


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Metin Heper, Sabri Sayar

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Ali L. Karaosmanolu

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

One of the major problems of Turkey's democratic consolidation has been the heavy impact of the armed forces on civilian politics. Since the country's transition to a multiparty system in the mid-1940s, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have complicated democratic processes by their outright interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980; by forcing the government to resign in 1997; and by restricting the authority of civilian governments. Moreover, there have been a number of coup plans and attempts that were aborted thanks to the vigilance of the higher echelons of the military hierarchy.

Civil-military relations became an international issue with Turkey's candidacy to the European Union (EU). Despite ups and downs, Turkey has so far made considerable progress in building new and democratic civil-military relations. From 2002 to 2006, in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU, the parliament revised the Constitution several times and adopted new legislation curbing the prerogatives of the military in political matters.

These reforms increased the power of the parliament and the Court of Audit to oversee and control all military resources and spending, including state property in possession of the TAF. The auditing process, however, still requires enabling legislation. The civilian membership of the National Security Council was increased, its secretariat was civilianized, and its power was reduced to the level of a purely advisory body. The State Security Courts were abolished. The jurisdiction of the military courts to try civilians in time of peace was abrogated and military personnel were henceforth to be tried by civilian courts. Moreover, military representatives were withdrawn from the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) and Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK). The major EU organs recognized that Turkey had sufficiently (although not fully) fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria to start accession talks. The subsequent "Progress Reports," after acknowledging Turkey's progress, emphasized the need for greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs in line with the European practice (n.a., 2006: 7–8).

Although these reforms brought Turkey's civil-military relations more into line with democratic norms and practices, it is too soon to say that the military has completely withdrawn from politics. No change was made to the TAF Internal Service Law, which authorizes the military to intervene *ex officio* if it deems this necessary for the protection of the regime. The TAF has yet to internalize democratic norms and values in their relationship with elected politicians.

Turkey still is in the middle of an ongoing process of democratic consolidation. There is not yet an established constitutional, democratic civil–military regime in the country. This chapter, therefore, will only trace the course of a trend—the outcome of which is yet to be determined—toward further democracy, with its paradoxes and dilemmas. The next section will examine the historical and cultural origins of a peculiar tradition of military guardianship and civil–military collaboration; the following section will survey the conduct of civil–military relations under the Republic, including the period of military interventions and failed coup attempts, and temporary cooperative regimes based on precarious civilian democratic control. The final section is devoted to the period of transformation in the first decade of the twenty-first century, which reveals a deeper sociopolitical movement toward a democratic regime of civil–military relations.

The historical and cultural origins of the military guardianship

The Ottoman modernization generated two ostensibly contradictory traditions, which were inherited by the Republic: the military guardianship and the interpenetration of “traditional” forces and modernity. The origins of the guardianship ethos can be traced back to the second half of the eighteenth century, when the Ottomans recognized European military superiority and the urgent necessity of reforming their armed forces and public administration. The three generations of the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the leaders of the Tanzimat, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, shared a consistent policy of “state preservation,” which gradually became a state ideology and continued to affect the thinking of the Republican elites of consecutive generations (Mardin, 2006: 192).

The military and political thought during the years of modernization was first influenced by a unidimensional reading of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The early intellectual encounters with the West occurred in the eighteenth century and were reflected in the ambassadorial reports of the Ottoman envoys. Another window on the West was opened by a number of European converts who served the Porte as soldiers. They introduced to the Ottoman military establishment European military techniques, education, and organizational reform. These initial innovations led in 1792 to the creation of the “New Order” or *Nizam-i Cedid*, the modern military units of Sultan Selim III. In 1826 Sultan Mahmut II abolished the traditional elite army, the Janissary corps.

