This article was downloaded by: *10.3.97.143*
On: 06 Dec 2023
Access details: *subscription number*
Publisher: *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of International Organization

Bob Reinalda

Multilateral diplomats of Central European states before and after 1989

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203405345.ch18
Jacek Czaputowicz
Published online on: 28 May 2013

How to cite :- Jacek Czaputowicz. 28 May 2013, *Multilateral diplomats of Central European states before and after 1989 from:* Routledge Handbook of International Organization Routledge
Accessed on: 06 Dec 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

18

Multilateral diplomats of Central European states before and after 1989

Jacek Czaputowicz

This chapter discusses the roles played by multilateral diplomats of the Central European states (CESs) in international organizations (IOs). Central Europe in the narrower sense comprises the states that were independent in the interwar period and retained statehood throughout the Cold War, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Poland and Romania. In turn, Central Europe in the broader sense also includes the states between today's Germany and the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. the Baltic States formerly incorporated within the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR): Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the Balkan countries emerging from the break-up of the old Yugoslavia, i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, along with Albania. This chapter employs the narrower of the two definitions.

It is claimed here that the role of IOs, and accordingly the role of multilateral diplomats, has changed following historical developments. The first section discusses multilateral diplomats in the period of the League of Nations, when new nation-states had to put multilateral diplomacy in place. The second section discusses the era in which the CESs were part of the Soviet sphere of influence, multilateral diplomacy became restricted and diplomats were also active in some communist IOs. It will be questioned whether, and to what extent, these IOs can be considered 'real'. The third section discusses the changes affecting the work of multilateral diplomats in the United Nations (UN) system and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which promoted détente in Europe from 1975 onwards. The fourth section deals with developments after 1989, i.e. the end of the Cold War and a return to independence for the CESs, whose foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy changed dramatically.

Central European multilateral diplomats in the League of Nations

When the first IOs emerged in the nineteenth century, the countries of Central Europe were not even present on the political map, because they were parts of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German (Prussian) empires, until their independence obtained them recognition at the 1919 Peace Conference in Versailles. Among the early objectives of these new

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

countries' foreign policies was accession to already active IOs, such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union, the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, as well as to the newly established League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Membership of these organizations ensured the incorporation of these new states into the system of international legal norms, and provided access to information in various policy fields, and fuller participation in global trade.

Central European multilateral diplomats had to be trained and learn how to function in a system of nation-states which also cooperated in the fields of security and economic and social relations. They regarded the League and other IOs as tools to strengthen their statehood and to solve some of the problems their states faced at the time. Diplomats were involved in the resolution of a Polish–Lithuanian dispute over Vilnius, a Lithuanian–German dispute concerning Klajpeda, a Polish–German dispute over Upper Silesia, and the conflict regarding the rights Poland enjoyed in the Free City of Danzig. They took part in the successful resolution of a Bulgarian–Greek conflict associated with the 1925 border incident at Demir-Kapù. The main issues the Central European diplomats had to deal with were the problems of national minorities. The shifts of territory after the war had resulted in large ethnic minorities, such as Germans in various countries, Poles in Lithuania, and Hungarians in all neighbouring states. By virtue of several treaties on minorities, each member-state enjoyed the right to alert the League to violations of minority rights. Central European diplomats regarded these treaties as discriminatory, because they were not binding upon the Great Powers and later served Nazi Germany's propaganda interests. However, they perceived the League's role as crucial for their security during the entire period.

According to Foreign Minister Eduard Beneš, Czechoslovakia could only safeguard its security and possibilities for development by playing an active role in the League and accepting conferment upon it of a right to intervene in states' internal affairs. In his diplomacy, Beneš preferred personal contacts. He was fluent in French and English and also able to hold talks in German. His contemporaries saw him as a creative and inventive master of activity beyond the conference hall, as well as a competent negotiator and achiever of working compromises (Taborsky 1958: 669). Beneš strove for disarmament and arbitration and was a proponent of the idea that European security was indivisible. Diplomats like Štefan Osuský and Ferdinand Veverka supported him at the League, which observers said had become a virtual second seat for the Czechoslovakian Foreign Ministry (Zinner 1994: 107, 110).

