


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Publisher: *Routledge*

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## Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing

Jennifer Lees-Marshment

### Party members as part-time marketers

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203349908.ch12>

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**Published online on: 10 Nov 2011**

**How to cite :-** Peter Van Aelst, Joop van Holsteyn, Ruud Koole. 10 Nov 2011, *Party members as part-time marketers from:* Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing Routledge

Accessed on: 11 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203349908.ch12>

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# Party members as part-time marketers

## Using relationship marketing to demonstrate the importance of rank-and-file party members in election campaigns

*Peter Van Aelst, Joop van Holsteyn and Ruud Koole*

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### **The topic: party members as part-time marketers**

Modern election campaigns consist of two elements: a centralized media campaign around the leadership of the political party and a campaign involving the participation of active party members or campaign activists. The literature on parties and campaigns emphasizes the importance of the first element, the media campaign, while at least until recently downplaying the importance of members. Political marketing literature itself has paid little attention to the role of members. This chapter will address that omission by combining insights derived from relationship marketing with ideas on party members and grassroots campaigning. Using the concept of part-time marketers, we demonstrate the potential importance of party members in modern or postmodern election campaigns. This will be illustrated through a case study of Dutch parties and party members.

### **Previous research: the dominant literature on professionalization rather than on member activity**

Within the political party literature, research on the media side of election campaigns describes various aspects of professionalization of parties (e.g. Panebianco 1988), including the introduction of campaign professionals (e.g. Plasser and Plasser 2002), opinion pollsters and market intelligence (e.g. Butler 1996), centralization of decision-making (e.g. Farrell and Webb 2000), improving media strategies (e.g. Norris *et al.* 1999), and a candidate-centered approach (e.g. Poguntke and Webb 2005). The idea is that professionalization and innovation has become a prerequisite for success and survival in contemporary campaigns and elections (Butler and Ranney 1992; Swanson and Mancini 1996). To sketch the line of reasoning roughly: elections are won by a small group of professional strategists who craft a central message, and a 'charismatic' party leader who

subsequently ‘sells’ this message successfully in front of television cameras. This handful of professionals and the political leader are in close contact with each other, operating from a ‘war room’. They have little contact with the rest of the party, let alone with the rank-and-file party activists and members: ‘parties have begun to transform themselves more and more into centralized and professional campaigning organizations, in which the scope for the amateur politician has been curtailed and in which the weight and direction of party strategy have tended increasingly to be located within the party leadership as such’ (Mair *et al.* 2004: 265).

This literature seems to ignore party members as a potentially valuable link to voters. In their ‘modern model of campaigning’, Swanson and Mancini (1996: 252) mention as its defining elements ‘personalization of politics; adapting campaign practices to media logic and priorities; and employing technical experts to advise parties on public relations, opinion polling and marketing strategies’. No mention is made of the rank-and-file party membership. By some scholars, party members are seen as a barrier to reach the general electorate since they are less flexible and ‘still bound to the traditions of their party’ (Mair *et al.* 2004: 266). Also, following the work of, among others, Duverger (1951) and May (1973), active party members are considered as more extreme and not representative of a party’s electorate and potential support. Notwithstanding the fact that this thesis lacks convincing empirical evidence, according to this line of reasoning a party that listens too much to its members runs the risk of being out of touch with ordinary voters and will subsequently lose elections.

In recent years the idea that party members and local campaigns are irrelevant or a hindrance for electoral success has been challenged. Especially in the UK, scholars have proven that traditional local campaigning, including the efforts of party members, may lead to better performance (for an overview see Fisher *et al.* 2006). Whiteley and Seyd (2003) have shown that local campaigning contributed to success in the 1997 British elections: without the efforts of local members, the Labour victory would have been more modest. The authors warn parties that alienating their members may come with a price (Seyd and Whiteley 2002). ‘[M]embers are as important as election campaigners ... Parties with fewer active constituency campaigners will suffer electoral consequences’ (Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 361). Denver and colleagues present concurring results for both the 1992 and 2001 British elections. Admittedly, the electoral benefits of the efforts of ordinary party members are marginal, but they are significant (Denver *et al.* 2004) – in times when each and every vote is worth fighting for, it would be ill-advised not to use all auxiliary troops that are at one’s disposal (Fisher and Denver 2009). The overall positive argument on contribution of local ‘labour-intensive’ campaign activities based on UK findings concurs with findings in other countries such as Canada (Carty and Eagles 1999), Ireland (Marsh 2004) and the US (Wielhouwer 1999; Green *et al.* 2003).