The European innovators were products of the French Enlightenment, who believed that the state and society, including the military, should be reorganized according to rational norms. The Ottoman reformers took their cues from the innovations introduced by the French Enlightenment and the simplistic sociopolitical implications of a crude rationalism that ignored the philosophical debate between the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and that of the Counter-Enlightenment of the nineteenth century. This unidimensional conception of rationalism became a dominant intellectual movement, permeating military education and the civilian administrative and judicial cadres (Karaosmanoğlu, 1993: 21–24).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, this intellectual movement was blended with an equally simplistic materialist and positivist philosophy. The Young Turks’ mindset was shaped predominantly by materialist–positivist ideas. They viewed materialism “as the driving force behind the material progress of the West” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 185). Consequently, they considered religion “as the greatest obstacle to human progress” (Hanioğlu, 2001: 305). Despite their antireligious sentiment, the Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) from time to time used religion to legitimize modernization by collaborating with the

ulema and other religious circles (Hanioğlu, 2008: 305–6). Another source of inspiration was German militarism. The influence of German military instructors such as Colmar von der Goltz Pasha, who taught in the modern Hamidian military schools where many of the Young Turks and future members of the CUP were educated, was considerable. Their *weltanschauung* was formed by nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism (Akmeşe, 2005: 21–22). *The Nation in Arms*, von der Goltz's book, was translated into Turkish in 1885 and read as a textbook in the War College (Harbiye) (Akmeşe, 2005: 69). Another significant characteristic of the Young Turks was their elitism. Their strong elitist tendencies were largely predicated on positivist French sociology as developed by Durkheim, Comte, de Tarde, and, particularly, the vulgarized versions of their ideas published by Gustave Le Bon (Hanioğlu, 2008: 308–9). The Young Turks did not place much faith in the people and democratic representation. Their major concern was the state, and they viewed society from the perspective of the state. In their eyes the parliament, as “an extension of the modern bureaucratic apparatus,” had to be “under the control of an enlightened governing elite” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 311). Thus, the military emerged as the prime transformer and guardian of the modern state.

Recent historical-sociological studies have brought to our attention another significant Ottoman legacy which may arguably contribute to our understanding of civil-military relations in modern Turkey. Şerif Mardin refers to “a modern Turkish Islamic exceptionalism”, the roots of which can be traced back to “the ubiquity of a peculiar mix of state and religious discourse in the Ottoman Empire” where “secular as well as religious elites shared a space provided by the state” (Mardin, 2005: 146). In their dialectical relationship, “traditional forces and modernity ... have interpenetrated and been transformed over time due to their propinquity” (Mardin, 2005: 160). Their interpenetration legitimized change and facilitated adaptation to modernity (Karpas, 2001: 420). The interpenetration of traditionalism and modernism has been reflected in the history of civil-military relations, including during the Republican period. Their political culture, which reflected a blend of traditionalism and modernism, encouraged them to come to shared understandings for the achievement of their common objective of reforming the state in order to ensure its survival. For instance, in the War of Independence against the occupying powers (1919–22), the military remained subordinated to the parliament (the Grand National Assembly) and was subject to its oversight. This democratic framework, however, faded after the War of Independence.

Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire as a result of World War I, the Republic, despite its pretensions, did not represent a total break from the intellectual and political ethos of the nineteenth century. Atatürk and his colleagues, who organized and led the resistance against the occupying powers upon the decision of the Grand National Assembly, had been educated in the modernized Hamidian schools and indoctrinated in the intellectual environment of the Young Turks. An outlook that placed supreme importance on the defense of modernity and national unity made its way into their perception of what constituted a threat. Debating laicism and cultural nationalism was viewed as a threat to internal security, particularly after the Kurdish revolt of 1925. Nevertheless, at the same time, the Republic refrained from following the Young Turk tradition in some important respects. First of all, the republicans were realists. They disliked irredentism. They limited nationalism to within the borders of the Republic, namely to Anatolia and eastern Thrace, where the majority of the population was Turkish-speaking. They rejected revisionist doctrines such as pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, but they were implacable defenders of political independence and territorial integrity. Although, like the Young Turks, they were anti-imperialists, the Western world occupied a privileged place in their minds as a prime source of reference. Their ultimate goal was to lead the nation to “contemporary civilization” and to integrate it within the Western community of nations. For

Atatürk, “contemporary civilization” was a dynamic concept that represented continual progress (Karaosmanoğlu, 2009: 35).

