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INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Southeast Asia has faced some of the most complicated insurgency environments of any region in the world. In several countries, there are multiple insurgencies, at times having little or no common ideological basis. The region also has had some of the longest lasting and seemingly intractable insurgent environments. All these issues are overlaid by broader internal security failures within the countries, complicating adequate responses focused directly on the insurgent movements. The three countries that continue to have the most significant insurgencies – Thailand, Burma and the Philippines – are the focus of this chapter.

Thailand

Throughout much of the 1960s and beyond, Thailand has faced an immensely complicated insurgent situation. By the beginning of the 1980s there were three principal insurgent movements: ‘poorly organized’ Muslim separatists; remnants of the Malay Communist Party that had conducted the insurgency in Malaya and Malaysia; and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) (Randolph and Thompson 1981: 16). Most of the members of the latter two groups were ethnically Chinese, and during that period both maintained relatively large numbers of members (Prizza 1985: 22). The CPT, however, faced a significant amount of factionalization after Hanoi and Beijing split, with various CPT leaders leaning to one side or the other. After the end of the Cold War, both Communist groups appear to have precipitously faded into insignificance.

Muslim separatists have, however, proven to be more problematic. Splits between the central government in Bangkok and the southern provinces have existed since the incorporation of the Sultanate of Pattani in 1902. The local populace did not respond well to their new status, and unrest quickly developed (Pojar 2005: 8–22). Ethnically and religiously, over 80 per cent of the roughly two million people in the three southern provinces are Malay and Muslim, with most southerners speaking Yawi, a Malay dialect (Pauker 2005/2006: 78). Historically, the majority of the ethnic Malay population continued to identify more with their kinsmen still in Malaya and Malaysia than with the concept of being Thai. Their status as Muslims almost certainly further exacerbated their alienation from the Thai Buddhist majority, but religion likely should be viewed more as a marker for larger ethnic differences than as being the key element of the unrest (Harish 2006: 48–69).
Unrest has been bubbling in southern Thailand for many years, with multiple forms of resistance from banditry – very active for years – to separate educational systems, political movements, and ultimately small-scale insurgency. The Thai governance of the south exacerbated the unrest. The consensus among analysts is that the south became the ‘dumping ground for incompetent or corrupt officials’ (Randolph and Thompson 1981: 15). At the same time, many demographic, social and economic conditions in the southern provinces lagged significantly behind those of Thailand as a whole.

Lesser or greater levels of unrest in southern Thailand, including occasional uprisings, continued for decades (International Crisis Group, 18 May 2005, pp. 2–6). Major groups have included the National Patani Liberation Front (BNPP), formed in 1959; the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), formed in the early 1960s; and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), formed in 1968. Most of these groups numbered in the low hundreds. The PULO in particular has had strong foreign contacts, with much of its leadership based in Mecca. The group has received considerable financial support from Arab countries, particularly from Syria and Libya, and has had training camps in Syria (International Crisis Group 2005: 8).

As unrest continued, other ephemeral groups emerged, conducting some operations but quickly fading. Even the major three groups began fracturing by the 1980s. As the groups split apart, factions adopted new names, but most of these small groups had limited impact. The PULO likely retained the largest number of fighters, albeit very reduced in numbers. Perhaps the key point, however, is that the hard core insurgents were not eliminated, leaving a cadre for future activities.

After the splits in the insurgent groups, several new or reorganized groups emerged as the principal players in the insurgency. Most of these new groups consisted of both younger and more militant members. Both PULO and a splinter group calling itself New PULO have continued their activities. A splinter group of the BRN, the BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C), launched its own operations. A youth group, the Permuda – with reported links to the BRN-C – has provided many of the insurgents. Another group, the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) has emerged, with its ideology based much more on Islamic terms. In the last few years, the various militant groups have formed a coalition known as Bersatu (Unity), also known as the United Front for the Independence of Pattani. Just how well this umbrella group has actually coordinated activities is however subject to considerable question.

