


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.93

On: 23 Oct 2018

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars

Edward Newman, Karl DeRouen

How Civil Wars End (and Recur)

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203105962.ch28>

Joakim Kreutz

Published online on: 18 Feb 2014

How to cite :- Joakim Kreutz. 18 Feb 2014, *How Civil Wars End (and Recur)* from: Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars Routledge

Accessed on: 23 Oct 2018

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203105962.ch28>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

PART V

Termination and resolution of civil wars

This page intentionally left blank

28

HOW CIVIL WARS END (AND RECUR)

Joakim Kreutz

Scholarship on how civil wars terminate and recur is remarkably diverse. In part, this is because of a difficulty of separating the end of conflict from what can be termed ‘post-conflict violence’ but the literature has also often chosen to approach this issue by focusing on specific sub-topics rather than accounting for all civil wars. We therefore know more about the difficulties of peace-making in a few, high-profile, cases like Palestine than countries which have witnessed a more consistent start-and-resume pattern of civil war activity such as Burma, Colombia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There has also been much attention given to the benefits and challenges of state partition as an outcome of conflict, even though there have only been eight instances where the end of civil war has been followed by independence for the rebel side.¹ Similarly, we know a great deal more about why peace settlements succeed or fail even though this sub-category constitutes less than 14 per cent of conflict terminations since the end of the Second World War.

This chapter will review existing theoretical and empirical literature on civil war termination and risks of recurrence. Given the limited space available here, this review will not be exhaustive and it will focus specifically on the findings from comparative studies even though it incorporates information from selected illustrative cases. This means that the chapter does not go into detail regarding how international relations can exacerbate civil war tensions through foreign intervention or by creating or supporting de facto proxy forces (Salehyan 2009; Peic and Reiter 2011). Moreover, it does not cover the literature that focuses on the role of post-conflict justice and reconciliation (Lederach 1997), nor the detailed challenges of implementing security sector reform and the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in society (Knight and Özerdem 2004).

The chapter will begin with a discussion about the difficult task of identifying when a civil war has ended and the limitations that are inherent in almost any existing definition. This is followed by a brief overview of the main known empirical facts with respect to the characteristics of the situations when civil war violence ceases for some time. The chapter then turns to a more detailed coverage of a series of broad themes covering the different theories that have been proffered as explanations for why civil wars recur, with a particular focus on why post-conflict societies are more at risk for resumed violence than a new conflict starting in a country without a legacy of warfare. This empirical finding, generally termed the *conflict trap*, is particularly pertinent in the aftermath of long-running civil wars and during the first, fragile, years of peace.

The next section discusses the security dilemma that former belligerents have to face at the end of civil war and how the credible commitment problem provides incentives for a resumption of violence. In addition to support from the international community, post-conflict democratization and power sharing are also considered as a means of achieving a sustainable peace. While much progress has been made with regard to identifying the challenges in post-conflict societies, the empirical evidence continues to be inconclusive. One reason for this is that the recent trend in using disaggregated empirical data for the study of the dynamic nature of conflict processes so far has not been extended to the study of conflict resolution and recurrence. As a consequence, this sub-field will benefit from additional contributions expanding the extant theoretical and empirical knowledge of why civil wars end and recur.

Identifying the end of civil war

In order to explore how civil wars end and the risk of recurrence there is first a need to clarify what we mean by civil war termination. Although this from the outset may seem a straightforward distinction, both qualitative and quantitative scholars have struggled with identifying the sufficient conditions for when society has transformed from a state of civil war to the post-conflict phase. For identifying civil war, most studies focus on the presence of a combination of organized actors, political goals and violence (Singer 1972; Gantzel 1981; Heldt 1993). Thus, an end of war should logically follow the removal or change in any of these aspects, with the quantitative literature focusing particularly on the end of observable violence between the warring sides. However, as has been highlighted by both comparative and single-case studies, the organized actors, political cleavages and use of violence exist also in the so-called post-conflict setting which at times has been used to expand the definition of the end of conflict to cover local justice or governance structures (Nordstrom 1997; Autesserre 2009; Staniland 2012a).

A disaggregation of the concept of civil war illustrates the difficulty of identifying a 'termination date'. First, civil war belligerents are usually made up of temporary coalitions of fighters, who may or may not choose to demobilize at the end of conflict. Indeed, there is a substantial degree of research dedicated to exploring internal fractionalization of civil war belligerents at the end of conflict, where the 'moderate' proponents of compromise are challenged by 'extremists' seeking to 'spoil' a peace process (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002; Pearlman 2009; Olson Lounsbury and Cook 2011). Second, there is a difference between agreeing to a political settlement of a conflict and the implementation of the settlement. As succinctly put by Walter (1999, 129):

the biggest challenge facing civil war opponents at the negotiating table is ... to design a treaty that convinces the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty's other terms.