Former Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski initially represented Poland in the League. Polish diplomats launched an initiative that resulted in the Assembly's adoption, on 24 September 1927, of a declaration recognizing that 'a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes', and was in consequence 'an international crime'. In 1931 they proposed the 'moral disarmament' concept, understood as action to eliminate the spirit of hate and violence from international relations. When Germany was allowed to join and was assured a permanent Council seat, Poland's diplomats demanded a similar position and managed to guarantee a 'semi-permanent' place (i.e. re-election after a three-year term). Romania's permanent representative to the League, Nicolae Titulescu, who was twice his country's minister of foreign affairs, presided over the General Assembly in 1930 and 1931. He spoke up for enhanced cooperation and accord between states, and subordinated Romania's security to the collective security system. He also advocated the principles of indivisibility of peace, the uniting of all states against a potential aggressor, regional and bilateral treaties, and mutual assistance.

However, Central European diplomats were unsuccessful in guaranteeing peace for their countries, because the political and military developments in Europe were beyond both their

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

reach and that of the League. At the Munich Conference of September 1938, the Great Powers permitted the annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland by Germany. The invasion of Poland in September 1939 then marked the beginning of the Second World War, during which both Czechoslovakia and Poland were members of the coalition of Allies standing up to Hitler and the Axis states. The authorities of these two countries also signed the Atlantic Charter of September 1941. However, the agreement reached at Yalta in February 1945 left the Central European states within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Diplomats in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact

For the CESs, the Soviet sphere of influence meant a Comintern-type of order entailing political subordination and a centrally planned economy under state control. The system was non-democratic, with opposing voices and movements repressed and governments that did not represent their countries' societies in place. The foreign policies of the CESs were subordinated to that of the Soviet Union. Continuity in multilateral diplomacy was broken, although some countries became early members of the UN and (some of) its special agencies (see later). Diplomats were, however, recruited from within the ranks of the communist apparatus, thus guaranteeing loyalty to the Soviet Union; they acted in the interests of the communist world. The era brought the establishment of two IOs of an appropriate profile in which the multilateral diplomats of the CESs were of secondary importance, i.e. the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact.

Known to the West as Comecon, the CMEA was set up in 1949 with the statutory aim of 'developing a socialist division of labour in the interests of the building of socialism and communism'. Deputy prime ministers served on its Executive Committee. The Council was a retort to the Marshall Plan, although its activities were effectively frozen throughout the Stalinist period. In the early 1960s the principle of a socialist division of labour was adopted officially, meaning specialization of output in line with a country's level of development. For example, a specialization in agriculture, especially the production of animal fodder, was imposed upon Romania, which ultimately acted to resist the idea, adhering instead to its plan for industrialization (Popa 2006: 648–50). Poland was also dissatisfied with the role assigned to it as provider of raw materials, whereas new technologies' development was attributed to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. However, protests against this Moscow-controlled division of labour were the exception rather than the rule. The CMEA enjoyed observer status at the UN.

The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955 as the Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. For the purposes of the UN Charter, it defined itself as a regional collective security organization, with Article 4 providing for immediate (if necessary, military) assistance in the event of an armed attack. In practice it served to legitimize the stationing of large Soviet military contingents on the territory of each CES. The decision-making body was the Political Consultative Committee, made up of the parties' first secretaries and the countries' prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs and defence. Sessions took place in each state in turn. Russian was the official language, with translations provided. The key players were party apparatchiks, rather than multilateral diplomats. Diplomats representing the state that organized the session prepared the Committee's draft resolutions. However, a delegation took the first versions to Moscow. At this stage those in the USSR made their corrections, sometimes toughening up particular provisions to give the impression of making concessions and compromise during actual sessions. The host-state would present the draft as

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

if it were its own. After formal acceptance, the document would make its way to the relevant departments of the foreign ministries, from where it would pass to other party and governmental institutions (Nowak 2011: 51–3).

When Warsaw Pact bodies met, the floor was always given first to the representative of the USSR. Addresses by heads of delegations would then underline the leading role of the Soviet Union in the defence of socialist unity against Western imperialism. The meeting adopted ideological and political stances of a principled nature that were to be pushed forward at multilateral fora such as the UN, the CSCE and the Geneva talks on disarmament. Other decisions were taken when the parties' first secretaries took their obligatory annual holidays in Crimea. These decisions would receive the necessary formalizing rubber stamp at an official Warsaw Pact gathering later on. In this way, Moscow prevented direct contacts between CESs, though the latter nonetheless competed for their position within the Pact. In the 1970s, for example, Poland made an effort to raise its profile by having the Permanent Secretariat actually located in its capital, but without success (Nowak 2011: 51–3).

