


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## **THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY**

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### **The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa**

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# 16

## THE EU AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*Richard G. Whitman*

There is now a need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas.<sup>1</sup>

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of postconflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.<sup>2</sup>

### Introduction

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its attendant European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have had an engagement with sub-Saharan Africa as a central strand of activities since their foundation.<sup>3</sup>

Commentary upon this sub-Saharan African strand of the CFSP/CSDP has consequently been an important component of the wider literature describing the evolution of the CSDP.<sup>4</sup> To date this literature on the CFSP/CSDP and Africa has for the most part sought to explore CFSP towards third countries and issues and individual CSDP operations and activities as the EU has engaged in more activity which, in turn, has provided scholars with greater opportunities for empirical work.

Sub-Saharan Africa is of considerable interest as a 'test bed' of CSDP activity as almost the full panoply of both civilian and military types of CSDP activity have been used on the continent since the initiation of CSDP activities in 2003. The EU has deployed military operations in support of Petersberg tasks, peace support operations, policing and police support operations and security sector reform operations (only rule of law and border assistance missions have not been utilized). Furthermore sub-Saharan Africa has been the sole location for some distinctive military operations: the CSDP's first naval operation, EUNAVFOR, the Artemis non-Berlin Plus operation and the AMIS peace support operation. With 10 of the EU's total of 24 CSDP operations to date taking place in sub-Saharan Africa the continent has therefore

been an important theatre of operations for the development of the operational practices of the CSDP. This has given rise to a particular characteristic to the EU's strategic behaviour which we will explore in the section on 'Strategic behaviour: operational activity' below.

Examining the decision-making processes that resulted in some of these operations has also been an important generator of theoretical insight. Case study analysis has been used to analyse EU decision-making processes as the basis for accounting for particular policy outcomes.<sup>5</sup> We will side-step these decision-making processes in the body of this chapter but return to this issue in the conclusion.

Where there is currently a gap in the literature is the extent to which the EU's CSDP activities in sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the development of an EU 'strategic culture'. This chapter contends that there has been an analytical neglect of the importance of sub-Saharan Africa to the refinement of the EU's definition of what constitute security threats, how these threats are seen by the EU to be particularly acute on the African continent and how the EU has used its foreign, security and defence policy interventions on the continent to test and refine its policy instruments.

As an attempt to generate a debate on the relationship between the EU's CSDP activities in sub-Saharan Africa and its strategic culture this chapter is very much a preliminary exercise in theoretical and empirical agenda setting. The chapter is intended as something of a tentative exercise to facilitate further and future empirical work.

The chapter proceeds by introducing the notion of strategic culture as applied to the EU before then seeking to refine the concept. It then makes a preliminary examination of what is considered to be a symbiotic relationship between the EU's strategic culture and sub-Saharan Africa.

### **An EU strategic culture?**

Debate around whether the EU possesses a strategic culture has been ongoing since the foundation of the CSDP in the late 1990s. The central issue of debate is whether the EU is developing a strategic culture and, furthermore, what its characteristics are. Why is the notion of the EU's possession, or not, of a strategic culture of such importance? To address this question it is necessary to briefly examine the wider literature on generic strategic cultures in addition to the literature that deals specifically with EU strategic culture.

### ***Strategic culture defined***

The literature on strategic culture (SC) is concerned with the assertion that there is a relationship between the strategies pursued by individual international actors and that these actors 'have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites'.<sup>6</sup>

Literature on SC developed during the Cold War with a predominant focus on the two superpowers and with generalizations about the superpowers' appetites for risk and the propensities in the use of force used to inform strategies for the conduct of nuclear war in the USA.<sup>7</sup> From this starting point has emerged a burgeoning literature that examines the SC of a variety of states, including those of individual EU member states.<sup>8</sup> Applying the concept to the EU represents a particular set of empirical and theoretical challenges as there are 27 distinctive security cultures in existence alongside a putative EU SC. The interrelationship between the individual member state security cultures and the EU's emergent SC raises the

question as to whether the process at work is symbiotic. Furthermore, if the EU is developing an SC, how and where can this be identified?

