


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THE AFRICAN UNION

A partner for security

Malte Brosig

For decades the African continent has been a conflict-ridden region in which African organizations did relatively little to settle conflicts and sanction war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide effectively. Indeed it has been argued that membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was primarily a means to ensure international legitimacy by often domestically challenged African leaders (Herbst, 2007). The OAU as an organization with a relatively low degree of institutionalization and weak secretariat could not throughout its existence from 1963 to 2002 develop a meaningful security strategy capable of solving African conflicts. The OAU's coming into being was shaped by ideas of pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and the attempt to consolidate national borders, often disputed as a result of arbitrary border-drawing during colonialism. Consequently non-intervention in domestic affairs became a core principle of the OAU in a move to prevent external intrusion in young and often politically unstable African states. This, however, led to the often criticized culture of impunity in which domestic human rights violations and ethnic conflicts were not perceived as international issues of urgency. Notorious dictators such as Idi Amin were not punished or sanctioned by the OAU. Only in a small number of cases (Congo, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan) was the OAU engaged in conflict prevention and peace negotiations (Walraven, 2010: 45–7).

It was only in the 1990s that African organizations made a more serious effort in engaging proactively in conflict areas and developing peacekeeping capabilities. In 1993 the OAU developed a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and in 1996 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation. In 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The impulse for these developments came primarily from ECOWAS, which under the leadership of Nigeria started a number of peacekeeping operations from 1990 in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, today ECOWAS is still the African organization with the most experience in peacekeeping operations. It provided a leading example for the AU.

The evolving African peace and security architecture

The 1999 summit of the OAU assembly in Sirte, Libya, initialized the transformation of the OAU into the AU and the emergence of the so called African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The Constitutive Act (2000) of the AU marks a remarkable step forward in overcoming the OAU's incapability as a serious security actor. The Constitutive Act provides for progressive tools of intervention in cases of severe human rights violations or unconstitutional changes in government (Art. 4p and Art. 30). Article 4h puts forward 'the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State ... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. The Constitutive Act ends impunity against severe human rights violations in Article 4o. Additionally the AU in its so-called Ezulwini Consensus of 2005 has acknowledged international norms on the responsibility to protect. At this point it should, however, be mentioned that so far Article 4h has not been invoked. Even for the AU mission in Darfur which is widely perceived as a case of genocide, the AU did not activate this article, nor did it in the case of Libya in 2011.

The APSA is a construct of several institutions of which the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) form a still-emerging and developing security regime (Engel and Porto, 2010). At its heart is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), constituting the highest authority in security matters within this system. Under the guidance of the PSC the AU is developing a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and an advising council, the Panel of the Wise (POW). The ASF and CEWS especially rely on the ability of RECs to set these structures in place. Force creation for the ASF is only accomplished sub-regionally and there is no AU Standby Force as such. Operationlizing the APSA is further complicated by the diverse number of overlapping and intersecting RECs on the African continent. More than a dozen exist, most of which have not engaged in security policies so far. The AU's division of Africa into five regions (North, East, West, Central and South) does not in all cases lead to a clear allocation of sub-regional responsibilities. Only in the case of Western and Southern Africa can we locate ECOWAS and SADC as sub-regional and capable RECs institutions. In the case of Eastern and Central Africa competences are divided between different organizations and AU relations with Northern Africa are the least developed. Nonetheless, with these four instruments the AU has taken an important step in strengthening African organizations and building up crucial capacities for taking security matters into African hands. It remains, however, clear that even when fully operational the APSA will need to cooperate with external security actors such as the UN and EU. The AU and EU peacekeeping capacities will in the foreseeable future not be able to replace UN peacekeepers (Cilliers, 2008; Cilliers and Pottgieter, 2010). It is clear that its capacity limits and the complex inter-regional governance structure between RECs and the AU pose real challenges for the APSA and its effective implementation. Its dependencies are multi-layered. First, the AU's capacity to act largely depends on the political willingness of its member states to use these institutional structures. Formally, decision-making in the PSC has been designed to avoid deadlock situations and vetoing as it appears to happen in the UN Security Council. If no consensus is found decisions can be made by a two-thirds majority. However, in practice the 15 members of the PSC decide by consensus (Sturman and Hayatou, 2010: 65). While the AU does not have much in common with its predecessor the OAU, the tendency to make decisions by unanimity encourages agreement on the lowest common denominator. Controversial discussions and debates are thus prevented.

