiate the significance of these key stakeholders. For example, Walters (2011) identifies how government taxation policies and processes can either support or undermine the international competitiveness of the sport national governing body bid. Hautbois et al. (2012) similarly report on the central role of government official leadership to support the sport group’s decisive position in the 2018 Olympic Winter Games French bid. Reference to the importance of these elite coalitions, community consultations and coordinated strategic event planning bids are also highlighted by Hiller (2000a) and Swart (2005) in the context of South African mega-event bids. Furthermore, proactive public consultation and support of the London 2012 ‘Back the Bid’ Olympic campaign, are illustrated by the establishment of journalist support (Mackay 2012), identifying the community’s willingness to pay (Atkinson et al. 2008), defining a new London government role (Newman 2012), and promoting the argument that the Games can overcome terror and violence to make Britain proud (Falcous and Silk 2010). Public support has become a potentially defining feature of the international bid. Working with activists to mitigate negative perceptions, as well as converting sceptics to advocates (Parent and Smith-Swan, 2013, Walmsley 2008), are an important aspect of a successful bid. Whereas gaining this support has largely focused on the pre-bid
decision phase, post-bid demonstrations are increasingly common as was evident at the 2013 Confederations Cup, where FIFA were not best pleased that thousands of Brazilians expressed their anger over the costs to stage the 2014 World Cup (Leahy and Blitz 2013).

Intermediary commitment therefore should include support that minimally includes the duration of the mega-event candidature. For example, against annual strategic priorities, the UK Sport World Class Performance Programme (UK Sport 2013) offers 14 aspects of government support, seven for event bidding and seven for the staging or delivery of the event (see Table 2.3).

However, even at the major sports event level, Walmsley (2008) argues that building a comprehensive bid proposition should focus on the strength of its intermediary relations, by proposing six fundamental elements of major event bids:

1. Unambiguous political support
2. Agreed financial support
3. Partnership agreements among the key political and sports organisations
4. Investment from the commercial sector

### Table 2.3 UK Sport World Class Performance Programme event support services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event phase</th>
<th>Nature of support</th>
<th>Examples of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for bidding</td>
<td>1) Political</td>
<td>1) Letters of support, ministerial presence, hosting evaluation committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Government guarantees</td>
<td>2) Taxation exemption, customs and visa support, underwriting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Feasibility planning</td>
<td>3) Feasibility studies, venue selection processes, business planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Bid advice</td>
<td>4) Dedicated consultants, bid team participation/advice, access to contacts and bid resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Bid funding</td>
<td>5) Technical documentation, travel, bid films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Event funding</td>
<td>6) Strategic lottery funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) International legacy</td>
<td>7) Advice and contacts to develop/leverage partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for event delivery</td>
<td>1) Government guarantees</td>
<td>1) Taxation exemption, customs and visa support, underwriting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Staging advice</td>
<td>2) Dedicated consultants, support to event LOCs/boards, access to specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Equipment</td>
<td>3) Scoreboards, flags and anthems, podiums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Promotional support</td>
<td>4) Cross-event marketing campaigns, market research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Branding</td>
<td>5) Banners, lanyards, outdoor branding materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Event impact research</td>
<td>6) Economic, media and sporting impact research, bespoke research, operate eventIMPACTS.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) Knowledge transfer</td>
<td>7) Observers tours, educational workshops, secondment and mentoring opportunities, online toolkit resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from UK Sport, 2013)
5 Comprehensive community support
6 Clear planned legacies.

Endorsement of this support can be clearly evidenced in both the successful Gold Coast Commonwealth Games 2018 submission (www.thecgf.com/games/2018/Gold_Coast_VOL_1.pdf) as well as Hambantota’s (Sri Lanka) unsuccessful submission. Whereas the former included letters of support from the host country’s Prime Minister, State Premier, City Mayor, Australian Commonwealth Games Association and Bid Board (pp. 3–7), the latter involved a Sports City concept legacy supported by 20 local supporting partners, and promoted as a ‘government-led project, with a strong financial commitment, fully supported by guarantees’ (www.hambantota2018.com/).

From the bidder perspective, event specialist agencies and promoters, as they are known in some sports, complement these key intermediaries both in the bid and event delivery stages. For instance, Designsport is an independent private bid consultant that possesses more than 10 years of Olympic, Commonwealth, and Arab Games experience. An example of their Doha 2011 FINA World Swimming Championships bid video and other bidding services offered can be viewed at www.designsport.org/ds-content/2010/12/doha-2011-world-championship-bid-file/.