As with all concepts in the social sciences there is considerable contestation on the deployment of the notion of SC. All of these arguments cannot be rehearsed here. For SC theorists a key area of debate concerns the relationship between SC and strategic behaviour (SB). This is a distinction which is of crucial relevance for study of the EU, as will be explored below. For Gray, SB ‘means behaviour relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes’.<sup>9</sup> The relationship between SC and SB can be further conceptually distinguished: ‘[S]trategic culture can be conceived as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behaviour, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as both.’<sup>10</sup>

This distinction between SC and SB is important because, as will be seen below, these are often conflated in discussion on the EU and SC.

### ***The EU and strategic culture***

Since the inception of the CSDP in the late 1990s there has been debate on the existence of an EU SC as an important necessary component of the EU realizing its ambitions for its foreign, security and defence policy. For the most part this literature glosses over definitions of SC itself in a rush to judgement as to whether the EU has an embryonic SC. What the nature of an SC is has been much less contested than whether the EU is acquiring one.

A dividing line within the literature on the EU and SC that Rynning identified in 2003 still holds.<sup>11</sup> Rynning distinguished between optimistic and pessimistic assessments on the EU’s possession of an SC. What divides these assessments is the conclusion as to whether the EU is gaining both the *ability* and the *confidence* to use military force to address perceived threats to EU security.

The most frequently cited and well-rehearsed discussions on the EU and SC are the two companion chapters by Cornish and Edwards.<sup>12</sup> Cornish and Edwards seek to evaluate whether the EU has acquired an SC by examining four areas: military *capabilities*; whether CSDP *experiences* are engendering a sense of reliability and legitimacy for autonomous EU action; whether policy-making processes of the EU now ensure a *political culture* with the appropriate level and depth of civil–military integration; and the evolving relationship between the *EU and NATO*. Cornish and Edwards entwine elements of SC and SB in their analysis and the conclusion drawn in 2005 was that the EU has an SC that is a work in progress.<sup>13</sup> Five years from this analysis – and ten years from the foundation of the CSDP – general stocktaking exercises on the CSDP conclude that the policy domain, and by implication the EU’s SC, is something of a curate’s egg.<sup>14</sup>

### **EU strategic culture and sub-Saharan Africa: making the case**

Examining the EU’s SC with reference to sub-Saharan Africa represents a twofold challenge. First, and as indicated above, the EU’s SC is a work in progress. Second, the wider literature on SC has not been applied systematically to the EU itself and, consequently, does not provide a well-trodden path of established frameworks of analysis by which to analyse the EU’s SC through examination of policy towards a region, continent or theatre of operations.

Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa may not appear to be the most appropriate case study through which to explore the EU’s SC. The Western Balkans would appear to be a more promising case as it has been the location of a sustained engagement of the EU’s foreign and

security policies since the foundation of the CFSP in 1993 and onwards through the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the eventual creation of the CSDP.

However, there are two distinct disadvantages that accrue to such an examination of the Western Balkans. The first is that the EU has defined a particular endpoint to its engagement with this region, which is to draw these states closer to the EU through a route map to EU accession. The second is that there have actually been more CSDP operations that have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to the Western Balkans.<sup>15</sup>

The EU's sub-Saharan Africa CSDP operations therefore provide an extremely important case through which it is possible to examine manifestations of the EU's SB.<sup>16</sup> As noted above, SB and SC are in a symbiotic relationship. By examining the EU's SB, as manifested through the EU's CSDP operations in sub-Saharan Africa, it is anticipated that the chapter will be able to draw preliminary conclusions on the wider EU SC. This will be attempted by examining two elements of the EU's engagement with the continent. First, in clarifying in what terms the EU has defined sub-Saharan Africa as a theatre of operations for its foreign, security and defence policies there will be the examination of key strategic declaratory instruments used by the EU.<sup>17</sup> Second, examining SB through the CSDP operations where the EU has used either force or the threat of force as a policy instrument.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa and strategic culture: strategy defined**

