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

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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European Security Institutions 1945–2010

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PART I

The EU as an international security actor

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EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 1945–2010

The weaknesses and strengths of 'Brusselsization'

Jolyon Howorth

A 'security institution' can be anything from a treaty-based alliance such as NATO to a small European Council Secretariat working-group such as the Committee on the Western Balkans (COWEB). Hundreds of such institutions contribute to the management of European security. The common feature behind all of them is their underlying purpose: cooperation in the field of security between sovereign member states and/or their agents. The underlying assumption is that each institution offers a positive-sum outcome. The post-World War II history of such institutions nevertheless reveals a tension between two contrasting approaches to security: Europeanist and Atlanticist; externalized and internalized (Cleveland, 1966; Schmidt, 2001). For the greater part of the Cold War period, Atlanticism and externalization held undisputed sway through NATO. However, prior to 1954 and since the mid-1980s, attempts to create *internalized Europeanist* institutions have competed with, while nevertheless simultaneously attempting to cooperate with, the NATO model. This double dichotomy was brought into focus as early as 11 November 1944 during a meeting in Paris between Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle suggested to Churchill that, whatever the differences in the wartime experiences of their two countries, when faced with the new reality of a bipolar world dominated by two superpowers, they henceforth shared objective strategic comparability, and probably identical interests. De Gaulle proposed a Franco-British security partnership – both to put Europe back on its feet and to help shape the contours of the emerging world order (de Gaulle, 1959: 63–4 and 367–78). Churchill listened attentively before informing de Gaulle that, unlike France, which effectively had only a European option, Great Britain also had an Atlantic option, from which the country fully intended to benefit (Churchill, 1954: 218–20). Thus were evoked, even before the war ended, the two dimensions of that double dichotomy which has divided European policy-makers ever since.

During the closing months of World War II, blueprints for the creation of a *West European security bloc* had been developed in a number of European countries – Norway, Holland, Belgium, France and Britain (Young, 1984: 5). Notwithstanding Churchill's response to de Gaulle, virtually all these different projects attributed to the UK, in association with

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France, the responsibility for leading such a European security arrangement. At first, the British seemed keen. In the immediate post-war years, Britain saw closer association with the Continent as essential – albeit limited to military and security issues (Young, 1984: 7). Most 'continentals' on the other hand were already thinking in terms of economic and even political integration. The institutional process which would eventually lead to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 was tentatively set in motion. The Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (4 March 1947), essentially directed against a hypothetical resurgent Germany, was the first formal post-war agreement between two European nation-states (Greenwood, 1989). By the spring of 1948, both the launch of the Marshall Plan (5 June 1947) and the Soviet take-over of Czechoslovakia (February 1948) had transformed the European security situation. The German 'problem' had been overtaken by the Soviet 'threat'. Europe needed to close ranks. The Treaty of Brussels (17 March 1948) marked the first major step on the road to European integration, involving as it did economic, social, cultural and security dimensions. Although the term 'Brusselsization' was coined only in the 1990s (Allen, 1998) the phenomenon first appeared as early as 1948.

The Brussels Treaty was impelled by both an internal European logic (it made eminent sense for the European nation-states to put an end to their centuries-long civil war) and an external American logic (the Marshall Plan was conditional on the European recipient states coming together to cooperate on optimal spending of the US stimulus money). In this way, the externalization/internalization dichotomy was hard-wired into the very origins of the European security-institutional process. That dichotomy was reinforced by two consecutive events, one featuring externalization, the other internalization. The first was the European effort, between 1948 and 1949, to persuade the USA to enter into an entangling alliance, the result of which was the creation of NATO (Cook, 1989; Acheson, 1987). The second was the parallel effort, between 1950 and 1954, to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) (Fursdon, 1980). While European nations (including France and the UK) proved prepared to pool and indeed even to alienate sovereignty in the US-underwritten security institutions of NATO, they ultimately proved unwilling (especially France and the UK) to share sovereignty in a purely European institutional arrangement such as the EDC. Instead, they built on the 1948 Brussels commitments through the 1950 creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first supranational institution of the future EU. According to its architect, Jean Monnet, the ECSC's avowed aim was, by pooling the raw materials of conflict, to 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible'. However, the early promise of internalized security institutions faded with the 1954 defeat of the EDC. The dynamic created by the ECSC was instead to lead to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which prioritized integration through markets and economics. At the same time, under largely British diplomatic pressure, the security dimension of the Brussels Treaty was subsumed under the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, whereby West Germany and Italy joined NATO (Deighton, 1997). Throughout the remainder of the Cold War, therefore, any prospect of *internalized European* security institutions was off the agenda. The first tussle between the two contrasting approaches to European security awarded game, set and match to the externalized Atlanticist model. The internal, Europeanist efforts implicit in Dunkirk, Brussels and the EDC would have to wait until the 1990s to be offered a second chance.

