


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THE EU AND ASIA

Towards proactive engagement?

Eva Gross

The emergence of Asia in economic and in political terms is of increasing global significance – not least because of the rise of China and India, but also because of the increasing range of foreign and security challenges that face the region and the international community as a whole. Asia, including Central Asia,¹ is a diverse and dynamic region. It accounts for more than half of the world's population and a quarter of the global economic wealth. Aside from high-income industrialized countries, countries in the post-Soviet space and emerging economies, Asia is also home to over two-thirds of the world's poor. The EU's traditional focus on trade, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance thus remains an important aspect of involvement.

Over the past decade a set of political and security challenges emanating from Asia have progressively gained prominence. These have challenged the EU not only to formulate interests and objectives towards Asia but also to apply a range of instruments in pursuit of them. In addition to poverty and weak governance, concrete security threats include terrorism, narcotics, nuclear proliferation, organized crime and state weakness and/or failure. Environmental degradation, migration and potential cross-border conflicts further increase the risk of regional instability.

In light of the region's diversity – including as it does established trading partners, rising powers, but also weak and failing states – the EU by necessity pursues a number of foreign policy interests in Asia. These include concerns over the maintenance of a multilateral, rules-based international order in light of ongoing power shifts that favor emerging powers China but also India; strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms; engaging in post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan; countering state weakness, nuclear proliferation and the potential for inter-state conflict with India in the case of Pakistan; military conflict, including a nuclear confrontation, between North and South Korea; securing Europe's energy supply in the case of Central Asia; and a cross-cutting concern with strengthening the rule of law, human rights and good governance.

The variety of policy responses required to meet these multi-faceted challenges in a complex region make a concise analysis and evaluation of EU approaches a somewhat challenging endeavor. This is also in light of the fact that the EU's own foreign policy instruments have been continually evolving since the formulation of specific EU rather than European/member state security interests – in Asia and elsewhere – that culminated in the

ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010.

The following sections analyze evolving EU interests and its professed strategic objectives vis-à-vis Asia, taking as their baseline the European Security Strategy (ESS) as well as policy documents and statements related to individual engagements that touch on foreign and security policy. The chapter then critically assesses the effectiveness of EU external policies in pursuit of its stated interests. It focuses on four dimensions of EU engagement: the individual strategic partnerships and bilateral relationships with Asian powers; the EU's engagement in, or in support of, regional integration efforts; the EU's attempt to forge bilateral relations with Asian countries in pursuit of particular security interests; and the EU's engagement through individual CSDP missions. Finally, the chapter considers whether the EU has achieved its objectives – and to what extent these objectives have been clearly defined to begin with. It argues that the EU has come a long way in defining and addressing individual policy challenges. However, a comprehensive and proactive approach towards the region as well as to the pursuit of individual EU security objectives that relate to it remains in the making. The chapter concludes by formulating some recommendations on how the EU can strengthen its strategic engagement with Asia as well as its approach towards concrete policy areas as they relate to the EU's foreign and security policy interests.

Defining EU interests and strategic objectives in Asia

The evaluation of the EU's security policy in Asia necessitates an exercise in defining and delineating foreign policy goals. Taking the 2003 European Security Strategy as a guideline, the core of EU interests and objectives in Asia (and elsewhere) can be divided into systemic, regional and individual threat-specific concerns and challenges. The systemic challenge is twofold. First, it concerns the EU's overall objective of working towards 'effective multilateralism' – that is, working with NATO, strengthening the UN system as well as regional organizations such as the OSCE and upholding and developing international law and a rule-based international order. In light of the ongoing global power shifts in favor of China and India – and, more generally, a multi-polar world – there is a concomitant concern over whether these two emerging powers will adopt a multilateral approach, or whether they will pursue individual policy objectives on a bilateral basis. Thus, the EU can only meet its objective if emerging powers that will form part of a multi-polar system subscribe and participate in a multilateral, rule-based international system. Individual bilateral strategic partnerships with individual countries, most of all China but also India, and the EU's existing relationship with Japan and South Korea, will ensure stability in EU foreign relations, including in security but also in trade, but also reinforce the EU's position in favor of multilateralism.