Her paper focuses on the difficulties of implementing peace settlements, but the suggestion that the end of conflict is a drawn-out process is applicable also to other types of outcomes. For example, the communists insurgency in Malaya effectively ended as a potent threat to the government as thousands of guerrillas surrendered in 1958. However, emergency rule remained in place until July 1960, and the activities of pockets of fighters continued to constitute a sufficient threat for Thailand and Malaysia to establish joint border patrols to combat communism in 1965. Fighting escalated for a decade and a peace agreement was not signed until in December 1989 (Barber 1971; Ratanachaya 1996).

Third, violence may persist in the post-conflict society. Not only may former combatants view the lack of state control as offering opportunities for banditry or illegal taxation, there may even be an net increase in societal violence compared with during the preceding conflict (Darby 2006). In a cross-national study examining 31 countries, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 12) find that 'during the first five years following a civil war ... [homicide] is around 25% higher than normal'. Similarly, the legacy of the previous war in the form of landmines or injuries and disease may cause fatalities several years after the end of actual battles (Ghobarah *et al.* 2003).

Thus, regardless of which criteria are used to specify the end of civil war, the former warring sides may still be present, the political grievances may still not be resolved and violence may still be endemic. In this chapter, unless otherwise stated, I define civil war termination and recurrence in accordance with the UCDP-PRIO definitions, consisting of three criteria: (1) a stated incompatibility; (2) an organized group versus the government of a state; and (3) at least 25 battle-related deaths within a single calendar year. Civil wars end when an active year is followed by a year which does not fulfil these criteria (Kreutz 2010).

The ways that civil wars end

Although the difficulty of ending civil wars has been recognized for decades (see Iklé 1991), it was not until the mid-1990s that systematic investigations of the issue became common. Greatly influential was the work of Licklider (1993, 1995) who created the first dataset focusing specifically on the means of termination of civil wars using a combination of data sources. His data showed that for terminated civil wars 1945–1993, only 14 out of a total of 57 ended with a negotiated settlement, suggesting that most civil wars end with a victory. What this data failed to show, however, was both the global increase in peace settlements in the 1990s and the possibility of civil wars in ending through inconclusive ways – that is, without either a clear-cut victory or a settlement. During the Cold War (1946–1989), only 12 civil wars ended with a peace agreement and another two through a ceasefire, constituting just 8.4 and 1.4 per cent of the civil war termination total for these years. In the same time period, 82 civil wars (58.2 per cent) ended with a military victory for either side. However, for the years 1990–2005, the pattern was substantially changed. Peace agreements brought 27 civil wars to an end (18.4 per cent), with another 29 terminated through a negotiated ceasefire (19.7 per cent). While negotiated outcomes increased, the proportion of military victories decreased to 20 (13.6 per cent) (Kreutz 2010).²

Looking at the descriptive statistics above highlights another important feature of civil war termination: that conflicts do at times end through means other than victory or peace agreements. Indeed, the most common termination of civil war sees neither a decisive victory nor a negotiated settlement (Kreutz 2010; Cunningham *et al.* 2009). Similarly, Lyall and Wilson (2009) find that approximately a third of all completed (excluding ongoing) civil wars since 1945 ended in 'draws', a situation that arguably conceptually differs from both victory and a formal peace settlement. What does this 'other' category of civil war outcomes then consist of? The first and most common is simply that fighting continues but at such a low intensity that it is not picked up by civil war datasets. This is particularly common when relying on data which uses a high fatality threshold for inclusion, like the Correlates of War data, but there are also many instances where fighting may fluctuate near the 25 deaths threshold of the UCDP-PRIO data. An example of a conflict with this type of characteristic is the fighting between the Myanmar (Burma) government and the ethnic insurgents of the Karen National Union (KNU).

Figure 28.1 shows the yearly fatalities from the violent interaction between the Myanmar government and the KNU insurgent group. These go below the UCDP-PRIO threshold (the




Figure 28.1 Fatalities Myanmar–KNU, 1995–2010

grey line) of 25 on three occasions – in 1996, 1999 and 2004. At no time during this time period was the KNU routed even though they needed some time to reorganize after having been forced to abandon their headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995, but this did not make the group a spent force. Furthermore, even though there were occasional peace talks throughout the period, these culminated in 2003–2005 when the decrease of fighting correlated with an unsigned ‘gentleman’s agreement’ of a ceasefire between the KNU and the government in December 2003 (Keenan 2012). This did, of course, lead to conflict termination with the narrowest of margins as there were 24 reported deaths in 2004.