The work of Scarrow (1994) on parties and party members theoretically underpins pro-membership arguments. They may operate as ‘vote multipliers’ or as ambassadors to their respective communities. If party members are willing to express their political views and preferences in their daily contacts this may result in a benefit for the party, especially if they are able to circulate the message to a ‘non-party milieu’. Since party membership is a communication channel that works both ways, party leaders may be able to learn about voters’ opinions via their members. Moreover, the more parties provide opportunities for their members to impact on party policies, the more members may be willing to be active as local ambassadors for their party (e.g. Ware 1992; Van Holsteyn and Koole 2009).

Political marketing research helps to expand these arguments by utilizing relationship marketing theories. The concept of part-time marketers was developed by the founding fathers of the so-called Nordic school (Gummesson 1987; Gummesson 1990; Grönroos 1994; Grönroos 2000). These scholars contributed substantially to the emerging theory of relationship

marketing, with roots in service and non-profit marketing. They stress the need of creating mutually satisfying exchanges and long-term relationships between customers and organizations (Grönroos 1994). Establishing such relationships should be realized by the organization and *all* of its members, not solely by a separate marketing or sales department. As Gummesson (1987: 17) puts it: ‘The work to create and maintain market relationships is divided between the full-time professional marketers in the marketing department and the omnipresent (non-professional) “part-time marketers”’. According to Grönroos (1990), this demands a specific management philosophy and a commitment of the organization so that employees as amateur part-time marketers have the attitudes and skills to perform this task. This implies attention to internal marketing and a view of employees as an important channel for promotion of the organization.

Relationship marketing has been applied to politics to only some extent (see Henneberg 2002; Bannon 2005; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009). In the work of Johansen (2005) the idea of the part-time marketer has been most explicitly applied to the world of parties. In order for a party (the organization) to create a relationship with its voters (the customers), a special role should be attributed to its members (the employees). In Johansen’s organizational perspective these members have a crucial input and output function. This is why she questions the increasing role of focus groups and surveys to gauge public opinion while at the same time ‘the potentially effective feedback channel of party membership’ is neglected (Johansen 2005: 95). By communicating daily experiences to the party leadership and campaign professionals within the organization, members can be a valuable help from an input or bottom-up perspective, acting as an ‘early-warning system’ for societal developments that may be about to hit the party (Koole 2000). Moreover, their contribution is less costly than the services of professional pollsters and consultants (Müller 2000). Lees-Marshment states that parties should be aware of the ‘internal reaction’ when employing a market-oriented strategy, but that taking members seriously does not conflict with the goal of electoral success (Lees-Marshment 2001; Lees-Marshment and Quayle 2001: 211). Also Strömbäck (2007) stresses the importance of ‘the internal arena’ in party-centred democracies.

## New research: the theory and practice of part-time marketers

### *Towards a model of members as part-time marketers*

This new research thus argues that rank-and-file party members have been overlooked as valuable, employable auxiliary forces in the fight for the volatile voter of the 21st century. Based on the insights of relationship marketing we develop and empirically explore the idea of party members as part-time marketers: marketing is not a separate task solely performed by a specialized department of the organization, but involves *all* parts of the organization. In the political and electoral context party members are those who operate close to the electoral market, which offers them the opportunity to have multiple contacts with ordinary voters. These contacts could be useful both as a way to persuade people to vote for their party and as a feedback channel to inform the party leadership about the concerns and preferences of ordinary citizens and potential supporters. Drawing on these ideas, we argue two principles:

- Members provide an important feedback function, i.e. a form of market intelligence: Parties may learn from their members as they interact on a daily basis with citizens and voters, as employees on a day-to-day basis interact with customers. Moreover, ordinary party members are more than the professional politicians present and active in different parts of society, e.g. in a sports club, school board, or interest group (Van Holsteyn *et al.* 2002). As a

consequence of this omnipresence in society the rank-and-file members receive plenty of information about the opinions, the preferences and the general mood of ordinary citizens.

- Members contribute to the electoral success of their party by promoting its candidates and platform: Using members as local campaigners can be considered as a contribution from an output or top-down perspective. This, of course, can hardly be considered an original idea, but rather an idea that seems to have been forgotten by political parties and scholars alike. In their effort to control, market and 'sell' their products, parties have centralized and professionalized their power structures, especially during election campaigns. Parties have indirectly discouraged their ordinary members to be active.

