


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11

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Converging, but in which direction?

Karen Del Biondo, Stefan Oltsch and Jan Orbie

The nexus between security and development policies has received great attention in recent years from policy-makers and academics alike. However, the notion of a correlation between security aspirations and economic development is not new at all: the European integration process is based on the idea that common economic development increases the security of Europe. New, however, is the intensity and the form of cooperation, coordination, coherence or harmonization aspired to by the two policy fields that used to follow rather separate policy objectives – while indeed development aid all too often was granted following the geo-strategic or economic interests of the donor.

The main assumption of the so-called security–development nexus is that both policy areas are mutually enhancing. Situations of severe insecurity – like armed conflicts – hinder economic development and destroy development investments; and lack of development – like severe poverty (or rather unequal access to resources) – might create causes for insecurity or feed into conflicts. Yet, the actual causal connections between development and security are far from being satisfactorily investigated, and thus, the characteristics and practical consequences for policy actors like the European Union (EU) remain ‘elusive and disputed’ (Büger and Vennesson, 2009: 4). Many controversies result from the fact that, as Büger and Vennesson point out, ‘the notions of development and security are broad and often ill-defined and the link between them can refer to many different, potentially contradictory, ends and means’. This is confirmed by research by Youngs, who found ‘notable discrepancies over basic definitions of what constitutes “development” and what constitutes “security”’ in interviews with EU policy-makers (Youngs, 2008: 426).

Thus, the next part of the chapter provides a brief conceptual clarification of the security–development nexus along two dimensions:¹ (1) in relation to policy *instruments*, development and security might tend either to diverge or to converge, when they are perceived as having either compatible or incompatible toolboxes; (2) in relation to policy *goals*, there might be a primacy of traditional development or of security policies. Taking these two dimensions into account, the subsequent parts of this chapter provide an overview of the

security–development nexus in EU external relations by looking at the EU’s policy declarations and institutional reforms and at recent EU initiatives and activities. We conclude that while the security and development spheres seem to be converging (dimension 1), there are also indications that security considerations are increasingly taking priority over the objectives of development aid (dimension 2).

Conceptualizing the security–development nexus: interconnected, but how?

Security approaches development: the two dimensions of human security

The question of what is seen as relevant to security policies has changed significantly during the last two decades. After the Second World War, the predominant concept for security policy was national security. Security policy had to secure the state from military threats by military (and diplomatic) means. Following the perception that, in addition to power–political threats, insecurity could also have economic, social, cultural or environmental causes, security policy concepts were extended and the spectrum of instruments for security policy to de-escalate crises had to be broadened – including civilian strategies. However, the state remained the reference object for security. This is problematic in so far as states themselves are among the biggest threats to human beings and a secure state does not necessarily guarantee or provide security for its residents.

The concept of human security meets these concerns. Human security is related to the security of people instead of states and defines security as the absence of severe threats to various areas of individual human survival. Individual human beings perceive various different threats to their security, such as losing their job, not having enough food, getting ill or being affected by violence or crimes. These threats now get into the focus of security-related policies. Hence, the necessary tools to achieve security must be enhanced as well, including mainly civilian and preventive measures.

It is worth mentioning that the concept was coined from a development perspective, namely by the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR), *New Dimensions in Human Security*, in 1994. The HDR defined human security in an all-embracing and quite unspecific manner as ‘freedom from fear’ (meaning freedom from direct threats to survival) and ‘freedom from want’ (encompassing economic threats, health issues, etc.) (UNDP, 1994). According to these two basic concepts, two main approaches to human security emerged in the course of the discussion during the 1990s: a narrow concept of human security, being limited to security from all kinds of violence, as in wars, violent conflicts, crimes or human right violations; and a broad concept, encompassing economic risks, health and social security, environmental risks, questions of education and even mental well-being and self-development.

In principle, the EU addresses both approaches to human security. In regard to the narrow concept – or the ‘protection dimension’ of human security (McFarlane and Khong, 2006) – the EU is an increasingly important actor in the protection of civilians in violent conflicts, which played a significant role in the development of the CFSP. Accordingly, the EU participates actively in the fight against land mines and small and light weapons, combats impunity from grave violations of human rights and played a large role in the creation of the International Criminal Court. The broader approach – the development dimension – of human security is pursued by the EU through adding it as an underlying principle of external assistance. For example, the EU Consensus on Development takes a ‘multi-dimensional’ approach to poverty, including issues of human security (European Union, 2006: 3).