Second, the APSA is a cooperative construction of RECs and the AU. This governance structure, on the one hand, results from pure necessity, as the AU does not have any

significant executive powers over its member states and Africa is a greatly diverse continent which creates significant dependencies towards sub-regional organizations. Thus the AU occupies a coordinative instead of executive and implementation role. On the other hand, this peculiar security system is increasing complexity and is diversifying political responsibility to such an extent that it might actually undermine its overall efficiency. In an ideal situation RECs function as gatekeepers for the AU which is coordinating internal African and non-African support, as happened in the case of Somalia. If institutional egoism prevails the AU might be sidelined by its African partners. ECOWAS and SADC have so far been rather reluctant in cooperating fully with the AU on issues relating to their own members (see the example of Madagascar).

Third, at the global level the APSA is dependent on cooperation with the UN and EU. The envisioned and so far only partially operational ASF will remain dependent on UN peacekeepers and their experience in conflict management. The ASF which only comprises a maximum of 25,000 troops is hardly able to replace the existing 88,076 UN peacekeepers in Africa in June 2011 (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet 30 June 2011). The lack of AU financial resources has led to a near total dependency on the EU and other donors. Through the African Peace Facility (APF) established in 2003 the EU channeled some €700m for capacity-building, peace operations and early response measures.¹ In comparison to this the AU's budget for 2010 was only €197 million.²

Not surprisingly these institutional capacity shortages have led to the creation of a multi-actor game in security matters in Africa (Brosig, 2010). Regarding peacekeeping operations we can observe a division of labor between the AU, UN and EU. Although the APSA is not yet fully operational, the AU has embarked on a number of peace operations. The AU has demonstrated a tendency for early intervention under conditions in which the UN and the EU as well declined to take action. In contrast to the UN and EU, it is of course more problematic for the AU to disengage from an emerging crisis in Africa as it is the only pan-African organization which is mandated to promote peace and security on the continent. Examples for such an early intervention can be found in the 2003–4 Burundi operation (ONUB), the 2004–7 mission to Darfur (AMIS) and the Somalia mission (AMISOM), deployed since 2007, and the Comoros (2008). In three of the four cases the AU functioned as early responder and facilitator for the UN and EU. Institutional shortcomings on the side of the AU, however, prevented the organization from engaging in fully comprehensive peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction measures. The AU's strengths seem to primarily lie in negotiating peace agreements and initiating early interventions. Here the AU fulfills a bridging role in which external actors have to be integrated in order to leave a sustainable positive footprint. In three operations the AU has either handed over or merged its missions with the UN and has received substantial financial support from the EU. In the case of Somalia, the EU has started to train Somali security personnel in Uganda in May 2010 and was, in the case of Sudan, supporting AMIS with an EU civilian–military action in 2005 (European Union 2005). This mission provided for training, troop transport and technical support until AMIS was merged with a UN mission forming the AU–UN Hybrid Mission to Darfur.

Despite the engagement meanwhile of the EU in ten African crisis management missions throughout the continent and the EU and AU setting up an APSA, the two organizations have so far not directly started a joint peacekeeping operation, nor have they taken or handed over a mission to each other. The reasons for this can be found in the EU's preferences for bridging missions instead of long-term comprehensive operations, its limited military capabilities and the lack of member state support for engagement in long-term comprehensive peacekeeping and post-conflict operations in Africa. The fact that both organizations tend to

set up bridging or specialized mission has led to a situation in which they tend to cooperate more closely with the UN instead of seeking direct cooperation with each other.

The EU and peacekeeping in Africa

This section analyzes the EU's engagement in the APSA by following two aims. First, it examines the EU's institutional preferences for engagement in peace operations in Africa and second it scrutinizes the EU's linkages with the AU in the area of capacity-building and institutional support.