The decision-making process over military matters was even more centralized. The bodies involved were the Military Council (operating from 1957) and the Committee of Defence Ministers (from 1969). Moscow enjoyed the opportunity to hand down 'recommendations' directly, thus assigning tasks to the military in the member-states. In the name of socialist internationalism, all opposition was precluded, military doctrine thus being wholly subordinated to that of the USSR. Efforts to achieve any kind of autonomy were punished by the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Were these communist IOs real multilateral organizations? They definitely met formal criteria, since they had statutes, seats, institutional structures and a membership of at least three states. In line with the letter of international law, the Warsaw Pact was a collective self-defence pact, registered with the UN and having a clear *casus foederis*, which generated alliance-like activity and political and military bodies (Skubiszewski 1959). But were they really multilateral? Multilateralism denotes a group of states coordinating policies in line with principles such as indivisibility (no discriminatory barriers for members), diffused reciprocity (the benefits accruing from cooperation are spread proportionally) and such generalized principles of conduct as sovereign equality and inviolability of borders (Caporaso 1992: 601–2). However, as the degree of adherence to these principles was low in both cases under consideration, the Warsaw Pact and CMEA can be considered IOs in formal terms only, the qualitative dimension characterizing most other IOs being absent. The principles of indivisibility, diffused reciprocity and generalized principles of conduct were not applied.

The level of security that Warsaw Pact member-states enjoyed differed from one to another. Resort to force was the last word in any dispute, as was made evident by the armed interventions. The organization was first of all a tool of Soviet interests underpinned by enforced unity. It was a military bloc, rather than a military alliance of the Western type. Its legitimacy was bogus and any apparent similarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was entirely superficial. Within the CMEA, the benefits from the imposed economic cooperation were highly asymmetrical. The organizational principles were antithetical to the norm of sovereign equality: the USSR was in a position to impose diktats, while the other states lacked the capacity to articulate their own interests.

In communist IOs, the roles of foreign ministries and multilateral diplomats were of secondary importance. They pursued policies dictated by Moscow to the parties' first secretaries. Furthermore, multilateral diplomats were recruited from groups that were loyal to the communist party. Their leeway in setting and implementing policies was very limited, so they were mostly involved in technical issues, while Party bodies took the real decisions.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Central European diplomats in the UN system and the CSCE

Central European states were also members of universal and regional IOs, among them the UN and the CSCE. When the UN was established in 1945, the communist states operated as an informal group of Slav countries that normally cast their votes together. These included three Soviet delegations (since Byelorussia and the Ukraine had their own separate votes) plus Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. In 1955 Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were accepted into the UN at the same time as other former Axis countries, i.e. Finland and Italy. Consultations between diplomats of communist states on site in New York or Geneva were not organized, as the Heads of Missions to the UN received their instructions directly from their countries' capitals, the provisions they included having been set previously at CMEA or Warsaw Pact level.

A few Poles left their mark on the UN. The jurist Raphael Lemkin was a member of the Polish delegation to the sixth conference of the International Bureau for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Copenhagen in 1935. In 1939 he left for the United States, where five years later he published a book that used the concept of 'genocide' for the first time. He started lobbying for a law that would make it a punishable offence. In 1948 his perseverance at Nuremberg and within the UN resulted in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. While Lemkin acted independently, two initiatives by Polish politicians were actually pushed for by the Soviet Union and had as their aim the securing of an advantageous strategic position for the communist bloc. In 1957, the plan of Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki envisaged the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the territories of Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and Poland (Wandycz 1994; Ozinga 1989), and in 1963 the leader of the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, proposed a similar plan for a nuclear armaments freeze in Central Europe.

An example of Central European diplomats pursuing policies in the context of specialized agencies involves the ILO, at which they refused to back labour standards that did not bear in mind the 'political realities' and did not contribute to 'social progress', in their idiosyncratic understanding of those terms. Thus, in 1976, they refused to extend their support to ILO Convention No. 144 concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International Labour Standards, considering it an attempt to impose the tripartite principle of governments, workers and employers. The communist countries considered standards that were highly detailed and precise (i.e. those normally regarded as essential if there is to be any effective action) to be superfluous in the case of their states. Instead, they wanted ILO Conventions to ensure appropriate levels of income and regulate the activities of transnational corporations, which were perceived as instances of neocolonialism. However, Polish multilateral diplomats did not prevent Poland from being criticized by the ILO for making the independent trade union Solidarity illegal after the imposition of martial law in December 1981.