Johansen (2005) stresses both principles and points to the fact that the party membership as input (feedback) and output (promotion) channel may interact and strengthen each other. Moreover, the more ordinary members have the feeling that they are co-producers of 'their' product, the more willing they are to convince others to taste and buy it. It is like the employee of Volkswagen who drives a Volkswagen and positively discusses the company and the car with friends, family and acquaintances as well.

If members have, potentially, such major benefits for parties both in the short and long run, how come they are given so little attention? Previous research suggests that the reluctance to include individual party members in modern election campaigns may have to do with their opinions and attitudes (see Lees 2005; Lilleker 2005a). Are members representative of potential voters of their party and for the party as a whole? If in particular the active members have more extreme positions (cf. May 1973; Jacobs and Shapiro 2002: 59; but see Norris 1995; Granik 2005; Koole and Van Holsteyn 2000; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010), there is a danger in having them act as marketers. They may chase off moderate supporters and attract the wrong, 'extremist' voters. More generally, the fact that this small group of citizens have become party members makes them the exception to the rule and different from all those citizens who did not become members. This may impact negatively on their capacity to act as party ambassadors, in particular in times when new political entrepreneurs are picturing a negative image of parties and party members. Politicians such as Berlusconi in Italy have created organizationally thin parties that more or less serve as the leaders' personal instrument (Mazzoleni 2000). The successful Dutch populist Wilders has created a party with only one individual member: himself.

Finally, that some people did become party *members* does not mean that they want to be active and want to become a party *activist*. The notion of party members as part-time marketers implies that members are willing and able to play an active role, in particular in the run-up to elections, in meeting and persuading potential voters. This is far from obvious. It is one thing to become a party member, but it is another thing to become active on behalf of this party in a discordant context – competitive democratic elections are about differences of opinion and conflicting preferences and interests.

To address these concerns about the electoral potential of ordinary party members we present a model (see Table 12.1), which includes three preconditions for the idea of members as part-time marketers: representativeness, connectedness and willingness. Representativeness refers to the position and attitudinal make-up of members as two-way communication channels between potential voters and the party. In this capacity, i.e. 'members can be political communicators, both upwards and downwards' (Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 362), they have to know and represent political opinions correctly (e.g. Scarrow 2007). Probably for party members the best way to possess this knowledge is to have identical or at least similar opinions compared to (potential) voters as well as to the party more generally. If in this way members are representative, then this precondition for acting as party ambassadors and intermediaries between the mass and elite

*Table 12.1* A model of members as part-time marketers

Representativeness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Members know and can communicate public opinion and preferences from mass to elite level</li> <li>– Members have identical or at least similar opinions compared to (potential) voters for the party</li> </ul>
Connectedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Members are connected to society at large, not just party elites</li> <li>– Members are connected to various other organized parts of civil society</li> </ul>
Willingness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Members are open about their political affiliation and willing to spread the word</li> <li>– Members are willing to campaign for the party in election time</li> </ul>

levels will be fulfilled. Connectedness means that members are active in society at large, not only in their party organization. Modern party organizations are sometimes referred to as cartel parties, linked to the state but detached from civil society and acting as ‘semi-state agencies’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 16). If this were indeed the case this would be problematic for the idea of party members as marketers. If neither parties nor individual party members are related to other parts of society, then any activities of individual members as part-time marketers would be impossible or ineffective. Willingness, finally, implies that members have the drive and motivation to be active for their party. Studies have shown that this is not always the case (e.g. Granik 2005; Scarrow 2000). If members are to take up their role as part-time marketers they should be open about their party affiliation and willing to actively promote their party.

### *The model of members as part-time marketers: the Dutch case*

We explore our model of party members as part-time marketers by inspecting the Dutch case in more depth. The Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy with an extreme proportional electoral system, a fragmented party system, a tradition of coalition governments and a polity that has been typified as a consensus or consociational democracy (Lijphart 1999). The Netherlands fits the general pattern of advanced Western democracies, with major changes in the political landscape in recent decades (Pennings and Keman 2008). As regards party membership, a slight reversal of the downward trend was noticeable following the exciting political situation with the rise and success of the controversial Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (Den Ridder *et al.* 2011a). The number of party members is about 3 percent (Andeweg and Irwin 2009: 76; see for a comparative overview Mair and van Biezen 2001).