Individually and collectively, the intermediaries and agencies add considerable strength and insights to inform the host bid. On the one hand, they can provide very specialist knowledge and access to important support networks, but on the other hand, hosts can face great difficulty in fully integrating these partners into the host team.

The consequences of not getting this right were clearly evident when the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) cancelled its contract with the 2005 Montreal Aquatics World Championships organising committee after four years of working with them. Relating to the relationship between the Aquatic Federation of Canada (AFC), an umbrella organisation of Canada’s four independent national governing bodies, and the promoter Montreal Sport International (MSI) who initiated the bid, Parent and Séguin (2007: 201) explained, ‘The lack of proper due diligence by the AFC relating to MSI meant it failed to see the conflicting self-interests, the political foundations, and way of operating of MSI’. Allied to a combination of factors, namely a ‘lack of formal financial commitments, power congruence between partners . . ., communication, proper human resource management procedures, and proper due diligence’ (Parent and Séguin 2007: 187), FINA cancelled the contract with the local organising committee and re-opened the bid process with six months to the event being delivered.

More effective intermediary partnership integration can be illustrated by the Melbourne tourism partnership, which is attributed to be the cornerstone behind Melbourne’s development as a globally renowned major event destination (Destination Melbourne 2013) and being voted the world’s ultimate sport city on three consecutive occasions (SportBusiness 2010). Branded under the guise of ‘Destination Melbourne’, this formidable tourism partnership includes the City of Melbourne (Council), Melbourne Convention Bureau, Tourism Victoria, and Victoria Major Events Company (VMEC). This partnership was created to ensure that that there was:

- a framework for leadership, communication and coordination;
- agreement on roles in marketing Melbourne as a tourism and events destination and in the delivery of information and visitor services;
- a coordinated approach to engaging the industry and city businesses in tourism and events marketing, advertising, and servicing initiatives; and
- contribution to the development of a strong brand and positioning of Melbourne (Destination Melbourne 2013).
One of these partners is Victoria Major Events Company (VMEC), a non-profit events acquisition group established and funded by the Victorian Government. Its role is to create and secure not just major sport events but also entertainment and cultural event opportunities for Melbourne and the state of Victoria (Victoria Major Events Company 2013). As illustrated in Table 2.4, their 2013 events programme constituted annual international events and included the sports of tennis, cycling, sailing, motor racing, surfing, football, golf, horse racing, and cricket. This annual events programme is supplemented by one-off events such as single sport world championships and multi-sport events such as the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games. In addition and as per any metropolitan region, these major events are on top of the many other events that do not possess VMEC involvement, such as the annual Melbourne International Comedy Festival (March/April – www.comedyfestival.com.au/2013/season/), the one-off Homeless World Cup (Dec 2008 – www.homelessworldcup.org/about), and other annual participant events, such as the Medibank Melbourne Marathon Festival (http://melbournemarathon2013.gofundraise.com.au/) and the 40 plus events that constitute the Victorian Open Water Swimming calendar (www.caseyseals.com.au/open_water_swim_calendar.html).

At the destination level, this example highlights the inter-organisation and intra-organisation cooperation and competition conflicts and issues that commonly exist between competing city, region, and national associations (Chalip and McGuirty 2004). For example, could a mega-event be accommodated in Melbourne in March, given the current annual event schedule, and what would be the impact on other events/services such as the locally treasured annual Australian

Table 2.4 Victoria Major Events Company case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013 annual event calendar</th>
<th>Additional one-off sport events include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>January</strong> – Australian Open (tennis); Jayco Herald Sun Tour (cycling); Festival of Sails (sailing)</td>
<td>2014 – FISA World Rowing Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February</strong> – Superbike World Championship; White Night Melbourne</td>
<td>2013 – British &amp; Irish Lions Test Match; XIV Australian Masters Games; The Melbourne Ring Cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March</strong> – L’Oreal Melbourne Fashion Festival; Melbourne Food and Wine Festival; Australian International Airshow; Formula 1TM Australian Grand Prix; Ironman Melbourne; Rip Curl Pro (surfing)</td>
<td>2012 – UCI Track World Championships; FIH Champions Trophy; Rugby League State of Origin; WDSF Dancesport Championship Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April</strong> – TV Week Logie Awards; Melbourne Winter Masterpieces – Hollywood</td>
<td>2011 – Presidents Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May</strong> – Melbourne Winter Masterpieces – Monet’s Garden</td>
<td>2010 – Bledisloe Cup; UCI Road World Championships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June</strong> – FIFA 2014 Qualifying Football Match</td>
<td>2009 – Abn Amro Men’s Hockey Champions Trophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July</strong> – Australian Goldfields Open – World Snooker Tour</td>
<td>2008 – Rugby League World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>September</strong> – AFL Grand Final</td>
<td>2007 – FINA World Swimming Championships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October</strong> – Australian Motorcycle Grand Prix; Australian Masters Games</td>
<td>2006 – Melbourne Commonwealth Games; Volvo Ocean Race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November</strong> – Australian Masters (golf); Melbourne Cup Carnival (horse racing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December</strong> – ISAF Sailing World Cup; Boxing Day Test Match (cricket)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Victoria Major Events Company, 2013)
Football League fixtures? Clearly, strategic and operational bidding requires a delicate balance in the management of a region’s event portfolio, with careful consideration of temporary yet complex sport and non-sport event hosting infrastructure networks. Indeed Ziakas and Costa (2011: 421) have recently recognised the significance and challenges of integrating event genres, organisations and multi-disciplinary study, by conceptualising ‘event portfolios as multi-purpose developmental tools for host communities and [proposing] . . . a comprehensive research framework to study this phenomenon’.