A second set of objectives for the EU is the maintenance of not only systemic but also regional stability. The creation and strengthening of regional cooperation mechanisms thus represents another core security interest for the EU. In Asia, this takes the form of two approaches: forging a regional approach towards Central Asia; and strengthening existing regional cooperation mechanisms in Asia. These include an interregional forum for discussion between Europe and Asia, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM); but also the EU's engagement with regional groupings including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In addition, the OSCE, which includes a significant number of Asian countries and thus engages regional actors, also represents an institutional instrument

for work towards good governance and democratization that the EU can actively support in its work towards common regional security aims in Asia (Lynch, 2009).

Finally, there are a number of issue-specific security interests that were identified in the ESS and reaffirmed in its 2008 implementation report that affect Asia in particular. These include state failure; regional instability, interstate conflict and nuclear proliferation; terrorism and organized crime; but also humanitarian emergencies; the fight against poverty; and adverse effects of climate change, including migration. In light of the inherent interconnectedness of these challenges, climate change and migration feed into the broader security–development nexus and the EU’s emerging peace-building agenda. Energy security, finally, has become a core concern for the EU and its member states, and constitutes one of the underlying motivations behind the adoption of the EU Central Asia strategy in 2007.

The application of CFSP/CSDP instruments in Asia

Placed in the context of the ongoing evolution of EU foreign policy both in terms of available instruments and geographical reach, Asia is a relative latecomer when it comes to the formulation of the EU foreign policy interests and objectives. The EU has engaged in individual Asian countries or conflicts, but a comprehensive view on the continent and its political and security challenges has been slow to develop. This refers both to the process of developing EU rather than member state foreign policy interests as well as filling declarations and documents with policy content.

The European Commission was the first EU-level actor to formulate policy objectives by releasing, in 1994, a Communication on the EU’s New Asia Strategy. The creation of the EU CFSP and later CSDP has further led to the formulation of political and strategic interests and objectives, not least through the drafting of the 2003 ESS. The institutional changes as a result of the Lisbon Treaty have further unified EU presence in the field by turning former Commission Delegations into EU Delegations with EU diplomatic representation through the EU External Action Service (EEAS). They have also led to a consolidation of foreign policy instruments at the Brussels level. With respect to policy interest and objectives, growing expectations as to the EU’s global role as well as global power shifts have moved the EU’s engagement with its strategic partners in Asia further up the political agenda

The EU gradually did become active as political and security actor through CFSP and CSDP policies, particularly in response to increasing expectations as to its response to global security challenges. These include the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent appointment of an EUSR to Afghanistan, which reflected the most immediate EU foreign policy reaction on the part of EU member states to a crisis in Asia.

While this signals that these two areas were regarded as politically relevant and meriting special attention on the part of the EU, it also gives some indication that, with regard to the rest of the Asian continent, EU engagement was politically underdeveloped. Confined to economic and developmental cooperation, EU member states also often overshadowed EU activities and prevented the evolution of European interests.

Central Asia occupies a separate policy space from the rest of Asia due to the region’s post-Soviet legacy, its relative proximity to the EU and the added security aspects of energy and trafficking. In its regional rather than bilateral focus, the 2007 EU Central Asia strategy explicitly builds on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in an attempt to draw the Central Asian Republics closer to the EU. The strategy cites energy security as a key concern together with border management as well as the mutual commitment to good governance,

democracy, rule of law and human rights.² To these ends, the EU maintains additional political representation through the post of EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Central Asia that was created in 2005.³

In addition, the conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, where the EU and its member states engage in reconstruction activities, also represents a threat to stability – and therefore indirectly also to EU interests – in Central Asia. The EU's engagement in Asian security is most pronounced in Afghanistan, and in the context of an active conflict and concurrent peace-building and reconstruction efforts. In Pakistan on the other hand, where the EU is slowly responding to an increasing security rationale, the EU attempts to strengthen its bilateral engagement through humanitarian and development assistance by increasingly focusing on good governance and the rule of law, and on the political aspects of a bilateral EU–Pakistan relationship.