The analysis is based on a survey among a sample of party members. Seven (out of ten) parties that were represented in the second chamber of parliament after the general elections of November 2006 participated in this Leiden Party Member Survey (LPMS) 2008.<sup>1</sup> The questionnaire contained several questions that were similar to questions of the Dutch National Election Study 2006, to compare members with ordinary voters. With response rates ranging between over 30 percent and over 60 percent, and a total number of 4,251 members participating, ample information on party members was collected.

- Representativeness: Do party members resemble voters? From a socio-demographic perspective this is not the case: members are old, male and highly educated. However, the picture for substantive representation tells a different story. On several issues members have almost identical opinions to the voters of their party. Only with regards to the issues of the

integration of ethnic minorities and European integration were there slight but significant differences between both groups for a few parties, but the overall conclusion is that the ideas of members correspond closely with those of the voters (see Den Ridder *et al.* 2011b; Koole and Van Holsteyn 2000). Moreover, in general ideological positions, i.e. with respect to their self-placement in terms of left and right, voters and members are similar. On a 10-point scale, the mean ideological position of the two groups of the same party never differs by more than one point; for several parties the difference is less than half a point.

For our model this substantive similarity should be considered much more important than the socio-demographic differences. As long as the older, educated male members express the same political opinions as the voters and potential supporters, as well as the party, they can act as both the party's input and output channel. Although similar issue and ideological positions, of course, do not conclusively prove that individual party members and other relevant actors within and for these parties are on exactly the same ideological wavelength, they do strongly suggest that members are suitable to act as part-time marketers from the perspective of representativeness.

- Connectedness: Pim Fortuyn, the political entrepreneur who was murdered only days before the general elections in 2002, referred to the Dutch political process as 'a completely incestuous scene of self-appointing and co-opting political and administrative elites' (Fortuyn 2002: 135–36, translation by the authors). This is another way of stating that parties have developed into cartel parties with strong ties to the state but only weak ties to civil society (Katz and Mair 1995). The fear that parties are disconnected from society is not warranted, however, if we look at their members. We asked them whether or not they were a member or supporter of a number of different interests and other groups, ranging from labour unions to sports clubs and from women's organizations to organizations for the conservation of nature, and whether or not they were active as a volunteer worker for these groups. These indicators of societal connectedness clearly prove that party members are not clinging exclusively to their party but are involved in other groups and organizations. Only a tiny minority of 5 percent were *not* members or supporters of any other group. In general, over 40 percent were members of one to three other organizations and an almost equal percentage were members or supporters of four to six organizations (see Table 12.2, final column). Moreover, passive involvement is more frequent than activism, but the majority of party members indicate that they have done voluntary work for one to three groups or organizations.

Even more important and relevant from the point of view of the respective parties is that there is no negative relationship between being active as a party member and both passive and active forms of involvement in other organizations within civil society. According to the rival structure hypothesis (e.g. Sainsbury 1983; Ware 1996), we should expect that as a result of the competition for scarce resources of time, money and energy, activism inside and outside the party would be correlated negatively. This is not the case. Indeed, if there is any correlation it is a (weak) positive one. Over 30 percent of the members who 'confess' to be inactive as a party member are not doing any voluntary work in any other organization either, compared with 15 percent of the members who consider themselves very active. In the latter group, one in ten members is engaged in voluntary work in at least four groups, whereas this is true for almost one in four of the most active party members.

Our data show support for the second precondition: party members are no unworldly citizens, isolated from and unaware of the wider society, and swallowed by the activism for or

Table 12.2 Indicators of societal connectedness of party members, by level of activism (%)

	<i>Level of (subjective) activism as a party member</i>				
	<i>(Almost) not active</i>	<i>Not very active</i>	<i>Fairly active</i>	<i>Very active</i>	<i>All members active</i>
Number of organizations of which party members are a member or supporter:					
0	7	4	4	3	5
1–3	51	48	42	45	48
4–6	41	44	48	45	43
7 +	2	4	6	8	4
Number of organizations for which party members are a voluntary worker:					
0	32	20	16	15	24
1–3	59	63	56	63	60
4–6	10	17	27	22	16
7 +	0	1	2	1	1

Source: Leiden Party Member Survey 2008 for seven parties (see note 1) (weighted data).

within their party. Contrary to the idea of a cartel party being isolated from society, members of Dutch parties are rooted in society at large and connected as members or volunteers to other organized parts of civil society. As such, they are able to constitute the linkage between their party and society. At election time they may canvass in the various societal environments and groups with which they are connected. All in all, many party members have the potential to play the role of ambassador, salesman or foot soldier – but are they willing to do so?