What the example shows, besides that fighting fluctuates in most civil wars, is that there may be several different reasons for parties to abstain from fighting. It may be because they are exploring what can be gained from negotiations and therefore avoid armed confrontation, it may be because they are militarily weak and need to rebuild the organization, but it can also be for completely internal reasons. When the Communist Party of India received greater electoral success than expected in 1952, they decided to renounce armed struggle providing they were granted an amnesty which led to the end of conflict. Violence against the government may also decrease as a consequence of increasing internecine power struggles over which strategy to pursue, or conflicts over rebel leadership. In some cases, such power struggles may even lead to the dissolution of a conflict actor and subsequent forming of new groups. For example, a leadership struggle in the Chadian rebel group FROLINAT led to the cessation of clashes with the government in 1970, but the competing factions emerged in 1971 as the ‘First Liberation Army’ and the ‘Second Liberation Army’ to resume civil war.

Why do civil wars recur?

The literature on civil war recurrence has identified one strong factor that influences both the likelihood of termination and the risk of recurrence – the temporal effect of war and the subsequent peace. The longer a civil war continues, the less likely it is to end. Similarly, the longer the preceding conflict was, the more likely it is to recur.

Figures 28.2 and 28.3 illustrate the relationship between the duration of the preceding conflict and the subsequent peace. Figure 28.2 is constructed using Correlates of War data and shows the number of years a *country* is in conflict and subsequent years of peace. Figures 28.3 relies on UCDP–PRIO data on conflict, which is defined using the *conflict issue* so there can be multiple conflicts within the same country. Thus, while the two figures look at different dimensions of how conflict affects post-conflict society, both show that long conflicts are rarely followed by many years of subsequent peace before recurrence. All figures include a reference line for conflicts that have been ongoing for 15 years or more, after which a long-lasting peace becomes extremely rare.

In particular, there is a similar pattern relating to the duration of conflict and subsequent peace stability. The pattern corresponds with empirical evidence that countries having experienced a previous civil war are more at risk for recurrence than the risk of onset in a society without prior conflict, creating a so-called ‘conflict trap’ (Collier *et al.* 2003; Collier *et al.* 2008). In essence, this literature argues that the same theory on opportunity costs for rebellion that explains the onset of civil war can also explain where civil wars recur. Because of the destructiveness of warfare, post-conflict countries will suffer from worse living standards; have inferior physical infrastructure, and weaker political and social institutions than countries without a preceding war. Thus, the opportunity costs for renewed rebellion will be lower in post-conflict countries because the population will be worse off, there will be fewer opportunities to pursue political goals peacefully, and the government will have limited capacity for controlling its territory. Walter (2004) draws on this literature when she argues that the ability for rebels to remobilize their former forces is the key determinant for civil war recurrence. In another iteration, Quinn *et al.* (2007; see also Mason *et al.* 2011) argue that the structural presence of ‘multiple sovereignty’ in a country is a necessary condition for the relapse of fighting.




Figure 28.2 Conflict duration and peace duration for country, using Correlates of War data v.4




Figure 28.3 Conflict duration and peace duration for country, using UCDP Conflict Termination data v.2010

This concept, originally developed by Tilly (1978) implies that the government is not the sole actor seen as a legitimate authority in a country. The implication of these arguments is that the risk of recurrence is a function of a post-conflict government's ability to foster economic growth as well as control over its territory.

Moving from the country-level analysis to conflict-level data, there are other ways of explaining the relationship between conflict and peace duration. It may be that some conflict issues are at the same time more difficult to settle, and that recurrence becomes more likely. While quantitative evidence has been inconclusive, theorizing and the case study literature have suggested rationales for why several types of conflict issues may be more likely to resume. One argument focuses on whether the belligerents' basic positions are fundamentally irreconcilable (Crocker *et al.* 2005; Gurr 1994). In particular, it has been suggested that conflicts mobilized along identity lines, either ethnically or territorially defined, will be more intractable (Fearon 2004). In the words of Azar *et al.* (1978: 50), these conflicts 'involve whole societies and acts as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity'. These characteristics often manifest in the early stages of fighting rather than something that evolves over time, suggesting a potential path dependency regarding which conflicts resume (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; Fuhrmann and Tir 2009).