There is a longstanding literature which has examined the interrelationship between the European integration process, EU member states and sub-Saharan Africa. The ECSC/EEC/EU's engagement with sub-Saharan Africa dates to the commencement of the European integration process itself. Consequently, the continent is one of the oldest subjects and objects of EU member state collective foreign policy formation. During the period of the Cold War the member states' foreign policy was largely pursued through development policy instruments and through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions.<sup>18</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is not to seek to account for the EU's wider foreign policy objectives within sub-Saharan Africa or even the full gamut of the EU's CFSP towards the continent. Rather the intention is to examine the EU's CSDP activities within the region to more clearly discern its SB. The wider literature on the EU and Africa suggests that the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa developed a new dimension in the 1990s with an increasing interest in conflict prevention and conflict management.<sup>19</sup> This assertion will be probed as an important step to discerning the evolution of the EU's SB.

Since this period, and alongside the EU's CSDP operations, the EU used a set of strategic declaratory pronouncements which provide the framework within which EU policy is being defined and organized. There is a hierarchy to this *informational diffusion* and in this chapter the pronouncements will be used as markers of the component of the EU's SB which have informed the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>20</sup> These documents are used to illustrate that the EU has established two key strands through its strategic declarations: the *security–development nexus* and the *human security imperative*.

### ***European Security Strategy: sub-Saharan Africa within the EU's Grand Strategy***

A key starting point for analysis of the EU's strategic declarations is the EU's first security strategy in December 2003.<sup>21</sup> In the words of the Heads of State and Government:

The European security strategy reaffirms our common determination to face our responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world. It will enable the European Union to deal better with the threats and global challenges and realise the opportunities facing us. An active, capable and more coherent European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, as the European Council conclusions also noted, the appropriate consequence of the ‘strategic orientation[s]’ contained in the document was that they had to ‘mainstream them into all relevant European policies’. Consequently the European Security Strategy (ESS) is supposed to provide the EU and its member states with the road map for a route march to greater global impact.<sup>23</sup>

The ESS defines Europe’s security interests and priorities across three parts of the document: *global challenges and key threats* – this identifies what the document calls ‘the security environment’; *strategic objectives* – how to address these threats; and *policy implications for Europe*. Sub-Saharan Africa features in each of these three sections of the document.

In the identification of global challenges and key threats the document is very much touched by its historical moment in international relations – terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime all appear. In this section of the document sub-Saharan Africa is used to illustrate a linkage between lack of development and political instability and conflict and the assertion that security is a precondition for development.<sup>24</sup> This is an embryonic expression of the security–development nexus that has subsequently become a key strand in the EU’s strategy, as will become apparent below.

The second section of the document – on strategic objectives – identifies three strategic objectives: ‘addressing the threats’, ‘building security in our neighbourhood’ and an ‘international order based on effective multilateralism’. ‘Effective multilateralism’ has become an overwhelming objective of the ESS. It is the EU’s equivalent of the US Cold War notion of *containment* as the key objective of the EU internationally. In this section of the Strategy sub-Saharan Africa appears as illustrative of the manner in which the EU has already addressed threats (with reference to the DRC – ‘to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet’) and as illustrative that ‘State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa.’ Sub-Saharan Africa is not defined as part of the neighbourhood but appears later in the document as ‘partner’ alongside Latin America and Asia. The African Union features as a component of the argument for effective multilateralism and the assertion that regional organizations strengthen global governance.

The third section of the document is almost all about capabilities development, which has been a collective concern since the early 1990s, and West Africa is used as illustrative of the assertion that ‘Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis.’ Strikingly, and unlike its references to other continents, the EU did not identify an African candidate for the ‘strategic partnerships’ that it was seeking to develop.

In its December 2008 five-year review of the implementation of the Security Strategy the EU has summarized the foreign and security policy evolution generally, and, for the purposes of this chapter, how sub-Saharan Africa fits within the EU’s wider grand strategy.<sup>25</sup> Human security is enshrined in the review document as a central concept for the EU. The refinement of this concept as a guiding principle for the EU was an important element of the work undertaken to implement the ESS after its publication.<sup>26</sup> There is also a section of the document devoted to the security–development nexus and with Somalia cited as illustrative of the inter-linkage. Guinea-Bissau and the DRC are both cited as instances

where the EU's intervention has been driven by the drive for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. This documentation represents a good snap-shot of the various strands of the EU's policy towards the region as they have consolidated over the last half decade. Stress is also placed on how the EU is working with the AU and also how the Joint Africa–EU Strategy is being used as a vehicle through which to enhance African capabilities in crisis management. There is also reference to the development of a more significant relationship with South Africa since 2003.