The creation of an APSA through the transformation of the OAU into the AU is providing Africa with new and better-adapted tools for shaping the continent's foreign and security policies. European foreign policy has likewise undergone substantial reforms in the last ten years. It has strengthened its foreign policy capacities significantly by launching the European Security and Defence Policy in 1999, the establishment of a High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy from 1999 to 2009, and the drafting of the first European Security Strategy in 2003. Finally through the Lisbon Treaty entering into force the EU now is represented by a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is supported by the European External Action Service with several thousand members of staff. Such substantial topping-up of EU institutional capabilities potentially provides the EU with the necessary political clout it needs to match its economic importance in the world. However, so far the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, has disappointed many observers by applying a quiet diplomacy approach instead of actively crafting and guiding EU foreign policy. In fact the EU's role during the Arab Spring and in particular during the civil war in Libya in 2011 was one of a bystander and not a driver. Additionally the EU has worked extensively on a military component of its security and defense policy. The setting up of 15 EU Battle Groups, the establishment of a Defense Agency and civilian-military planning cell in Brussels have given the EU military assets it did not possess previously. As far as Africa is concerned we have also noticed that the EU is becoming the preferred tool through which European countries are multilateralizing their African security policies. How stable this trend turns out to be remains to be seen. In 2011 France acted in the case of Cote d'Ivoire and Libya outside the EU framework.

In 2003 the EU drafted its first ever security strategy in which it laid down its vision of the Union in foreign and security affairs. This document supports 'an international order based on effective multilateralism' (see also Biscop in this volume), of which regional governance structures such as the APSA are one expression. At another point the security strategy speaks about the need 'to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention'. In this vein the EU aims at taking global responsibility and wants to be prepared for actively engaging in peacekeeping operations, of which Africa is the world's biggest receiver. However, the document also makes clear that the main responsibility for peace and security lies within the hands of the UN and the Security Council. A similar position is taken by the AU PSC, which does not claim exclusive responsibility for African security but refers to the UN as a central and legitimate provider of international peace and security. At this point it becomes apparent that both the EU and AU do not attempt to monopolize security policies but want and need to cooperate with the UN to accomplish their goals. The EU has underpinned the importance of cooperation with the UN in its own Council Common Positions on conflict prevention in Africa (2004e, Art. 1) and the PSC Protocol makes cooperation with the UN obligatory (Art. 17). Thus while the AU and RECs are developing an APSA and the EU is involved in capacity-building for this African security

regime, both organizations refer to the UN as main provider for peace and stability. This in the end supports the emergence of a security regime which is based on a triangle of inter-organizational relations between the AU, EU and UN. Indeed looking at all peacekeeping missions deployed in Africa we find that a security regime is developing between these three actors and that they are dominating this multi-actor game of peacekeeping by forming a variety of different cooperation modes ranging from bridging operations and co-deployment of troops to fully integrated or hybrid missions.

In its joint cooperation declaration with the UN (2003) the EU had outlined the conditions under which it is willing to deploy troops. In essence, the EU is reluctant to take over long-term and comprehensive peace-building operations on its own but is willing to provide for bridging and specialized operations on a short-term basis. The set-up of EU Battle Groups largely follows this concept. As small military units of 1,500 soldiers per Battle Group they are primarily deployable as a bridging force and rapid-reaction tool. The AU is in a similar position – its main competence so far is with negotiating peace agreements and early intervention. It does struggle with setting up long-term comprehensive missions covering the full spectrum from peace negotiations to post-conflict peace-building. For a sustainable positive impact the AU relies on the UN and not the EU to take over its missions. For this reason EU–AU relations are far less developed on the operational military level than on the institutional one. Both organizations are focusing on bridging tasks, which hinders them from engaging in joint peacekeeping operations.

Despite the EU and AU not co-deploying troops in crisis areas, the EU has supported the AU missions to Burundi, Comoros, Darfur and Somalia. This support encompassed financial contributions, troop transport, providing military equipment, delivering logistical support and police training. Thus the EU played an active and substantial part in AU peacekeeping missions, leaving political and military leadership to the AU and its member states and thereby strengthening African ownership. While it is true that the EU is providing much-needed support for the evolving African security structure through supporting AU peacekeeping it has not strengthened regional African structures systematically in its African missions.