The most concrete manifestation of EU engagement in security policy in Asia remains its CSDP missions, EUMM Aceh Indonesia and the police mission EUPOL Afghanistan. They reflect the EU's multifaceted engagement in Asia, its evolution but also its limitation as a security actor. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which lasted for 12 months starting in September 2005, was established to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki. The mission provided monitors, together with five contributing countries from ASEAN, Norway and Switzerland. The mission's objective was to contribute to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh, including investigating and ruling on complaints and alleged violations of the peace agreement and establishing and maintaining liaison and good cooperation with the parties.⁴ EUPOL Afghanistan, in contrast, was launched in June 2007 with the objective of contributing to the establishment of effective and sustainable Afghan civil policing capacities through advising and mentoring the ministry of the interior and through contributing to limited training activities.⁵ In a different and ongoing conflict context, the mission's mandate and strength continue to evolve both in response to evolving needs on the ground as well as broader trends in the politics of international intervention – but has also demonstrated the political and operational shortfalls in the EU's crisis management toolbox (House of Lords, 2011).

Evaluating CFSP/CSDP policies in the context of the EU's overall external action in Asia

Since EU foreign and security interests and policy formulation in Asia have evolved gradually over the course of the past decade and a half, policy instruments in pursuit of these interests have been deployed in a gradual rather than systematic and comprehensive manner. At the inception of EU foreign policy activity through CFSP and CSDP, the 'mental map' of EU security interests encompassed the Balkans and Middle East, the Eastern Neighborhood and sub-Saharan Africa. When it came to Asia, supplementing traditional concerns over aid and trade as well as inter-regionalism with security policies and more generally developing a political approach towards the region necessitated a cognitive process of interest formulation on the part of the EU as well as its member states, which frequently pursued bilateral policies in support of national interests. Identifying European objectives, formulating EU-level policies and balancing them against member state bilateral preferences, therefore, has been and remains an ongoing process (Geeraerts and Gross, 2011). Perhaps unsurprisingly, rather than engaging in a systematic stock-taking and formulating a proactive policy towards individual conflicts,

the EU has taken a reactive position towards, for instance, Afghanistan, but has also taken advantage of an opportunity to intervene, in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission – and has adopted bilateral and regional approaches to underpin these individual policy activities.

The EU, a strategic actor in Asia?

While the EU has come to pursue a number of strategic interests in Asia, it would be an overstatement to say that the EU constitutes a strategic actor in Asia. This is not merely on account of the differing policies applied as well as their objectives. The EU's strategic engagement with Asia often remains overshadowed by US predominance in the region. The influence wielded by individual EU member states with long-standing interests and engagement in individual countries or sub-regions often further eclipses the EU's political standing and visibility. Establishing itself as a political and security actor – rather than an economic actor – in the perception of its Asian partners continues to be a lengthy and to date incomplete process as a result (Holland, 2009). Brussels has recognized this lacuna: the policy instrument of strategic partnership is to enable political engagement and cooperation with partners, including Asian powers. At the same time, there is a clear sense that the EU has not yet exhausted this particular platform – nor has it formulated what specific policy goals it intends to pursue through this instrument, or how those goals identified will and can be pursued (Balfour, 2010).

The EU and regional groupings

The EU's relationship to ASEAN, but also its efforts at strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms and institutions, while in existence, could be explored and strengthened in more detail. When it comes to the EU's emphasis on regional integration and dialogue, a slight shift towards security is detectable. The EU's approach to regional integration such as the annual EU–ASEAN summit focuses on trade and development rather than security concerns: the implicit assumption is that increasing economic integration will lead to a stronger regional identity and peaceful relations as a result.

The EU also holds regular Asia–Europe Meetings (ASEM). The tenth such meeting took place in October 2010. While it focused mainly on global economic governance and sustainable economic development, the summit also addressed global security concerns including piracy, terrorism and organized crime, disaster relief, human security and human rights and democracy and nuclear proliferation – as well as their regional dimension. ASEM as a regional consultation mechanism expands the membership from Asia and Central Asia to (since 2010) also include New Zealand, Australia and Russia, which expands the regional scope of this particular format.

The variable geometry of the countries participating in ASEM and ASEAN as well as SAARC can be read as an asset but also as a liability. These regional groupings enlarge the number of stakeholders; at the same time, they do not necessarily strengthen coherence in developing a common approach towards common challenges.