Development approaches security: securitization and conflict sensitivity of development

Concepts of development policy have experienced a similar broadening in recent years. Actually, one background for effective development policy can be seen in the Marshall Plan, which was, in Marshall's own words, directed against 'hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos', which as Büger and Vennesson (2009: 7) note, 'is as good a definition of fragility as any'. Nevertheless, development cooperation initially focused on economic growth of partner countries – trying to trigger a trickle-down effect to increase the wealth of the population. Yet, this effect often failed to appear. In addition, connecting development policies to geo-strategic interests of the donors in the Cold War context rather undermined the development efforts and increased insecurity.

Hence, development concepts were gradually broadened and deepened. On the one hand, the referent objects shifted from nations to sub-state actors, communities, grassroots organizations or even households. On the other hand, focus issues were gradually expanded from economic growth over basic needs concepts, gender issues, environmental sustainability, human rights, good governance and civil conflict transformation to its recent objectives: the Millennium Development Goals. Both evolutions can be equally observed in the EU's development policies. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000) considers 'social and human development' as an area of support and mentions issues such as gender, sustainable development, human rights, democratization and good governance, security and the MDGs.

The concept of human development focuses on individual human beings in development cooperation and emphasizes the diversity of human needs and general improvement of human life in addition to pure economic growth.² This conceptual shift anticipated the theoretical and ethical shift that later was repeated by the human security discussion emerging out of traditional national security concepts. Like human security, the concept of human development focuses on people rather than on states and aims at the development of the potential of people and the enlargement of choices and well-being.³

Securitization of development issues might be in the interest of both security and development actors. From the development perspective, securitization would raise legitimate development objectives on the political agenda. Linking development issues with security concerns was often supposed to redirect security funds – such as the peace dividend after the Cold War – to development policy. This partly explains why the EU member states agreed to increase their spending of Official Development Assistance (ODA) following the 11 September terrorist attacks (Santiso, 2002). From the security perspective, securitization of development policy could be used to legitimize a shift of development objectives to areas of severe insecurity and to use development funds as well as the development toolbox to primarily reach security policy goals. Several commentators have warned against the development impact of such an evolution, also in EU external relations (e.g. Hadfield, 2007).

The existence of a general correlation between poverty, instability and violent conflicts is undisputed. Nevertheless, the real causality of the linkage is yet to be fully analysed (Tschirgi, 2006: 47; Tschirgi *et al.*, 2010: 2; Büger and Vennesson, 2009: 25). There is plenty of evidence that violent conflicts are more likely to occur in areas with low levels of economic development and a high level of inequality than in more prosperous regions. It can also be observed that most wars happen in the poorest regions of the world. However, poverty does not necessarily lead to conflict – it is only one of many factors (Tschirgi *et al.*, 2010: 3). It is equally clear that development policies can be undermined by insecure environments and that conflicts destroy development investments (Stewart, 2004: 5). On the other hand, a strict

focus on development goals can also increase insecurity, since development ‘is transitional by definition and therefore gives rise to instability’ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006: 99). As overall growth may fail to improve life for the poorest groups, development might increase inequality. In the development community it is furthermore widely acknowledged that development cooperation and humanitarian aid cannot be entirely neutral in areas of conflict but will become a part of it. By just pursuing legitimate development or humanitarian goals, it might feed into social conflicts by unintentionally strengthening dividing factors within the societies (Anderson, 1999).

Since development cooperation thus cannot work around conflicts and insecurity, security issues at least have to be taken into account: development policies need to be sensitive to their security outcome. In addition to conflict-sensitive development policy, development actors are well equipped to use their approaches and methods to directly support civil conflict transformation.

How to merge EU policies?

Given this empirical uncertainty over the relation between security and development, it may not come as a surprise that merging these two policy areas is highly disputed. On the one hand, the merger of security and development policies might open various options to improve European foreign policies. On the other, even given all the consonance and correlations, development and security still enjoy separate objectives, and concentrating on the nexus might bear the risk of neglecting or subordinating these objectives under the goals of another policy field. Apart from the ideas behind the enhancement of the security–development nexus, there are also bureaucratic interests involved. In the EU context, it can be seen as an opportunity to detach development funds for security purposes, which are typically located in the European Commission (Bagayoko and Gilbert, 2009), but also as an opportunity for policy-makers at the Commission’s DG Development to increase their relevance and to broaden their scope (Büger and Vennesson, 2009: 11).

Büger and Vennesson’s (2009: 4) matrix provides insight into the sensitive political questions that emerge because of the overlap between security and development. The first dimension refers to a potential *convergence or divergence* of the two policy fields. To what extent are the toolboxes of EU development and security policies compatible with each other? Convergence implies that organizations or practices in the policy fields could in principle be integrated into one single set of policies. Although divergence would mean that cooperation between the security and development realm is difficult, this does not necessary imply that both spheres are conflictive or incoherent. Rather, divergence refers to the independence of security and development policies. Apart from the question whether there is convergence or divergence, a second question refers to which policy field is prioritized. Does the EU give priority to security or development goals? What is integrated into what? The second dimension thus looks at whether there is a *primacy* of security or development objectives. Keeping these two dimensions in mind, the following sections will examine the EU’s documents and activities in relation to the security–development nexus.