The EU missions on the African continent have hardly integrated the AU or RECs enough to allow Africans to claim ownership of their matters (Aning and Danso, 2010: 56). In its peacekeeping missions the EU is largely cooperating with the UN instead. In general the UN and AU are not competing for EU cooperation. EU involvement in peacekeeping in Africa is also a reaction to the limited peacekeeping capabilities of the AU and RECs and is based on a formal invitation of the AU. In situations in which the AU or an REC has taken the lead such as the AU in Darfur or in Somalia, the EU has made important contributions to these missions and in fact strengthened AU institutions. In other situations in which African leadership is less pronounced the EU has tended to support existing UN operations, such as in Congo, or has helped the UN to establish its missions, as for example in Chad and the Central African Republic. In this context it becomes apparent how the EU's involvement in African peacekeeping is shaped by external conditions such as the existence of viable regional institutions adequately equipped with peacekeeping and conflict prevention instruments which also display political leadership.

EU–AU institutional relations

The relationship between Europe and Africa in the post-colonial era has largely been shaped by a number of formal trade agreements (Yaoundé, Lomé, Cotonou). Only in the last ten years have both the EU and AU set up institutions on foreign and security policy providing

for an institutional framework for their continents. It is primarily with the emergence of the AU and its plans for the APSA that a more structured EU foreign and security policy can effectively cooperate with the AU. From 2007 onwards AU–EU relations developed very dynamically. The 2007 EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon established the Joint Africa–EU Strategy which today forms the institutional framework through which the EU is channeling its capacity-building efforts for the AU. The Joint Strategy is not to be interpreted as an EU development program in the classical sense but is aiming to overcome ‘the traditional donor–recipient relationship’, developing a ‘partnership of equals’ and ‘building on common values and goals’ (Lisbon Declaration 2007).


The Joint Strategy is made up of eight pillars, of which one is on Peace and Security. Its specific goals have been laid down in two Action Plans, one for 2008–10 and one for 2011–13. These Action Plans emphasize three priorities: first, enhancing AU–EU dialogue on security matters; second, full operationalization of the APSA; third, providing for predictable funding for AU peace operations.

The first priority seeks to develop ‘common positions and implement common approaches’ in security matters. A number of inter-institutional EU–AU meetings have therefore been set up and make up the core of institutional cooperation between the two organizations. An Africa–EU Summit takes place every three years, the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU PSC and EU Commissions have met regularly, EU–AU ministerial Troika meetings are gathering several times each year. At the heart of AU–EU institutional interchange are the Joint Africa–EU Expert Groups (JEG), which met for the first time on 18 November 2008 and are supposed to meet biannually (Elowson, 2009: 31). Furthermore, a Joint Africa–EU Task Force (JTF) has been set up and in 2011 members of the AU Military Staff Committee (MSC) and EU Military Committee (EUMC) were scheduled to meet for the first time and establish a regular exchange. In late 2007 the EU appointed an EU Special Representative to the AU who simultaneously heads the European Commission Delegation to the AU. Between the EU and AU a whole network of inter-institutional meetings and working groups at all levels has emerged, at least guaranteeing a steady communication flow (see [Figure 25.1](#)).

The second priority in the action plan is far more ambitious and could not be realized within the time frame of the first Action Plan (2008–10). Core elements of the APSA such as the ASF or CEWS are not fully operational. Progress in the implementation of the ASF and CEWS is visible but unevenly distributed across the African continent. Central and Northern African regional organizations have not been able to contribute their share to the building up of the ASF. EU capacity-building should take account of this unequal preparedness.

The EU’s capacity-building efforts have taken very concrete steps. In February 2008 General Pierre-Michel Joana was appointed as a Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities (Brussels, 29 February 2008, S091/08). In liaison with the EC Delegation to the African Union and the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) the Special Advisor constitutes the EU focal points for capacity-building which are primarily funded by the APF. APF funding automatically excludes financial aid for military equipment, and thus EU support for building up the ASF is largely focusing on civilian and training measures at regional (AU) and sub-regional level (RECs).

