Introduction

As a social science project, intelligence studies has its origins in the United States. US scholarship has done much to shape this project, and continues to do so. The focus of much of this scholarship, however, has been on US intelligence structures and practices, and it has not always been clear how far the conclusions of some of this scholarship are transferable beyond the confines of the US intelligence system. Increasingly, a number of intelligence scholars – both in the US and beyond – have identified the paucity of comparative analysis of intelligence as a challenge that intelligence studies must confront if it is to advance further as a social science project. This is rooted in the understanding that to ‘be effective in developing theory, and in being able to make statements about structures larger than an individual or the small group, the social sciences must be comparative’ (Peters 1998: 25). In turn, this reflects the fact that while the core responsibility of all states is to provide for the security of their citizens, the ways in which states seek to achieve this goal differs; all states ‘do’ intelligence, but there is marked variation in the extent to which they invest in it, the roles, reach and intrusiveness of intelligence bodies, and the nature and extent of their oversight. Comparative analysis is needed to facilitate awareness of the extent of similarities and differences, and allow for the generation of hypotheses to explain these. However, recognition of the comparative challenge has not resulted in a scholarly stampede to meet it, a situation at least in part attributable to the problem identified by Michael Warner; ‘the lack of agreement, among both scholars and practitioners, of just what would be compared in a comparative approach to intelligence studies’ (Warner 2009a: 11).

What to compare?

This chapter proposes that, equipped with a clear understanding of our terms, national intelligence cultures can provide a fruitful frame for comparative analysis. At the outset, it is important to define what we mean by both ‘culture’ and ‘intelligence culture’. In doing this we need to recognise that culture is a slippery concept, and in abstract discussion of it we run the same risk as that identified by Wilhelm Agrell with regard to the study of intelligence itself – ‘if everything is intelligence, then nothing is intelligence’ (Agrell 2002). The Oxford English Dictionary defines culture as the ‘philosophy, practices, and attitudes of an institution, business, or other organization’. For Raymond Williams, one of the most influential commentators on culture, the term had three meanings: as an ‘ideal’, as the ‘documentary’ and as the ‘social’ (Williams 2009: 32).
Mark Phythian

The latter of these sees culture as ‘a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour’. In this context, the study of culture involves ‘the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture’ (Williams 2009: 32). Both of these are useful starting points for thinking about what we mean by ‘culture’ in the context of intelligence. While the OED definition might suggest a relatively narrow focus on organisational culture, Williams’ inclusion of the ‘social’ dimension demands a broader focus that encompasses the links between intelligence culture and the wider political culture within which intelligence is inescapably situated. This is because the ‘meanings’ and ‘values’ to which Williams refers are rooted in this wider political culture, and while this political culture might appear fixed at the macro-level, at the micro-level it is dynamic, a product of contestation and consequent evolution. It is this broader focus that this chapter proposes.

Given that intelligence studies and strategic studies have concerns in common, and that the idea of culture is recognised now as being central to the study of strategy, strategic studies seems an obvious starting point when considering what the comparative study of intelligence cultures should include. The focus on strategic culture within strategic studies arose from the insight that, during the Cold War, Soviet approaches to nuclear strategy differed from Western approaches for reasons attributable to culture; that there was a ‘Russian way’ both of thinking about the threat or use of force for political purposes, and of acting strategically’ (Gray 2009: 225). By extension, this means that ‘different security communities think and behave somewhat differently when it comes to strategic matters’, and that those differences ‘stem from communities’ distinctive histories and geographies’ (226). Hence, just as there might be said to be an identifiable American, British, Russian or French ‘way of war’, we might also be able to identify distinctive (or, at least, distinguishable) American, British, Russian and French ‘ways of intelligence’. Whereas strategic culture can be regarded as the product of ‘the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation’ (Snyder 1977: 8), so intelligence culture may be regarded as the ideas, responses and behaviours acquired by intelligence communities and conditioned by history and geography.3

However, as suggested earlier, intelligence culture also needs to be considered more broadly. While there are important studies that focus on organisational cultures and different understandings within these of what is meant by ‘intelligence’ (for example, Davies 2002, 2004a; Bean 2009), what is required for comparative analysis is a broader study of intelligence systems rather than a more specific focus on intelligence communities and the production of intelligence. What is meant by an ‘intelligence system’? We could do worse than adopt Michael Warner’s definition of an intelligence system as comprising ‘the collective authorities, resources, oversight, and missions assigned to parties officially assembled to perform intelligence duties’ (Warner 2009a: 15–16). This definition has the advantage of incorporating the ‘social’, or societal, via the inclusion of oversight.