The security–development nexus in the EU’s discourse and institutions

The merger of security and development policies can easily be found in the EU’s policy declarations and it can be considered one of the guiding motives behind the institutional reforms over the past decade. The first concrete EU document reflecting this merger was

the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, which emphasized that ‘development policy and other co-operation programmes provide, without doubt, the most powerful instruments at the Community’s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict’ (European Commission, 2001: 9). The Communication was followed by the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, adopted by the European Council in June 2001, which made conflict prevention a central objective of the EU’s external relations and invited the European Commission to strengthen the conflict prevention elements in the Country Strategy Papers setting out the development strategies. Many more documents have followed, both from the development and the security realm, inspired by a change from mono-causal thinking whereby development determines security, to a more cyclical view on the complex relation between both concepts (Hadfield, 2007).

From a development perspective, two important documents clearly illustrate this evolution: the European Consensus on Development of 2005, which replaces the Development Policy Statement of 2000; and the revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2005, which replaces the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000. The European Consensus states that ‘Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur.’ Article 11 of the revised Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries introduced new sections on the ‘Fight against terrorism’ and ‘Cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. Cooperation on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became an ‘essential element’ of the agreement, alongside human rights, democracy and the rule of law.⁴ The second revision of Cotonou in 2010 further amended Article 11, emphasizing the parties’ commitment to addressing situations of fragility. There is also a reference to human security and a commitment that ‘the interdependence between security and development shall inform the activities in the field of peace building, conflict prevention and resolution, which shall combine short and long-term approaches’.

The Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) (2005) initiative, another key document on EU development policies, identifies security as one of the 12 priority areas and reiterates that ‘there can be no development without peace and security; and no peace and security without development’ (European Commission, 2005b).⁵ The Joint Africa–Europe Strategy of 2007 also has a separate partnership on peace and security. It states that ‘peace and security lie at the foundation of progress and sustainable development’. However, somewhat surprisingly, the reverse relationship is less pronounced. Equally, the partnership on the MDGs does not refer to peace and security (except for food security).

This brings us to the security perspective. Here the landmark document is the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, which clearly states that ‘security is a precondition of development’. In addition, the ESS considers ‘development activities’ as one of the tools at the Union’s disposal to pursue its ‘strategic objectives’. Within the development community and the academic world, the ESS has been castigated for putting too much emphasis on threats and defence rather than on the root causes of conflict and insecurity, hence turning away from human security and from the conflict prevention objectives of the Gothenburg Programme (Kaldor and Glasius, n.d.: 5; see also Manners, 2006a; European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2006). According to Youngs (2008), in Brussels the ESS is mainly seen as ‘Solana’s baby’, from which the Commission distances itself. In this context, he also states that the then Development Commissioner, Nielson, ‘was progressively excluded from policy deliberations after the September 11 attacks and that, despite cultivating a higher profile, his successor Louis Michel has failed to reverse this trend’.

This apparent lack of convergence between the security and development spheres has been addressed through various institutional reforms in the past decade (dimension 1 on policy instruments). However, here too, fears that security would be prioritized over development have emerged (dimension 2 on policy goals, see above). Already in the context of the Gothenburg Programme, a Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit was established within DG Relex in order to coordinate and mainstream the Commission's conflict prevention and management activities *and* to provide the link with their Council counterparts. Yet discussions on the making of a 'European Civilian Peace Corps' and a 'Human Security Doctrine for Europe' were not productive (see Gänzle, 2009). Moreover, a number of reforms of the EU's development policy architecture fuelled fears that more convergence might equal less development; or more specifically, that development would be subordinated to foreign policy and security goals. First, the establishment of EuropeAid for the implementation of aid policies in 2001 strengthened the power of the Commissioner for External Relations, who chaired the new agency's board, while the Development Commissioner is Chief Executive. Second, the Development Council was abolished as a formal body and integrated in the broader General Affairs and External Relations Council in 2002. Still, the Development Council continued to meet informally (Orbie and Versluys, 2008: 82).

