Introduction

Since economic reform commenced in 1978, China’s gross domestic product has increased by an average of more than 9 percent annually (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). At the same time, China’s crime rate has had a striking increase. China is currently the world’s most populous nation and has distinctive political, economic, and cultural features. At least for these reasons, students of Chinese criminology have had a growing interest in China’s crime prevention and control (Hebenton and Jou 2010). One question they ask is: “Is social and crime control in China unique?”

In order to answer the question, this chapter will first describe major Chinese characteristics, compared to Western society. The next section will identify criminological concepts that reflect social and crime control with Chinese characteristics. The chapter ends with future research suggestions and a conclusion.

It is worth noting that, while this chapter examines social and crime control with Chinese characteristics, it does not mean that social and crime control in China does not have any similarities with other countries. Differences and similarities between nations depend on the angle and level (e.g., macro-level and micro-level) of the examination of social and crime control. This chapter focuses on the uniqueness of Chinese social and crime control.

Chinese characteristics

China has unique political, economic and cultural features that make students of China think about a criminological theory that may have Chinese characteristics. Politically, China features a one-party ruling system. This party is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the one-party ruling system, the CCP is superior to the government and the law. The CCP is centralized so that it can penetrate all organizations in Chinese society. Economically, China has a socialist market system with public ownership playing a crucial role in its economic development (Wang 2010). Along with the one-party ruling system, the Chinese socialist market has a significant plan component, which is used to adjust the direction of China’s economic development. The public ownership and planning in the socialist market make it possible for the CCP and
government to control and influence its citizens not only in political areas but also in economic life. Culturally, Confucianism has dominated Chinese society for more than 2,000 years, with an emphasis on family and family-based relations, hierarchy, and moral control. Under this cultural tradition, law is the last resort. Sentiment (qing 情) precedes law (fa 法), which is mediated by reason (li 理). They form a hierarchical sequence of sentiment–reason–law (Martin 2007). Fei (1985/1947) used “differential and hierarchical association” (chaxu geju 差序格局) to describe Chinese society, stressing that interpersonal relations are hierarchical and differential. The hierarchy is determined by a person’s rankings in a family, organization, or social status. The differential association is measured by the closeness between two persons in terms of sentimental feeling and material interests. Sentiment and morality are primarily used to guide and control interpersonal relations.

Social and crime control with Chinese characteristics

It has been recognized that the development of social science in general and of a discipline or theory in particular is affected by a country’s context, including political, economic, and cultural backgrounds (Albrow 1989; Cao 2004; Hebenton and Jou 2008, 2010). In his 2004 article, Cao examined historical and political factors that affect the emergence and development of criminology in China. Hebenton and Jou (2005, 2008, 2010) investigated how the development of criminology was shaped by its unique political, economic, and intellectual environment in Taiwan and then in the People’s Republic of China. This chapter will not look at the impact of society on criminology as a discipline, but will focus on criminological concepts with Chinese characteristics. Following an approach used by Cullen (1994), this chapter draws on previous studies in crime and crime control in China to identify the criminological concepts that reflect Chinese characteristics.

Please note that this chapter distinguishes between criminological concepts and criminological theories. A criminological theory consists of a set of correlated propositions that state relationships between concepts. The criminological concepts with Chinese characteristics described in this chapter have not been systematically linked to other concepts (causes or outcomes) yet, although they are an important step for the development of a criminological theory. The empirical tests of relationships between these concepts and other correlates are rather limited. Thus, there is no commonly recognized criminological theory with Chinese characteristics. This chapter provides readers with some criminological concepts of social and crime control with Chinese characteristics and I hope they will be helpful for the development of criminological theories in China.

Semiformal governance or semiformal control

When the East meets the West, it is the right place to talk about rule of man and rule of law, or informal control versus formal control. China stands at one side of the informal–formal control spectrum, while the U.S. stands at the other. In fact, the topic of informal and formal control in China has attracted many criminologists’ attention. Several journals have devoted special issues to Chinese crime control (see Hebenton and Jou 2010: 8 for more details). Books edited by Troyer et al. (1989) and by Liu et al. (2001) have focused on social and crime control in China. A recent special issue of Asian Journal of Criminology (2012, vol. 7, no. 2) also has articles on social control in China.