Adopting this broader approach helps distinguish analysis of intelligence cultures from that of strategic cultures. While there is some recognition within strategic studies that the question of strategic culture needs to be capable of distinguishing between three distinct elements – public culture, strategic culture and military (organisational) culture (Gray 2009: 227) – the study of public culture and understanding of its significance within overall strategic culture remains underdeveloped. The focus of strategic culture is overwhelmingly at the level of professionals and political elites. However, the simultaneously inward- and outward-facing nature of intelligence means that it impacts more directly on the political culture – ‘the predispositions which give shape and meaning to political acts’ (Kavanagh 1972: 13) – and that the nature of intelligence – the nature and
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clarity of the intelligence mandate, the degree of secrecy that attaches to intelligence, the extent
and efficacy of oversight, the scale and reach of intelligence organisations, and the frequency of
recourse to and nature of covert actions – does much to shape the broader political culture, to the
extent that it can be considered a key element of political culture. The emergence of oversight as
a norm means that the professional group is not beyond the reach of the wider political culture. It
provides an opening via which overseers and inquiries, and those who take up their conclusions
and recommendations, can impact on intelligence culture. This makes intelligence culture a more
open culture than previously. Moreover, intelligence agencies’ increased tendency to respond to
criticisms and perceived criticisms, if only for reasons of continued legitimacy and budget pro-
tection, has itself resulted in a general trend towards greater public engagement – for example,
through public speeches, the development of websites and even the sanctioning of official histories
– which has encouraged greater public awareness and debate. This is not to say that intelligence
agencies have not engaged in acts of resistance, or that overseers always demonstrate the necessary
political will, but this is the essence of the contestation and evolution mentioned earlier.

The importance of the inclusion of a societal dimension has also been recognised by other
writers on intelligence. Glenn Hastedt, one of the first to call for the comparative study of intel-
ligence, suggested a framework based on four levels of analysis: the individual, the institutional,
the societal (that is, the impact of values, norms and political structure), and the influence of the
international system (Hastedt 1991). Michael Turner adopted a wide range of variables to explain
the emergence of a unique US intelligence identity (Turner 2004). Although Turner describes
this as a ‘unique’ identity, several of the norms he identifies clearly apply in other national intel-
ligence contexts. For example, ideas of secrecy and the provision of accurate, timely and relevant
intelligence are central to a number of definitions of intelligence (for example, Gill and Phythian
2012: 19). Similarly, the idea of ‘intelligence exceptionalism’ extends beyond the US. A more
recent study of national approaches to intelligence employed strategic environment (i.e. the
impact of geography and history on threat perception), regime type, organisation and control,
and oversight as key variables (Farson et al. 2008). This approach has much in common with the
variables embedded within Warner’s definition of an intelligence system. Both are rooted in a
broad understanding of ‘intelligence’, one that goes beyond the confines of the traditional model
of the intelligence cycle. Both recognise that covert actions can be part of intelligence, and that
oversight is a core component of intelligence systems in liberal democratic contexts.

By drawing together elements of these approaches, it is possible to suggest key variables that
can provide a basis for the comparative analysis of national cultures of intelligence, organised
around different levels of analysis (Figure 3.1).

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**Figure 3.1** The comparative analysis of national cultures of intelligence: levels of analysis
In practice, these levels of analysis are highly permeable, as indicated by the arrows (e.g. Level 1 can impact on Level 2, Level 2 impacts on Levels 3 and 4, Level 3 impacts on Level 4, etc.), and are isolated in this way for the purposes of analysis. Considerations of strategic environment are in essence those that underpin approaches to strategic culture within strategic studies. Having already discussed this area of commonality, and argued that the notion of ‘culture’ with regard to intelligence needs to go beyond that most usually involved in understandings of strategic culture, it makes sense to now focus on the other three levels.