Institutional innovations from the Lisbon Treaty are undoubtedly more far-reaching. While the new treaty aims to improve coherence of the EU's external action, the concerns mentioned above that the Commission's aid budgets would be controlled by those in charge of foreign and security policy have only increased. To be sure, the treaty recognizes development aid as an independent policy area with the eradication of poverty as its principal aim.⁶ Provisions on development cooperation also include a commitment to PCD, by stating that 'The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries' (Art. 208). However, the main responsibility for the coherence of the EU's international action lays with the newly established function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is also the vice-president of the European Commission. In the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Treaty (Art. 42(4)) states that the HR 'may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate'. The question whether this 'EU Foreign Affairs Minister' would eclipse the development sphere was central in the discussions on the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS), which according to the Lisbon Treaty should assist the HR and will comprise officials from the Council General Secretariat, the Commission and the member states' diplomatic services. The Council decision establishing the EEAS stipulates that the agency should respect the development objectives set out in the Lisbon Treaty. However, the whole debate revolved around the incorporation of development budget and staff in the EEAS. The EEAS decision states that the HR will 'ensure overall political coordination of the EU's external action', including through the EU's budgetary instruments. The programming and management of these instruments (e.g. Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes) will be prepared by the EEAS in cooperation with the Commission.

Decisions in relation to the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) need to be approved by the EEAS, but will be prepared under the responsibility of the Development Commissioner (Council of the EU, 2010b). It is unclear how this 'dual key' between the HR and the Development Commissioner will work in practice (Furness, 2010). The latter's ability to leave a stamp on these decisions

can be questioned, given the reduced number of staff at DG Development (DG DEV). Indeed, 93 employees at DG DEV, including staff from the geographical desks, have moved to the new agency, together with the entire staff from DG Relex, which has been abolished (European Union, 2010b). The remaining part of DG DEV has merged with former DG AIDCO or EuropeAid, responsible for the implementation of EU development assistance, forming the new DG Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO). Hence, DG Development, formerly responsible for the entire aid programming and political relations with the ACP region, has now been transformed into an administration responsible in the first place for the implementation stages of EU development policies (such as establishing annual action programmes and implementation) in all regions. In addition, the new EU Delegations in the field, which provide much input into the programming and management of aid funds, will henceforth report to the HR (interview, 11 August 2010).⁷ However, fears that the Commission's responsibilities in aid programming would be fully assumed by the EEAS were not wholly confirmed. Indeed, despite earlier plans to move the entire geographical desks to the EEAS, the new DG DEVCO will continue to have geographical desks, with which the EEAS will cooperate in the programming phases. Moreover, this cooperation will also take place in the EU Delegations, which will comprise diplomats from EU member states, EEAS staff and people from DG DEVCO (personal communication, 6 October 2011). Various development NGOs argue that the EEAS goes against the spirit and the letter of the Lisbon Treaty and that its role should be restricted to the CFSP, whereas decisions on the spending of development aid should remain within the Commission (CIDSE *et al.*, 2010). Some advocate a more formal and comprehensive coordination of aid programming between the EEAS and the Commission. They argue that the EEAS development structure should be reinforced by establishing a separate Development Directorate. Under these conditions, the EEAS could be an opportunity for a more effective development policy embedded in a more coherent external European policy (ECDPM and ODI, 2010; Furness, 2010).

Officials close to the HR stress that poverty reduction objectives will continue to guide the management of development budgets, but at the same time emphasize that development can no longer be separated from foreign policy considerations:

We are unfortunately living in a world where development depends on political factors. You do not make development in the Sudan or Somalia and forget that there is a political context. That is what the EEAS is about. It is not a way of trying to divert development money to so-called political purposes. It's about how you best promote the interests of that particular country.

(quoted in *EUObserver*, 27 April 2010)

Summarizing, over the past decade the EU's main documents and institutional structures have continually emphasized the need to address the challenges in the security–development nexus. Yet it is unclear to what extent security and development policies have converged in practice. Moreover, there has been a constant concern that development goals could become subordinated to foreign and security policy purposes. The next section takes a closer look at both perspectives by considering the EU's activities and initiatives in the security–development realm.

The security–development nexus in EU policy practice

Increasing convergence?