A related but slightly different explanation focuses on how events during the preceding conflict can create ethnic rivalries that persist into the post-conflict period. It can, for example, be suggested that violence against civilians, long-term fighting and subsequent large-scale refugee or exile communities makes continued or renewed conflict more likely even if pre-conflict relations were peaceful between the belligerent communities (Kaufmann 1996). The

net result of conflict over identity goals, or where identity becomes polarized during fighting, is that violence will resume if former belligerents are forced to coexist in the same post-conflict state entity. Whether partition is a viable, or even necessary, solution to ethnic conflicts has become one of the most contested debates in the civil war recurrence literature. Those arguing for the stabilizing effect of partition have generally stated that this could be seen as an unfortunate consequence of different ethnic groups' inability to live peacefully within a single state (Horowitz 1985). Sceptics have suggested that the newly formed states from a partition may become international rivals like India–Pakistan, China–Taiwan or Ethiopia–Eritrea rather than coexist peacefully, and quantitative studies have shown little support for post-partition peace (Sambanis 2000; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009; Johnson 2008).³

Overcoming the post-conflict security dilemma

Proponents of partition argue that it is the post-conflict security dilemma that makes it necessary to separate former belligerents at the end of conflict. Although particularly pertinent in ethnic wars because of the ascriptive nature of ethnicity, this theory is commonly at the core of studies of civil war recurrence. Drawing on bargaining theory, scholars have emphasized the difficulty that civil war belligerents have in reaching a compromise and ending fighting because of their concern that the opponent will renege on the agreement in the future (Filson and Werner 2002; Morrow 1989; Walter 2002). There are two alleged consequences of this; the first is that parties may not reach a settlement and instead continue fighting, and the second is that *if* there is a peace agreement, there is a greater risk of civil war recurrence. This argument posits that after the signing of a peace agreement, both sides have incentives to try to renegotiate its terms during the implementation phase. Since both parties know that their opponent has incentives to push for more concessions or launch a surprise attack, they are caught in a security dilemma which stalls implementation of the settlement and eventually leads to its breakdown. In particular, it is argued that changes in the distribution of power between belligerents can provide incentives to return to armed strife (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Leventoglu and Slantchev 2007). To overcome this credible commitment problem, the successful settlement of conflict depends on parties' ability to signal peaceful intentions and continued dedication to the peace process (Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002).

Walter (1999, 2002) provides a solution to this credible commitment problem by suggesting that in the uncertain and risky environment at the end of a civil war, it is near impossible for parties to credibly signal that they will not renege on an agreement in the absence of a third party. Thus, the deployment of peacekeepers can be a particularly useful method to overcome the commitment problem between belligerents. Furthermore, the presence of peacekeepers to monitor demobilization and troop movements make a surprise attack much more difficult, thus reducing the post-conflict security dilemma (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). By taking on some responsibility for law and order, peacekeepers can also help control and minimize challenges, such as public instability, that might otherwise escalate and spark renewed conflict. When no peacekeepers are present each side has only two choices in the face of violations of the other; retaliate and risk escalation, or do nothing and risk appearing weak, and thereby invite further encroachment by the enemy.

While there has been some evidence that the presence of peacekeepers may provide a solution to the credible commitment problem at the end of civil war, there are shortcomings in the extant literature on how third parties can contribute to post-conflict stability. First, most systematic empirical scholarship has focused on the sub-set of cases that have ended through a peace agreement and not taken into account the role of third parties after other outcomes.

Second, since peacekeepers are not deployed to all post-peace settlement societies, there is a potential selection effect in deployment that influences their likelihood of success (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). If peacekeepers are deployed to the 'easiest' conflicts, failing to maintain the peace afterwards indicates that peacekeeping is not very useful. If, on the contrary, peacekeepers are deployed to the 'hardest' cases, then the occasional resumption of conflict even if peacekeepers are present can be expected. Recent years have seen a new approach to this question, as researchers have identified that peacekeepers, as well as mediators, tend to engage more in conflicts if the warring sides are targeting civilians (Melander 2009; Hultman 2013; Kreutz and Brosché 2013). While those situations may not constitute the hardest conflict issues to settle, these are societies particularly characterized by a widespread post-conflict security dilemma.