The idea to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe came from Poland's search for confirmation of its western borders along the Oder–Neisse rivers. The USSR, looking for an improvement in its tarnished image after the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, supported the initiative. Afraid that the USSR would use the Conference for bilateral talks with the West, and to strengthen its hegemony over Central Europe, Poland stressed the importance of broader consultations with other CESs. The preparations for the CSCE meeting in Geneva in September 1973 show how communist multilateral diplomacy at that time functioned. During the consultations within the Warsaw Pact framework the day before the meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed the Central European representatives their assigned tasks, as well as the authorships of prepared proposals to be

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

tabled at Working Groups. Bulgaria and Poland had to address the issue of human rights, for example. Poland had counted on receiving a different portfolio, but Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski voiced no reservations out loud, presenting the material the following day as if it were a joint Polish–Bulgarian proposal (Nowak 2011: 49–50).

The CESs regarded the Final Act of the CSCE, adopted in 1976 in Helsinki, as a success, because it confirmed the borders in Europe and reinforced the territorial status quo. For Poland, it substituted a peace conference after the Second World War, while Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania saw possibilities of opening up to the West and closer cooperation in the Danube region. However, the CESs accused the Western states of propagating their model of democracy and of reducing the Helsinki process to humanitarian issues. The so-called 'Third Basket' of human rights was treated as the West's 'Trojan Horse', because the CSCE genuinely encouraged the crystallization of a democratic opposition in the CESs, with the emergence of such groupings as Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Workers' Defence Committee and Solidarity in Poland.

The CSCE's regular meetings soon became battlefields for multilateral diplomats from East and West. The diplomats of the latter accused the CESs of violating the Final Act, and used the forum to highlight specific cases of the repression and imprisonment of dissidents. The communist states defined this as interference in their internal affairs. During the 1977 CSCE meeting in Belgrade, the Western states enhanced their position, after the head of the American delegation Arthur Goldberg had introduced the tactic of naming political prisoners. This limited the room for manoeuvre of Central European diplomats. The head of the Polish delegation informed his ministry that the Western states had attempted 'to turn Belgrade into a kind of tribunal, judging the socialist countries on human rights' (Jarząbek 2008: 49). Another diplomat complained of the Western states' 'effort to legitimise on an international plane the minority opposition and dissidence in socialist countries, and to put forward a whole catalogue of unrealistic postulates concerning contacts between people and the flow of information' (Nowak 1980: 41–2).

Poland's international standing deteriorated even more after its imposition of martial law and suppression of Solidarity in 1981–2. Demonstrations at Polish embassies in Western states were numerous. A report on human rights violations in Poland, prepared by a Helsinki Committee, was delivered to the Madrid CSCE Conference (1980–3), the UN and the ILO. Polish diplomats involved in the CSCE negotiations argued that the Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding and, to defend their case, cited the CSCE principle of non-intervention. They used procedural means to prevent discussion and later the more offensive strategy of accusing Western states of abusing human rights. An example is the 1985 Ottawa Expert Conference on Human Rights, at which Polish delegate Andrzej Towpik argued that Poland was among the societies in which social justice had been a primary value, as opposed to societies in which individual freedoms had dominated. The CESs were particularly afraid that control mechanisms for human rights proposed by Western states might actually be introduced (Jarząbek 2008: 55–7).

The diplomats of the CESs did not act independently of Moscow, but their Western counterparts saw Hungarian and Polish diplomats as less dogmatic and more flexible (Thomas 2001: 74). They discerned two currents among these diplomats in the CSCE: a conservative current that was servile towards Moscow and afraid that the human rights issue would undermine the communist system; and a liberal one, which comprised younger diplomats expecting the CSCE to foster greater openness towards the West and to weaken the USSR's stranglehold on Poland (Nowak 1997: 111–12). However, this 'liberalism' was seriously limited by the predominance of conservatives. Furthermore, the diplomatic network was infiltrated by the

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Secret Service, whose main goal was to fight opposition supporters abroad. Multilateral diplomats had to follow party lines strictly if they wanted to continue in the Foreign Service. In the second half of the 1980s, most Central European regimes were more conservative than the Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev. Contacts of diplomats with opposition leaders were not allowed until the breakthrough of 1989.