So far the APF has provided more than €700m in support of the APSA and its components. The sum of €600m has been spent for AU peacekeeping operations (Darfur and Somalia). Indeed, the APSA does provide for the necessary conflict-resolution and management instruments but it does not possess the financial resources to maintain its peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the 2010 APSA Assessment Report has criticized the apparent ‘mandate–resource



Source: Europeafrica.net: News and Resources on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy. Online. Available HTTP: <http://europafrica.net/jointstrategy/diagram-on-the-jaes/>.

Figure 25.1 EU–AU common institutional structures.

Table 25.1 Ninth and tenth EDF for APF 2004–mid-2011

	€m
Peace-support operations	600
Capacity-building APSA	92
Early-response mechanism	15
Total	707

Source: Annual Report: African Peace Facility, 2010. Brussels: European Commission.

gap', pointing to the ability and willingness of the AU/PSC to mandate peacekeeping missions but to the lack of resources to sustain them.

Capacity-building programs received a more modest allocation of €92m. The most important EU initiative is probably the Amani Africa–Euro RECAMP initiative, which in principle aims at 'strengthening the politico-strategic capabilities' (Factsheet EURO RECAMP 2009) of the AU and in particular the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The Amani Cycle as it is called consists of a number of training and exercise seminars and workshops between 2008 and 2010 which enable the AU and RECs to operationalize the ASF. The last exercise took place in October 2010 and the readiness of the APSA to respond to a fictional crisis scenario. As a result a number of deficits came to the fore. The ASF has been criticized for over-emphasizing military aspects in comparison with police and civilian functions; the PSOD appeared as not sufficiently resourced to manage several peacekeeping missions concurrently; the logistical and communication infrastructure supporting the ASF is insufficiently developed; and despite the adoption of a memorandum of understanding between the RECs and the AU there is still uncertainty about which legal obligations RECs possess to support the APSA.³

In fact, the successful operationalization of the APSA depends to a large extent on effective relations between the AU and RECs. A joint meeting of the EU, AU and RECs in Akosombo (Ghana) in December 2009 has prioritized this issue. One EU strategy is to support the various regional training centers which exist in different African regions and support liaison offices of RECs in Addis Ababa in order to provide for a basic infrastructure for communication. In general, the EU prefers to cooperate with RECs via the AU which is supposed to provide coordinative leadership. Thus the EU has not developed a systematic strategy to support capacity-building for the various RECs active within the APSA but has lent individual support for single organizations.

With the adoption of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for the years 2009 to mid-2011, an Early Response Mechanism (ERM) has been established with a budget line of €15m. The ERM has been designed as an ad hoc instrument to support political mediation efforts undertaken by the AU. Funds have already been used in the case of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, Somalia and Sudan.⁴ As a result ERM funds have reinforced the political role of the AU as a peace-broker in the region.

EU capacity-building and institutional linkages with the AU and RECs now take place in a systematic and institutionalized manner. The framework for effective cooperation is in place. The idea behind capacity-building for the APSA is to provide support for 'African organisations for African-led operations'.⁵ This idea, however, may be compromised by a number of conditions.

First, EU–AU dialogue and capacity-building for AU peacekeeping are systematic and institutionalized but operational cooperation in peacekeeping missions is hardly existent. Both the EU and AU at the operational level primarily work together with the UN but have not set up joint operations. The issue of institutional cooperation is at the heart of operationalizing the APSA as most AU peace missions have been taken over by the UN. A crucial node thus exists between the AU and UN which EU–AU relations should address adequately.

Second, member-state support on both sides the EU and AU is often lukewarm, except in the case of some lead nations. Such a tendency is potentially undermining the APSA, which is crucially dependent on sub-regional support from all African regions to become fully functional. Within the EU, initiative rests primarily on France, Belgium and Britain, which in a Union of 27 countries may not suffice to establish capacity-building for the APSA as a long-term political priority despite the existing institutional framework.

Third, EU capacity-building is also reliant on the AU and RECs' ability to absorb external support. The understaffing of the PSOD and the PSC, which both only have a handful of full-time support staff to run these crucial organs, sets clear limits to EU capacity-building efforts. In fact, the unequal power relations between the EU and AU, with the EU commanding over considerably more resources financially and on the administrative side, threaten to challenge African ownership of the process.