According to Jiang et al. (2007), we can look at the formal–informal control continuum from three different perspectives. First, formal control refers to legal control or law-based control, while informal control is considered as moral control or morality-based control. Second, formal
control refers to control carried out by official control organizations, while informal control refers to control carried out by unofficial control groups. When criminal justice agencies such as police, court, and correctional units enforce law, it is called formal control. On the other hand, when unofficial control groups such as family, neighborhood, and peers are in charge of control, it is usually considered informal control. Third, formal and informal control are also distinguished by punishment. When sanctions are imposed by law or implemented by official control organizations, they are called formal punishment, an indicator of formal control. When sanctions are based on moral rules and/or carried out by unofficial control groups, they are considered informal punishment or informal control.

Using his archival research of documents in different periods of history in China, Huang (2008) revealed a unique form of governance in dispute resolution, which he called semiformal governance. His research focuses on social control institutions. He argued that Max Weber’s patrimonial bureaucracy cannot explain archival evidence of governance he found from Chinese history. Weber distinguished between two governmental ideal types—“patrimonialism” and “bureaucracy”; the former type of government involves rule of man, while the latter type involves specialized functions performed by impersonal and salaried positions. He used patrimonial bureaucracy to describe the governance of the Chinese state, where the emperor had the patrimonial claim of the entire country as his personal domain in theory. In practice, he had to rely on a bureaucracy to ensure the stability of his rule. Huang believed that Weber’s characterization of patrimonial bureaucracy of the Chinese state served his ideal types of patrimonialism and bureaucracy and described state and society as either/or dichotomous binary but did not catch China’s semiformal governance.

Huang’s archival research of the Qing (1644–1911) approach to civil justice or minor matters such as disputes over land, debt, inheritance, and marriage revealed that most of the minor matters were resolved by local community or kin mediation. When disputes could not be resolved by this means, court got involved. The liaison between court and the societal mediation was the xiangbao (乡保), an unsalaried quasi-official recommended by the local community and confirmed by the state. The magistrate heavily relied on the xiangbao’s work for his comments and decisions on dispute cases and preferred to use informal and semiformal processes to resolve disputes. When these means failed, he had to use a formal court procedure to adjudicate a dispute (Huang 2008). Huang called the use of an unsalaried quasi-official in the process of disputes semiformal governance. Using governmental records from Baodi County in the late Qing and Shunyi County in Hebei in the Republic period (1911–49), Huang also found semiformal governance in dispute resolution. According to Huang (2008), the semiformal governance in civil justice also existed in tax administration in the late Qing and Republic Hualiu County in Hebei, educational administration and village schools in Haicheng County in the northeast in the late Qing and Republic Hualiu County in Hebei, and county yamen administration in Ba County in Sichuan in the Qing.

In fact, as Huang (2008) observed, semiformal governance continues to exist in contemporary China. In rural areas, the lowest government is township level (it was called commune level until the 1980s). Cadres at the village level (below the township level) are not salaried governmental officials. They are mainly paid by the village (or production brigade) but carry out a great deal of governmental responsibilities. Village school teachers were paid by the village or production brigade, although they are now paid by the government. As China develops, it has moved towards bureaucracy and formal control. However, Huang believed that

[While] new-age imperatives for a welfare state may render much of the old minimalism irrelevant, its tradition of semiformal governance and of state initiative plus local participation
may yet have a role to play in China’s ongoing search for its own distinctive political modernity.

2008: 32

Semiformal governance or control is also recognized by other scholars. From 1982 to 1987, Ronald Troyer visited China five times as a guest of the Ministry of Justice of China to observe the Chinese responses to crime and deviant behavior. He and his team had a lot of observations of the Chinese criminal justice system, meetings with Chinese officials, conversations with regular citizens, and additional readings. His trips made him believe that China was then well organized. Two grass-roots organizations – the residents’ committee and the residents’ groups – made it possible for individual citizens to frequently encounter the social control devices. These lower levels of organizations played an important role in connecting regular citizens with the government. The residents’ committee was responsible for a number of neighborhood functions, including settling disputes, maintaining public order, and organizing meetings to discuss political matters. Although a few leaders received small stipends from the local government, members of the residents’ committee were not government employees. They were local residents who were usually retired. The residents’ committees were referred to as mass organizations: “they are not voluntary associations in the U.S. sense; they are government organized and controlled entities” (Troyer 1989: 27). Troyer did not call the residents’ committee semiformal governance or control, but the committee is very similar to those described by Huang (2008).