Outcomes, governance and civil war recurrence

While there is an intuitive appeal to theorizing civil war resolution and recurrence on the bargaining nature of war, there is one aspect of the theory where the empirics run contrary to expectations. It is assumed that in situations where the belligerents cannot come to a compromise, they will continue fighting until one side is the winner and that such a clear outcome will provide more post-conflict stability. Drawing on Clausewitz's depiction of war as politics by other means, it is suggested that peace will be more stable when the victorious party can impose its will in the post-conflict society and ensure that the opponents' capabilities are demobilized at the end of conflict (Licklider 1995; Quinn *et al.* 2007; Toft 2010).

However, victories in civil war – particularly government wins – occur on average earlier than when conflicts end through peace agreements (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Brandt *et al.* 2008). According to Kreutz (2010), civil wars that end with victory have an average duration of 625 days (1.7 years) while peace agreements are concluded after on average more than 5.5 years of fighting (2,068 days). Indeed, many victories are registered after just a few hours of fighting as part of successful or failed coup attempts. What this empirical pattern indicates is a different logic than what is expected from most models of bargaining theory. In the first phase of civil war, belligerents will be unwilling to compromise and focus all of their resources on trying to achieve a military victory. If they fail to defeat their opponent, they may explore the possibility of getting concessions through talks. If that fails, rebels will continue opposing the government even without the expectation of future victory, in order to protect their political legitimacy within the local community (Mack 1975). As mentioned above, civil wars often continue at low intensity levels without a decisive outcome, and these types of situations are not surprisingly more at risk of recurrence than both outright victories and negotiated settlements.

A growing area of scholarship depicts civil wars less as a constant contest between competing armies, but rather as a political order where territory and resources are shared between government armies and non-state armed groups (Staniland 2012a). As noted in this literature, the presence of 'warlords' (Duffield 1998) is not exclusively restricted to the periods of active warfare as they may continue to wield power even as fighting against the government army decreases (Richards 2005). This view of conflict adds yet another layer of complexity when trying to explain civil war termination and recurrence as it suggests that political compromise may not be sufficient to convince armed groups to cease fighting. As noted by Atlas and Licklider (1999), peace negotiations create new divisions within warring parties as some individuals (particularly the top leadership) can expect benefits for signing the agreement, while others will lose their access to economic and societal power. They identify that recurrence of fighting commonly involves former allies rather than between the former belligerent sides; a finding since also replicated with global data (Kreutz 2012).

The risk that factions or individuals within the warring organizations have incentives to sabotage a peace process has been further elaborated as the theory of spoilers (Stedman 1997). Similar to theories relating to structural factors that make civil war recurrence more likely, spoilers can be motivated by concern over their individual gains or have political aims. If the end of conflict means that they lose access to economic and political power, then they will have incentives to resume hostilities. At the same time, it can also be argued that spoilers primarily consist of actors that hold more extreme views than the moderate factions that want to engage in a peace process (Kydd and Walter 2002; Pearlman 2009). While the terminology focusing on the threat of spoilers remains commonplace, the usefulness of the concept has been criticized for being tautological. If a peace process fails, then it is because of the presence of spoilers while a successful peace means that there were no spoilers (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011).

As a possible means to overcome the risk of spoilers, some scholars argue that former belligerents should have a stake in the post-conflict society to ensure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. This can be achieved in two ways: either through competitive democratic elections or by offering rebel leaders a guaranteed position in the ruling coalition through power sharing. While post-conflict elections have contributed to very successful peace processes – for example in Guatemala and Mozambique – as well as some partly successful cases such as Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they can also exacerbate violence and polarization in society. One of the problems that has been identified with post-conflict elections is the challenge faced by countries to organize free and fair polling while at the same time trying to reconstruct institutions and the economy, and demobilize former fighters. While the international community may contribute resources to support these processes, the legacy of the conflict is likely to influence who runs in the elections and on which platform. Electoral competition in new democracies has been found to provide incentives for candidates to argue in favour of militancy, and this is arguably particularly likely in post-conflict situations if former opponents or ethnic minorities can be depicted as threats (Mainwaring 1992; De Figueredo and Weingast 1999; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). In addition to the risk that the election campaign in itself can provoke renewed violence, there is also a risk that the losing candidate will renounce the results and return to armed struggle. This is what happened in Angola, where the UNITA rebels fared poorly in the 1992 elections and therefore continued fighting in the civil war for another decade.

An alternative approach to ensuring the commitment of former rebels to a peace process consists of creating institutions where former belligerents will share power. They will then have incentives to cooperate rather than resume old hostilities which also, supposedly, may provide an easier approach to managing extremist views within the warring organizations (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hartzell *et al.* 2001). While most of the literature on power sharing has primarily focused on different governance structures, ranging from autonomy to coalition governments, some scholars have emphasized the need to demobilize or integrate forces into a unified army (Berdal 1996; Call and Stanley 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008).