**Regime type**

The distinction between Level 2 and Level 4 is based on the Weberian distinction between state and society. As a basis for comparative research, distinguishing between established democratic, transitional democratic and non-democratic regimes is a sufficient starting point; given that cultures of intelligence play a role in determining the complexion of the state, distinctions within each of these broad categories can be expected to emerge from comparative analysis. As a starting point, each of these categories contains certain a priori assumptions that further inquiry may require to be qualified. For example, in the case of non-democratic states it might be expected that: intelligence organisations would exhibit significant degrees of autonomy; national security would rank at or near the top of the policy agenda, with threat definition pointing to both internal and external threats, but with intelligence more orientated towards addressing the former; intelligence autonomy may create a not insignificant space for official corruption to flourish; human rights norms would not represent a significant impediment to the pursuit of internal or external ‘enemies’; and that international intelligence cooperation would be more limited. However, environmental factors may produce marked differences in some of these cases. At the same time, the formal appearance of democracy (the existence of a range of political parties, the holding of regular elections, etc.) may conceal degrees of intelligence autonomy and/or corruption that qualify the very notion of ‘democracy’ – for example, as in Peru under the premiership of Alberto Fujimori and Russia under Vladimir Putin. Cross-temporal analysis of intelligence cultures in different forms of regime that share the same broad classification can also generate important insights – for example, the role of the Gestapo and Stasi in Nazi Germany and the GDR. (Dennis 2003: 4–6).

An alternative approach would be to simply distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states, where ‘weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation’ (Buzan 1991: 99). The paradox here is that the ‘weaker’ the state the more pronounced and interventionist are the organs of state intelligence (as the unofficial Stasi motto put it, ‘trust is good but surveillance is better’), giving the appearance of state strength.

This strong state–weak state dichotomy raises the question of what might be termed the ‘two states problem’ in intelligence studies. One of the advantages of a focus on national cultures of intelligence is that it offers a means of addressing this problem. It arises from the dual focus of intelligence studies. On the one hand, this focus is on the international, on the other it is on domestic security intelligence. The international focus tends to take its underlying assumptions from realist and neo-realist theories of international politics. The state here is assumed to be a unitary actor on the world stage, encompassing all national territory and all those who live within it. The state is either a status quo or a revisionist power. There is no need to delve any more deeply, because foreign and security policies are determined by the nature of the international system rather than internal political factors, such as regime type. Hence, neo-realism
(particularly offensive realism) explicitly excludes consideration of internal political factors from its analysis.

At the level of domestic security intelligence, notions of the state are much more nuanced. Arguably, the most useful way of approaching the state from an intelligence studies perspective is via the Weberian notion of the state as an institution that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory. John Hoffman has highlighted the fundamental tension that arises from this approach, one that generates the requirement for domestic security intelligence:

> The very need to exercise a monopoly of legitimate force arises only because states are challenged by rebels and criminals who themselves resort to force, and who (either implicitly or explicitly) contest the legitimacy of the laws they break . . . The state which actually succeeds in imposing a monopoly of legitimate force thereby makes itself redundant since a gulf between ideals and reality is essential to the state’s very raison d’être.
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> (Hoffman 1995: 5)

Hence, by definition, the state can only ever be partially successful in asserting its claim to this monopoly. Nevertheless, different states experience this dilemma to differing extents, depending on strategic environment and regime type variables. Some operate in environments where their legitimacy in at least parts of the geographic area they formally cover is severely contested – for example, the UK and Northern Ireland, the Colombian state by the FARC (and other guerrilla groups) and drug traffickers (see Boraz 2008). This can also be true of new states that emerge from secessionist processes and/or wars – recently, for example, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya (see, for example, Hauslohner 2012). The strategic environment into which these states emerge can require them to deal with land and maritime borders that invite forms of trafficking and criminality unless effectively policed, or can require them to address the hostility of neighbouring states or other states in the international system if they are to survive.