The EU–Central Asia strategy: a regional approach in the making?

The EU–Central Asia strategy represents an attempt on the part of the EU to put a regional approach into action, although this has not served as a model towards other regional clusters in Asia but rather replicates the policy model adopted through the European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It explicitly serves a set of security and integration aims, and is partly driven also by the assumption that the diffusion of European values is a key component of ensuring security. The EU implements its strategy through existing instruments, including Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) as well as Trade and Cooperation Agreements.

More concretely, EU engagement with Central Asia has included the EU's rapid response to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in cooperation with the UN and the OSCE; and a strengthened EU presence in the region through the opening of an EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – as well as the entry into force of the PCA with Tajikistan, and the interim agreement of the PCA with Turkmenistan. At the same time, the EU's 2010 strategy progress report noted limited regional cooperation between the five republics, and lack of progress on human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy.⁶

In the area of governance and the rule of law, the EU and key member states launched a Rule of Law Initiative in 2008. Given that programmes have only recently reached their implementation phase, an analysis of policy effectiveness, particularly with regard to this particular initiative, is premature. At the same time, the 2010 progress report highlighted intensified engagement between the EU and the five republics. This engagement included both bilateral relations and responses to individual policy problems, but also a strengthened overall bilateral engagement in terms of developing political influence in the region. Given the relative youth of the policy and its components it is too soon to draw conclusion over the strategy's impact; however, given the low starting points on governance and human rights coupled with the EU's limited reach in terms of political representation on the ground (the EUSR is Brussels-based) EU activities in Central Asia remain less visible and concentrated than regional approaches closer to the EU's borders.

The CSDP missions: EUMM Aceh and EUPOL Afghanistan

When it comes to CSDP proper, and the manifestation of the EU's security policy, the record is mixed: the EU has launched two small missions in very different theatres of operations. While the Aceh mission is universally judged a success and effective at reaching its core objectives (Braud and Grevi, 2005), the same cannot be said for EUPOL Afghanistan, a mission that has been fighting an uphill battle to assert itself as a credible actor in Kabul. Granted, Aceh profited from a fortunate constellation of events that facilitated EU intervention: a natural disaster that led conflict parties to settle on a peace agreement; EU-member state/Finnish involvement and initiative-taking at realizing a CSDP mission; and a relatively precise and manageable mandate. In the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, on the other hand, ongoing shortfalls in personnel coupled with mobility problems, continuously readjusting mission design and an ongoing and deteriorating conflict setting have negatively impacted EUPOL's effectiveness. At the same time, ongoing institutional improvements as a result of the Lisbon Treaty mission design have had a positive impact on EUPOL and the broader EU presence. Some of this also had to do with a greater transatlantic acceptance of the EU's approach, and the particular conflict setting where the EU acts alongside not only an ongoing military operation through ISAF but also a NATO training mission, NTM-A.

While the EU's priorities as far as the conflict itself is concerned – establishing good governance and the rule of law, as well as a focus on rural development and health – are long-term peace-building measures, they do not directly contribute to the military operations; nor does the EU's particular political presence and decision-making structure lend

itself to impact on the international political agenda setting as far as approaches towards the conflict itself are concerned. The overall political direction tends to be set by Washington, and EU member states have in the past prioritized bilateral relationships either to the USA or approaches towards the Afghan government and this has negatively impacted the EU's visibility and also its impact. At the same time, in the current political and security climate the EU's contribution has come to be more valued and the coordination with NATO and US activities has improved (Gross, 2010).

EU policy effectiveness in Asia: sufficiently ambitious, achieving objectives?

The analysis of the effectiveness of the EU's policy in Asia reveals a mismatch between stated aims and ambitions on the one hand, and policy content and resources extended, on the other. The incremental nature of the EU's foreign policy reach has increased the unevenness of policy developments – as have the different policy models employed to reach the EU's aim, which span strategic partnerships, a regional policy, but also individual CSDP missions.