The Republican regime inherited secularism and positivism as necessary means not only to struggle against religious fanaticism, but also, and more significantly, to reorganize the society and the state along the lines of a new national identity. Even today, for many state officials (military and civilian) and politicians, individual liberties are to be construed according to “scientific principles.” They must not cripple the modernizing Republican project, as understood in the 1930s, because that project is “scientific” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2009: 34). It should be noted that there is today heated debate on this Turkish Republican version of secularism (laicism). Sami Selçuk, a former president of the Court of Cassation, has criticized the doctrinaire aspect of Turkish secularism. He argued that it “starts from a concern for rationality ... and aims to develop a rational individual. In the realization of this aim, it regards religion as the principal obstacle to modern society and politics” (Selçuk, 2000: 56–57).

The excessive politicization of the Ottoman army by the Young Turks (specifically, the CUP) had greatly damaged military professionalism and brought about the tragedy of the Balkan Wars. The defeat at the hands of the newly independent Balkan states had a lasting impact on Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Under the Republic, Atatürk removed the TAF from any position of “direct responsibility for government” (Hale, 1994: 88). Serving army officers were prohibited from involvement in party politics and from voting in elections. The military, however, was not kept completely out of politics. Atatürk made sure that it remained loyal to him and to the basic tenets of the Republic (Hale, 1994: 76; Mango, 2000: 417, 532). This implied that, under the Republican regime, the guardianship role of the military would effectively continue. In Huntingtonian terms, the TAF would “mirror” the republican and secular state. This was a prototypical example of “subjective control of the military” (Huntington, 1985: 80–83), different from “objective” democratic control within the framework of a separation between a “professional” military and a democratically elected government (Huntington, 1985: 83–85). Nevertheless, it can be argued that Atatürk greatly reduced the officers’ tendency toward involvement in political activities, which had been one of the causes of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse (McLaren, 2008: 218).

The dilemmas of the guardianship

On the transition to a multiparty system after World War II, opinions in the military were divided. Quite a number of officers were anxious about the risks of democratization, because they believed that it would be difficult to maintain the Republican principles, especially laicism, in a democratic polity. Another group of officers, including some generals, were in favor of a multiparty system and believed that the democratic transformation would facilitate Turkey’s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The former group of officers went so far as to approach İsmet İnönü, president of the Republic and the leader of the governing Republican People’s Party, to suggest that the newly formed Democrat Party (DP) should not be allowed to take power through the democratic and free elections that were soon to take place. President İnönü, however, strongly rebuffed their suggestion, and the latter group of officers assured the leaders of the DP that they would not allow such an unfair intervention in the elections (İpekçi and Coşar, 2010: 3–18; Hale, 1994: 91–92; McLaren, 2008: 219–20). The voting took place in May 1950, and the Democrat Party came to power with a considerable majority.

After the transition to democracy in the late 1940s, the TAF found itself trapped in a multilayered dilemma. In the post-World War II period, democracy emerged as a fundamental

dimension of modernization. The TAF gave its tacit consent to the adoption of the multiparty system. Democratization, however, brought ideological fault lines and conflicting socio-economic interests to the center stage. Moreover, what seemed more ominous was that it tended to make religion increasingly visible as a social force. The officers, confronted with this challenge, adopted an ambivalent position toward democracy. Although they tended to share the view that democratization had become an integral element of modernization, they believed that political parties must not divide the nation into conflicting groups and must act in conformity with Atatürk's secular principles. In other words, as an implication of its peculiar understanding of democracy, the military was willing to tolerate interparty conflicts "only if a guard such as itself was tasked with monitoring them" (Aydınlı *et al.*, 2006: 80–81).

On the one hand, the military desired to promote democratization because democracy was an integral part of modernization, and modernity implied civilian primacy. On the other hand, however, they refrained from acting as an agent of the civilian government because they believed that subordination to the civilians would prejudice their role of guardianship. The officers believed that they should stay out of politics because politics would undermine their professional integrity, but still intervened in politics whenever they deemed it necessary for the protection of secularism and other Republican principles. The military's unpredictable conduct complicated the civilian politicians' efforts to manage civil-military relations. This was reflected in, for instance, İsmet İnönü's treatment of the military. On many occasions, İnönü praised the TAF for their "faith in democratic values." At times when the generals tended to interfere with public affairs, however, he would warn the military to stay out of politics (Heper, 1998: 228–29).