Although sporadic violence continued for many years, a major upsurge in unrest began in Thailand’s southern provinces in 2001. According to Thai Ministry of Interior statistics, insurgent attacks numbered 50 in 2001, 75 in 2002, 119 in 2003 and over 1,000 in 2004 (International Crisis Group, 16). In January 2004, insurgents raided an army depot in Narathiwat, stealing about 300 weapons and killing four soldiers. Simultaneously, arson attacks hit 18 government schools. Shortly after, a wave of operations was conducted against local police stations. Since then, a series of attacks have been conducted against police, Buddhist monks, teachers and government officials. Over 1,500 people have been killed in the region since January 2004. Most attacks have occurred in the three southern provinces, but a few bombings have been conducted outside the region.

Several patterns have marked the insurgency. Attacks generally have been well coordinated and, in many ways, the insurgents have maintained the initiative. Targets have included government offices, police stations and homes of government and police officials. Government-sponsored schools and school teachers have been a particular focus for insurgent attacks. Many of the attacks have come in waves. For instance, in June 2006, about 70 small bombs were detonated over a three-day period in a widely dispersed area; likewise, in early August, about 130 targets were hit in only a few days. Attacks dropped in 2007–8, but began intensifying again in 2009 (International Crisis Group 2009: 2).
According to Thai government analysis of captured insurgent documents, the insurgent groups are pursuing a seven-step strategy. The first step is propaganda and agitation; second is infiltration of mass organizations; third is establishment of a united front, with the intention of having 30,000 supporters, 3,000 armed militants and 300 ‘commandos’. Succeeding steps are recruitment and organization, indoctrination and training, preparation and ‘revolution’ (Thailand Interior Ministry, cited in Lumbaca 2005: 26–7). It should be noted that these steps are very similar to virtually all insurgent movements.

One interesting development in the most recent unrest is that the ethnic–religious component of the Thai Muslim unrest may have developed a more religious underpinning. After an insurgent attack in 2004, a manual titled *Berjihad di Pattani* was found on the bodies of several insurgent casualties. This document, using Islamic terminology, calls for the liberation of the south as an independent kingdom from ‘colonialists’ (Liow 2006: 100–3). Government of the new polity would come from the traditional Malay rulers. The document also directs that ‘hypocritical’ Muslims should be attacked along with Thai security forces. Significantly, it does not mention global sufferings of the Muslim community (the *umma*) or the creation of a regional caliphate; instead, it focuses solely on local issues, albeit in more intensified religious terms.

This ideological emphasis on religious issues has been reflected in operational patterns in some insurgent operations. The combination of Sufi-style Islam and folk religious beliefs was apparent in the preparations for attacks in April 2004:

[The leader] claimed to have supernatural powers that would help them fight. He taught ... recruits from his village how to perform *zikir* (recitation of the name of Allah) and special prayers over and over – as many as 70,000 times a day for 40 days – in order to become invisible at will and be impervious to bullets and knives. He gave recruits in Songkhla sacred water to make them invisible. Some members travelled ... to Malaysia, to visit Ayoh, the Kelantanese they referred to as ‘the master’, to receive special blessings, for which some paid 450 baht.

(*International Crisis Group* 2005: 22)

Probably as a result of the increasing religious content of the insurgency, Buddhists living in the south increasingly have become targets of the insurgents. There have been a number of public beheadings of Buddhists, particularly monks, and at least 34,500 persons, mostly Buddhist, had fled the area by mid 2005 (Montlake, 2005, online). Overall, however, it appears that in fact more Muslims have been killed by the insurgents for ‘collaboration’ than have Buddhists.

The actual number of insurgents remains somewhat uncertain. One assessment suggested that there are an estimated 1,000 insurgents, who control some 247 villages (Abuza, 2007, online). A more official estimate from a Thai police official suggests that the numbers are closer to 3,000 insurgents active in some 500 towns (Shinworakomoi, 2006, online). One feature of the most recent incarnation of the insurgency has been the significant role that the ponohs (Islamic schools) have played in the movement; many of these schools have been centres for recruitment and leadership of the various insurgent groups.

At least one senior Thai officer has argued that support for the insurgency follows a typical pattern: 10 per cent of the local population supports the use of violence to achieve the separatist goal; 10 per cent oppose the use of violence; and 80 per cent are ready ‘to support the side that is able to protect their lives and property, so they can live and work peacefully’ (Not-for-attribution briefing by a senior Thai Special Forces officer, 2005). General Kitt Rattanachaya, a government security adviser expressed similar realistic sentiments: ‘People will always be
[siding] with those who have power. If we are stronger, they will be with us. If [the insurgents] are stronger, people will be with them’ (Thammasathien, BBC, 8 January 2004).