Beyond the Cold War: reviving internalized European security institutions

The institutional arrangements offered by NATO were never perceived by Europeans as entirely satisfactory (Freedman, 1980). External dependency on the USA generated internal

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demotivation, which simply exacerbated the dependency. France, indeed, found this vicious circle so unsatisfactory as to warrant withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structures (Vaïsse *et al.*, 1996). But for as long as the Soviet threat persisted, the Europeans seemed in no position to guarantee their own security. This situation began to change in the 1980s for three reasons. First, as a result of growing recognition that dependency and demotivation constituted a potentially lethal cocktail in the context of an increasingly unilateral American administration. In his first term, Ronald Reagan seemed prepared to risk limited nuclear war in Europe. In his second term, he seemed prepared to abolish nuclear weapons (along with their perceived deterrent value) altogether (Halliday, 1986; Mann, 2009) – without consulting the European allies. Second, Europe's mood changed as a result of a renewed sense of confidence in the European project in light of the Single European Act (1986), the proposed single currency and continued EU enlargement (Keohane *et al.*, 1993). This resulted in the creation of the European Council Secretariat, a Brussels-based agency geared to harmonizing various aspects of the EU's foreign policy initiatives. Third, change came as a result of the 'Gorbachev phenomenon' which seemed to usher in a qualitatively new period of transcontinental détente (Grachev, 2008).

All these elements provided the impetus for a renewed attempt to create an *internalized*, *Europeanist* set of security institutions. First, between 1983 and 1987, came the 'revitalization' of the Western European Union (WEU), that semi-dormant security institutional structure dating from the 1948 Treaty of Brussels. In its 'Platform of The Hague' (October 1987), the WEU boldly declared that 'we are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence' (WEU, 1988: 37). Under the terms of the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), the embryonic EU launched a *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) which designated the WEU as the key agency for the harmonization of security policy. Alas, the WEU proved to be too limited militarily and too unwieldy and ineffectual politically and institutionally to take on the challenges of the post-Cold War world (Howorth, 2007: 160–7). WEU was quietly put out to grass at the Franco-British Summit of Saint-Malo (December 1998), a summit which gave a major boost to Europe's security-institutional arrangements by launching the *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP) (Howorth, 2007). A decade later, the Treaty of Lisbon 'converted' Saint-Malo by introducing the definitive institutional structures of EU security policy. After Lisbon, ESDP became the *Common Security and Defence Policy* (CSDP).[1] In what follows, I shall trace the evolution of the EU's security-institutional 'architecture' from the late 1980s to the present.

Prior to the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, there were no fewer than eight *European* institutions with inputs to EU security policy, some of which continue to this day to exert influence. At the highest level stand the three monthly *European Council* meetings of heads of state and government with ultimate decision-making and political responsibility for all policy areas, including security policy. It was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty (1991) – and was subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Nice (2000) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) – that security and defence policy would be conducted by a special *intergovernmental* pillar of the EU in which the heads of state and government and appropriate ministers, voting unanimously, would take all ultimate policy decisions (De Schoutheete, 2006; Werts, 2008). Below the European Council came the *General Affairs Council* (GAC), which was renamed the *Foreign Affairs Council* (FAC) by the Lisbon Treaty. This body meets monthly and comprises the EU's 27 foreign ministers. It is, in practice, the main decision-taking body for the bulk of foreign and security policy (Hayes-Renshaw, 2006; Cross, 2011). Traditionally, the meetings of the GAC/FAC have been prepared by the *Committee of Permanent Representatives*