The dilemma confronting the military was the reflection of a more fundamental dilemma and a deep uncertainty faced by the entire modernizing elite. As İlkyay Sunar has pointed out, "the dilemma involved finding a *modus vivendi* between the conflicting imperatives of republican secularist consolidation and democracy, and the possibility of failure of such an accommodation" (Sunar, 2004: 102–3).

That *problematique* had a profound impact not only on the mindset of Turkish officers, but also on the military organization as a whole. It heavily politicized the TAF. It had a divisive effect on the military establishment and seriously damaged the military's professionalism and its hierarchy. While the lower-ranking officers were often divided by bitter conflicts, the higher echelons struggled to maintain the unity and hierarchy of the army, especially after the military intervention of 1960.

This intervention, which severely violated military discipline and flouted the chain of command, opened the way for subsequent coup plans and on occasion actualized interventions. The military, however, had never intended to stay in power; they quickly handed power back to an elected civilian government after having prepared a favorable constitutional and political milieu for the continuation of their guardianship. Following the coup of 1960, the military regime executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his cabinet ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, upon the decision of a special tribunal. Nevertheless, the junta left the government to elected civilian politicians, after having drafted a constitution that was even less democratic than the constitution of 1924, particularly as regarded civil-military relations. The new constitution extended the privileges of the military and curtailed the powers of the executive and legislative branches.

In spite of occasional ruptures, there have also been periods of "concordance" (Schiff, 1995: 7–34; Narlı, 2000: 107–27) and "collegial" (Bland, 2001: 525–40) relationships between the military and the civilian government in the history of the Turkish Republic since 1960. During those interludes, civil-military relations operated within a fairly effective democratic framework. The Özal period (1983–93), and the periods of the EU reforms, from 1999 to 2002 under a

coalition government and from 2002 to 2006 under the government of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), can be mentioned as conspicuous examples.

An important development in that direction took place in the 1980s following the military coup of 12 September 1980. In 1983 the Motherland Party came to power. Its leader, Turgut Özal, had strong Islamic roots. The party, however, pursued a policy of integrating with the world economy and altered the state-controlled protectionist economic structure of the country itself. Özal, who served as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and as president between 1989 and 1993, was a firm believer in economic liberalism. He promoted entrepreneurial interests and competition in international markets. The liberalization of the economy had a positive impact on the defense industry. It also furthered cooperation between the public and private sectors. The intensification of business relations between the TAF and the private sector (both domestic and international) moderated the military's state-centric conception of internal and international politics. The new policy opened the defense industry to foreign investment and technology. Moreover, the government established the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration/Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (DIDA), the aim of which was to promote cooperation between different sectors and to encourage transfer of technology and capital to Turkey. The DIDA also administered the Defense Industry Support Fund, which generated income through indirect taxes levied on luxury imports. The fund financed the defense industry, including various joint projects. The most important such venture was the F-16 project undertaken by the newly established Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) (Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroglu, 2002: 157–59).

Turgut Özal's active interest in security and defense matters and the steps taken by him to rapidly develop the defense industry created a fairly large space of common understanding and concerted action between the democratically elected civilian government and the military. This "conciliatory relationship" with the TAF consolidated political authority and facilitated a smooth as well as rapid civilianization of the political system following the 1980 coup (Kuloğlu and Şahin, 2006: 96–97). Özal was remarkably successful in playing a determining role in security and defense policy, to the extent of imposing of his political will on the TAF in the matter of the appointment of his own candidate, General Necip Torumtay, as the chief of General Staff in 1986. In a recent interview, General İlker Başbuğ, chief of General Staff at the time (of the interview), acknowledged "with gratitude" Özal's contributions to the modernization of the TAF (Başbuğ, 2010).

Turgut Özal believed in the primacy of the civilian authority over the military and did his best to strictly apply that principle during his presidency. In the heat of the Gulf crisis in December 1990, Torumtay resigned as chief of General Staff as the result of a divergence of views between himself and Özal over what Turkish policy should be in the 1990–91 Gulf War. Torumtay, in a statement to the media, explained his resignation in the following words:

There is no conflict between the military and civilian officials. The Turkish Armed Forces commanders know very well that the civilian authority has always the final word. The army knows where it stands ... Of course, in meetings with civilian officials differences of opinion will arise. But this is only to be expected.