- Willingness: According to our third precondition, party members should be willing to be active as part-time marketers. As said, this is not obvious. First, many members are not active in their party. In the LPMS 2008 a plurality of 44 percent of the members considered themselves inactive; only 25 percent was in their own estimation fairly or very active. The fact that not all Dutch party members are or want to be active is not exceptional from a comparative perspective (Scarrow 2000).
- The concept of part-time marketers, however, implies that members are first of all open about their political affiliation and willing to spread the word. Our data show that many Dutch party members are willing to speak out about their party membership (Table 12.3, final column). For over 90 percent it is true that their acquaintances know about their membership and a large majority of 72 percent of the party members talk about their party at work. Moreover, about 80 percent do not think that being active for their party would cause any discomfort in everyday life.
- Party members also think that they can be a source of information for their party (at the input side of the communication channel). A large majority of over 70 percent agrees with the statement that rank-and-file members may have good ideas about what their party should do, and a non-negligible minority of about 20 percent even think that they know the minds of the people better than elected representatives. Since less than 10 percent of members think that activities of people like themselves are of no use since the party leadership decides everything, the potential for fuelling the leadership with information from the mass level very likely does exist.



- If it is true that future behaviour is best predicted from past performance, parties still have some encouraging to do. In Table 12.3 findings for three separate campaign activities are presented, i.e. for actions that indicate the willingness of members to show their political preference and to actually canvass at elections. The data show that four out of every ten members have shown a poster or window bill at home; over 20 percent tried to persuade others to vote for their party, and distributed leaflets or other campaign information. But the glass appears to be half empty rather than half full: some party members already act as part-time marketers for their party, but for all parties included in our study the majority is *not* active, or at least not at recent election campaigns.

To sum up, party members who are less active internally do not differ strongly from their more active fellow members with respect to their willingness to speak out as a member or in their self-confidence as a party member. What makes the difference – and this may come as no surprise – is that those members who are less active within their party also appear to have been less active as auxiliary troops for their party at previous election campaigns. Apparently, those members who consider themselves to be very active already act as part-time marketers: 65 to 75

*Table 12.3* Indicators of potential willingness of members to be active for their party, by level of activism

	<i>Level (subjective) of activism as a party member</i>				<i>All members</i>
	<i>(Almost) not active</i>	<i>Not very active</i>	<i>Fairly active</i>	<i>Very active</i>	
<i>Willingness to speak out as a party member</i>					
'At work I never talk about my party' (% not true)	62	74	83	90	72
'The people among my acquaintances know that I am a member of [party]' (% true)	87	95	99	99	92
'People who are active for their party experience discomfort in their everyday life' (% (fully) disagree)	78	78	82	76	79
<i>Self confidence of party members</i>					
'Rank-and-file party members know the minds of the people better than elected representatives' (% (fully) agree)	21	24	20	18	22
'Often rank-and-file party members have good ideas about what the party should do' (% (fully) agree)	69	72	78	81	72
'Activities of party members like me are of no use since the party leadership decides everything' (% (fully) agree)	9	9	6	8	8
<i>Prior campaigning experience : percentage of party members who during the previous five years (very) often...</i>					
...showed a poster or window bill at home	24	40	65	77	40
...tried to persuade others to vote for the party	9	19	39	64	22
...distributed leaflets or other information	5	19	51	76	23

*Source:* Leiden Party Member Survey 2008 for seven parties (see note 1) (weighted data).

percent of those members did show a poster, tried to persuade others and/or distributed campaign information. Those members who are less active within their party are also (much) less active in the run-up to elections. So according to our data, a substantial number of reserve troops are still at rest. Dutch parties have tried to mobilize these troops, but apparently not effectively and without convincing results as yet. However, the party that succeeds in getting them into action will be able to employ an impressive number of extra marketers in future campaigns.

