Sociology and learning

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Sociology is often presented as a foundation subject for education; however, it will be argued here that learning is at the heart of a sociological dilemma. That concerns the tension between structure and agency and the extent to which external social, political, cultural and other factors constrain our practices. Textbooks in sociology address this tension directly; Bauman and May argued that sociology asks, ‘How do our individual biographies intertwine with the history we share with other human beings?’ (2001: 7). Giddens presents this tension between human action and social structure as an enduring area of ‘controversy or dispute’ (Giddens, 1997: 567). However, in his earlier work Giddens argued that a new consensus was emerging between most schools of thought in sociology:

That is to say they are unified in their rejection of the tendency of the orthodox consensus to see human behaviour as the result of forces that actors neither control nor comprehend, in addition (and this does include both structuralism and ‘post-structuralism’) they accord a fundamental role to language, and to cognitive faculties in the explication of social life.

(Giddens, 1984: xvi)

Giddens’s approach to reflexivity (1984) implicitly acknowledges that the relationship between social structures and human action is entwined with human learning. Elsewhere, parallels have been drawn between sociological issues and the processes involved in human learning. Indeed Beilharz’s (2000) reading of Bauman suggests that human openness to learning is the key to understanding social change. This paper takes a similar view and argues that this is also the logic of Margaret Archer’s account of human reflexivity (2000, 2007).

Learning itself is a practice. It will be argued that looking at the world through the lens of learning we get a better understanding of a key element of the subject of sociology. Adopting a learning perspective can help to unlock one of the discipline’s enduring theoretical dilemmas, that between structure and agency. Elements essential to learning provide a mediating aspect between the social structures that exist before us and the human agency that reproduces, rejects, adapts or radically challenges these structures. In turn, it is also argued that a sociological insight, what Mills (1959) referred to as the sociological imagination, or Bauman and May (2001) talk of as the sociological eye, can improve learning. Indeed, learning is central to Mills’s understanding of the relationship between private troubles and public issues (1959: 8). Bauman and May argued ‘Sociology is a disciplined eye that both examines “how” we get on in our daily
lives, and locates those details onto a “map” that extends beyond those immediate experiences’ (2001: 166). Extending our experience beyond the here and now, learning from others, is a key element in learning (Dyke, 2006). At times Sociology appears polarized between those who argue either for the priority of structure over agency or the reverse. We will argue that a learning perspective helps to understand the relationship between the two. Whether or not sociology informs learning, and/or a learning perspective can inform sociology, it is important to keep the learner at the centre of the discussion. To paraphrase Polanyi (1958): all individuals know more about learning than they can say; they do it every day. Indeed, it is central to how we all ‘go on’ in terms of the mundane activities of getting through the day and the more considered and ‘serious’ matter of living a life worth living. In a recent interview the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman suggests that sociology has to some degree lost its way between number crunchers and philosophers. Instead Bauman argued, ‘The task for sociology is to come to the help of the individual. We have to be in service of freedom. It is something we have lost sight of’ (Guardian, 3rd November 2010). This is a value and perspective that is shared here.

This chapter makes a link between issues of structure and agency in sociology and supports Archer’s (2007) presentation of reflexivity as a mediating aspect. It will draw parallels between structure, agency and reflexivity, and elements of learning such as knowledge, practice and reflection. The paper presents the case that human learning is that key process which mediates between structural reproduction and social change. It is learning that leads to structures changing, as this changes how people decide to act in the world – to reproduce structures or challenge and change them. Human learning is the way in which we address the inadequacies both of ourselves and the world. It is how we make sense of the world that we all know and inhabit. To live in the world is to know and to find our way through it.

Agency, structure and reflexivity

The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social structure stalks through the history of sociological theory. Basically, it concerns how to develop an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men [sic] constituting society and the social formation of human agents.

(Archer, 2010: 225)

Archer opens her seminal challenge to Giddens’s structuration theory with this acknowledgement of the enduring sociological dilemma between structure and action. Archer rejected Giddens’s definition of structure; it was argued that Giddens failed to account for the temporal nature of the relationship between structures and action. Archer noted that structures inevitably predate the human actions that reproduce or change them. Any transformation of structure must logically postdate those actions. Structural impacts, therefore, can endure over time and are not, according to Archer: changed by action in an instant (2010: 238). Structures remain a constraint on our actions with powerful social consequences. Following the financial crash of 2008 we are all keenly aware of these consequences; as Keynes is said to have noted ‘Markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent’ (Schilling, 1993).