Opposition activists were the ones to put communist foreign policy under pressure. In the mid-1980s, they had joined Western peace campaigners in declaring that the Helsinki Final Act might offer a good basis for uniting the societies of East and West, and in counteracting the division of Europe by showing respect for the right of self-determination (Giving 1986, Czaputowicz 2009: 42–53). Multilateral diplomats were not independent in their foreign policy initiatives, however. With just a few possible exceptions, they were isolated and restricted in their room for manoeuvre as a result of their countries' subordination to Moscow. This situation changed in 1989.

The CSCE thus played an important role in relaxing Cold War tensions and in enhancing cooperation between East and West. It prepared the CESs for democratic change and facilitated the transition towards liberal democracy.

Central European multilateral diplomats after the end of the Cold War

The political changes and fall of communism in Central Europe in 1989 took a largely peaceful course, other than in Romania, and the regaining of independence by the CESs had a serious impact on their diplomacy. Newly elected governments broke with the communist legacy and referred symbolically to the sovereignty they had briefly enjoyed in the interwar period. Symbols of statehood kept by their governments-in-exile were solemnly handed over to democratically elected parliaments. Diplomats received new inputs, with some room to initiate new policies. There were internal disputes over how to strip the Diplomatic Service of its communist character and a real regaining of credibility was needed. Should communist diplomats and those who had collaborated with a Secret Service abusing human rights be allowed to continue their careers? Countries answered this question differently. While 'old' diplomats in Poland mostly remained in the Service, and even played their part in the new multilateral diplomacy, their counterparts in Czechoslovakia who had worked for their Secret Service were not considered legitimate representatives of the country. In September 1990, foreign minister and former Charta 77 activist, Jiri Dienstbier, ordered a vetting procedure for all diplomats.

As a result of the new independence, CESs started to train a new generation of diplomats in Western institutions such as the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, or else established their own diplomatic academies as in Poland and the Czech Republic (Digol 2007). This ended a Cold War situation whereby the Moscow State Institute of International Relations had prepared the diplomatic cadre for all Soviet Bloc countries. Years of this kind of Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact had fixed bad habits, such as an entrenched political culture founded upon the elimination of different viewpoints. Ultimately, both the Warsaw Pact and CMEA were dissolved in 1991, as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union that had created them. Horizontal relations between CESs replaced relations radiating out from Moscow to its 'satellites'.

In the late 1980s, communist authorities and opposition activists alike viewed the CSCE (in 1995 transformed into the OSCE, or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) as the main institution that would underpin any future pan-European security architecture. A key exponent of this approach was Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel. But, once

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Table 18.1 Accessions of Central European states to international organizations

IO	*Poland*	*Czech Republic*	*Slovakia*	*Hungary*	*Romania*	*Bulgaria*
Council of Europe	1991	1993	1993	1990	1993	1992
Visegrad Group	1991	1991*	1991*	1991	–	–
CEFTA	1992	1992	1992	1992	1997	1999
IMF and World Bank	1986	1990*	1990*	1982	1972	1990
OECD	1996	1995	2000	1996	–	–
NATO	1999	1999	2004	1999	2004	2004
European Union	2004	2004	2004	2004	2007	2007

*As Czechoslovakia

the states of Central Europe acquired the capability to pursue independent foreign policies, they founded regional institutions of their own, such as the Visegrad Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), as well as acceding to existing ones, such as the Council of Europe, financial IOs such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), NATO and the European Union (EU) (see Table 18.1).

The Council of Europe

Membership of the Council of Europe represented a symbolic closing with the past, and was followed by accessions to a whole series of conventions concerning human rights, the prevention of torture and the fight against terrorism, but also issues such as broadcasting, common cultural heritage and nature conservation. Standards regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities were introduced and heeded (Tesser 2003). The CESs were genuinely incorporated into Europe's legal space through this web of commitments. The conventions required domestic legal orders to be adjusted, which also prepared the CESs for EU accession. On 16 and 17 May 2005, Polish diplomats organized the Council of Europe Summit in Warsaw under the slogan of a 'Europe Without Dividing Lines'. The declaration from that summit stressed the need for European unity upon the foundation of common values, with divisions between EU member-states and the rest combated and new synergies between the Council and the OSCE sought out. The 2007–8 Slovak presidency of the Council focused on strengthening civil society, support for multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies and reinforced cooperation with other players such as the EU, OSCE and UN.