In his conceptual comparison between Chinese and Western social and legal control, Xiaoming Chen (2004) believed that the two societies may represent the extremes on a continuum with respect to emphasis on informal versus formal control. China has long relied on informal and moralistic control. Furthermore, compared to the West, Chinese control is “quasi-formal.” It means that Chinese social control is not a completed informal system; rather, it is formally invested in less formal structure . . . For example, some informal institutions such as neighborhood committees do not form a part of the formal criminal justice system, yet they are established based on certain legal regulations and often are trained by local justice organs or police.

Chen 2004: 524

Chen’s observations are similar to Troyer’s (1989). The grass-rooted organizations described by Chen are also similar to those reported by Huang (2008).

In 1996, Zhang and his associates published an article on the importance of Tiao-jie and Bang-jiao in crime prevention in China. Tiao-jie as a form of mediating disputes is carried out by the people’s mediation committee (Xiong 1999). The committee is under the leadership of the residents’ committee in an urban community and of the village committee in a village. The people’s mediation committee consists of three to nine unpaid residents, who are elected by local residents. The committee members are called people’s mediators. The committee’s major tasks include settling disputes and distributing and promoting law (Xiong 1999). People’s mediators receive some training from the city street office or township government, the police station, or the district court (Zhang et al. 1996). “Bang-jiao means assisting, helping, guiding, and directing offenders, especially juvenile offenders” (Zhang et al. 1996: 208). The basic form of bang-jiao is neighborhood bang-jiao groups. In urban areas, the group usually consists of the offender’s parents, a residents’ committee member, and a police officer. If an offender is an ex-student, the head of the school where the youth was a student would also be a member of the bang-jiao group. Many members in both tiao-jie and bang-jiao groups are voluntary and unpaid but confirmed by
the local government. Their activities are usually organized or supported by the local government. Both tiao-jie and bang-jiao groups are semiformal control devices in Chinese society.

In their test of the generability of social disorganization theory, Zhang et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2011) also observed the semiformal control in China. Zhang et al. used “quasi-official” and “semi-public” control, while Jiang et al. used semiformal control to describe social and crime control by residents’ committees and neighborhood (or people’s) mediation committee. Using survey data, Zhang et al. (2007) found that semi-public control did not affect the risk of household burglary in Tianjin, while Jiang et al. (2011) revealed that semiformal control did decrease the perceived neighborhood property crime in Guangzhou.

**Total societal strategy and total person approach**

When asking who is responsible for social and crime control, China’s answer is the entire society. This is called the “total society strategy” by scholars (Shaw 1996; Tang 2008; Zhang et al. 1996; Jiang, Lambert et al. 2010; Jiang, Wang et al. 2010). In China, the official term for the strategy is the comprehensive management and control approach (zonghe zhili or 综合治理) to maintain social order and control crime. That is, the government “mobilizes a variety of social forces, such as political, economic, cultural, judicial, educational, and the media, to prevent crime and keep social order” (Jiang, Wang et al. 2010: 461). The Chinese government is centralized. Thus, it can and does extend its control to mass organizations such as residents’ committees in urban areas and village committees in rural areas via province- and county-level channels. The total society strategy is carried out not only by vertical connections but also by a horizontal mechanism. The CCP agencies and governmental organs, including police, court, correction system, youth league, women’s federation, employees’ union, the media, and grass-roots organizations, are all required to participate in social and crime control (Shaw 1996; Jiang, Wang et al. 2010). In contrast, American control is decentralized and stresses professionalism. The cooperation between organizations is guided by laws and motivated by money. Law enforcement has been considered the responsibility of the criminal justice system and is more likely to rely on professionals (Chen 2004; Jiang, Lambert et al. 2010).

The total society strategy is reflected in community policing. Chinese community policing is part of the comprehensive management and control approach. Chinese police have a tradition of working with local community and citizens, which is called mass-line policing. In 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security officially adopted and launched community policing as a strategy to fight rising crime in China. Since then, all forms of community policing programs have flourished in the nation (Wu et al. 2011).