Giddens tended to emphasize the instantiation of our more reflexive times; his definition of structure suggests it has an ethereal character, ‘Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action’ (Giddens, 1984: 377). Although there is a link here between this concept of structure and that of knowledge, and we would agree that knowledge is an aspect of structure, we would take issue with the ‘virtual’ rather than real and material definition of structure. As Archer argued, structures materially exist, impact on our lives and predate action. We come into a world not of our own making.

Examples include various kinds of scarcity which can arise without power or normative regulation and involve nothing other than physiological signification, like famine, over-population, shortage of skills
or land. In what possible sense do these require instantiation? They are there and the problem is how to get rid of them or deal with them.

(Archer, 2010: 232)

Archer uses a Popperian analogy to provide a realist conception of knowledge and structure in a critique of Giddens:

Less obviously, why should World Three knowledge, even if it lives on only in libraries, be regarded as outside time and space; it is there continuously and thus awaits not instantiation but activation. Yet when it is activated it contains its own potentials and limitations independent of the constructions and regulations imposed upon it.

(Archer, 2010: 232)

Again, with Archer, as with Giddens, there is an explicit link between knowledge and structure: knowledge is something that exists before us. It is both sedimented and available as secondary experience (Jarvis, 1999: 31). Most of the things we know about the world are mediated and second-hand. Personal knowledge rooted in actual direct and primary experiences appears more ‘real’, though it is often downgraded to the anecdotal (Usher, 1985).

A related point is made with Young’s realist conception of knowledge (2008), which asserted that the importance of knowledge is that it exists before and beyond the immediate primary experience of individuals. In a similar vein, Archer argued that, to experience something it must exist, unless it is fantasy, prior to us and autonomous to us (2000: 154). However, knowledge and structures do not determine who we are or become, this is filtered through reflexivity and practice, which Archer presents as ‘the fulcrum of knowledge’ (2000: 9). A distinction is made, by Archer, between different forms of knowledge. The first is embodied knowledge, and we may learn without intending to do (Archer, 2000: 160); it emerges from our relationship with the natural world and includes the self-discovery associated with early childhood and continues throughout the life-course. The second is practical knowledge, which involves the ‘active process of doing since it is performative in relation to the material culture’ (Archer, 2000: 166). Practical knowledge is acquired initially through ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Apprenticeship provides an example of how practical knowledge can be acquired. The third type is ‘discursive knowledge’, which is propositional, associated with the social order and may be obtained through scholarship (Archer, 2000: 167).

In the field of education Jarvis uses a similar approach to knowledge and notes the tacit nature of knowledge, evident in Polanyi (1958): practical knowledge that includes ‘knowledge how’, and propositional, or ‘knowledge of’. These categories derive from (Scheffler, 1965). Jarvis argued that these forms of knowledge are ‘legitimated in at least three different ways: rationalistically, empirically and pragmatically’ (Jarvis, 1999: 41). All knowledge and all learning is situated; there is no view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986). These situations supply us with the motives for learning which over any given life-course are unique to the individual. Because these motives are linked as vocabularies of action to unique situations, they are as various as the situations in which they occur. Most psychologists may not like this, but from this perspective there are no singular motivations to learn. Indeed, ‘motivations’ as we understand them play no part in the informal learning of our native language. The problem with trying to understand learning in terms of some underlying motivation is that it simply does not apply to many cases of informal learning. All we can assert here is that, in given situations, we just ‘learn’: there is no mental clockwork that sets learning in train.

We can see from this discussion that there are strong parallels between the dualisms of structure and agency in social theory, and knowledge and practice, that are evident in the educational field of literature (Jarvis, 1999). These links are implicit in the sociological theory of Archer (2000). However, it is the
relationship between these themes that requires further exploration. Some theoretical approaches have a
tendency to emphasize the power of social structure in determining human action. From this perspective, it
is society that makes us what we are: we inherit culture, tradition, habitus and reproduce it. Archer talks of
this approach as ‘Society’s Being’ (2000: 86), presenting humanity as passive and moulded by the social or
economic structures that form the socialization and instill the cultural traditions that precede them. Bourdieu,
it is argued, provides an example of this approach:

Bourdieu proposes that social divisions and mental schematic are structurally homologous because they
are genetically linked: the latter are nothing other than the embodiment of the former.