The EU's Security Strategy and its implementation across the last five years provide key indicators to the EU's SB which are echoed in key documents that deal specifically with sub-Saharan Africa. The key CFSP document that encapsulates the EU's strategic objectives for sub-Saharan Africa is the Common Position adopted in January 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.<sup>27</sup> It establishes a number of principles that have guided EU policy. First, that the EU seeks to 'contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field'. Second, that to implement the policy there is close cooperation with the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations. Third, that conflict prevention, management and resolution need to be tackled through capacity-building at the international, regional and country level. The Common Position has been the platform on which the EU has developed a number of strands to its policy that have focused on capacity-building, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and on combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.<sup>28</sup>

### ***Sub-Saharan African strategic declarations***

From 2003 onwards strategic declaratory statements of the EU on sub-Saharan Africa have contained significant reference to both the security–development nexus and the human security imperative. The EU has 'uploaded' these two key strands of its strategic behaviour into its strategic objectives for the continent.

The security–development nexus was central to the European Africa Strategy adopted by the EU in October 2005, the central objective of which is to guide the EU's response in assisting with the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with an aim to 'strengthen its support in the areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (peace, security, good governance), areas that create a favourable economic environment for growth, trade and interconnection and areas targeting social cohesion and environment'.

Furthermore the EU outlined its response strategy to these objectives:

The EU will step up its efforts to foster peace and security by means of a wide range of actions, ranging from the support for African peace operations to a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention addressing the root causes of violent conflict. These actions also target cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support for regional and national strategies for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion in order to contribute to the reintegration of ex-combatants – including child soldiers – and stabilisation of post-conflict situations.<sup>29</sup>

This theme was reinforced at the second Africa–EU summit, 8–9 December 2007, in Lisbon under the Portuguese EU Presidency and at the level of heads of state and government from Africa and the EU. Running through the key declarations and documents of the summit

– the Lisbon Declaration and the Joint EU–Africa Strategy – is the characterization of the relationship as ‘Strategic Partnership’. This Partnership is to be structured through eight strands and with the objectives set out in a two-year Action Plan.

The Joint EU–Africa Strategy is replete with references to human security. The Strategy also makes peace and security one of the fourfold objectives of the partnership.<sup>30</sup> The security–development nexus is also presented as shared understanding that underpins the objectives for the partnership: ‘Africa and Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development.’ The ‘Peace and Security’ section of the Joint Strategy and its attendant action plan are primarily concerned with the EU facilitating African ownership of conflict prevention and conflict management and with the EU playing a facilitating, mentoring and assisting role.<sup>31</sup> Two key priorities are given to achieving full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Predictable Funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations.

These two elements of the Action Plan highlight a sub-Saharan Africa region-specific aspect of the EU’s SB. This is to sub-contract operational activity to African third parties – a *preference for local enforcement*. This aspect of the EU’s SB was systematically codified in the peace and security cluster part of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, adopted by the European Council in December 2005. This, in turn, was developed at greater length in the *EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts* in November 2006.<sup>32</sup> Measures and initiatives proposed in the concept would directly support the AU’s ongoing establishment of an APSA, including the creation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF).

These activities are being financed via the African Peace Facility (APF) intended to facilitate the African Union taking responsibility for African security. The APF provides EU financial support to facilitate capacity-building by African states and the AU particularly for the training of African troops to perform peace and security operations. Building African capabilities also diminishes the requirement for direct European military involvement on the continent. The APF funding is drawn from the European Development Fund (EDF) and for 2008–10 stood at €300 million. The initial €250 million funding of the Facility at its foundation in 2004 proved to be insufficient, particularly because of the costs involved with the AMIS operation, and funding was raised to €440 million by 2007.<sup>33</sup>

In examining a set of the EU’s strategic declaratory instruments as indicators of the EU’s SB it has been suggested that there are three strands which are apparent. Two of these strands are considered to be general and generic strands of the SB – the security–development nexus and the human security imperative – and there is a distinctive sub-Saharan Africa specific strand which is the preference for local enforcement.