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(COREPER), formally comprising the ambassadors (referred to in this context as permanent representatives) of the member states to the European Union. This committee, the third of our longstanding foreign and security policy institutions, meets at least once a week in Brussels, and has traditionally enjoyed considerable influence over the policy-shaping process (Lewis, 1998; Cross, 2007). Any items on which the permanent representatives agree unanimously are normally adopted by the FAC without discussion. However, as we shall see below, COREPER's influence over security policy has waned since the advent of the new post-Saint-Malo institutions of security policy, particularly the *Political and Security Committee* (PSC).

A fourth body of some significance used to be the *Political Committee* (PoCo) comprising the political directors of the member state *Ministries of Foreign Affairs* (MFAs). This agency derived from the informal process of *European Political Cooperation* (EPC) whereby, from the 1970s onwards, European foreign ministers and political directors would hold monthly meetings to discuss policy coordination (Nuttall, 1992). However, as with COREPER, much of PoCo's *security and defence* remit was, after Saint-Malo, taken over by the PSC – made up of 27 ambassadors from the member states (see below). Occasionally the PSC is still convened at the level of the political directors but the institution as such has ceased to function in its traditional guise. The fifth pre-1999 institution is the *Council Secretariat*, which dates from the Single European Act of 1985 when it was felt necessary to establish a permanent secretariat to coordinate the foreign policy implications of the EU's growing trade and economic relations with the rest of the world. The Secretariat, which involves some 2,500 officials from across the EU, supports and advises both the European Council and the FAC. The sixth institutional input traditionally came from the rotating *Presidency* of the EU, which, prior to Lisbon, assumed responsibility for galvanizing and even initiating foreign and security policy during its six-month term of office. However, although after Lisbon the rotating presidency continues to exist with respect to most policy areas, in the field of foreign and security policy its powers of initiative have been overtaken by the creation of the key Lisbon institutions we shall examine below. In addition to these six separate agencies of intergovernmentalism, there is, of course, the supranational *European Commission* (EC), which has been largely responsible for the *delivery* and *implementation* of foreign and security policy through its *Directorate General for External Relations* (Relex), which contributes to policy formulation and works closely with other DGs such as EuropeAid, Development, Trade and Humanitarian Aid; and the *European Parliament* (EP), whose specialist committees on foreign affairs (AFET) and security and defence (SEDE) have continued to play an oversight role of growing importance (Duke, 2002: 127–30). One further institution technically pre-dating Saint-Malo[2] is the post of *High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy* (HR-CFSP), which from 1999 until 2009 was occupied by Javier Solana and, since Lisbon (in an upgraded form), by Catherine Ashton. We shall assess this institution below under the Lisbon institutions.

The post-Saint-Malo institutions

One might have thought, given this multi-level and already extremely cumbersome decision-making apparatus, that the advent of ESDP and the call in Saint-Malo for 'appropriate structures' would have presented a golden opportunity for wholesale institutional rationalization. However, the intergovernmental conference leading up to the Treaty of Nice (2000) was already in train and was essentially concentrating on the institutional consequences of the major EU enlargement planned for 2004. Therefore Nice simply added four key new

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institutional agencies to the already complex nexus we have just outlined. These new institutions have proven to be extremely important.

Political and Security Committee

The most important of these was, and still is, the *Political and Security Committee* (PSC), which was enshrined in the Treaty of Nice, modified by the Treaty of Lisbon, under Article 25:

> [A] Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies [and] shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations referred to in Article 28B.