Although the high-water mark for insurgent operations seems to have been in the mid 2000s, with operations waning since then, the insurgency appears far from over. The various insurgent groups continue to be rather disorganized and unlikely to threaten the existence of the larger Thai state, but at the same time the Thai security forces appear unable to completely end the insurgency. Greater political, social and economic efforts in the south would help remove at least some of the underlying local grievances, and the Thai military appears well aware of this crucial component. Given the larger ongoing political problems within Thailand, it remains unlikely that the Thai government will be capable of focusing enough attention to the south to stop the insurgency environment from continuing to exist.

Philippines

The Philippines has faced two very different strands of insurgent movements. The first, and seemingly viewed by the Philippines government for many years as being by far the most significant, has been the New People’s Army (NPA). The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, began operations in 1969. The NPA, together with some 13 smaller armed Communist groups, is part of the New Democratic Front. Several key leaders, including Jose Maria Sison, the chairman of the CPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, live in exile in the Netherlands. There have been repeated splits within the leadership, with the Philippines government claiming the latest split – reportedly based on whether to continue a Maoist armed strategy or to shift to a political strategy – began in January 2010. Earlier splits, to include a number of mass executions of those suspected of being collaborators, reportedly occurred in 1982–8 and again in the 1990s.

The NPA now probably has about 9,000 to 10,000 members, down significantly from its peak strength of about 25,000 in the 1980s. Although it has conducted some urban operations, it generally has focused its main efforts in rural areas of Luzon, Visayas, and parts of northern and eastern Mindanao. The group conducted some major operations from its inception and represented a significant threat to stability for a considerable period. Some 40,000 have been killed in the fighting since 1969. In the last few years, although fighting has continued (with about 200 soldiers and guerrillas killed in 2008), the level has decreased significantly. Despite frequent abortive ceasefire talks and frequent governmental claims of ‘victory’ against the NPA, there seem to be few prospects of completely eliminating the group’s activities. Unless the NPA self-destructs, continued operations are likely to remain at least on low levels, with occasional upsurges of violence.

The second strand of insurgency in the Philippines has been the various groups under the rubric of the Moros, i.e. Filipino Muslims. The Moro insurgency has involved a varying mix of ethnically and religiously based organization and ideology. The relative appeal of the ethnic and religious components of the insurgency appears to have shifted over time. Although the religious bases of the insurgency have been significant throughout the conflict, the saliency of religious factors as distinct from ethnicity seems to have increased in recent years.

Given that Muslim Filipinos are a distinct minority of the overall Filipino population, comprising only about 4 to 5 per cent of the population, they have only limited chances for a nationwide movement. Muslims are, however, concentrated in the southern Philippines, providing a potential critical mass for concerted political activity. Filipino Muslims have had a number of legitimate grievances. Government land reform policies frequently have provided land to Christians at the expense of Muslims, whose land tenure system has been informal. Filipino Muslims
generally have a lower per capita income than that of Christians, and the majority of the more lucrative jobs in the Mindanao economy typically have gone to Christians (Che Man 1990). Historically Christians have viewed the Muslim community as ‘uncivilized’ and as needing outside assistance in becoming ‘true’ Filipinos. Although Muslims in the Philippines have had a distinct identity for several hundred years, a sense of ‘nationhood’ became more prominent after the Second World War. The first significant post-war Islamic secessionist group was the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), launched in 1968. Although the MIM never was of particular significance, it did serve as a training ground for leaders and members of larger movements.

The most significant figure to emerge from the MIM was Nur Misuari. A teacher of political science at the University of the Philippines, in 1969 he and other secularly educated Muslims founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with Misuari as Chairman. Beyond the overall Moro independence movement, the environment has been greatly complicated by localized political feuds. In many cases, severe political violence has had less to do with any particular liberation or insurgent movements, but instead has been local. Politicians have used armed gangs – such as the Barracuda and Blackshirts by an Islamic congressman, and the Rats by a Christian provincial governor – to settle political conflicts (Mercado 1984: 157). One aspect of this local political violence has been to further poison the environment between Muslims and Christians. According to The Economist (20 February 2010), there have been few if any improvements in this situation, with one politician’s militia in the province of Maguindanao massacring 58 civilians in November 2009.