This, then, is an area where the proposed approach to cultures of intelligence, with its four levels of analysis, can be beneficial by drawing attention to the impact of the international on the national. The key point is that cultures of intelligence do not develop in isolation; their development is influenced by the strategic environment in which they exist. This environment plays a part in determining, for example, the values held by state intelligence personnel, the scale of investment in intelligence, and the relative size, influence and reach of security intelligence organisations.

This also suggests a related variable that could be considered within discussion of regime type in assessing cultures of intelligence – the nature of state formation. For example, we can extend the logic of the preceding discussion to revolutionary states – states that come into existence or are transformed via successful socio-political revolution, as with the Soviet Union in 1917, Cuba in 1959 and Iran in 1979. This also has the capacity to address an important question posed by Michael Warner: ‘While many national leaders may feel themselves swept along by historical tides, there have been some important ones who saw their nations as shapers of history. How did they wish intelligence to serve them in their projects?’ (Warner 2009c). In short, revolutionary states have tended to combine defensive concerns with expansive agendas designed to spread revolution, giving intelligence a distinctive role and giving rise to distinctive intelligence cultures.

Moreover, as Fred Halliday observed, with regard to revolutionary states, 'the survival of the state is uncertain from month to month, the practicalities of ensuring security against
invasion and subversion take an enormous toll on the allocation of resources, and on the
time, nerves and concentration of those in power, as well as affecting the conception of what
is licit dissent’ (Halliday 1994: 86). Particularly high degrees of secrecy attach to intelligence
in these contexts, over which there is either limited or only formal (ministerial) oversight.
The legislative oversight norm that has come to apply in established democracies, and that
constitutes a link between state, government and society with regard to intelligence, is absent
here. Instead, the only links between state and society that exist in respect of intelligence are
via networks of local informers, equivalents of Cuba’s Comité de Defensa de la Revolución
network or the GDR’s network of IMs (Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter – informal collaborators),
these latter coming to number around 170–180,000 (around one informer for approximately
every 60 citizens), and testimony to the GDR’s siege mentality and sensitivity to the possibil-
ity of internal subversion.

This absence of oversight, distance between state intelligence and society, and centrality
of security intelligence give rise to the potential for intelligence agencies to operate as a ‘state
within a state’ – an analysis regularly offered with regard to the Stasi in the GDR, but also the
Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) in Cuba, General Department II of the Ministry of
National Defence (Bo Quoc Phong) in Vietnam (see Thayer 2008), and Iran’s Ministry of
Intelligence and National Security (VEVAK) – with the attendant capacity for corruption to
flourish. In any case, their separation from society means that their officers constitute a privi-
leged class in national contexts where either the causes of revolution or process of revolutionary
state-building were to be found in, or gave rise to, shortages and suffering among the general
public.

While revolutionary regimes need to develop intelligence capabilities quickly, they are
rarely required to establish these on their own and usually receive assistance from sympathetic
states – in the twentieth century this mostly meant the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
allies, often the GDR. Hence, national intelligence systems in revolutionary states have histori-
cally contained a significant international dimension – whether Cuba after the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion of 1961 (see Klepak 2008), Iran after 1979 or Iraq after 2003. Hence, national intelligence
cultures in these states can contain a foreign imprint at times at odds with elements of the
broader national culture. These factors together help explain Fred Halliday’s observation that,
‘within [revolutionary] states, an initial overthrow of the pre-revolutionary state, and utopian
statements about new, spontaneous, forms of political order, are immediately replaced by the
formation of recast, authoritarian and coercive institutions’ (Halliday 1999: 12).

The question of ideology

There is a risk that this focus (in essence, rooted in historical sociology) could result in the role
of ideology being understated. The role of ideology and extent of variation in this are questions
that require further comparative analysis if they are to be answered. For example, while accept-
ing that the ‘export’ of revolution involves some combination of ideology and pragmatism,
Theda Skocpol’s emphasis on the impact of the international on post-revolutionary develop-
ment suggests that ideology itself does not determine the emphasis on, or form of, security
intelligence in revolutionary states (Skocpol 1979). That it does has been a staple of a number
of analyses, such as that of John Dziak with regard to the Soviet Union (Dziak 1988a, 1988b).
In place of this, Skocpol places greater emphasis on the fact that ‘states also exist in determinant
geopolitical environments, in interaction with other actual or potential states. An existing econ-
omy and class structure condition and influence a given state structure and the activities of the
rulers. So, too, do geopolitical environments create tasks and opportunities for states and place
limits on their capacities to cope with either external or internal tasks or crises’ (Skocpol 1979: 30). Hence, Skocpol’s explanation for the nature of the evolving Soviet state and prominent coercive role of the Cheka within this emphasises the environment of counter-revolutionary subversion that existed in 1917 (Skocpol 1979: 215), rather than suggest that the emergence of the Cheka was a natural outgrowth of Bolshevism (see Dziak 1988b: 74).