Is the EU's aim to increase convergence between security and development more than lip service? The EU's foreign policy system is notorious for its compartmentalization, facilitating stove-piping and hindering a coherent approach between the various sub-systems (see e.g. Pilegaard, 2009; Olsen, 2009b). In relation to security and development, there are indeed indications that, in practice, there are still high walls between both spheres. Echoing the results of several studies on this topic, Büger and Vennesson (2009: 32–3) criticize the fact that the EU's rhetorical commitment to 'coordinating more' has barely impacted on concrete situations on the ground. They stress that 'there is no clear indication that current coordination initiatives have led to either a subordination or prioritization of security or development policies, *because coordination has not been functioning well*' (emphasis added). The 'coordination bubble' in Brussels even has the adverse effect that it diffuses policy responsibility over European decisions on difficult conflict situations. Similarly, in an empirically rich account of the EU's conflict and development policies, Faria and Youngs (2010: 4) emphasize that the security and development spheres have hardly been integrated in the field: 'ESDP missions are still not actually "integrated", but simply have military and civilian strands running in parallel – "in awkward juxtaposition and rarely dovetailing well"'. The priority is still on short-term and crisis management operations, which overshadow long-term and development issues and neglect the reform of state structures and the fundamental causes of conflict. There is first a military decision, and only in a second stadium are development, governance or security experts consulted. For example, Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives promoted by the EU still look like 'fairly standard counter-terrorist programmes, with few tangible reform aspects' (Faria and Youngs, 2010: 2). Although only projects to increase the democratic responsiveness of armed forces are accepted as development aid according to the OECD–DAC criteria for ODA (OECD, 2007b) and the EU considers good governance as a 'link in the chain' between security and development (Youngs, 2008: 16), SSR missions have focused much more on the efficiency than the accountability of armed forces in developing states (Youngs, 2008: 7). An OECD–DAC evaluation voiced similar concerns on the limited connection between ESDP missions and long-term development planning (OECD, 2007c: 66). One of the main reasons for this lack of convergence is the 'ramshackle institutional machinery' (Sheriff, 2007: 89) of the EU, with the Council focusing on short-term actions such as crisis management, and the Commission being concerned with long-term activities including conflict prevention and good governance. The difficulty of overcoming this institutional divide is shown by the drafting process of an EU Concept on SSR: both the Council and the Commission prepared their own documents. Thus, the problem seems not that EU development has become securitized, but rather that its security initiatives are not being 'developmentalized', and that both foreign policy subsystems are still going their own way.

Several authors suggest that the security foreign policy sub-system is not really interested in or well informed on development issues, while development actors remain highly sceptical of the security sphere (Youngs, 2008; see also Olsen, 2009b). When analysing the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) of the EU (2007–13), Hout (2010) also comes to the conclusion that the complexity of security, development and related governance issues is recognized in the country analysis, but that it remains limited to technocratic reforms which do not tackle fundamental reforms in a country, including developmental issues. CSPs include a security dimension only in theory, but not really in practice. Thus, the two policy fields are still far

from integrating – and increased coordination is necessary. The same divergence also seems to exist between humanitarian aid and ESDP policies such as civilian crisis management and conflict prevention (OECD, 2007c: 98).

Over the past five years, several EU initiatives have been launched to increase convergence. Two sets of Council Conclusions were prepared in the course of 2007 and adopted in November 2007. The first conclusions on Security and Development were prepared by DG Relex and focused on the need to coordinate between short- and long-term planning and actions, and between security, development and foreign policies (Council of the EU, 2007c). The second conclusions recognized the need to address the problem of fragile states, which are perceived as security threats by the EU (see, for example, the ESS) because these countries are the breeding ground for terrorism and organized crime. Both Council Conclusions emphasize the need to address institutional divergence by adopting a ‘whole-of-government approach’: getting different ministries to act as a coherent whole (Doelle and de Harven, 2008: 47). For example, in the case of SSR, this can be achieved by enhancing information flows on SSR activities, pursuing field coordination, carrying out joint assessments, pooled funding, etc. (Council of the EU, 2007d). As a follow-up to these conclusions, it was agreed that the EU would adopt an Action Plan in 2009 for implementing the Council Conclusions on both topics, jointly prepared by development and security officials. Four areas for increasing coherence were identified: strategic planning, SSR, partnerships with (sub)regional organizations and humanitarian aid and security. In this context, two studies were commissioned which provide an interesting overview of the EU’s policies in the security–development nexus and which both recommend a more convergent and comprehensive EU approach (Commission of the European Communities and Soges SpA, 2008; HTSPE Ltd, 2008). Meanwhile, the OECD-DAC had also issued a critical evaluation of the limited convergence in the EU’s approach to fragile states (OECD, 2007c: 66–7). In a recent document on Policy Coherence in Development (European Commission, 2010d: 33–40), the Commission suggests that there is still room for improvement in the coherence of development and security. The report makes several suggestions, such as the full involvement of development actors in the planning and implementation of crisis management missions, taking development objectives into account in security spending, making development plans more conflict sensitive and using the various instruments for conflict prevention more coherently. The long-expected action plan has still not been finalized; however, a concrete implementation of the conclusions is currently being tried with the EEAS’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, which is intended as a joint strategy with different pillars (conflict resolution, governance, fight against terrorism, economic development, etc.) (personal communication, 6 October 2011).