On 24 October 1972, a group of several hundred guerrillas, based on a loose temporary alliance, attacked a Philippine constabulary station and seized the campus of the Mindanao State University. This attack reportedly caught the MNLF leadership by surprise (Mercado 1984: 161). The guerrillas were driven out of the city in about 24 hours, but unrest spread rapidly throughout the area. This attack was followed by a massive deployment of Philippine army troops to the Moro areas, and marked the beginning of the armed campaign.

After the resulting martial law declaration, the various Philippine Islamist groups sought and received support from other Islamic countries. They received particular support from Libya, and the MNLF moved its political headquarters to Tripoli, Libya. Leaders both of the MNLF’s political and military wings tended to be young and college educated, although some traditional elites also belonged to the MNLF, primarily in the political wing.

The NPA, although originating in Luzon, also was very active in Mindanao. The MNLF as an organization kept a considerable distance between itself and the NPA. Misuari in fact was quoted as stating that he would be willing to join forces with the Philippine military against the NPA if the Communists posed a significant threat (Chapman 1988: 238). At the same time, however, there were some tactical alliances between the NPA and some Moro commanders.

Early operations of the Moro guerrillas were marked by their seizing towns or rural areas and attempting to hold the areas against government counter-attacks. Needless to say, such a strategy – given the military’s preponderance of heavy weaponry and equipment – resulted in a heavy toll of guerrilla casualties. After a series of such disasters, the insurgents adopted more ‘conventional’ unconventional tactics of hit-and-run operations and ambushes. These tactics proved much more successful, and the Philippine security forces began ceding large areas of Mindanao to de facto insurgent control.

The first phase of the insurgency from 1972 to 1975 was very bloody, with estimates of about 60,000 soldiers, insurgents and civilians killed. This phase was ended by the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 in which a ceasefire was declared and the establishment of an Autonomous Regional Government in 13 provinces of Mindanao and Sulu. Although the first phase of the insurgency was under putative MNLF leadership, its actual control must be viewed with some scepticism.
The group’s political wing was located in Libya, with the geographical separation between the politicians and the fighters continuing to present difficulties. Moreover, many of the guerrillas appeared to have only tenuous loyalty to the MNLF as an organization, with some clearly more interested in fighting for relatively local issues (McKenna 1998: 183–5).

The MNLF and succeeding insurgent groups have suffered from a steady stream of surrenders and defections to the government, frequently ‘in bulk’, as when in 1978 the MNLF Vice-Chairman and all his followers surrendered to the government. In many cases, the defections seemed more a result of economic than ideological reasons, with important defectors receiving large cash payments, special export licenses, or even government positions. In many cases, though, although putatively returning to the government fold, defectors remained relatively independent of any realistic government control and became local power brokers.

The MNLF has been marked by continual splits and dissent, particularly after the collapse of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Three major factions emerged: the Misuari ‘mainstream’ MNLF and the MNLF Reformist Group led by Dimas Pundato. The third major faction was led by Hashim Salamat (a former vice-chairman of the MNLF), who in 1977 left with a group of his followers to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), formally established in March 1984.

The MILF’s publicly expressed ideology has been much more religiously based than that of the MNLF. Although also calling for Moro independence, the group called for the imposition of Sharia law in the proposed state. Clerics have been much more prominent among the leadership of the MILF than in the MNLF; the MILF also has had a significant presence of traditional aristocrats. The MILF also has demonstrated stronger links with foreign groups, training a number of members of other regional groups in its camps (Abuza 2005: 453–70).

Strength estimates of the MILF have varied widely. The Philippine government has used figures of 8,000; Western estimates normally are in the 40,000 range; the MILF itself claims 120,000 troops. Beyond the normal propaganda games played with such estimates, much of the disparity can be ascribed to the MILF’s system of troop mobilization. MILF military forces are organized into six divisions, but most soldiers are only part-time. Each brigade within the individual division has one full-time battalion with about 600 soldiers, with another battalion on active service for a month on a rotational basis. According to MILF sources, the training of their forces is very professional, with soldiers receiving three months of full-time training and officers one year of training (Tiglao 1996: 28).