(Archer, 2007: 39)

With such a social determinist position, where is the space for human agency for an individual’s practices to
influence and shape the world? People are presented as passive, and structural conditions are thereby static.
Such an approach is perhaps more suited in its explanatory power for times of social stability than our period
of social change.

Alternative perspectives tend to result in an emphasis on the individual’s power through action and
practice to shape the world. Archer (2000) paints a picture of Modernity’s Man as a rather absurd epitome
of a rational choice theorist. A similar point is made by Bauman in Modernity and the Holocaust (1989),
where some variants of enlightenment thinking have produced a technical rationality that is devoid of
human ethics. Although Giddens explored the relationship between structure and agency, through his
approach to structuration (1984), in later writing he presents the individual as powerful and free of struc-
tural constraints. For Giddens a consequence of the rapid pace and scope of change is that tradition has
been eroded and individuals have more space to construct their own identities.

The self is seen as a reflexive project, for which individuals are responsible. We are, not what we are,
but what we make of ourselves.

(Giddens, 1995: 75)

It is precisely in respect of this move toward agency and disregard for the enduring influence of structural
constraints that Archer took issue with Giddens’s individualistic approach and argued for a social realist position.

Archer provides a succinct definition of reflexivity, even though it begs the question as to what is meant
by ‘normal’:

Reflexivity is the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider
themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa.

(Archer, 2007: 4)

It is our capacity to think, to conduct an internal conversation in relation to structure, and our courses of
action that mediates between structural circumstances and the ways in which people act in the world. The
emphasis is placed on reflexivity precisely because it mediates between structural properties and social
actions.

The subjective powers of reflexivity mediate the role that objective structural or cultural powers play
in influencing social action and are thus indispensable to explaining social outcomes.

(Archer, 2007: 5)

Reflexivity is a form of internal conversation in the mind that is explicitly linked to Dewey’s approach to
thinking and reflection (Archer, 2007: 40–41). This is a very interesting approach from a learning perspective, as
it places a Deweyian sense of reflection and thinking between what people come to know about the world, how they make sense of it and how they come to act within it. Structures and situations, circumstances, influence the concerns that people have. There is a link between what Mills (1959) refers to as public issues that are not of our choosing and our private concerns. There is no cause and effect, people do not respond to events in a uniform and infallible fashion, but there are situations with which people reflexively engage to select projects over their life-course that ultimately influence their actions and practices. Reflexivity is a means by which people transform their experiences acquired, directly and indirectly, and translate them into action, practices and new forms of knowledge. It therefore closely parallels how we learn and navigate our way through our world.

The phenomenon of learning

Learning is elemental and universal, an ontological condition of ‘being in the world’. It can be considered as a condition with two aspects – getting through the day and living a worthwhile life. Learning is essential to being, in terms of knowing what to do and how to act, both in ordinary routine circumstances and when faced with new situations. It has both unreflective (‘second nature’) and reflective (deliberate) characteristics. Learning is also expansive of being, a projective becoming through self-critical, contemplative and reflexive engagement with practices and values other than the familiar. It entails judgment and understanding beyond the immediate and practical.

Learning is not a singular phenomenon – practices, processes, meanings, values, purposes, histories and social conditions are all implicated. It is hardly surprising therefore, that any social theory of learning would have a hard time explaining what it is that is being theorized. There is no phenomenological unity to learning as such; it is simultaneously event, process, purpose, result. Any theory of learning would therefore have to choose what aspects of the phenomenon to concentrate on, and the history of the discipline shows both a tendency to over-theorization and perhaps mis-theorization, where there is insufficient phenomenological understanding of its elemental and universal characteristics as a ‘practice of being’.

How do people learn naturally?