Another attempt to cope with the apparent divergence between security and development policies is the introduction of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2007 to finance projects that operate in the grey zone between security and development policy. The Commission and European Parliament wanted a more ambitious instrument which also includes peace-keeping and peace support, but the Council eliminated these concepts from the original proposal (Gänzle, 2009: 59–60). Its primary goal is to enable the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises. However, short-term security aims seem to dominate in the use of the IfS. The crisis response component accounts for the majority of the IfS (at least 73 per cent of the budget), while the rest goes to a long-term component, meant to provide assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. According to Faria and Youngs (2010: 2), ‘The Commission itself stresses that the Stability Instrument ... has not been designed to feed into development goals. Funding from this budget has gone to immediate crisis

response priorities such as mediation, demobilisation, security cooperation, displaced persons and transitional justice.’ The Commission has indeed acknowledged that synergies between the EDF and the DCI, which are mainly geared towards development objectives, and the IfS, which is mainly used for conflict prevention, peace-building and security purposes, could be enhanced (European Commission, 2010d: 39–40). There is also an institutional obstacle to more convergence between security and development in the implementation of the IfS: its management was the responsibility of DG Relex, while aid allocations to the ACP countries fell within the mandate of DG Development (Commission of the European Communities and Soges SpA, 2008: 90–1). Although the new EEAS could be an improvement in this regard, the fact that the EEAS will be responsible for the programming phases of the IfS, while EDF and DCI funds are jointly programmed by DG DEVCO and the EEAS, indicates that the IfS is still being regarded in the first place as a foreign policy instrument, in contrast to the development-oriented EDF and DCI. The IfS has increased the speed of Community responses, and has potential to improve convergence. However, its success will ultimately depend on the political will of member states in the Political and Security Committee and the geographical working groups to coordinate closely with the Commission on embedding IfS measures within the EU’s broader foreign and security policy (Gänzle, 2009: 8).

Coherence for development, or primacy of security?

At the same time, there are indications that security considerations are more and more overshadowing the EU’s development policy. As suggested by Woods (2005: 13), ‘in the name of coherence, a greater diversion of aid flows for geostrategic purposes may take place, and increased coordination would magnify that effect’. Can such criticisms, mainly based on policy documents and institutional reforms (see above), also be confirmed in the EU’s concrete initiatives and activities? Although it is too early to give a definitive verdict, we will attempt to offer some insights by ‘following the money’: to what extent is EU ODA, as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), used for geopolitical and security-related goals?

The most obvious example of a diversion of EU development money is the financing of the African Peace Facility (APF) for peacekeeping and peace enforcement with money from the EDF. While the IfS is an example of additional development funds for security-related expenses, security-related EDF expenditures for the APF are not compensated with additional budgets for development. The EDF regulation suggests that, in the choice of projects financed by the APF, ODA-eligible projects are given priority. However, almost half of the entire APF budget until now has been contributed to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which does not qualify as ODA. Faria and Youngs (2010: 2) conclude that development activities in the context of the APF ‘still represent the lowest share of all APF priorities’.

More generally, it should be noticed that some EU countries, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy, supported by the US, provoked a fierce debate within the OECD-DAC with their demand to broaden the definition of ODA to include peacekeeping operations. They were opposed by Sweden, the UK, Norway and Japan, and to a lesser extent Germany (interview, 25 August 2010). Eventually, a limited extension of ‘conflict-, peace- and security-’ related expenses was qualified as ‘DAC’-able’ from 2004/5 onwards.⁸ This extension did not immediately lead to a great increase in the European Commission’s and EU15’s spending on conflict, peace and security, which remained about 1 per cent of their total ODA. However, in recent years, a considerable surge can be noted. The Commission now spends over 3.5 per cent of its ODA on this category, which is similar to the USA’s share of

security-related ODA and slightly higher than the EU15 (see [Figure 11.1](#)), which saw large increases by the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and the UK.

In addition, recent reports by the NGO consortia CONCORD and AidWatch point out that some EU member states such as Germany and the Netherlands have been trying to include peacekeeping costs, for example in Afghanistan, as ODA. The new member states, which hardly have any OECD monitoring and public scrutiny of development, are known for spending much of their development aid on security-related expenses. For example, a large part of Lithuanian aid goes to the NATO mission in Afghanistan (CONCORD and AidWatch, 2009: 41) and about one third of Poland and Hungary's ODA goes to Afghanistan (CONCORD and Aidwatch, 2010: 12).⁹ In 2009, the European Commission again raised the issue, suggesting that discussion in the OECD-DAC should continue to resolve the situation of many peace- and security-related activities that are not covered by the current ODA definition (European Commission, 2009b: 32).