However, ideology clearly has a role to play, particularly in states formally organised around an official ideology. For example, Beatrice de Graaf has shown how the Stasi’s foreign operations were hampered by adherence to an official ideology that determined information requirements independently of international developments. It also restricted the pool in which the Stasi could fish for potential foreign IMs – already limited to left-wing political milieux – by excluding all Trotskyist and related groups on the grounds that they were deviationists and enemies of the GDR. Moreover, ideological assumptions affected and distorted analysis, while dissemination was affected by a tendency to avoid forwarding reports that might point to economic or administrative failure for which the ruling party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), was responsible, thereby leaving policy-makers without a full picture of the nature and scale of internal dissatisfaction with SED rule (de Graaf 2010). In short, ideology compromised every stage of the intelligence cycle.

**Organisational level**

This is the level at which most existing approaches to intelligence culture have focused. Here, organisational culture can refer narrowly to the form of intelligence organisation, which can itself be seen to be a product of environmental factors. For example, it is possible to view the fragmented nature of the US intelligence community as being a product of a political culture within which suspicion of strong central government has been a core feature. Alternatively, it can be seen to be the product of bureaucratic infighting. Either way, its ‘flawed by design’ nature provides one source of explanation for intelligence failures (Zegart 1999).

It can also embrace consideration of the relative openness of intelligence. Notwithstanding the centrality of secrecy to the practice of intelligence, different states have exhibited differing degrees of openness. Some have embraced the need for a degree of openness as a by-product of the introduction of oversight, or as arising from the need to justify increased expenditure to taxpayers who want to understand more about this need, or as a consequence of past intelligence failures or scandals draining public confidence, or as a combination of all of these. For others, it is more a reflection of the extent to which notions of openness are embedded in the broader political culture. Hence, the US is usually recognised as being distinctive in the degree of openness that characterises discussion of intelligence, including via media briefings (see, for example, Wirtz 2007: 28–38). However, even in contexts where openness about intelligence derives from a wider norm, it can be subject to temporal shifts and reined in if it is held to have gone too far in relation to the wider environmental context (see, for example, Shane 2012).

Additional factors can also be considered here, such as the ‘reach’ of national intelligence organisations – i.e. the extent, frequency and nature of interventions, domestically and internationally. Similarly, the nature and extent of international intelligence cooperation can be considered. This tends to be greater among democratic states, but generates the paradox that it lies largely beyond the reach of national intelligence oversight – or, at the very least, is much more challenging for national overseers to capture (see Born, Leigh and Wills 2011). For all these reasons, I would suggest that organisational culture should not be considered in isolation from the other levels proposed here.
Societal level

This question of the reach of national oversight bodies leads to the final level of analysis; that concerned with the reception of intelligence in the wider political culture and the impact of this on intelligence organisations and practices. This, then, is the site of intersection between political culture and intelligence culture. In a liberal democratic context, intelligence practice can, at times, exist in tension with principles held to be core to the broader political culture. This can generate a scepticism towards national intelligence bodies on the part of those they are intended to protect (although on the Weberian reading offered above, there will always be some groups in society who are more targets of intelligence than beneficiaries of it). This is true to a greater or lesser extent across all liberal democracies. For example, Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit have written of the French public’s ‘longstanding contempt’ towards French intelligence agencies arising from their domestic role (Denécé and Arboit 2010: 726). The tension between intelligence and society that exists in New Zealand has been well captured by Willem de Lint (de Lint 2008), while a number of commentators have identified a tension between society and intelligence in the US, one expression of which is the almost uniformly critical nature of histories of the CIA (for example, Weiner 2008).