The PSC as an institution was first convened on an interim basis in March 2000, becoming permanent in January 2001. It was aptly described in the first detailed scholarly studies of its activities as the 'linchpin' (Duke, 2005) and as the 'work-horse' behind ESDP decision-making (Meyer, 2006: 116). The 27 permanent representatives, with the rank of ambassador, meeting twice to three times a week in Brussels are involved in monitoring the international situation, formulating security policies and overseeing the implementation of those policies. However, an important caveat is immediately in order. Despite its centrality to the decision-shaping process, the PSC can easily be short-circuited by national capitals in the event of a real crisis which rules out member-state consensus. During the Iraq crisis of 2002–3, for instance, the Committee, notwithstanding the text of Article 25 of the Treaty, was kept entirely at arm's length from what was certainly the most significant foreign and security policy issue of the entire five-year period following Saint-Malo. This stark reality speaks volumes about the relative salience of *national* security policies as opposed to *European* policy on security when push really comes to shove.

The PSC deals with all aspects of the EU's common foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP/CSDP), although interviews with current and former ambassadors suggest that it works best in what is considered its 'core business' – the planning, preparation and oversight of operations, whether civilian or military. Some ambassadors feel that the body works less well when it ventures over-ambitiously into broad-ranging generalities about the future scope and direction of CFSP/CSDP. A representative of the Commission is present as the twenty-eighth member of the Committee in order to ensure cross-pillar consistency and coherence. Meetings are also attended by four representatives of the Council Secretariat. The work of the committee is assisted by 'European Correspondents' based in the MFAs who form a liaison between the political directors and the PSC ambassadors. The wide-ranging remit of the committee generates a vast amount of paperwork, creating an intensive workload for its members. This pressure is somewhat alleviated by the assistance of the Politico-Military Working Party, comprising officials from both MFAs and MODs and which convenes up to four times per week, dealing with both the diplomatic aspects and the technical details of planned operations, including relations with NATO. In addition, the meetings of the PSC are facilitated by a preparatory group, the 'Nicolaidis group', which fixes the most logical order for discussion of agenda items and indicates in advance where member states have concerns that they wish to raise.

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How influential is this key committee? The first systematic attempt to evaluate the influence of the PSC was conducted by Ana Juncos and Christopher Reynolds (2007). They sought to assess the committee with reference to the methodological and theoretical debates between rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2010[3]). The key issue here is the extent to which the members of this formally intergovernmental committee, through a process of socialization and mutual familiarity, actually reach consensus in a quasi-supranational mode. Juncos and Reynolds present their conclusions based on some 20 interviews with a variety of actors in Brussels and in the national capitals. Recognizing that rational approaches fail to grasp the significance of the permanence of the PSC in Brussels, they conclude that the PSC members, far from being bogged down in rational bargaining around pre-set national 'red lines' are involved in problem-solving and consensus-seeking. Their aim is to define what is and what is not possible under CSDP. Although the authors use the somewhat ambiguous notion of 'government in the shadow' as the sub-title of their article, the intention behind this notion is to argue that the members of the PSC do *take decisions* in the manner of governments and to some extent operate, in their words, 'outside the charmed circle of diplomacy'. The committee, they conclude 'remains a forum where informal norms and rules play an important role and in which routine interaction can make a difference, both to the representatives themselves *and to the actual substance of national foreign and security policies*' (my emphasis). My own work on the PSC (Howorth, 2010) fully corroborates these findings. The PSC has emerged as a strong *epistemic community* which, increasingly, operates as the de facto central agency for the definition and implementation of EU security policy.

That national capitals are prepared to champion this institution is so for several reasons. First, although member states formally retain their longstanding autonomy in national foreign and security policy-making, they all know that they have a strong vested interest *in making CFSP and CSDP work*. In these policy areas above all, there is recognition that, most often, the whole will prove to be greater than the sum of the parts. Second, there is a strong collective desire to achieve results. For this reason, it is rare for a proposal to come up to the PSC which is clearly going to run up against some strongly entrenched national interest on the part of one or more member states. What the PSC is in effect doing is writing on a blank sheet of paper the limits of the possible in CFSP/CSDP (and, by the same token, the profile of the impossible). It is, in a sense, *creating* an entire policy area from scratch. It is a kind of script-writer for the CSDP narrative. Debates thus tend to turn around proposals that have a realistic chance of success. Finally, the PSC is effective because, while operationalizing EU security policy, it in no way interferes with the maintenance, in the major national capitals, of a residual *national* foreign and security policy for those member states who attach fundamental importance to their individual role in the world.