The empirical findings regarding power sharing have been inconclusive, and have largely only studied the sub-category of post-peace settlements. This is problematic both because it does not compare whether power sharing reduces the likelihood of recurrence compared to all post-conflict situations but also because power sharing can be implemented even in the absence of a formal peace agreement. The civil war in north-eastern India against the Naga National Council (NNC) in the 1950s is illustrative of this. While the Indian government was unwilling to accede to the demands of independence raised by the rebels, they increased the autonomy for the local administration and created the state of Nagaland in 1963. This move was accompanied by an offer of amnesty to all rebels that led to a wave of defections and a subsequent reduction of fighting (Sema 1986). Those Naga factions that continued to push for independence remained

armed but participated in peace talks with the Indian government for almost a decade thereafter before the conflict escalated again. Thus, while power sharing was implemented as a means of addressing the grievances of the rebels, this was not accompanied by military defeat or a successful peace settlement.⁴

The example from Nagaland illustrates another factor that has only occasionally been explored in theories on civil war resolution and relapse: many civil wars consist of a multitude of different rebel organizations. Scholars seeking to disaggregate the study of civil war away from the focus on structural factors have also occasionally focused on civil war termination and recurrence. While it was quickly discovered that civil wars involving multiple rebel groups are more difficult to end and more likely to resume, it was unclear how this theoretically could be explained (Cunningham 2011; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). According to Bloom (2004), the presence of competing rebel factions result in attempts to 'outbid' the others in the use of violence to signal commitment to the political demands. This limits the manoeuvrability that is necessary for finding a peace settlement and creates incentives for signatories to renege on the deal and resume violence. In recent scholarship which has moved away from the narrow focus on peace processes, it has been suggested that this internecine competition between rebel factions over constituency support also provide incentives to cease fighting against the government. According to this view, it can be advantageous for rebel groups to 'defect' and accept rewards from the government in order to protect their local power status (Kalyvas 2008; Staniland 2012b). The logic behind this argument would suggest that rebel defeats become more likely in cases with multiple rebel groups but also that recurrence due to this competition may be more likely. There is at present little systematic empirical work specifically dedicated to exploring this phenomenon, but Nilsson (2008) finds that peace agreements signed by only some rebel groups tend to abide to the settlement. Non-signatories may, however, continue or resume conflict.

The next steps for the literature on civil war recurrence

As the study of civil war overall has focused on disaggregation to identify mechanisms, a similar approach may improve our knowledge about the processes that bring civil wars to an end. There are in particular two issues that would benefit from additional scholarship. The first relates to the concept of victory, and the consequences of successful rebellion or counterinsurgency. While victory generally has been defined in the military sense, some early work suggested alternative approaches (Carroll 1969; Coser 1961). This includes the relationship between the parties during and after the conflict (capitulation, armistice and strategic surrender), the relationship between war aims and war outcomes, or a relative comparison of gains or losses (Heraclides 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2007). While the work of Kalyvas (2003) and Staniland (2012a, 2012b) has identified the multiple governance structures and uses of violence that exist in conflict and post-conflict societies, this warrants further attention. Similarly, in contrast to the large literature on violence during and after peace processes, there has been little investigation of post-victory violence. Licklider (1995) found that the risk of genocide was greater after victories than after other conflict outcomes, and Krain (2000) has suggested that internal cohesion among the winners determines the extent of post-rebellion repression.

This leads into the second factor of civil war termination and recurrence that needs further attention. We know little about the role of former rebel organizations, movement leaders and the rebel rank-and-file in the post-conflict society. While some contemporary studies have indicated how wartime experience can shape subsequent political and violent behaviour (Blattman 2009; Jha and Wilkinson 2012), this has not yet been fully explored in the context of civil war recurrence. Of particular interest would be to study the organizational structures of former rebel groups, and

learn more about their post-conflict internal politics. This has been done in some cases, but only in the aftermath of peace agreements rather than after all types of conflict outcome (Themnér 2011). One of the few projects – or possibly the only one – that has tracked the organizational development of rebel groups beyond the end of fighting is Hartzell (2009) who found that, surprisingly, many groups remained intact several years after the end of fighting. What made her findings particularly notable was that this phenomenon could be observed after both peace settlements and defeats, which further illustrates the need for more research in this area.