At the intersection of political and intelligence cultures, discussion is often framed in terms of a ‘trade-off’ between security and liberty. Where different societies collectively draw the line here will be also influenced by environmental factors. At the same time, notions of a ‘trade-off’ can introduce a false dichotomy, and intelligence professionals contest them because they imply that, by definition, they are ‘against’ liberty because they are ‘for’ security (see, for example, Manningham-Buller 2012: 36–37). The key point here is that, in liberal democratic contexts, national intelligence cultures are not simply the product of currents within policy and professional elites, they are also influenced by pressures applied on policy and professional elites from without. In the terms of Almond and Verba’s classic study, these are participant political cultures in which intelligence was previously a closed-off sphere, but has now been opened up by the establishment of the oversight norm and the progressively greater openness this has brought, as opposed to the subject political cultures of non-democratic states, such as the former GDR (Almond and Verba 1963). This is not to make exaggerated claims for the effectiveness of oversight arrangements, or to suggest that there is no need to press for more extensive oversight (in a UK context, the revelations of the last decade strongly suggest that there is), but simply to recognise that intelligence is no longer separate from, and so immune to, the wider political culture. Oversight has created an apertura linking intelligence to society. Some of the exceptionalism surrounding intelligence has been lifted as a result of this process – or, at least, sweeping claims as to the extent of this exceptionalism do not command the same support as in the past.

This does, however, raise the problem of secrecy, the other side of the openness coin. For oversight or the public to apply pressure from without, it must have some knowledge of what is going on within. While secrecy is a key element of intelligence, being fundamental to the comparative advantage that investment in intelligence seeks to secure, national security can also be invoked as a convenient blanket to conceal awkward, damaging or otherwise embarrassing facts about intelligence practices. The existence of struggles over secrecy and the extent to which public, media, overseers and legislators are prepared to contest secrecy, and expose practices that diminish the broader political culture, is a key element of the broader conception of intelligence culture that I have proposed here. Liberal democratic contexts provide an implicit ‘invitation to struggle’ over specific intelligence policies and practices, and the application of excessive secrecy to avoid political inconvenience or embarrassment. Approaches that radically depart from the expectations of the broader political culture are, in these contexts, unlikely to
be sustainable if the ring of secrecy in which they are developed and enveloped is broken. This is the essence of participant political cultures.

**Conclusions**

If viewed from the (macro) level of the state, parallels in intelligence logic and practice are easily discernible. After all, the need for intelligence arises from concerns common to all states to varying degrees, rooted in the nature of the international system and the domestic context of the state, which mean that, by definition, all states are likely to face challenges to their claims. However, comparative analysis of national intelligence cultures can highlight the nature and extent of key differences across states by prompting questions about: the significance of different historical experiences and geographical contexts; the impact of these on elite and popular perceptions; the significance of regime type on, for instance, the reach and intrusiveness of (foreign and domestic) intelligence and frequency of resort to covert actions; and on the related question of the importance of the circumstances of state formation. Such a focus also concentrates our attention on the organisation, control and oversight of intelligence agencies. In short, it alerts us to the fact that not all states are alike, and that the practice of intelligence at the national level is conditioned by the interaction of a complex set of factors and considerations, operating at different, albeit permeable, levels that collectively constitute the national intelligence culture.

**Notes**

1. The focus of this chapter is national intelligence, although the comparative analysis of intelligence can take place at the different levels at which intelligence activity occurs (see Gill and Phythian 2012: Ch. 2, esp. the map for theorising and researching intelligence, p. 51).
2. As Macridis advised: ‘Comparative analysis has one purpose that is central to the development of political science: the identification and explanation of uniformities and differences in political behaviour’ (Macridis 1961: 39).
3. Snyder’s is one of the foundational definitions of strategic culture. Similarly, Colin Gray defines strategic culture as comprising ‘the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience’ (Gray 1999: 131).
4. Weber’s original 1919 definition was that a state could be considered to exist, ‘if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence (das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges) in the enforcement of its order’ (Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in Lassman and Speirs 1994: 309–369).