### Advice for practitioners

What lessons can parties learn from the general idea of members as part-time marketers, and the Dutch case in particular? We showed that the alleged unrepresentativeness of members is to a large extent – in the Netherlands and from a substantive point of view – a myth. Dutch party members' opinions on major political issues and in terms of left–right ideological self-placement hardly differ from their parties' electorate. Furthermore, party members are active in and connected to other parts of civil society as members and active participants in various societal organizations. This makes these members well positioned to provide feedback about the general mood of the electorate. Our study supports the idea of devoting structural attention to this valuable and relatively cheap form of market intelligence, for instance by organizing regular surveys among members and providing members with easy online and offline ways to express their opinions to the party headquarters. This feedback channel is the first benefit of treating members as part-time marketers.

Besides the market intelligence that it provides, the input channel strengthens the second benefit of the part-time marketer concept: members as active ambassadors and foot soldiers for their party. Our case study showed that the representativeness and connectedness of members does not imply that they have been active in campaigning. A majority of members has not canvassed for their party in recent years. This means that there may be new ground to develop among the party membership. Parties should try to mobilize this group of potential foot soldiers, who remain necessary in order to meet with potential voters face to face and make the party visible on the street. This is not an easy assignment, but it might be an effective undertaking. In our survey over 40 percent of members stated that they were never asked by their party to get involved in any activity for their party, but of those 60 percent who were contacted, over 90 percent appreciated this. Among the 40 percent who were never contacted, over 50 percent thought this would be a good idea. Among the party membership there is virgin territory as regards party activism.

Finally, we believe that regarding members as part-time marketers is not only useful in the short run, i.e. to win the next election, but also in the long run. Parties that neglect their rank-and-file members may attract new voters, but simultaneously lose their traditional base of support. In the case of UK New Labour, Lilleker (2005b) found that members felt that there had been a lack of consultation when their party modernized in the 1990s and they had been disenfranchised. Labour had won votes, but lost two-thirds of its members since the mid-1990s (Pettitt 2009). As voters become more disloyal, a party that loses a significant amount of members loses some of its lifeblood. Moreover, '[b]y taking measures to extend the role of individual members in party decision-making, cartel parties can defend themselves against accusations of elitism and detachment from society' (Hopkin 2001: 345).

### Impact on politics

Parties are not the only beneficiary of the part-time marketer model: democracy as a whole might benefit. The idea of members as part-time marketers means that ordinary people are actually

involved, not only as spectators but as co-producers. In this respect, the part-time marketer model is in line with theories that stress the importance of a participatory democracy (e.g. Verba *et al.* 1995).

As party members become an integrated part of an electoral strategy in a market-oriented modern election campaign, our model might also adjust the (incorrect) idea that political marketing is necessarily in conflict with traditional party activism. The concept of part-time marketers should not be seen in contrast to the centralized media campaign, but rather as a crucial part of it. We even argue that without the party's central organization involvement and coordination, the idea of part-time marketers has little chance of being truly effective. On the one hand, the input and knowledge from wider society would never reach party headquarters, and on the other hand, party leaders' attempts to activate their members would be unheard or left unanswered. In short, successful election campaigns require an integration of modern and traditional methods. As Marsh (2004: 263) aptly puts it, 'elections take place on the airwaves, but they also take place on the doorsteps'.

### The way forward

Future research should try to test more cases to explore whether party members are really unwilling, or rather unable, to be more active in a campaign context. Are these members simply not mobilized, or consciously neglected by party headquarters? Whatever may be the case, with at least two of the three preconditions fulfilled in the Dutch case, there is ample reason to further explore and develop the possibilities for political parties to increase the grassroots potential of party members in election campaigns, in particular in a time where the internet has dramatically increased the opportunities for parties and candidates to connect more easily with their core supporters, as was shown by the primary campaign of Howard Dean in 2004 (Hindman 2005) and again by Barack Obama in 2008. 'It is clear that parties are here to stay, an unavoidable part of democracy. Whether, as Schattschneider believed, political parties make modern democracy, or whether they are an inextricable weed in its garden, is a question that social science research does not answer yet' (Stokes 1999: 263–64). Indeed, political parties are here to stay, as are their members, so why not make the best of it?

### Note

- 1 The parties that participated were: the Christian Union (ChristenUnie, CU); the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA); D66 (Democraten 66, or Democrats 66); the GreenLinks (GroenLinks, GL); the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA); the Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD); and the Dutch Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP). Three parties did not want to participate: The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV); the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP); and the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD).

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