Fourth, the concept of African ownership in which capacity-building should be demand-driven is more difficult to realize than is commonly imagined.⁶ Ideally the EU's engagement within the APSA, would in large part be responsive to external demands for support. In practice demand for capacity-building is so substantial that the EU's offer for support will generally be welcomed. The concept of African ownership only works if there are actors who expressly want to own the process. However, in some situations the EU would be forced to either generate ownership before engaging in capacity-building or limit its engagement until ownership has grown from below. To a substantial degree the JAES remains rather cosmetically a joint project.

Fifth, the JAES is a politically empty vessel. The JAES established institutional links between decision-making organs in the AU and EU without providing content for a political agenda. The goals and targets of the JAES remain rather technical and abstract. Despite the reference to supposedly common values of human rights and democracy, which are apparently not shared by all countries, the JAES fails to craft a truly common political project expressing a strategic and shared vision for cooperation between Africa and Europe.

Sixth, Africa and Europe do not share the same understanding of concepts of state sovereignty, humanitarian interventionism and issues of international criminal law. This political divide became apparent during the civil war in Libya in 2011. While the AU tried to defer the prosecution of Gaddafi before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and rejected the linkages between regime change and protection of civilians, European countries took a more interventionist position and expressed clear support for the ICC and acceptance for forceful regime change in the case of Gaddafi. European and African security concepts do not always point in the same direction and the JAES has so far not been a place in which differentiating security cultures could be mediated.

In summary, the EU's supporting activities for the APSA are crucial for helping the ambitious AU plans to finally become fully operational, but this process will take longer than foreseen in the Action Plan for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Problems, however, will remain even until after the APSA has been set up successfully. Contrasting the planned troop numbers for the ASF with the number of current UN troops deployed it is apparent that the APSA cannot rely on its own capabilities but needs to work closely with the UN and EU. Considering the weak financial resources which the AU and RECs command, there will also be a long-term need for external funding for AU peace operations. If this funding is not provided the whole system of the APSA runs the risk of becoming a bystander to conflicts instead of preventing and solving them.

Conclusion

With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, African states embarked on an ambitious project, the development of the APSA. Despite the APSA not being fully operational today it has given the AU a wide array of valuable instruments with which it can detect potential future violent conflicts through a CEWS, engage in finding diplomatic solutions through the POW, take political leadership through the PSC and set up peacekeeping missions through

the ASF. Thus, the AU is becoming a true partner in African security matters for the EU and UN. The institutional framework for solving the most pressing security issues is evolving and depends on the political commitment of AU member states to use these tools and support their further development and implementation.

Alongside the emerging APSA, AU–EU relations have developed dynamically and found an institutional set-up in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy. Institutional linkages between the two organizations exist at all levels including peace and security. The EU has funded all AU peace operations, which would not have been deployed without this financial support. EU capacity-building measures concentrate on the final operationalization of the APSA, for example through Amani Cycle. The extent to which the finally implemented APSA can take ownership of African security politics remains to be seen. Peacekeeping operations on the ground have been conducted as cooperative undertakings between the UN, the EU and the AU. Current trends in peacekeeping in Africa show a division of labor in which the AU takes responsibility for regional peace negotiations and early troop deployment and the UN takes over these missions at a later point, fulfilling more demanding post-conflict reconstruction tasks. The EU prefers not to engage in long-term comprehensive missions but provides for crucial financial support. Its approach is comparable to the AU's preference for bridging operations.

In sum, any analysis of peacekeeping in Africa must seek to integrate various players, beginning from AU member states, AU institutions, RECs, the UN and EU and their respective member states. Since the APSA is in practice extending beyond the PSC, ASF, CEWS and the POW, this accounts for an increasingly complex security regime which is characterized by inter-organizational cooperation of various IOs and their member states, thus gradually forming an African security regime.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm>, accessed 15 June 2010.
- 2 African Union, 2010.
- 3 AMANI Africa Cycle, 2010.
- 4 African Peace Facility, 2010: 7–9.
- 5 Council of the European Union, 2004d.
- 6 Council of the European Union, 2006c.