Sociologists and psychologists have struggled to understand the phenomenology of ‘learning’. Their explanatory models have typified learning as a complex process and have produced a mass of apparently supportable evidence, through selective measurements and indicators from captive groups in formal institutional settings. This is perhaps unsurprising given the ease of access to population data sets, institutional records and researchable subjects (especially students in classroom or training settings and their teachers). This has resulted in a discounting of learning in its universal, informal everyday contexts.

Given that we are taking a learning approach to the understanding of learning sociologically, we need to understand learning as a universal primal phenomenon in its unremarkable and non-institutional contexts. We want to assert that any and every learning has practice and participation at its heart, and that it requires a number of conditions which, when present, are necessary and sufficient for learning to occur. We also want to re-establish learning as essential to the ontological status of being-in-the-world, both in the mundane sense of just ‘getting through the day’ and in terms of the value-laden project of living a worthwhile life.

Essential to being-in-the-world is learning from and contributing to that world. Planned learning, i.e. that which is subject to curricula and formal institutional rules, is only one aspect, perhaps even only a minor aspect, of learning in this important sense: we are called to be ‘educated’ as a matter of public policy; we are called to ‘learning’ as a matter of being. The phenomenological essence of learning is that it is conversational, interrogative, representational, open-ended, engaging, and sedimented (as stores of knowledge).
The conditions for learning are those that entail practices of being-in-the-world, practices in effect of continual ‘becoming’. They require ‘engagement’, both with the world and with the self as a reflexive being, and include the following:

- **Knowing.** As making sense of the world. The world accounts for itself, including scientific, creative, humanistic and historical accounts of how the world ‘works’ in terms of different horizons of understanding, and encompasses the relating of experiences of discovery, etc. It is important to note at this point that the self as a learner is continually engaged in having internal conversations in which she/he is simultaneously teller and audience. Our experiences are, in principle, relatable to others and to ourselves. Knowing involves a level of *Scripting*. This refers to processes for producing and securing knowledge in transmissible form. We ‘learn’ the means to do this (reading, writing). Through text, recorded images, artifacts and other recoverable traces – without records of the learning efforts of others – knowledge remains unsedimented, requires continual renewal and is vulnerable to extinction.

- **Reflection.** Our biographies provide us with a unique ‘constellation of concerns’ (Archer, 2000: 190) by which we as reflective human beings come to make sense of the world. All accounts about the world, ranging from the ones we tell ourselves to those that are a matter of public record, are open in principle to challenge and to thinking, reflection and counter-argument. Knowledge accumulates through interrogation and transformation of the taken-for-grantedness of previous accounts. Critique in the form of critical questioning is essential to the process by which we come to accept ‘better’ understanding of being and of the world.

- **Practice.** We share Archer’s (2000) position that practice is pivotal, that learning involves learning from experience. Our meanings derive from our ‘doings’ in the world. This is the position that Dewey also takes in *Experience and Nature*, that our propositional knowledge derives from practice and its interplay between our natural and material world. At some level we practice first and give meaning later. At the same time, ‘learning of the rules’ of a game may be important to the presentation of ‘self’ and a projective practice of being in the world (Goffman, 1959). We practice, act and impact on the world before we become self-conscious of our acting and roles; experience and practice come before interpretation and meanings – before we learn the rules of any games. As Archer concluded, ‘Our concrete practices were accorded primacy in the emergence of our selfhood and these same practices were held to be pivotal to our knowledge of the world’ (2000: 318). We may have inner and outer lives.

- **Engagement/interaction:** The above conditions can be satisfied within the self as a learner as a reflexive being. This fourth element entails interaction with others in the forms of learning about different ways of being in the world and different interpretative horizons (Gadamer, 1975). Learning is enhanced when it is expansive, involving engagement with difference, with others unlike ourselves. Such a comparative approach has been fundamental to the social sciences and is woven throughout canonical texts. Engagement is central to committed action in the service of change.

- **Risking.** All learning represents a process with an uncertain promise. One never knows for sure how learning will work out. In addition to uncertainty, there are *stakes* to ‘being’ here, such as the credibility of the self and the possibility of getting things wrong. Also, as Foucault (in his work on power-knowledge formations) and Habermas (in his understanding of knowledge and human interests) remind us, it is the *interests* of all the parties to any teaching/learning transaction that are implicated – in short, who and what is to be trusted?