When it comes to taking ownership of certain policy challenges and to increasing the EU's reach beyond specific countries or problem areas, EU policy in Asia is marked by tentativeness. To be fair, the EU's policy evolution in Asia has been complicated by a number of factors that include pre-existing spheres of interests and influence on the part of the United States. In addition, the size and growing influence of China coupled with the EU's profile as a non-traditional foreign and security actor have made the exertion of policy interests and influence difficult. This has been the case also with respect to the EU's relations with India, where similar values and forms of governance have raised expectations of more intensive cooperation than has been achieved to date (Peral, 2010). All too often, therefore, the EU has either not been perceived as a foreign-policy but rather as a trade or development actor; or has had difficulties translating its growing political clout in the pursuit of specific EU interests. Individual member states' ongoing investments in their bilateral relationships with individual Asian powers have further complicated the task of increasing the visibility of the EU's contribution. These factors are reflected in the EU's engagement with individual Asian powers and also with individual policy issues.

The EU's strategic partners: common values and interests?

The EU's strategic partnerships with individual countries but also its engagement with regional associations in principle express the intent to develop and engage in focused dialogue and engagement in pursuit of EU but also joint interests. In reality, however, they are of a sufficiently different nature and of sufficiently different content for the term 'strategic partnership' to mean relatively little; and to create the impression of incoherence given the divergent challenges addressed in each strategic partnership (Renard, 2010a). The EU has not helped matters by remaining vague in its commitments to each partner, even if policy-makers have acknowledged the challenge of missing content and purpose.

Besides the question over policy content, the term 'strategic partnership' is also somewhat contradictory in that it suggests a commonality of interests and values between the EU and its partners. Whereas this might be the case in Japan, China's worldview, value assumptions and resulting policy positions differ considerably from those of the EU. These different assumptions and actions make the pursuit of a joint approach towards common challenges, including

those near the top of the EU's policy agenda such as climate change or effective multilateralism, a difficult undertaking. Individual strategic partnerships, particularly with China and India, also suffer from lack of EU–member states cohesion – and the EU position has been frequently shaped but also undermined towards a lowest common denominator position to do justice to the member states' bilateral interests.

Not quite a strategic partner: the EU and Pakistan

Strategic partnerships are of concern for the EU because they allow engagement with stakeholders in maintaining global but also regional order. As a result, the EU is gradually adopting a strategic approach towards other countries in Asia that are crucial for the attainment of regional stability and security. This applies in particular to Pakistan, where EU policy illustrates once more the difficulty facing the EU in forging a policy at the EU level in a country where individual member states either had too much or too little interest to graft a strategy at the European level (Islam, 2010). EU–Pakistan summits have taken place although these have not necessarily focused on the security dimension. Instead, EU engagement with Pakistan has tended to focus on trade and humanitarian and development assistance. The EU has increased its support for civil society and good governance, but more could be done to do justice to the security interests the EU pursues in Pakistan and the wider region. A strategic approach has yet to emerge – towards Pakistan or its broader region, which would include connecting EU interests (and by extension the application of policy instruments) in Pakistan with those in India but also Afghanistan, where the EU and its member states have made significant investments over the past decade.

Non-proliferation

On the issue of non-proliferation in Asia the EU has been relatively subdued. While the EU can look to its engagement with Iran as a record of engagement as well as a case study of policy action – and cooperation with other stakeholders – on this particular issue, this experience has not been replicated in Asia. The EU supports the Six-Party Talks (but without being a party to it) in the case of North Korea – where other EU assistance has been suspended without plans for drawing up a new country strategy paper in the absence of domestic developments. In the case of Pakistan and India, on the other hand, the EU has tended not to raise the issue of non-proliferation in favor of other policy concerns (Quille, 2008b). As a result, despite the EU's overall concern with non-proliferation – after all, the fact is that there has been a personal representative for WMD to first Javier Solana and then Ashton since December 2003 – the EU's engagement in Asia is marked by little visibility but also little engagement with individual countries in the region. This is a manifestation both of the EU's lacking strategic actorness but also of the dominance of external powers as well as individual regional players. And yet, given the prominence the EU attaches to this particular policy field, the lack of engagement on non-proliferation in Asia is striking.