The CESs signed multilateral treaties more often than other states, a fact that may reflect their desire to build confidence. The top 20 countries in the world being party to the greatest number of multilateral treaties concluded after 1989 include Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Elsig et al. 2011). By acceding to multilateral treaties, states were signalling their attachment to democratic values, effectively closing off certain political options, consolidating their democratic institutions and enhancing their stability and credibility internationally (Moravcsik 2000: 220). This ratification of multilateral treaties was intended to convey to key fora how determined the CESs were to meet all criteria necessary for both NATO and EU membership.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Visegrad cooperation

In February 1991, the Hungarian town of Visegrad hosted a meeting at which Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland began to cooperate more closely. The primary aim was to coordinate efforts at integration with Western institutions through consultations in various fields and coordinated stances at international fora. The Central European Free Trade Agreement, established in 1992, was extended to Slovenia. Good regional relations between countries augured well for future cooperation within the EU framework. Established in 2000, the International Visegrad Fund promoted closer cooperation between member-states and the countries of Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the Southern Caucasus. There have been regular meetings of Visegrad officials and diplomats at different levels. The CESs share interests when it comes to the EU being of an open character, the Eastern dimension enhanced via the Neighbourhood Policy and a common policy on energy security developed.

The financial and economic organizations

Membership of the IMF and World Bank gave the CESs the chance to participate in international financial markets and to take advantage of credit. It facilitated post-1989 discussions with the Paris Club on the restructuring of foreign debts. The World Bank helped the CESs to restore macroeconomic stability, extend support to the private sector and promote reform of public finances. In the mid-1990s, the CESs became members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which entailed enhanced efficiency of the economy and adaptation of domestic law, especially with regard to customs duties. The WTO offered access to markets that encouraged growth and trade and released the pressure for protectionist measures being imposed by interest groups. Membership of the OECD for some CESs further strengthened the latter's image as democratic states with free-market economies.

Within the framework of the OECD, different ministries have been engaged in multilateral diplomacy. The Polish Ministry of Economy coordinates cooperation with the OECD, which exercises its influence through reports and conferences. In March 2004, the translation of the OECD *Economic Review of the Slovak Republic* was presented at a conference under the auspices of the Slovakian prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda entitled 'Economic Reforms for Europe' (Dacho 2005: 97–8).

The capacity of IOs to set conditions lies in their making conferment of aid dependent on, for example, the introduction of a democratic system, economic reform or the heeding of minority rights (Schmitter 1990: 30). Nevertheless, enthusiasm for democracy and reform may also have endogenous roots as a result of domestic convictions. Under this scenario, the external setting of conditions is a factor of secondary importance.

NATO

At the outset, the CESs perceived NATO as a Cold War organization. However, the failed putsch in Russia in the summer of 1991 and the outbreak of war in the Balkans promoted the conviction that the CSCE was unable to ensure the continent's security. NATO thus came to be seen as an indispensable element for the European security system (Hyde-Price 1995: 242–4; Czaputowicz 1997; Kupiecki 2001). The CESs drew on arguments concerning historical justice, and invoked the need for democracy and the multilateral norms binding the alliance to be maintained, not least equality and indivisibility of security (Schimmelfennig 2003: 229–36). In practice, NATO memberships granted in 1999 and 2004 did indeed confer a

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

feeling of security, favour the modernization of armed forces and enhance the image of the CESs as stable and responsible participants in international relations.

The departments of international security of foreign ministries coordinated the multilateral diplomacy in NATO. Diplomats were recruited from among those who had gained experience in multilateral disarmament negotiations at the end of the Cold War within the framework of the CSCE, as well as from younger generations that had started their diplomatic careers after 1989. In Poland, however, it was persons engaged in the CSCE process in communist times who played the key roles. For example, Adam Rotfeld, who had become director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in the 1990s, became advisor to President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and later deputy foreign minister with a portfolio of international security and multilateral cooperation, before he became minister of foreign affairs. Andrzej Towpik was director of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry, ambassador to NATO, deputy minister of foreign affairs and defence and ambassador to the UN in New York. Jan Nowak was ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna, director of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to NATO based in Brussels.

The European Union

The CESs anticipated political, economic and social benefits from EU membership. The political benefits were in turn concerned with counteracting the inheritance of a divided continent and stabilizing its political system. Economic pluses were expected to accrue from participation in the single market and access to assistance funding and modern technologies. The social benefits would reflect approximation with European standards on safety, working conditions, health, education, the environment, science and the modernization of administrative structures.