(n.a., 1990: 2; Torumtay 1994: 125–26)

Resolving the dilemmas

After the death of President Özal in 1993, the military resumed its guardianship role and forced a democratically elected government to resign in 1997. Subsequently, another notable period of

civil-military reconciliation on a democratic basis occurred under the coalition and the JDP governments, which introduced a series of reforms curtailing powers and privileges of the military. These reforms were realized in tacit agreement with the military. Although the founders of the JDP have strong Islamist origins, they have followed in the footsteps of Özal and have, to a considerable extent, abandoned religious militancy and adopted a position in harmony with the world economic system and the EU.

Moreover, the JDP government has shown a great interest in pursuing an active policy not only in neighboring regions but also in NATO and in multilateral peace operations in countries as distant as Afghanistan. Participation in such operations has greatly contributed to the transformation of the Turkish military in line with emerging conceptualizations that take into account the human and societal dimensions of security (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006: 472–88).

In the twenty-first century the military has become more careful not to involve itself in politics in too palpable a manner. The armed forces have seemed to develop a *modus vivendi* with civilian governments (Heper and Itzkowitz-Shiffrinson, 2005: 244). There are several reasons for this trend. First, in the contemporary era, democracy, which implies civilian primacy and the military's subordination to a democratically elected civilian government, cannot be disintegrated from modernization. As the "agent of modernization," the military has been increasingly mindful of this historical development since the end of World War II. Second, the military is aware of the fact that its involvement in politics undermines the professionalism of its officer corps. Third, there is growing pressure for further democratization from public opinion. Political statements by the chief of General Staff and the force commanders spark heated debates in the media. Many columnists and academics severely criticize such statements as unjustifiable interference in civilian politics.

The TAF supported Turkey's bid for EU membership, constitutional and political reforms, and the radical change in Turkish policy concerning Cyprus. In June 2006 then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül acknowledged that the armed forces had made valuable contributions to Turkey's EU objectives and the related reforms. He said, "The reforms would be much more difficult without the support of the military. They understand where Turkey's interests lie. They have a long-term strategic vision ... The change in Turkey's Cyprus policy became possible thanks to their active contributions. We have been in continual contact with them" (Yetkin, 2006: 6).

Although these reforms and the public's demands for further democratization brought Turkey more into line with democratic norms and practices, occasional public declarations by military leaders in 2006 and 2007 demonstrated the continuing involvement of the armed forces in politics. On 27 April 2007 the military's effort to influence the outcome of the referendum on the presidential election through an "e-memorandum" was a blatant example of this. That "memorandum" (n.a., 2007c: 7) proved ineffectual, however, with the JDP winning a landslide victory in July 2007.

Nevertheless, even before that date, following Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's confidential meeting with Chief of Staff General Yaşar Büyükyanıt in the Dolmabahçe Palace on 4 May 2007, the military had begun to gradually adopt a position of standing off from public affairs. The new pattern of civil-military relations was marked by close and effective collaboration between the civilian government and the military concerning the Kurdish problem in general and the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in particular. The air and land forces undertook 15 cross-border operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq in 2007–08. Before the launching of the operations, the government worked hard to prepare a favorable political and diplomatic environment in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. At that

time, the prime minister and the chief of General Staff began meeting almost weekly in both official and unofficial meetings to discuss and evaluate the operations and other security problems. In addition, “summit meetings” of the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the chief of the General Staff, joined on occasion by other members of the top echelons of the state, took place at times of political crisis. A declaration from one of these summits in early June 2007 emphasized that the fight against terrorism would be carried out “on the basis of democracy and rule of law,” and also stated that “full harmony and coordination” existed between the government and the armed forces (n.a., 2007b: 6). This collegial relationship not only created a window of opportunity for further democratization, but also highlighted the importance of the strategic interaction between politics and military operations. Furthermore, it brought to the forefront the inescapable political dimension of counterterrorism and the Kurdish problem.