Notes

- 1 Cases of partition are the Chinese Civil War (creating Taiwan), Pakistan (Bangladesh), South Africa (Namibia), Yugoslavia (Slovenia), Yugoslavia (Croatia), Ethiopia (Eritrea), Indonesia (East Timor) and Sudan (Southern Sudan).
- 2 The pattern is similar across datasets. In the Correlates of War data (v. 4), there are 35 intra-state wars ending through ‘compromise’ in 1990–2007, compared with only ten in the preceding 173 years (1816–1989) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).
- 3 Some authors have expanded the inquiry to also discuss de facto partition during low-intensity conflict, which I discuss as scholarship on so-called wartime political orders below (see Chapman and Roeder 2007).
- 4 This approach was similar to how many colonial conflicts ended – meaning that the colonial power withdrew but power was transferred to loyalists rather than the armed opposition.

References

- Atlas, P.M. and Licklider, R. (1999) ‘Conflict Among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon’, *Journal of Peace Research* 36(1): 35–54.
- Autesserre, S. (2009) ‘Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention’, *International Organization* 63(2): 249–280.
- Azar, E.E., Jureidini, P. and McLaurin, R. (1978) ‘Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East’, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8(1): 41–60.
- Barber, N. (1971) *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948–1960*. London: Cassell.
- Berdal, M. (1996) *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*. Adelphi Paper 303, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blattman, C. (2009) ‘From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda’, *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 231–247.
- Bloom, M.M. (2004) ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, *Political Science Quarterly* 119(1): 61–88.
- Brandt, P.T., Mason, T.D., Gurses, M., Petrovsky, N. and Radin, D. (2008) ‘When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars’, *Defence and Peace Economics* 19(6): 415–434.
- Call, C.T. and Stanley, W. (2003) ‘Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars’, in J. Darby and R. MacGinty (eds) *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Carroll, B.A. (1969) ‘How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses’, *Journal of Peace Research* 6(4): 295–321.
- Chapman, T. and Roeder, P.G. (2007) ‘Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions’, *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 677–691.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) ‘Murder by Numbers: Socio-Economic Determinants of Homicide and Civil War’. Centre for the Study of African Economics Working Paper Series/2004–10. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Collier, P., Elliott, V.L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N. (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Söderbom, M. (2008) ‘Post-conflict Risks’, *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 461–478.
- Coser, L.A. (1961) ‘The Termination of Conflict’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5(4): 347–353.
- Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (2005) *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Cunningham, D.E. (2011) *Barriers to Peace in Civil Wars*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Cunningham, D.E., Gleditsch, K.S. and Salehyan, I. (2009) 'It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570–597.
- Darby, J. (2006) *Violence and Reconstruction*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- De Figueiredo Jr., R.J.P. and Weingast, B.R. (1999) 'The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict', in B.F. Walter and J. Snyder (eds) *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- DeRouen, Jr., K.R. and Bercovitch, J. (2008) 'Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(1): 55–74.
- DeRouen, Jr., K.R. and Sobek, D. (2004) 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303–320.
- Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. (2000) 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.
- Duffield, M. (1998) 'Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection', *Civil Wars* 1(1): 65–102.
- Fearon, J.D. (2004) 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275–301.
- Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. (2007) 'Civil War Termination', paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 30 August–2 September 2007.
- Filson, D. and Werner, S. (2002) 'A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 819–838.
- Fortna, V.P. (2004) 'Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War', *International Studies Quarterly* 48(6): 269–292.
- Fuhrmann, M. and Tir, J. (2009) 'Territorial Dimensions of Enduring Internal Rivalries', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4): 307–330.
- Gantzel, K.J. (1981) 'Another Approach to a Theory on the Causes of International War', *Journal of Peace Research* 18(1): 39–55.
- Ghobarah, H., Huth, P. and Russett, B. (2003) 'Civil Wars Kill and Maim People Long After the Shooting Stops', *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 189–202.
- Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S.J. (2003) 'Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?' *International Studies Review* 5(4): 37–54.
- Glassmyer, K. and Sambanis, N. (2008) 'Rebel–Military Integration and Civil War Termination', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(3): 365–384.
- Gurr, T. (1994) 'Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System', *International Studies Quarterly* 38(3): 347–377.
- Hartzell, C.A. (1999) 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(1): 3–22.
- Hartzell, C.A. (2009) 'Settling Civil Wars: Armed Opponents' Fates and the Duration of the Peace', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4): 307–329.
- Hartzell, C.A. and Hoddie, M. (2003) 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management', *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318–332.
- Hartzell, C.A., Hoddie, M. and Rothchild, D. (2001) 'Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables', *International Organization* 55(1): 183–208.
- Heldt, B. (1993) *States in Armed Conflict 1990–91*, 2nd edition. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
- Heraclides, A. (1997) 'The Ending of Unending Conflict: Separatist Wars', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26(3): 679–707.
- Horowitz, D.L. (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hultman, L. (2013) 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?' *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1): 59–73.
- Iklé, F.C. (1991) *Every War Must End*, 2nd edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jha, S. and Wilkinson, S. (2012) 'Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia', *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 883–907.
- Johnson, C. (2008) 'Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security* 32(4): 140–170.
- Kalyvas, S.N. (2003) 'The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil Wars', *Perspectives on Politics* 1(3): 475–494.
- Kalyvas, S.N. (2008) 'Ethnic Defection in Civil War', *Comparative Political Studies* 41(8): 1043–1068.
- Kaufman, C. (1996) 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security* 20(4): 136–175.