**Normative role**

Operating in a high-stake and intensely competitive bidding scenario, perhaps the biggest challenge facing these diverse and sometimes conflicting bid-related organisation agendas is ensuring that appropriate normative practices are adhered to. Some authors have duly recognised the inevitable contradiction between hosting one-off mega sports events that are short-lived and involve large sums of public money, and the nature of sustainable development (Furrer 2002, Smith 2009, Hayes and Horne 2011). As Furrer (2002: 1) elaborates with reference to the Olympic Games:

> the high concentration implied by the Games in time (two week event), in space (one host city only) and in investment . . . seems largely to contradict the concepts of sustainable development that advocate the dispersion and sharing of environmental, social and economic impacts across time and space for the benefit of all.

On the one hand, Lenskyj (1998) argues that much of the sport event management environmental bid claims are ‘bluff and bluster’. Smith (2009) similarly asserts that many hosts use the rhetoric of sustainable development merely as an urban propaganda tool to justify their bid. On the other hand, Getz (2009) believes we are currently experiencing a ‘responsible events’ movement which is derived from a broader conception of sustainability, with corporate social responsibility (CSR) origins and the triple bottom line approach of measuring and reporting against economic, environmental, and social accountability parameters (Furrer 2002, Gibson et al. 2011). What is clear is that event managers today are increasingly expected to be socially responsible to future generations and implement more sustainable and ethical operating practices than in the past (Walmsley, 2008, Getz 2009, Kang 2013).

The sport property owner has largely dictated the requirements of both the host and agent responsibilities and through recent initiatives increasingly accepted responsibility to ensure sustainable business practices are included in the bid documentation process. At very least, today’s event owners are now being seen to be putting something back into the local community (Walmsley 2008: 19), relative to the negative legacy of the Montreal 1976 Summer Games that left a three decade $1.5 billion community debt.

In recent years, sustainable mandates and in particular environmental considerations have become an increasingly common and significant criterion of the event bidding process (Van Wynsberge et al. 2011). As illustrated in Table 2.5, environmental sustainability in the Olympic Games has been a dynamic process of evolution, with hosts adding to the event owner bid requirements and thereby improving on ecological practices and methodologies.

### Table 2.5 Environmental developments in the Olympic Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winter Olympic Games</th>
<th>Summer Olympic Games</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lillehammer (1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The first ‘ecological Games’. Initiated and implemented a comprehensive and co-operative environmental programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney (2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bid committee released environmental guidelines and became the first ‘Green Games’. Using a variety of environmentally friendly technologies and processes, such as solar energy sources in the athlete’s Olympic Village and low emission public transport for the spectators, they established the environmental benchmarks for future Games. Greenpeace involved from the outset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turin (2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pioneered further environmental developments, first by compulsory adhering to the Italian law 285/00 that required Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) project methodologies, and second by choosing to follow the international and externally validated Environmental Management System (EMS) standard that conformed to ISO 14001. Additionally included a social reporting dimension to environmental needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing (2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Similarly adopting the ISO 14001 EMS standard they further demonstrate the significance of ecological responsibility by applying the ‘Green Olympics’ theme as one of its three mottos, and proposing post-Games actions to reform its local industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London (2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Promoted as the ‘Greenest Games in modern times’, and meeting the Sustainable Sport Event standard BS 8901, LOCOG is the first host to address sustainability in all phases of the Games. Developed a methodology for calculating carbon costs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Furrer, 2002; Hayes and Horne, 2011; London 2012, 2010)
and revised in 2009), it demonstrated LOCOG’s commitment towards addressing sustainability in all three phases of the Games (preparation, event staging, and legacy) and covered the five headline themes of climate change, zero waste, biodiversity, inclusion, and healthy living. For example, London 2012’s (2010: 5) climate change objective was to be