Climate change and energy security

Finally, climate change and energy security represent separate and at the same time two intrinsically linked challenges for the EU: asserting leadership in international climate negotiations on the one hand, and emphasizing energy security on the other. Policy responses, therefore, should focus on the EU's place in the international system and its ability to persuade other

stakeholders to work through multilateral means; and on bilateral and regional engagement with countries in possession of energy resources. With respect to Asia, this means bilateral engagement with the EU's strategic partners China and India for shaping policy positions, and strengthening commitments towards a multilateral approach towards climate change. It also includes, however, the exploration of the EU Central Asia strategy for securing energy supplies. EU policy instruments suitable for these aims, namely the strategic partnerships with China, a key stakeholder in climate negotiations, and the EU's Central Asia strategy, however, to date have underexplored these two security challenges.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that European engagement in Asia is cross-cutting and increasingly comprehensive – but that it lacks overall strategic and political depth when it comes to EU security interests in Asia. Despite the number of policy initiatives launched the degree to which they contribute to effectiveness, and the degree to which the overlap between bilateral and regional approaches mutually reinforce various EU policy interests, remains open for improvement. Over the past five years, the EU has mapped its security interests in Asia and defined its policy objectives and increasingly also the policy instruments to be applied in pursuit of these objectives. Despite some criticism and weaknesses when it comes to implementing policies, as well as in individual instances policy design, this represents a significant improvement to the EU's foray into foreign and security policy as well as into Asia as a security actor.

The history of policy implementation shows, however, that the application of policy instruments in Asia has been uneven both in terms of the resources extended but also in the ratio between security threat and political attention – and the eventual policy instrument extended. Individual threats such as weak and failed states receive a significant level of interest in the case of Afghanistan, but less has been done in the case of Pakistan. And, the strategic engagement with Asian powers and regional organizations is further developed in some instances than in others. There is a sense, therefore, of selectivity and a reactive stance on policy implementation – and in some instances, such as nuclear proliferation, insufficient engagement with particular policy areas as they pertain to Asia. There is thus a need to strengthen the political content of the EU's engagement and the coherence between the EU's individual policy strands. In this regard, the emerging Lisbon structures present an opportunity to strengthen the EU's political presence and to better align EU and member state instruments. Member states, finally, must play their part in strengthening the EU's position in Asia.

Finally, the threat assessment of EU security interest in Asia suggests that the EU's scope of involvement could be expanded to include, for instance, more concrete assistance to improve governance and the rule of law in Pakistan; addressing the conflict in Kashmir; strengthening local capacity; and contributing its significant experience in border management in an attempt to fight organized crime and terrorism. This presupposes, however, that the EU together with its member states engage potential host countries as well as other international and regional actors with stakes in particular conflict or issue areas. This will not only facilitate EU involvement but also make it more effective when it does happen. And, in case the EU does not want to get involved directly – save for the most pressing circumstances – it should nevertheless proactively define its security interests and its approach towards addressing them: either by acting bilaterally or by influencing target states as well as states in the broader region to address specific security challenges. Meeting its security interests in

Asia, at the end of the day, does not have to involve the range of EU instruments in every instance – but the EU should be in a position to influence others to take on particular policy challenges; or to bring about a change in a particular regional political dynamic.

To conclude, pursuing EU security interests in Asia does not and should not necessarily mean that the EU increase the number of its CSDP missions, or that it get involved as a political actor in every conflict context. It does mean, however, that the EU strengthen its political capacity in order to achieve more with the considerable economic, political and security presence it already possesses in Asia. In the end, pursuing EU security interests in Asia is a predominately political challenge: to achieve greater coherence between EU instruments; to balance systemic, regional and issue-specific security interests and activities; and to thus maximize the EU's political impact – and move from a reactive to a proactive engagement in Asia.

Notes

- 1 To date the EU pursues separate Asia and Central Asia strategies, an approach that honors the different geographical, historical and cultural priorities and circumstances in these two geographical groupings. The two strategies are driven by a diverse and only partially overlapping set of security concerns, to which the EU responds through a different set of policies. In the interest of comprehensiveness, this chapter discusses the two geographical entities jointly.
- 2 Council of the European Union (2009e).
- 3 Under their current mandates, Pierre Morel is EUSR in Central Asia, whereas Vygaudas Usackas functions simultaneously as EUSR and Head of EU Delegation.
- 4 See EU Council Secretariat (2006).
- 5 See European Union (2010a).
- 6 See Council of the European Union (2010a).