We want to assert that, when these practice conditions for ‘being’ are present, then learning will be optimized and that, conversely, without these conditions, education is impoverished. Without the
phenomenal conditions, no subject discipline (whether sociology, psychology, history or philosophy) can place learning or education as its explanatory object. Put another way, we need a phenomenological foundation of learning for any possible ‘social science’ of learning, rather than needing such a ‘science’ as a foundation for learning.

Given our understanding of the elemental nature of learning as a necessary accompaniment to being-in-the-world, we want here to make the point that, for each individual, ‘being’ is played out differently in each case. Each person has an autobiographical uniqueness and knows tacitly that she/he is both constant and changing as a ‘self’. At any given time we can tell a unique story from which others (listeners, readers) can learn from us. Our first-hand experiences become their second-hand experiences. Much of what we know is second-hand and involves a recognition of the authority of the ‘other’ to tell of her/his own being, but to have that telling open to an alternative evaluation or challenge in the light of changing experiences. An example would be that of knowing one’s own parents in a different way after becoming a parent oneself — one ‘learns’ to be a parent in a largely unremarkable way and through personally being able to compare different generational practices. A ‘life-course’ is both something that happens and one that (especially in education) is steered within situational constraints. All life-courses are, as it were, ‘semi-open’ to both opportunity and risk. Life-course learning is both a singular problematic and a universal phenomenon (i.e. regardless of gender, or ethnic or other considerations). Learning has an inescapably temporal nature which is often missed by conventional socio-psychological models.

### Dualistic misconceptions about learning

Dualisms provide useful analytical tools. A dualistic conception is at the heart of the structure-agency dilemma. Dualisms also characterize the world of education.

Consider the dualisms shown in Table 37.1, which constitute educators’ understandings of what learning is ‘really’ about. They are the power-knowledge formations of practitioners having particular interests in educational policy-making, teaching, management and evaluation.

These dualisms saturate the everyday world of educational practitioners. They are formulated and familiarized within their own vocabularies of practice and are evident in informing institutional motivations and characteristics (Mills, 1940), so that different levels and types of education/training actually ‘feel’ different (e.g. further education compared to the university sector, private schools and state schools, liberal arts and engineering establishments, etc.). In forming the everyday conversational worlds of practitioners, they sustain the dispositional realities of practice as ‘truths’ that are hermetically sealed and self-affirming — what ‘everybody knows’. But when we unpack this performative, dualistic discourse, we can clear away some misunderstandings and elisions about ‘learning’.

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<tr>
<th>Dualism</th>
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<td>Formal v. informal</td>
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A phenomenological approach to learning is useful. Here are a couple of examples:

- Consider for a moment ‘learning’ in two of its prepositional forms – ‘learning to’ and ‘learning about’. The former concerns procedural practice and offers the prospect of successful practice; it addresses ability to do. This can be taught or trained for in arranged institutional contexts. It is applicable, having performance and purpose as its rationale. It is sequential (one learns to do x before one can learn to do y) and curricular in character, having specific content. The sequence and content of learning allows it to be organized and systematically codified and delivered in educational and training institutions. The latter is more nebulous and contingent; it may be considered as a growing awareness that naturally and necessarily accompanies different modes of being in the world. It is not expressly performative or directive towards some identifiable end. An example may make the prepositional distinctions clearer. One ‘learns to’ become a banker by taking courses in banking, finance, accountancy etc. One ‘learns about’ the perfidy of reckless investment bankers in a different, non-institutional way, through becoming directly or indirectly aware of certain practices and consequences for oneself and/or others. On the one hand, one learns theories and practices of money management; on the other, one learns what it means to be perpetrator and victim. ‘Meanings’ come to us as non-instructed understandings (subject of course to critique and revision); they are slippery, resist codification and formal transmission (teaching).