Two factors motivated civil-military collaboration in this instance. Before and during the operations, the need to maintain national solidarity became and remained an issue of high priority. The military wanted to avoid any steps that would split the nation. Second, and probably more significantly, a change of approach to the struggle against the PKK had occurred. The internationalization, to some degree, of the PKK issue and the Kurdish problem on the one hand, and the convergence of this with the complex warfare—involving a multiplicity of warring parties, states, and non-state entities—in Iraq on the other aggregated diverse security challenges emanating both from inside and outside Turkey’s borders. This development made the political and other nonmilitary dimensions of the problem increasingly visible. Moreover, the revival of the PKK despite successful military operations in the 1990s confirmed the need to subordinate military operations to a new, comprehensive understanding integrating military and political efforts, including economic, diplomatic, sociopsychological, and public relations measures (Başbuğ, 2009: 30–32). Such an approach would naturally require close collaboration between the military and the civilian government.

The revelation of numerous plots and coup plans, beginning in 2003, was another significant development in civil-military relations. The General Staff opened military premises, including a location in Ankara where top secret documents were kept, to public prosecutors, judges, and the police, enabling them to proceed with their investigations and detain suspects. The former chief of General Staff, General Işık Koşaner, who resigned from office in protest over the growing number of officers in jail and the long detention periods, informed the public that there were in prison 250 general, admirals, and other officers. Of these, 173 were on active duty and 77 were retired. Another 14 generals and admirals and 58 colonels were under investigation and facing detention (n.a., 2011). The High Criminal Courts deemed most of the indictments sufficient to hear the cases.

Conclusion

The Turkish Republic inherited a tradition of military guardianship from the Ottoman Empire. Under the Republic, there have occurred periods of collegial relationship, in which the initiative as well as the last word belonged to the civilian political authority. In other words, the civilian politicians and the military were not always at loggerheads. Yet, on the whole, military guardianship has been a characteristic of the Republic. This is, however, changing in the twenty-first century. Since Turkey is rapidly integrating into a globalizing world, and is already a member of NATO and OSCE, as well as a candidate for EU membership, it is not possible for political and cultural interaction to take place solely at the domestic level. Involvement of external actors is inevitable, enlarging the context in which the dialogic process is occurring. The contemporary

international context, interpenetrating with the internal one, discourages overt military intervention in politics and promotes civilian democratic control of the military.

The repeated flare-ups of the PKK's terrorist activities and the continuation of the Kurdish problem despite successful military operations indicated that military measures had to be reconsidered within the broader framework of a comprehensive strategy integrating military and political (i.e., all nonmilitary) efforts. As noted above, such a strategy would require the military and the democratically elected civilian government to work closely together. Moreover, the internationalization of the Kurdish question focused attention on the legitimacy of internal decision-making procedures and practices. This also motivated the involvement of the political leadership and engaged the military in a collegial relationship with the government.

The political power of the military has been significantly reduced by both internal and international developments, with civil-military relations in Turkey clearly tending in the direction of more civilian political initiative and less military influence over civilian politics. A consensus among the political parties and the military on setting a more democratic balance between secularism and religion, and between solving the Kurdish question and preserving the unitary state will certainly accelerate the process toward greater civilian control of the military. Although a considerable degree of democratization has been achieved in this regard, Turkey still lags behind Western democratic standards.

On 18 August 2008 the government released a national program regarding EU accession, which provided for significant additional reform in Turkey's civil-military relations. The new program increased the power of the Court of Audit to control all military spending. In addition, the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians and over military officials involved in civilian affairs would be restricted, while the jurisdiction of civilian courts would be extended. Furthermore, internal security services such as the gendarmerie were to be put under complete civilian control (n.a., 2008: 1, 17). Although the judiciary and the internal security services were reformed according to the national program of 2008 without delay, the by-law concerning the Court of Audit came into force only in 2011. Nevertheless, the government and the Republican People's Party (the main opposition) have expressed their intention that democratic reforms should continue during the process of preparing a new and more democratic constitution in 2012.

The EU has played a key role in facilitating and expediting the reform process in Turkey by opening effective new channels of intercultural dialogue, as could be observed during the period from 2002 to 2006. Taken together, the EU-related reforms, the debate in the media on civil-military relations, and the trials of high-ranking officers in civilian courts signify—despite the occasional political declarations of the General Staff and its reflexive moves to defend what it regards as its professional honor—not only an institutional and structural change, but also the transformation of Turkey's politico-military culture.

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