### **Strategic behaviour: operational activity**

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the most significant cluster of CSDP activity since the initiation of such operations in 2003. These CSDP operations provide an important basis from which to assess the operational activity aspects of the EU’s behavioural culture. As indicated above the EU has established two key strands of its SB which can be identified through strategic declarations: the security–development nexus and the human security imperative. Through an examination of the sub-Saharan CSDP operations we can also see the third of strand of SB, which is the preference for local enforcement.

Each of the individual CSDP operations has been the subject of academic and policy analysis.<sup>34</sup> This analysis has been primarily to assess the motivations behind the deployment



of each of the operations, the difficulties with converting the mandate of the GAERC into a CSDP operation and whether the operation constituted a successful realization of its objectives. The interest for the purposes of this chapter is to examine these CSDP operations in totality to see what patterns can be discerned that are relevant for the characterizations of the EU's SB.

To analyse the ten sub-Saharan African CSDP operations they will first be considered against a typology of *operational types* and then against a set of *rationales* providing an indication as to where each fits with the three strands of SB outlined above.

### ***Operational types***

The fivefold operational types are presented in [Figure 16.1](#). The sub-Saharan CSDP operations have been categorized on the basis of the mandate criteria outlined in the Joint Action authoring the operation. All the EU's CSDP operations can also be placed on both a civilian–military spectrum and defined in terms of their operation type. The sub-Saharan operations to date account for four of these five types, with only a border assistance and monitoring mission not being deployed. Through the use of these four types of operations the EU has generated a particular set of characteristics for the operational aspects of its SB in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the CSDP deployments to date Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad–Central African Republic, EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta and the EU's support to the African Union's AMIS II operation in Sudan can be viewed as being at the military end of the civil–military spectrum. As we shall see below the circumscribed nature of these operations also fits within the human security imperatives identified above.

*Policing and police support operations:* two out of the nine CSDP operations to date can be characterized as this operational type – EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL, DR Congo. The second of these two operations was a successor operation to the first.

*Reform-focused operations: rule of law and security sector reform.* Three operations have been conducted under this category to date, the first the ongoing EU security sector reform mission EUSEC, DR Congo. The second operation is the completed EU SSR security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau. The third operation is the EU training mission to Somalia that was initiated last April. This is a military training mission for the development of the Somali security sector through the provision of specific military training, and support to the training provided by Uganda of 2,000 Somali recruits.

*Logistical assistance.* Only one CSDP operation to date has fallen into this category, which is the EU support to AMIS (Darfur) and which was EU technical support to the African Union, to assist it in the mounting of the AU's first ever large-scale peace support operation (AMIS II) in the Darfur region of Sudan. This was concluded on 31 December 2007, when AMIS was succeeded by UNAMID.

*Military deployments in support of Petersberg tasks.* Four military deployments have taken place in support of Petersberg tasks. First, the Artemis operation in the Congo (June–September 2003). Second, the EUFOR DRC (April–November 2006) operation to provide security for the general election process in the DRC. The third operation has also been concluded and was the EUFOR Chad–Central African Republic operation to protect the camps of refugees and displaced persons in the east of Chad and the north of the Central African Republic. The fourth and final operation of this type to date is the ongoing EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta, which is devoted to anti-piracy and anti-robbery operations off the coast of Somalia.




Figure 16.1 A typology of CSDP operations.

### **CSDP operations rationale-types**

Each of the CSDP operations can also be categorized on the basis of their correspondence to the security–development nexus, the human security imperative and the preference for local enforcement (see Figure 16.2).

The assessment of each CSDP operation has been through a combination of examination of the mission mandate, the activities undertaken during the mission’s duration and the actors involved in the implementation. The material used as the basis for the assessment is the IISS’s *Strategic Survey*, development indices, EU documentation and secondary source analysis.<sup>35</sup>

The CSDP operations can be categorized according to their correspondence to different aspects of the EU’s SB.