Another indication comes from the main beneficiaries of EU development aid. While the top ten of EU beneficiaries were almost exclusively sub-Saharan African countries in the period 1989–95, European countries in the Western Balkans became increasingly important from 1999 onwards. Turkey, an upper-middle-income country, but strategically closely located to the EU and a candidate for EU membership, is the top recipient since 2004. In addition, Afghanistan appeared on the list after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the US military invasion. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, countries in conflict such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan or partner countries in the fight against terrorism such as Ethiopia are preferred aid recipients. On the other hand, there were also some least-developed countries (LDCs) not very important to the EU's security interests, such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda, in the top ten in 2004/5 and 2007/8 (see [Figure 11.2](#)).

Linked to the discussion on poverty reduction versus EU strategic interests is the regional distribution of EU funds. Multilateral EU aid does not seem to go primarily to the poorest countries in the world – actually it never has and was always given to countries with special relationships with or of specific interest to donor countries. This is even more so for the EU, which is focused on other regions such as the European neighbourhood, than for EU member states. However, after the Cold War, geopolitical interests had become less important in aid distribution. This trend has changed again, and in recent years the EU has distributed its funds increasingly to countries that are important for the EU's own security interests. Aid to sub-Saharan Africa has fluctuated in the last decennium, reaching its lowest points in 1997 and 2002, but has remained mostly above 40 per cent. Aid to Europe has increased even further since 1999, and reached no less than one third of total aid in 2007 ([Figure 11.2](#)).¹⁰ Although the EU claims poverty reduction to be the main objective of its development assistance (European Union, 2006; Lisbon Treaty Article 208), its ODA to LDCs has known a sharp decrease since the mid-1990s. While LDCs still received over 40 per cent of total EU aid in 1995, this was only 33.1 per cent in 2008. Similarly, aid to lower-middle-income countries declined by almost 20 percentage points between 1997 and 2008. In contrast, aid to upper-middle-income countries, such as Belarus, Croatia, Turkey or Serbia, grew steadily from about 7 per cent in 1995 to almost 25 per cent in 2008 ([Figure 11.3](#)).

Thus, it is clear that countries in the EU's neighbourhood, which undoubtedly constitutes a region of strategic priority, are the main beneficiaries of EU development aid. If we extend the list of strategically important countries and regions for the EU, adding those that are referred to as threats in the ESS (e.g. the Great Lakes region, India and Pakistan

in relation to Kashmir, North Korea, the Middle East, fragile states), or that are either important partners in the fight against terrorism (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Nigeria) or provide a potential breeding ground or safe haven for terrorists (Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia), countries that are crucial in the fight against drug trafficking (Colombia) or that are identified as strategic in Biscop's chapter in this volume (e.g. Sudan/Darfur and neighbouring countries; the Sahel as a whole, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf Region), we come to the conclusion that they constituted more than 60 per cent of all EC aid in 2008.¹¹ In addition, those states that can be defined as 'fragile' (according to the World Bank LICUS index) but that *cannot* be considered as strategic have received only a limited amount of EU development aid (on average about 7 per cent, only 3.2 per cent in 2008) over the past decade. Similarly, if we take the group of LDCs that are not strategic, these have only received 15 per cent of total EU aid on average since 1999.

Conclusion

While a consensus has emerged that security and development objectives are mutually enhancing, the interaction between both external policy spheres raises sensitive political issues. These are perhaps even more prominent in the EU which has considerable experience with development aid, but has only recently embarked on a foreign security policy. Therefore, these discussions also touch on the very nature of the EU's (putative) international identity as a civilian or normative power.

Since the security–development nexus is a relatively recent topic on the EU's agenda (e.g. Instrument for Stability in 2007, Council Conclusions on fragile states in the same year, current discussions on ODA definition, forthcoming action plan on security–development, etc.), it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on where the EU is heading to. Indeed, it seems that the EU is still in the process of defining its approach to the security–development nexus. However, based on recent discourses and initiatives, and referring to the matrix outlined in the first part of the chapter, we can tentatively say that the development and security toolboxes seem to be converging (dimension 1 on policy instruments), and that this goes with a prioritization of security over developmental objectives (dimension 2 on policy goals). A closer examination of ODA flows also revealed that a large part of EU aid budgets are directed towards countries that are strategically important for the EU, to the detriment of countries that are of less importance from a security perspective. This trend might be reinforced through the post-Lisbon foreign policy arrangements which enhance the muscle of Europe's foreign and security policy apparatus over development issues.