The MNLF has largely disappeared as a cohesive organized group. In 1986, the Philippines government and leaders of the MNLF reached an agreement in which the government ceded considerable autonomy to the provinces in which the MNLF was strongest, and the MNLF agreed to enter the ‘normal’ Filipino political process. This process was eased by many MNLF leaders and members being given various economic incentives and appointments to potentially lucrative political positions. The MILF, however, has continued its opposition despite on-again, off-again peace talks. Nevertheless, fighting between the government and the MILF has dropped significantly, with only sporadic fighting. The MILF reportedly controls about 10 per cent of Mindanao. Even in ‘government-controlled’ areas, the MILF is said to have an influential shadow government.

Another splinter group of the MNLF is the Abu Sayyaf Group, which probably has received more foreign attention than any of the other organizations. Although a significant group in terms of its terrorist activities, it has exhibited limited popular support and some of its cells may have degenerated more into warlord or criminal groups than a political movement. Its primary significance may lie more in its continued role as an additional security stressor in the southern Philippines and the possibility that its members could serve as the possible nucleus for yet newer insurgent movements.
Burma

Some ethnic opposition movements have been struggling against the Burmese regimes for 60 years. Although the level of armed operations against the government has decreased significantly from its peak, these ethnic movements remain a significant factor in the internal stability of Myanmar. Beyond the ethnic conflicts – and for a considerable period, more significant – the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) launched a major insurgency in 1948 that lasted until 1989. Since 1988, with the seizure of power by military officers as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed in 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the levels of ethnic insurgent activities have increased.

As of 2006, there were at least 41 armed ethnic groups in Burma (Smith 1999: 308). Although some efforts have been made to unify these ethnic movements – and to forge alliances with various pro-democracy activists – these efforts generally have had little impact. Over a third of these groups were splinters of other organizations, and most have only a handful of armed troops. Only the Karen National Union, the Karen National Progressive Party, Shan State Army-South, Chin National Front and National Socialist Council of Nagaland maintain armed forces of several hundred troops or more (Smith 1999: 296). Of these 41 groups, roughly two-thirds have reached some form of ceasefire with the government. There are some ten groups still formally in armed opposition to the government. The three major non-ceasefire armed groups are the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) operating as part of the KNU, and the Karenni Army. In many ways, the KNU remains the most important of the ethnic opposition groups in terms of its overall political impact, both within Myanmar and within the region.

According to a Western source with extensive experience in working with Burmese ethnic groups, all ethnic resistance organizations suffer from the following in varying degrees:

- no stable forms of revenue/tax basis;
- no retirement system, a fact that keeps elders in power past their prime;
- deference to elders, no matter how poorly they lead;
- leaders do not rely on staffs the way we do in developing courses of action – leaders tend to do all the work themselves;
- they also are often quintuple-hatted, being members of various coalitions or consortia. This keeps them in endless meetings;
- disempowerment by Western NGOs who generally bypass ethnic governments in order to empower the people at lowest levels;
- no professionalization of ethnic governments;
- little appreciation of what strategy is;
- tendency to focus on near-term survival;
- no unifying strategy;
- no apparent leader development within ethnic governments;
- no stable or coherent Western support other than through niche interest groups and faith-based donors;
- vulnerable leadership in exile (discussions and email follow-up with source requesting anonymity).

The most consistent observation of reporters and analysts who have visited ethnic groups within Burma and Burmese refugees in the region is that of war weariness. This is hardly surprising. Most ethnic opposition groups are now in their third or fourth generation of resistance. Insurgencies typically have a ‘shelf life’, and 60 years represents an extraordinarily long time.
Maintaining motivation among fighters and supporters likely is becoming increasingly difficult for the movements’ leaders.

The insurgent groups essentially are operating on the strategic defensive. In almost all cases, their remaining strategic goals seem to centre around protecting what civilians they can. Sanctuaries generally have shrunk in size and few if any fixed bases remain within Myanmar. The various ethnic groups remain very subject to splits and unilateral ceasefires among their members.