Although the West and China both use community policing, they use it quite differently. For example, philosophically, American community policing places the police as the main social control institution with citizens providing help and exercising supervision (Wong 2001). The police play a primary, professional, and formal role, while the public’s role is a secondary and informal one. In contrast, crime prevention in China is “a method by which police provide back-up services for citizens” (Bracey 1984). China’s former Minister of Public Security Luo Ruixing said that “[O]ur public security work . . . [should] not . . . have matters monopolized by the professional state agencies. It is to be handled by the mass . . . The mass line principle . . . is to transform public security work [into] the work of the whole people” (cited by Wong 2003: 208).

The total society strategy is also reflected in community corrections in China. After China’s central government officially adopted the concept of community corrections and started pilot programs in six provinces or municipalities (Beijing, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang) in 2003, 89 percent of townships in rural areas and streets in urban areas had established
community corrections programs by the end of 2011 (Hao 2012). In a community, the local justice office (sifasuo 司法所) is officially in charge of the community corrections of offenders under public surveillance, probation, parole, and temporary execution of sentences outside confinement facilities. However, the office is required to and does work with the street-level government, police station, local court, other correctional systems, volunteers, and even a variety of business organizations. On the one hand, the local justice office is responsible for its higher levels of justice administrators. On the other hand, it is under the leadership of a street office in urban areas and of township level in rural areas. The office obtains support from this dual leadership system and thus is able to effectively work with other organizations and volunteers. It is worth noting that, since Chinese government is centralized and community corrections are a top-down program, local governmental agencies and criminal justice organs are also required to do their best to lead and support the local justice office to implement community corrections.

The answer to the question of what aspects of an individual need control reflects another Chinese characteristic in social and crime control. The Chinese believe that behavior is determined by thoughts. Thus, in order to effectively control people’s behavior, their values and attitudes also need control. When comparing Chinese and Western control systems, Ren states that [The] most important distinction, perhaps, is the efforts of the Chinese state to control both the behavior and the minds of the people. Social conformity in the Chinese vocabulary is not limited to behavioral conformity with the rule of law but always morally identifies with the officially endorsed beliefs of social standards and behavioral norms.

We can call this the total person approach, in which a person’s values, attitudes, and behaviors are all controlled.

In the West, although it is commonly believed that basic values are behind attitudes and attitudes affect behavior, thoughts or values cannot be controlled. Thus, in reforming offenders, Western societies can only work to change their attitudes and then their behavior.

In order to form and reform people’s mind and behavior, China often uses a fatherly or patriarchal method. “Like a father in a family, controllers in society are supposed to not only keep citizens in line with morals, rules, and laws but also support them for their good” (Jiang, Wang et al. 2010: 461). The fatherly control method is the integrative use of sentiment and reason. “Moving people with sentiments, convincing people with reasoning” (dongzhiyiqing, xiaozhiyili 动之以情，晓之以理) is a popular saying and widely accepted means for general education as well as social control in China. This method is also applied to reform offenders (Li 2004). Based on his more than 10-year experience in China and in-depth interviews of 100 Chinese citizens, Shaw (1996) considered the fatherly control method as a significant difference between China and the U.S. in social control. He observed that Chinese leaders in organizations sometimes use public and personal sentiments to criticize their subordinates to such an extent that they burst out crying. However, “[The] motivation is often good, fatherly, or at least non-threatening” (Shaw 1996: 229). Comparatively speaking, Chinese control “may be close, flexible, imprecise, associated with support or offer of care, and immersed in human relations” (ibid.: 229). American control “may be distant, mechanical, exact, connected to law, and responsive to the demands from division of labor” (ibid.).

**Sentiment, reason, law and two-group-two-legal-culture control model**

Another way to look at the criminological concept with Chinese characteristics is the balance among sentiment, reason (or morality), and law. Social control in Chinese societies, including
Chinese social and crime control

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, has long relied on sentiment and morality with law as the last resort. Although these two societies have different political systems—a one-party ruling system in the PRC and a multi-party ruling system in Taiwan—both are in transition towards law-based formal control. During the transition, how sentiment, morality, and law will be balanced is an interesting area to explore.