*Security–development nexus.* The majority of the EU’s sub-Saharan African CSDP operations demonstrate evidence of a the security–development nexus as providing a rationale for intervention. The locations of EU intervention in the DRC, the CAR and Guinea-Bissau are all countries that are both placed low on the development index and are also regions of lack of development and territories assessed as suffering from political instability and conflict.

*Human security imperative.* Here the rationale for EU intervention is where the EU has identified the individual, rather the state, as the primary security concern and has consequently intervened for reasons of human security. The EU’s Artemis operation is the most dramatic illustration of this imperative at work.




Figure 16.2 CSDP operations, rationale-types.

*Preference for local enforcement.* The EU has demonstrated a preference for local enforcement in the characteristics of its operations. First, all CSDP operations have been of a set duration, with the EU not seeking a prolonged duration to its commitment. Second, the EU preference has been to engage in activities to supply know-how to increase indigenous capacity, as through the EUPOL and SSR operations, or to provide support for African peace-keeping capacity through the AMIS operation.

The majority of the EU's sub-Saharan African CSDP operations demonstrate more than one aspect of the EU's SB. The only CSDP operation which cannot be easily located within this threefold schema of the EU's SB is the Atalanta operation. This operation is undertaken under the auspices of a UN mandate as with all other EU CSDP military deployments. As this operation is at an early stage of operation and the most recent of the EU's CSDP sub-Saharan Africa operations it may demonstrate other aspects of SB as it unfolds.

This analysis is a provisional attempt at considering the EU's CSDP operations as a part of a specific exercise in attempting to map the EU's SB. However, there is considerable scope for drawing appropriate comparisons between the EU's activities and those of other actors in future work. A key comparator for the EU's activities in sub-Saharan Africa is that of the United States. There are some potentially interesting comparisons to be drawn here. As Olson has noted it is striking to see how willing the European Union has been to use military forces in Africa in contrast to a greater US reluctance in recent years.<sup>36</sup>

## Conclusion

As this chapter is a preliminary undertaking it is also appropriate to reflect upon a number of issues which will require further consideration and examination in the further empirical work needed to refine the analysis.

First, the EU's activities in sub-Saharan Africa raise the question of the extent to which the experiences have been 'downloaded' into the EU's wider SC. To what extent have the EU's policies pursued through the CFSP/CSDP towards sub-Saharan Africa played a key role in impacting both on the direction of development of the totality of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy strategic culture and, crucially, in the forms of military intervention contemplated in the future?

Second, what is the relationship between the EU's SB in sub-Saharan Africa and the strategic cultures of the individual member states? This is particularly significant because decisions as to when and where to undertake CSDP operations have been driven by individual member states. Analysing EU involvement in sub-Saharan Africa in a manner that facilitates the study of the duality of the CSDP structure and involves the SC of individual EU member states as well as EU institutions and EU decision-makers has been previously identified as important by analysts.<sup>37</sup>

Third, where to best seek the evidence for how the EU SC has been generated and so to gauge its characteristics and development? This is a problematic recognized within the general literature on SC:

Just as all strategy has to be 'done' by operations which consist of tactical behaviour, so all strategic, operational, and tactical behaviour is 'done' by people and organisations that have been encultured supranationally, nationally, or sub-nationally.<sup>38</sup>

It is, however, still possible to draw a number of conclusions from the analysis within this chapter. The case study examination of the EU's foreign security and defence policy engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has allowed for the identification of components of the EU's SB. The use of strategic declarations that the EU has made towards the continent has allowed these to be identified and these have been further validated through examination of the CSDP operational activity that has been undertaken. Using the concepts of SB and SC the chapter tentatively suggests that the EU policy pursued towards sub-Saharan African demonstrates three characteristics to the EU's SB.

Sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be an invaluable case study through which to conduct this examination, as over recent years the continent has become an increasingly significant venue for the EU's foreign, security and defence policy. However, the EU has had a small 'footprint' in the region, confining its activities for the most part to the Great Lakes region, conflicts within Central Africa and a more recent involvement in the Horn of Africa. Consequently it remains to be seen if the EU will expand the scope and range of activities on the African continent and whether the SB identified in this chapter gains greater depth.

### Notes

- 1 Council of the EU (2007f).
- 2 Council of the EU (2008e: 8).
- 3 It is, however, noteworthy, how the agenda issues have shifted across time, with South Africa a predominant concern in early phases and with a wider set of agenda issues subsequently. For accounts of the development of the CFSP see: Nuttall (2000: ch. 9); Holland (1997, 2005). For a definitive account of the development of the CSDP see: Howorth (2007).
- 4 See the 'secondary source' section of note 35.
- 5 Krause (2003); Sicurelli (2008); Gegout (2005).
- 6 Johnston (1995a: 34).
- 7 Johnston (1995a).
- 8 Meyer (2006); Katzenstein (1996); Hoffmann and Longhurst (1999).

- 9 Gray (1999b: 50).
- 10 Gray (1999b: 51).
- 11 Rynning (2003).
- 12 Cornish and Edwards (2001, 2005).
- 13 Cornish and Edwards (2005: 820).
- 14 Menon (2009); Witney (2008).
- 15 There have been six Western Balkans CSDP operations to date: Althea; Concordia; EUPM/BiH; EULEX Kosovo; EUPAT/FYROM; Proxima/FYROM.
- 16 This chapter will largely confine itself to examination of the CSDP, rather than CFSP, strands of the EU's foreign and security policy as it provides the best basis from which to assess strategic behaviour.
- 17 These are key statements about the EU's intended strategy guiding its relationship with third parties. For a full exploration of the concept see: Whitman (1998: ch. 1); Whitman and Manners (1998). The idea is much refined and presented by Manners as informational diffusion, which is 'the result of strategic communications' (2002: 244).
- 18 Grilli (1994).
- 19 Olsen (2009c).
- 20 See note 17 and Manners (2002) for the notion of informational diffusion.
- 21 Council of the EU (2003c).
- 22 Council of the European Union, European Council 12 and 13 December 2003, Presidency Conclusions, 5381/04, Brussels, 5 February 2004.
- 23 Whitman (2006).
- 24 Council of the EU (2007f: 2).
- 25 Council of the EU (2008e).
- 26 Whitman (2006).
- 27 Council of the EU (2004e).
- 28 On the same date as approving the Common Position the Council also adopted conclusions on this subject, stressing that it was committed to assisting the African continent in developing a comprehensive conflict prevention policy with a view to long-term conflict prevention (Bull. 1/2-2004, point 1.6.185).

On 22 November 2004 the Council approved a peace and security action plan for Africa, focusing on capacity-building, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (Bull. 11-2004, point 1.6.119).

On 13 December 2004, it approved guidelines on implementation of support to peace and security in Africa under the European security and defence policy. The guidelines deal with the legal instruments required, budgetary and management aspects, and logistical and operational support (Bull. 12-2004).

On 2 December, 2004 further to existing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, the Council offered a funding and technical assistance to the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) Decision 2004/833/CFSP (OJ L 359, 4.12.2004; Bull. 12-2004).
- 29 Commission of the European Communities (2005).
- 30 The four objectives are: (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues.
- 31 Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, <[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007\\_action\\_plan\\_peace\\_security\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_peace_security_en.pdf)>.
- 32 Council of the EU (2006c).
- 33 For a full discussion of the funding arrangement and its support for APSA see: Pirozzi (2009).
- 34 See 'Secondary source material', note 35.
- 35 Primary source material: CFSP Joint Actions for each mission; International Institute for Strategic Studies (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008); United Nations Development Programme (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).

Secondary source material: Bagayoko (2004); Duke (2008); Faria (2004); Fiott (2008); Hendrickson, Strand and Raney (2007); Hoebeke, Carette and Vlassenroot (2007); Martinelli (2006, 2008); Merlingen and Ostraukaite (2005a); Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004).
- 36 Olsen (2009a).
- 37 Grimm (2003).
- 38 Gray (1999b).