- Keenan, P. (2012) *The Karen National Union Negotiations 1949–2012*. Chiang Mai: Burma Center for Ethnic Studies Working Paper 2.
- Knight, M. and Özerdem, A. (2004) 'Guns, Camps, and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(4): 499–516.
- Krain, M. (2000) *Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States*. London: Macmillan.
- Kreutz, J. (2010) 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243–250.
- Kreutz, J. (2012) *Dismantling the Conflict Trap*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Report 96.
- Kreutz, J. and Broshé, J. (2013) 'A Responsibility to Talk: Mediation and Violence Against Civilians', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 19(1): 26–38.
- Kydd, A. and Walter, B.F. (2002) 'Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence', *International Organization* 56(2): 263–296.
- Lederach, J.P. (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Leventoglu, B. and Slantchev, B.L. (2007) 'The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 755–771.
- Licklider, R. (ed.) (1993) *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. New York: New York University Press.
- Licklider, R. (1995) 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–2003', *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681–690.
- Lyall, J. and Wilson, I. (2009) 'Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars', *International Organization* 63(1): 67–106.
- Mack, A. (1975) 'Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict', *World Politics* 27(2): 175–200.
- Mainwaring, S. (1992) 'Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues', in S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and J.S. Valenzuela (eds) *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J. (2007) *Electing to Fight*. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
- Mason, T.D., Gurses, M., Brandt, P.T. and Quinn, J.M. (2011) 'When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars', *International Studies Perspectives* 12(2): 171–189.
- Melander, E. (2009) 'Selected To Go Where Murderers Lurk? The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4): 389–406.
- Morrow, J.D. (1989) 'Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining', *American Journal of Political Science* 33(4): 941–972.
- Nilsson, D. (2008) 'Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 479–495.
- Nilsson, D. and Söderberg Kovacs, M. (2011) 'Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace Processes', *International Studies Review* 13(4): 606–626.
- Nordstrom, C. (1997) *A Different Kind of War Story*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Olson Lounsbury, M. and Cook, A.H. (2011) 'Rebellion, Mediation, and Group Change: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Hypotheses', *Journal of Peace Research* 48(1): 73–84.
- Pearlman, W. (2009) 'Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process', *International Security* 33(3): 79–109.
- Peic, G. and Reiter, D. (2011) 'Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920–2004', *British Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 435–475.
- Quinn, J.M., Mason, T.D. and Gurses, M. (2007) 'Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence', *International Interactions* 33(2): 167–193.
- Ratanachaya, D.K. (1996) *The Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia, and Thailand: Truce Talks ending the Armed Struggle of The Communist Party of Malaya*. Bangkok: Duangkaew Publishing House.
- Richards, P. (ed.) (2005) *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Salehyan, I. (2009) *Rebels Without Borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sambanis, N. (2000) 'Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War', *World Politics* 52(4): 437–483.
- Sambanis, N. and Schulhofer-Wohl, J. (2009) 'What's in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?' *International Security* 34(2): 82–118.
- Sarkees, M.R. and Wayman F.W. (2010) *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816–2007*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Sema, H. (1986) *Emergence of Nagaland*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

- Singer, D. (1972) 'The Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale', *World Politics* 24(2): 243–270.
- Staniland, P. (2012a) 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 243–264.
- Staniland, P. (2012b) 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 16–40.
- Stedman, S.J. (1997) 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.
- Themnér, A. (2011) *Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers, and Relationships*. Abingdon/New York: Routledge.
- Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Toft, M.D. (2010) *Securing the Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walter, B.F. (1999) 'Designing Transitions from Civil War', *International Security* 24(1): 127–155.
- Walter, B.F. (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walter, B.F. (2004) 'Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 371–388.