The Burmese government, however, is far from having achieved any sort of outright victory. Despite the reduction of areas controlled by the non-ceasefire groups, they still retain areas in which the army has difficulty operating. Borders remain porous even if neighbouring governments are more prone to cooperate with the Burmese regime. Regional refugee camps remain a good source of recruits and support for the insurgent groups. The army’s extreme brutality also continues to drive many to support the insurgents.

The regime’s political strategy of ceasefire negotiations with the various groups and their breakaway factions does not represent an unalloyed success for the government. Although certainly reducing the level of violence directed against the government, few of the ceasefire groups have actively supported the SPDC. Most remain as quasi-independent power centres with very mixed allegiances. If pushed too hard by the military government, they easily can slip back into active opposition. Longer term, several of these groups could convert into full-scale warlord armies (which already seems to be occurring with at least two groups).

Two other factors will play a role in future developments within Myanmar. The first are the internal dynamics within the military regime. Internal dynamics within the junta remain opaque, but there have been some clear differences among its members in the past. Although even the purported moderates are almost certainly not ever going to make significant concessions to either the ethnic groups or pro-democracy groups, they may be more prone to reach further negotiated agreements.

The second factor involves the SPDC’s proposed plans for some form of elections in 2010, which already are having an impact on the various opposition groups. The regime reportedly has ordered all ethnic groups, whether or not in a formal ceasefire, to form approved political parties to contest the elections. The apparent goal is to remove the military leadership of the opposition groups and to have them replaced by purely political figures. Given the history of factional struggles within the various ethnic insurgent groups, such efforts may well bear fruit for the current regime. As mentioned, there is considerable weariness after 60 years of struggle, and a significant number of ethnic group members may view some form – however limited – of political representation to be preferable to seemingly endless conflict and suffering.

Overall, the most probable situation in the near term is continued strategic stasis. As long as the military retains control of what it views as the core areas of Myanmar, it probably will continue its current strategies and tactics. The junta generally can meet its major interests, including reasonable economic enrichment, by simply maintaining its current policies. At the same time, the existing insurgent groups are unlikely to regain the initiative and must focus simply on maintaining their existence and some ability to protect at least part of their population. The ethnic resistance – factionalized, with continued ceasefires that come and go as the situation changes – and the Burmese army’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign are almost certain to continue to be a running sore for the region.

**Patterns among the countries**

Several similarities exist among all three countries. The first is the very complex security environment in the areas of active insurgency. Each has been marked by a long history of banditry,
varying levels of warlordism, and overall lack of effective governmental control. Also, each country’s government has faced significant levels of corruption creating public distrust among significant segments of the population. In the cases both of Burma and the Philippines, the insurgencies have been active for decades. Although the formal insurgency has not lasted as long in Thailand, lower levels of unrest have existed for as long. Finally, each faces multiple insurgent groups, with various goals and distinct identities. Again, Thailand has somewhat a lesser problem with this issue in terms of significantly different ideologies, but must face a number of separate groups in the south. The splits among the insurgent groups in all three countries means that each group is individually weaker than if a unified movement were in place, but the divisions also make it much more difficult for the governments to devise a straightforward unitary political and military strategy, much less a single negotiating strategy.

The Philippines presents the clearest picture of one other aspect of insurgencies. Even as governments succeed in negotiations with some of the more moderate elements of insurgent movements, ‘true believers’ may split to continue the struggle. Although the new groups will be smaller, they probably will be more radical and less willing to compromise their objectives. As such, they may be even more dangerous to the population than the more broadly-based groups. Even if such radicalized groups are controlled, a significant number of insurgents may prove to be incapable of returning to a ‘normal’ life and to continue as members of criminal or warlord groups. This of course particularly is the case where governments are unwilling or incapable of conducting legitimate reconciliation programmes, which would seem to apply to a greater or lesser extent to all three countries. While some progress may be made through negotiations and more effective counterinsurgency operations, there is little reason to be sanguine about the restoration of governmental control in the affected areas or the end of armed unrest.

**Recommended readings and references**


Insurgency in Southeast Asia


Moro Islamic Liberation Front Website, at www.luwaran.com.


The South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/burmese_refugee.htm.