the first Summer Games to map its complete carbon footprint over the entire project. This vast undertaking is underpinned by our four key aims concerning carbon management: to avoid and eliminate emissions at source; to reduce inefficiency in energy use, transport and work practices; to replace inefficient systems with low-carbon technology alternatives; and to compensate for unavoidable emissions by influencing behavioural change and standards so that others follow suit.

Adopting local, national, and international sustainability practices, Hayes and Horne (2011) suggested that London’s sustainability agenda was therefore designed to be transformative in four ways:

1. making the Olympic Park a ‘blueprint for sustainable living’ and establishing a benchmark for new environmental practices with transferable applications;
2. constructing the Thames Gateway project in low carbon living as well as strategically growing the city in addressing its current social, economic and infrastructure problems;
3. inspiring people to volunteer, become healthier and fitter, and adopt more environmentally efficient personal lifestyles;
4. hosting a successful Games to endorse the national government’s plan to become a beacon site in a globally competitive environmental technology sector.

Clearly, mega sports events, and in particular the Olympic Games, can be powerful catalysts and agents of responsible as well as ecological lifestyle change (Furrer 2002, Hayes and Horne 2011, Mol and Zhang 2012). Derived from these flagship ventures, technical standards, materials, systems, methods, and targets have been incorporated into other major sport event bid processes (O’Brien and Chalip 2008). For example, the previously cited Commonwealth Games bid documentation (Table 2.2, Theme 5) forces candidature cities to address the environment, legacy/sustainability, and meteorology delivery theme. Similarly the growth of eco-tourism and impetus of the United Nations’ Agenda 21 have resulted in an emergence of voluntary codes of practice to promote environmentalism in other contexts. In applying Chernushenko’s 12 principles of sustainable green games for sports events, Berridge (2004) provides a useful voluntary organisation review of sustainable practices of mountain biking events in the UK and USA. Citing outdoor sports where natural erosion occurs, such as jet-skiing, snowboarding, and mountain biking, he commends the landowners who have either banned or placed significant restrictions on sport event practices to host green events.

Regardless of setting, international sports governing bodies are proactively establishing environmental sustainability policy and initiatives (see the International Federation of Rowing Associations policy www.worldrowing.com/environment/fisas–environmental–policy); promoters are endorsing sustainability and access issues (see Destination Melbourne’s initiatives www.destinationmelbourne.com.au/industry/accessible-tourism/); and sport event hosts are increasingly expected to adopt “measures to reduce, re-use and recycle . . . [and for tourist attracting events] account for energy consumption, plus greenhouse gas emissions” (Getz 2009: 70).

While significant efforts are being made by event owners, hosts, and intermediaries to create a more positive legacy and eradicate the environmental damage of the past (Furrer 2002), Hayes and Horne (2011) suggest these innovations predominantly focus on issues of environmental stewardship and neglect the social dimension (Smith 2009). Using the London 2012 Olympic
and Paralympic Games as a case study, they argue that in reality only ‘a hollowed-out form of sustainable development’ (Hayes and Horne 2011: 749) was achieved. They forward the notion that mega-event owners, largely due to their power and elite status, can and often do dictate top-down planning methods to host cities. Given the need to adhere to strict quality, time, and place requirements, this means that local citizens’ environmental and social needs are usually minimally considered in the bid phase. To this end, Hayes and Horne (2011: 758) believe, ‘London 2012 raises the central question of the extent of active citizen co-production, of the form and extent of demographic participation in its definition, negotiation, and implementation’. Tarradellas (2003) and Mol and Zhang (2012) similarly endorse the lack of citizen inclusion in participatory decision-making, and with reference to social legacies, Smith (2009: 117) vehemently argues that ‘Unless innovative leverage projects are undertaken, social effects from major sport events are usually consigned to a transient “feel-good” factor’.

Despite some examples of good practice, such as Turin’s 2006 Winter Olympic (TOROC) Social Report and The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a United Nations long-term, multi-stakeholder international process to improve overall reporting methods, public consultation, particularly in the bidding phase, appears to be largely tokenistic, compliancy focused (Furrer, 2002), and ‘relegated to the role of after-the-fact consultation’ (Hiller 2000b: 193). This leads Hayes and Horne (2011) to raise the important question, if sustainability is fundamentally about people and how they live, why are they not more involved in the event, whether this is to be in the bidding phase or development of legacy plans?