Set in 1993, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria on conditions for EU membership encompassed the establishment of institutions capable of securing democracy, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights (including the rights of ethnic minorities), a functioning market economy, an ability to compete within the EU and an overall ability to assume obligations resulting from membership. The CESs justified their aspirations to seek EU membership in terms of the sharing of relevant standards and values. Their rhetoric was sufficiently powerful to bring into focus the inconsistency between certain states' reluctance to support EU enlargement and a much-vaunted adherence to the principles of membership and ideas regarding a pan-European community of democracy (Schimmelfennig 2003: 5). The road to membership was nonetheless a lengthy one. Diplomats from foreign ministries and civil servants from newly established institutions like the Office of the Committee on European Integration in Poland conducted intensive multilateral negotiations. European Union membership exerted a significant influence on foreign policy with regard to third countries. Bulgaria, for instance, retained a wide-ranging relationship with Russia, but under Community law was required to introduce visas for Russian citizens, and to erect barriers to trade. As a result, traditionally friendly relations rather cooled.

United Nations

Structural changes with regard to post-1989 multilateral diplomacy took place in the foreign ministries. In Poland the Department for International Organizations was renamed Department for the United Nations System, which included the UN Missions in New York,

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Table 18.2 Central European states elected as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council

Bulgaria in 1966–7, 1986–7 and 2002–3
Czechoslovakia in 1964 and 1978–9; as the Czech Republic in 1994–5 and as Slovakia in 2006–7
Hungary in 1968–9 and 1992–3
Poland in 1946–7, 1960, 1970–71, 1982–3 and 1996–7
Romania in 1962, 1976–7, 1990–91 and 2004–5

Geneva and Vienna. Organizational inertia explains why the number of diplomatic staff dealing with the UN was for a long time much larger than the number occupied with priority areas such as NATO and the EU. The foreign policies that the CESs pursued at the UN were in line with the values most of their people recognized. Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and multilateral diplomats in the UN were in favour of raising the rank of human rights, through the establishment of a Human Rights Council (instead of Commission), a Committee for Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues to the General Assembly and a Human Rights Department to deal with peacekeeping (Kuźniar 2009: 196). In 2000, a Polish initiative brought the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the conference 'Towards a Community of Democracies', hosted by Warsaw, was the venue for the adoption by over 100 states of a declaration that voiced support for democratic principles, practices and institutions – in particular, for the election of governments in the context of multiparty systems (Toward 2000). A democratic caucus in turn supported the Resolution on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy at the Millennium Session of the UN General Assembly.

The existing Eastern European Group within the UN ceased to be a platform for political consultation and became little more than procedural in character. Initially the CESs considered a transfer to the Western European Group, but pragmatic considerations concerning election rules won the day, and changed their minds for them. The Group consists of 23 states, including Russia and the countries that arose out of the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

The CESs perceive the UN as a most valuable instrument for stabilizing the international situation and counteracting non-military security threats. The CESs were elected for membership of the UN Security Council 18 times, 11 times before and seven times after 1989 (see Table 18.2). They have supplied significant military contingents for UN peacekeeping operations. Their representatives have been nominated as special envoys: e.g. Miroslav Jenča of Slovakia as the secretary-general's representative and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Asghabad, Ján Kubiš of Slovakia as the secretary-general's special representative for Afghanistan, Edward Kukan of Slovakia as the secretary-general's special envoy in the Balkans, Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland as special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia (stepping down following the spring 1995 Srebrenica Massacre), and Ivo Petrow of Bulgaria as the secretary-general's representative and head of the UN Mission in Tajikistan.

Conclusion

The multilateral diplomats from the CESs evolved from essential agents of newly independent states in the interwar period 1919–39, via a role as instruments of Soviet diplomacy during the Cold War (1945–89), to being subjects of independent states acting in their national interests.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Since the 1990s, multilateral diplomats from the CESs have gained experience in working within the framework of universal and regional IOs. They were not treated as equals with Western diplomats from the beginning, as they had to gain credibility and experience, but their historical experiences, geographical locations and relative strengths have ensured their countries' status as advocates of multilateralism in foreign policy.

The multilateral diplomacy of the CESs may be characterized by reference to the twin trends of Europeanization and specialization. European Union membership has ensured that the CESs appear at international fora, not as individual actors, but as members of a larger whole. This gives them new opportunities to act since they may count on the support of other member-states. However, this compels them to reach compromises, denoting at times 'lowest common denominator' stances. In contrast, specialization allows them to focus on particular priority issues, such as respect for human rights and regional advancement of democracy to the east of the EU (Bilikovà and Matějkovà 2010: 319). The EU position has influenced their decisions on, for example, the ratification of the statute of the International Criminal Court and the recognition of Kosovo's independence. European Union membership has also changed their *modus operandi* within the UN framework. Stances are consulted and agreed upon with other member-states before being presented by EU delegates, unless it has proved impossible to arrive at a common position. Drawing up a common position is frequently time-consuming for multilateral diplomats; however, the status of such a position is incomparably greater.