Recently, Jeffrey Martin (2007) vividly described how policemen in Taiwan balance sentiment and law based on his participant observations. Contemporary Taiwan faces a contradictory situation. At the macro-institutional level, it has a clear and firm movement towards the rule of law. However, at the micro-institutional level, Taiwan still features interpersonal sentiment, which often engenders a marginalization of legal control. Given this situation, a Taiwanese policeman or more specifically a neighborhood patrolman, as a “law executor” or law enforcer, has a difficult role to play. When a patrolman is dispatched to a community to resolve a dispute or conflict, he uses an instrumental “strategy of reducing law to its thinnest procedural requirements . . . in order to creatively utilize these minimal requirements as resources for the task of immediate conflict management” (Martin 2007: 694). He uses a reason to pursue a balance between law and sentiment. This reason is “provisional, ad hoc, and radically situated in its immediate context” (ibid.: 692).

Martin’s observations of Taiwan’s neighborhood policing suggest that legal control is not unreasonably absolute. Its effectiveness is highly dependent on societal contexts including regular citizens’ legal consciousness, sentiment, morality, and law enforcers’ skillful invocation of law in conflict management. In a society with a tradition of sentiment and morality-based informal control like the PRC and Taiwan, control theory may be quite different from a society with a tradition of law-based formal control such as the U.S.

More than 60 years ago, Fei used the term “differential and hierarchical association” to describe Chinese society. In Chinese society with differential and hierarchical associations, people are not equal; they are vertically positioned in their rankings in a family, an organization, or social status. In this society, people are group-related rather than independent; they are horizontally differentiated based on sentimental feeling and intimacy. These features are different from the West where people are equal—at least in theory—and are independent individuals. Since people in Chinese society are not equal and independent, law is difficult to apply to each individual equally. Jiang and Lambert (2012) proposed that China has dual groups (or societies) and dual legal cultures which can be called the two-group-two-legal-culture control model. In an inner-circle group or acquaintance society, group formation is primarily based on bloodline, sentimental feeling, and sometimes interest as well. Group members are acquaintances; they have a relatively high level of interaction, know each other well, and are dependent in sentiment or/and interest. In this group, the primary control mechanism is sentiment and morality rather than legal control. China also has a group that can be called an outside world or stranger society. This is a theoretical group for comparison with the inner-circle group. In this group, members are strangers; group members do not have clear bloodline, sentimental connections, or interests. They may not have any direct interactions or have only infrequent interactions. Therefore, they do not have a high level of dependence in sentiment or interest. Law, along with universal morality, may be a more frequently used control mechanism for this group.

Future research

China has long stressed informal control. Semiformal control is recognized by scholars as its distinctive feature. What exactly does semiformal control mean? In China, how can informal and semiformal control be measured? What are predictors of formal, semiformal, and informal
control? Which form of the above social control or combinations of them is most effective in crime prevention? All these issues need further research.

As noted before, Jiang et al. (2007) defined formal and informal control. In their definition, control mechanism is an important criterion to distinguish between formal and informal social control. Since some organizations are neither completely official nor completely unofficial in China, semiformal social control attracts scholars’ attention. What does semiformal social control mean? Based on publications by Huang (2008), Chen (2004), Zhang et al. (2007), Jiang et al. (2011), and Troyer (1989), semiformal control can be defined as the control carried out by quasi-official organizations such as a residents’ committee, village committee, and neighborhood mediation committee. These organizations are grass-rooted. They are government organized but also mass organizations. They have governmental responsibilities. In these organizations, members or workers are partially paid, unpaid, or volunteer-based.

With regard to measures of the three forms of social control, Jiang et al. (2007) and Jiang, Lambert et al. (2010) used control carried out by unofficial organizations/groups such as families, neighbors, and peers as an indicator of informal control, and control carried out by official organizations such as police, courts, and correctional agencies as an indicator of formal control. Their studies focus on college students’ views of the effectiveness of formal and informal mechanisms in crime prevention. Zhang et al. (2007) used neighbors’ likelihood to discuss and work out solutions to deal with major problems in their community to measure informal control, the action of the neighborhood mediation committee to measure semiformal control, and the frequency of the respondents who saw police officers in their neighborhood to measure formal control. Following social disorganization theory, Jiang, Wang et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2011) employed the likelihood of residents in the local neighborhood intervening in concrete types of deviant or criminal behaviors as a measure of informal control in Guangzhou. Jiang et al. (2011) used the perceived importance of the neighborhood mediation committee in maintaining community order as an indicator of semiformal control and the multi-item-based satisfaction with police as an indicator of formal control.