This resonates with the more general finding in the literature that the EU is increasingly aspiring to a 'great power' status on the international scene. A paradigmatic shift seems to be taking place whereby the EU is abandoning its civilian or normative power role which emphasizes non-traditional, 'human' security issues, in favour of a 'drive towards martial potency' (Manners, 2006a), a 'global power' (Rogers, 2009a) and a 'superpower temptation' (Diez, 2009). Other authors have suggested that the EU's new attention for security issues in Africa cannot only be explained by real concerns for the security situation, but also by their symbolic role in establishing the EU as a significant and legitimate player on the international scene (Olsen, 2004; Bagayoko and Gilbert, 2009).


Is the 'Europe as a peace project' idea clearing the ground for 'EU superpower' ambitions (Kaldor and Glasius, n.d.: 1)? As emphasized above, definitive conclusions are hard to draw. However, given the EU's increased aspirations on the foreign security front, it is questionable whether a sustainable balance in the security–development nexus can be maintained.

Annexe

Table 11.1 Top ten recipients of EC ODA, 1989–2008


	1989–90	1994–5	1999–2000	2004–5	2007–8
1	Côte d'Ivoire	Morocco	Former Republic of Yugoslavia	Turkey	Turkey
2	Cameroon	Ethiopia	Morocco	Serbia and Montenegro	Palestinian Adm. Areas
3	Mozambique	Egypt	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Morocco	Ethiopia
4	India	Ex-Yugoslavia	Sts. Ex-Yugoslavia unsp.	Afghanistan	Morocco
5	Ethiopia	Côte d'Ivoire	Egypt	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Serbia
6	Bangladesh	Mozambique	Tunisia	Egypt	Afghanistan
7	Sudan	Cameroon	South Africa	Palestinian Adm. Areas	Sudan
8	Egypt	Zimbabwe	Turkey	India	Egypt
9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Uganda	Albania	Mozambique	Croatia
10	Kenya	Bangladesh	Macedonia/ FYROM	Tanzania	Uganda

Source: OECD (2002; 2007c).




Source: Based on data from OECD Creditor Reporting System (online).

Figure 11.1 ODA commitments: conflict, peace and security, EC, EU and US (percentages).




Source: Based on data from OECD Creditor Reporting System (online).

Figure 11.2 EC ODA commitments by region (percentages).



Source: Based on data from OECD Creditor Reporting System (online).

Figure 11.3 EC ODA commitments by income category (percentages).



Source: Based on data from OECD Creditor Reporting System (online).

Figure 11.4 EC ODA commitments by income category.

Notes

- 1 These two dimensions are based on a matrix Büger and Vennesson proposed in their paper ‘Security, development and the EU’s development policy’ (2009).
- 2 According to the definition of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), ‘[h]uman development is about much more than the rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. ... Fundamental to enlarging these choices is building human capabilities – the range of things that people can do or be in life. The most basic capabilities for human development are to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community’ (UNDP 2001: 9).
- 3 Although a lot of consonance can be found, the concepts must not just be equated with each other. Human security pledges for the capability to cope with insecurities to allow a life free from dangers. Development aims at the continuous improvement of the conditions in which humans live. Human development means an extension of human possibilities and human security means the potential to make use of those possibilities. The focus of development thus is growth; the focus of security is the prevention of crises or, as Amartya Sen puts it: ‘Growth with equity’, ‘downturn with security’ (Sen, 2000).
- 4 For a detailed analysis, see Hadfield, 2007; Gänzle, 2009: 39.
- 5 In addition, the new PCD approach proposed in 2009 identifies ‘security and development’ as one of the five priorities (European Commission, 2009b).
- 6 The eradication of poverty also appears among the general objectives of EU external action, see Art. 3(5) and Art. 21(2).
- 7 In addition, some interesting evolutions are taking place at the level of the Council of Ministers. Although it seems that the meetings of development ministers will henceforth be held separately from the meetings with the ministers of foreign affairs, and will be prepared by the CODEV and ACP committees, they will also be chaired by the HR. Ashton has already vowed to ‘seriously

influence' the agenda, e.g. by putting Afghanistan and Somalia on the top of the development agenda in 2010 (interview, 11 August 2010).

- 8 Five categories were identified: (1) management of security expenditure; (2) enhancing civil society's role in the security system; (3) prevention of the recruitment of child soldiers; (4) security system reform; (5) civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution; and (6) the prevention of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (OECD, 2008).
- 9 Nevertheless, not all examples point towards a tendency to include more and more security-related expenses as ODA. Although it has a large military presence in Afghanistan, the UK reports only little security assistance as ODA (CONCORD and AidWatch, 2010).
- 10 Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus (until 1996), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia (until 2002), Turkey.
- 11 Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, Uganda, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, India, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Moldova, Turkey, Colombia, Palestinian Territories, North Korea.