While Kang (2013) argues that most research on sustainable development has been conceptual, ecologically based, or codified in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI 2002) or the Sustainable Sport and Event Toolkit (AISTS and VANOC 2009), Raco (2004) concludes that social sustainability currently involves regeneration of communities, rather than regeneration in communities. Until the public are fully involved in genuine consultation at the earliest stage of the bidding process, the nature of sustainable events will merely be a dream and not a reality (Furrer 2002). With this in mind, Furrer (2002: 26–27) provides the following sustainable practice recommendations for Olympic Games organisers and responsible city/region authorities:

- A voluntary decision
- A long-term strategy
- An integrated and realistic approach
- Partnerships for sustainability (collective effort)
- Early inclusion into urban and regional strategies
- Public participation
- Mitigation measures (open and honest about all potential negative effects)
- Use of sustainability monitoring and reporting tools
- Transfer of public knowledge.

Furthermore, in referring to the Olympic Games event owner (the IOC and the Olympic Movement), Furrer (2002) recommends that they should continue to pursue their current initiatives and assist organising committees and public authorities through education, particularly via their knowledge transfer services. In so doing they will reinforce the sustainability dimension of the bidding phase, and through greater public evaluation, draw attention to normative governance and sharing of best practice. In the words of the former IOC President, ‘The Olympic Games may not make the world a better place all the time, but the IOC will continue to strive to make the Olympic values grow stronger between Games, and thereby play its part in making the world a better place’ (Rogge 2003: 16).

38
Summary

Over time, the sports event bidding process has become more complex, expensive, and competitive. While the industry recognises the need to become more open and professional, academically the bidding process is still a very under-researched area of study. With limited sport-specific research available, this chapter is based upon Getz’s (2004) conceptual framework of the generic event bidding process, and is adapted to the more complex national and international sport event scenario. Primarily involving a bilateral exchange process between an event owner and an event bidder, respective antecedent and selection factors have been considered. Both parties, but more frequently the event bidder, have increasingly used a network of specialist intermediaries and advising agencies to enhance the quality of their outcomes.

Within highly contextualised and often historical settings, the mechanics of the sport event bidding processes and best practices were illustrated, along with the key challenges identified for each stakeholder. For the event owner, the creation of a fair objective and transparent bidding process was seen to be essential, as without it there is no open competition and sport property owners face the risk of alienating future bidders. The challenges faced by the event bidder was seen to be twofold, to better understand the critical success factors to win the bid, and to be able to more objectively justify the benefits to the local communities they serve. Intermediaries and advising agencies, on the other hand, face both integration and ethical conflict of interest issues.

Operating in a high-stake and intensely competitive bidding scenario, all three partners need to ensure that appropriate normative practices are adhered to. Focusing on environmental and social sustainable issues, the chapter recognises that while flagship developments had been promised via the bidding process and document submissions, they tended to focus on the qualities of the physical environment rather than the rights of people.

However, this literature review must recognise the limitations of current sports event bidding research. Whereas scarce empirical research exists to inform us of the sport event owner’s decision-making process, event bidder research has largely focussed on one-off multi-sport mega-events, which do not represent the full gamut of sporting opportunities. With this in mind, more analytical and comparative analyses are urgently required, and possible future research directions for aspiring hosts and intermediaries could include:

- **Host perspective** – How can hosts directly compare different sport event offerings? In practice, what, who, and how are the event hosts selected? With escalating bidding costs, potentially unknown competition at the outset, and changing event owner selection policies, what are the risks and benefits gained from bidding? What are the personal, team, organisational, and network impacts of losing a bid? How can hosts better involve their local communities in event-specific decision making? Who determines what and how bid information is shared with intermediaries?

- **Intermediaries and agencies perspective** – What strategic alliances should be developed before the bidding process commences? Why? What moral decision-making mechanisms and processes do promoters use where they encounter a conflict of interest? What types of conflict of interests exist? What level of long-term commitment should intermediaries give to specific hosts and why?

- **Specific aspects** – content areas such as improved sustainability monitoring and reporting tools, broader methodologies such as international comparisons and longitudinal studies, and more empirical bid research that address the full range of sport events rather than the current focus on one-off mega sports events.
Suggested readings

Further depth of reading and practical understanding can be obtained from the following recommended sources:


References


Leahy, J. and Blitz, R. (2013, July 18) 'FIFA questions Brazil as 2014 World Cup host', Financial Times.