Recommended for further reading

Hyde-Price (1995), Schimmelfennig (2003), Kuźniar (2009) and Czaputowicz (2009).

References

All websites accessed 7 May 2012.

Bilikovà, V. and Matějkovà, Š. (2010) *The Multilateral Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy*, in M. Kořan et al. (eds) *Czech Foreign Policy in 2007–2009: Analysis*, Prague: Institute of International Relations, 311–21.

Caporaso, J.A. (1992) 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism. The Search for Foundations', *International Organization*, 46(3): 599–632.

Czaputowicz, J. (1997) 'Poland's International Security', in *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 1997*, Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23–33.

—— (2009) 'Foreign Policy in Opposition Activities before 1989', *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 18(3): 40–66.

Dacho, D. (2005) 'The Slovak Republic and International Organizations', in *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Association, 93–8.

Digol, D. (2007) *Emerging Diplomatic Elites in Post-Communist Europe*, European University Institute, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/{6941/2007}_03_Digol.pdf;jsessionid = 1D987FF6C4AA300D3811B49380FA1D0C?sequence = 1

Elsig, M, Milewicz, K. and Stürchler, N. (2011) 'Who Is in Love with Multilateralism? Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era', *European Union Politics*, 12(4): 529–50.

Giving (1986) *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords. A Memorandum Drawn Up in Common by Independent Groups and Individuals in Eastern and Western Europe*, Brussels: European Network for East–West Dialogue, November.

Hyde-Price, A. (1995) *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Jarząbek, W. (2008) *Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964–1989*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper 56, May.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 06:47 06 Dec 2023; For: 9780203405345, chapter18, 10.4324/9780203405345.ch18

Kupiecki, R. (2001) 'Atlanticism in Post-1989 Polish Foreign Policy', in R. Kuźniar (ed.) *Poland's Security Policy 1989–2000*, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House, 229–85.

Kuźniar, R. (2009) *Poland's Foreign Policy After 1989*, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House.

Moravcsik, A. (2000) 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe', *International Organization*, 54(2): 217–52.

Nowak J.M. (1980) 'An East European Perspective', in N. Andren and K.E. Birnbaum (eds) *Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE in Perspective*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 39–50.

—— (1997) 'Poland and the OSCE: In Search of More Effective European Security', *OSCE Yearbook 1995–1996: The Yearbook of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Vols. 1–2, Baden-Baden: Nomos: 111–28.

—— (2011) *Od Hegemonii do Agonii. Upadek Układu Warszawskiego – Polska Perspektywa* (*From Hegemony to Agony: The Fall of the Warsaw Pact – A Polish Perspective*), Warsaw: Bellona.

Ozinga, J.R. (1989) *The Rapacki Plan: The 1957 Proposal to Denuclearize Central Europe and an Analysis of its Rejection*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

Popa, C. (2006) 'The Communist Regime in Romania (1948–80)', in I.-A. Pop and I. Bolovan (eds) *History of Romania: Compendium*, Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Institute, 617–75.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2003) *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schmitter, P.C. (1990) 'The Influence of the International Context upon Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies', in L. Whitehead (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Democratization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 26–54.

Skubiszewski, K. (1959) 'The Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations Charter', *The American Journal of International Law*, 51(3): 613–34.

Taborsky, E. (1958) 'The Triumph and Disaster of Edvard Benes', *Foreign Affairs*, 36(4): 669–84.

Tesser, L.M. (2003) 'The Geopolitics of Tolerance: Minority Rights under EU Expansion in East-Central Europe', *East European Politics and Science*, 17(3): 483–532.

Thomas, D.C. (2001) *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Toward (2000) *Toward a Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference: Final Warsaw Declaration*, 27 June, available at: http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/ warsaw_english.pdf

Wandycz, P. (1994) 'Adam Rapacki and the Search for European Security', in G.A. Craig and F.J. Loewenheim (eds) *The Diplomats*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 289–317.

Zinner, P.E. (1994) 'Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Beneš', in G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds) *The Diplomats, 1919–1939*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 100–122.