- There is confusion about what ought to characterize a ‘learning society’. We do not know the answer to this, save to say that it can (should?) embrace learning for personal occupational/career purposes; learning for trans-personal economic purposes; learning for its own sake; and learning for critical engagement. Policy, resources and practice promote the former two senses of learning, but not the latter two. The phrases ‘learning for its own sake’ or ‘learning for critical engagement’ can be understood as counter-discursive to learning for occupational, career development purposes or trans-personal economic purposes (e.g. national competitiveness). The fate of so-called liberal and radical education attests to the power of the latter over the former, being constructed either as an (un-fundable) private good in times of limited public resources, or dangerously irresponsible within the prevailing hegemony. The latter two senses are constructed in mainstream educational discourse as residual or troublesome in a global age of homo economicus. The position of ‘liberal’ or ‘radical’ education rests on a counter-hegemonic weakness, but also a phenomenological misunderstanding. There is no such thing as ‘learning for its own sake’, devoid of purpose. The phrase suggests that learning is its own objective, as if it were hermetically sealed. Learning always serves purposes beyond itself, minimally the self as a learner, as an agent in and interpreter of the world. It is an essential accompaniment to the stasis and the dynamics of ‘being’.

Conclusions

We have argued for putting learning as a practice at the heart of being. At one level, ways of being are largely unconscious dispositions that we inhabit. Unreflectively, this is the world of the familiar, the ordinary, the routine and the tacit. It does not draw attention to itself. It is a world that works for us without effort. It is one to which we are accustomed. At another level, through our internal conversations, our reflexivity, we engage with different forms of knowledge about our world. We reflectively evaluate our position in the world and this in turn influences how we act within it. It is such reflexivity that mediates between knowledge and practice in learning and offers an explanatory framework for understanding the relationship between structure and agency. It is human learning that is the difference between structural reproduction and social change. An understanding of learning and reflexivity has the potential to unlock the theoretical dilemma between approaches that emphasize structural control and those that emphasize human agency. The approach is pithily summarized as ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx, 1885: 96).

Anything new represents a challenge to learning. ‘What are we to make of (things that are new)?’ is a question that we routinely ask. Two general dispositions within the everyday world are possible: a) to treat the new or different as unfamiliar – for example as ‘other’ or ‘threat’ or, b) to treat the new as opportunity, enlightenment or wonder. Change calls forth dispositions out of existing social circumstances as the result of negative or positive connotations. We learn eventually, for example, whether change is a good or a bad thing for us or has neutral consequences. Since we cannot, simply as a practical matter, simultaneously attend to or make sense of all the changing events in our world we must, most of the time, choose to bracket out or disregard elements of the world. Our horizons are necessarily restricted. Learning is contingently selective. At the same time we are necessarily, as an inescapable condition of being in a dynamic world, ignorant of large parts of it. Although ignorance is understood to mean something negative in educational circles, it is a necessary condition for getting on with one’s life. It is a condition of critical reflectivity and taking charge of those local and personal aspects of the world over which we can have power. The force of learning is always felt locally and personally and its consequences are unlikely to be the same for any two individuals. We recognize that there are such phenomena as collective learning and social aspects to learning, but learning is only ever carried by and through individuals. Disregarding most of the world in our daily practices in order to concentrate on the ‘ready to hand’ (Gadamer, 1975) is required for discrimination in where to put one’s learning efforts, what is important from what is inessential to being.

The social sciences nurture learning through engagement with others. Mills’s The Sociological Imagination (1959) or Bauman and May’s sociological eye (2001) both note the benefits of an expansive experience where learners actively engage with difference and broaden experience, engage with the wider social world and cultures different from our own. This is a theme that goes to the heart of the subject and its origins in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which championed learning from other cultures. As Porter argued ‘The philosophies mocked narrow minded nationalism along with all other kinds of parochial prejudice’ (1990: 51). Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) noted the benefits of consulting the impartial spectator as means of gaining a comparative view of ethics. These are themes that run throughout classical sociological approaches to other cultures, such as those of Durkheim (1976) and Mauss (1972): and can be found in more recent expressions in Gadamer’s fusion of horizons (Gadamer, 1975) or the postmodern ethic of Bauman (1993). The process of learning is projective and expansive; it imagines a future state of affairs in which the agent as a ‘knower’ is more informed and thus better enabled. In coming to know more about the world as individuals, we contribute naturally to the stores of knowledge available to society. That knowledge is sedimented as both resource and constraint for future generations. It is both an aid and impediment to understanding and navigating the world. The social sciences nurture expansive learning on the one hand; on the other, an understanding of learning as the practice of being and becoming helps us comprehend key relationships in the social sciences, such as that between structure and action.

References
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