These efforts are an important step to establish measures for the three forms of social control. However, they have limitations. First, these studies used only police control as a measure of formal control. Other formal control also needs to be included in the measure, such as control carried out by the local justice office, street government in urban areas, and township government in rural areas and other governmental agencies. The measure of policing needs to be more inclusive as well. For example, contact with the police, perceived fairness of policing, police force size, professionalism of policing, calls to the police, and the police’s cooperation with community all can be indicators of formal control.

Second, semiformal control also needs to be more inclusive. Besides the neighborhood mediation committee used by Zhang et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2011), other semiformal organizations also play important roles in semiformal control. They include but are not limited to residents’ committees, village committees, owners’ committees (yezhu weiyuanhui 业主委员会), community security committees (shequzhian weiyuanhui 社区治安委员会), and community corrections offices (shequjiazhengsuo 社区矫正所).

Third, the measure of informal control used by Zhang et al. (2007), Jiang, Wang et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2011) is limited to neighbors’ willingness to intervene to stop deviant or criminal behaviors in their community. Although the measure is commonly used by the students of the social disorganization tradition, it may not be a major indicator of informal control in China. A neighborhood-based informal control in a Chinese city is more likely to be implemented by semiformal organizations. Informal control without governmental involvement at a local
community is more likely to be carried out by families, peers, and friends in China. Statistically, this kind of informal control is likely to be treated at the individual level.

In summary, there are three forms of social control in China. Each form of social control needs improvement in its content validity of measurement. More empirical research on the predictors of each form of social control and their effectiveness in social and crime control is needed.

With regard to the total society strategy, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy? How can they be identified and measured? These questions need to be answered. From a crime prevention perspective, a whole community working together seems more effective than professionals working alone. However, in China, semiformal organizations in the local community have too many tasks. For example, a local legal office, whether in the urban or rural areas, usually has one to three full-time and paid staff members. The office is in charge of a large array of responsibilities: community corrections, legal education, legal consultation, guiding and participating in the people’s mediation, dealing with disputes on behalf of the street (or township) government, participating in community security comprehensive management and control, cooperating with the police station and local court to maintain public order and control crime, and implementing other legal services delegated by the department of justice at the district (or county) level and the street government (Baidu 2012). When community organizations face too many tasks, they usually do not have enough personnel, money, or other resources to implement the total society strategy. Thus, systematic research on the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy is needed. In order to achieve this goal, researchers need to explore how to measure results of the strategy and empirically examine the relationship between the strategy and outcome.

The total person approach appears as a nationwide practice in China. If there is no variety of practice, we cannot test the effectiveness of the approach within China. One way we can conduct a test is the cross-national comparison of outcomes with and without the approach. Another way is to examine the people’s views of the approach and its effectiveness in crime control in China.

Compared to the West, guanxi or interpersonal connection is much more important in Chinese society. China features the differential and hierarchical association (Fei 1985/1947) rather than individual rights and equality before the law. Thus, Jiang and Lambert (2012) proposed an ideal type of two-group-two-legal-culture control model. Does the model exist in China? Survey-based empirical research is needed for confirmation. In addition, does the inner circle with sentimental and moral control help reduce deviance, crime, and victimization? Since it is difficult to obtain valid data about their own deviant and criminal behavior from Chinese citizens, survey research on victimization is more feasible.

Conclusion

China has unique political, economic, and cultural characteristics. It also has unique social and crime control. Besides its long tradition of informal social control, China has used semiformal control for at least hundreds of years. Since informal and semiformal controls have been used for a long time, sentiment and morality have played a more important role than the law in social control and crime prevention. Due to its differential and hierarchical association feature, China appears to have a two-group-two-legal-culture control model. Given a cultural foundation of Confucianism, Chinese authority has been centralized and unified. This makes it possible for China to use the total society strategy and the total person approach for its macro- and micro-control. In order to develop a criminological theory in China, future research needs to connect
the concepts reflecting social and crime control with Chinese characteristics to other factors and form a set of propositions. Additionally, more empirical research needs to be conducted on the Chinese characteristics discussed in this chapter and their relationships with other correlates.

Notes
1. Thanks to Starr Jiang for editing and proofreading the chapter.
2. If not specially noted, China refers to the People’s Republic of China.

References
Chinese social and crime control