Military Committee and Military Staff

Two other institutions were created in 1999 alongside the PSC. The *European Union Military Committee* (EUMC) is the highest EU military body. It is established within the Council and is formally composed of the *Chiefs of the Defence Staff* (CHODs) of the member states meeting at least biannually, but is normally attended by their military representatives (MILREPs), who, in most cases, are double-hatted with each nation's NATO representative. This Committee rapidly imposed itself as a vital mechanism in the policy-making process. Its ultimate function is to deliver to the European Council, via the PSC, the unanimous advice of the 27 CHODs on all matters with a military dimension as well as recommendations

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for action. Such unanimity is essential to the commitment of EU forces to any military operation. The EUMC is the designated 'forum for consultation and cooperation between the member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management'. Its advice and recommendations pertain to

> the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects; the … political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and situations; the risk assessment of potential crises; the military dimension of a crisis situation and its implications, in particular during its subsequent management; … the elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability objectives according to agreed procedures; the EU's military relationship with non-EU European NATO Members, the other candidates for accession to the EU, other states and other organisations, including NATO; and the financial estimation for operations and exercises.
>
> (Rutten, 2001: 193–4)

These terms of reference are essentially drawn from those of NATO's Military Committee. The EUMC thus emerges as the key decision-shaping body in crisis-management situations, drawing up and evaluating strategic military options, overseeing the elaboration of an operational plan and monitoring operations throughout the mission. It is also responsible for giving advice on the termination of an operation. The Chairman of the EUMC is a four-star flag officer, normally a former Chief of Defence of a member state.

The most complete analysis of the impact of this institution has been conducted by Mai'a Cross (Cross, 2010, 2011), whose findings are unequivocal. This is a committee where the role of expertise, the impact of a pre-existing common recruitment pattern and common culture, the intensity and sustained periodicity of meetings (especially informal meetings), shared professional norms and the ability to persuade capitals of the wisdom of EU consensus is exceptional. Cross notes that

> despite the fact that EU military power is still a relatively new aspect of EU security integration, the impact of the military epistemic community on the trajectory of security integration has been quite[4] strong, and is likely to grow. The professional norms, culture, and worldview of the military epistemic community indicate that it is a highly cohesive transnational network of experts. In particular, their tactical expertise is for all intents and purposes the same, and this enables them to come to agreement very quickly.
>
> (Cross, 2011: 257–8)

There is no doubt whatever that this key military committee of experts plays a fundamental role in the shaping of policy options on CSDP. Its inter-governmental structure in no way impedes its capacity to deliberate in supra-national ways.

The third agency created by Saint-Malo is the *European Union Military Staff* (EUMS). This body comprises some 200 senior officers from the 27 member states. It provides military expertise and capacity, including during the conduct of EU-led military operations. The EUMS works under the political direction of the European Council (through the PSC) and under the military direction of the EUMC. Although the EUMS does not act as an operational HQ, it performs the operational functions of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and provides in-house military expertise for the High Representative. The EUMS is in fact a General Directorate within the Council General Secretariat and is the only

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permanent integrated military structure of the European Union. Established on 11 June 2001, the EU Military Staff has had four Directors-General, each fulfilling a three-year mandate.

The fourth post-Saint-Malo institution is the *Civilian Crisis Management Committee* (CIVCOM). This body mirrors the EUMC, providing policy options to the PSC, but on *civilian missions* – which have turned out to be the most numerous of all CSDP operations. However, it offers a somewhat different picture from the EUMC, for a number of reasons. First, the members of this committee are drawn from a wide range of civilian and diplomatic backgrounds and lack the cohesive recruitment patterns and culture which characterize the military. Second, they meet more frequently in formal settings and less frequently in informal settings and are thus less likely to 'bond' with one another than the members of PSC or the EUMC. Third, by its very nature, the work of CIVCOM is relatively new and experimental and little can be taken for granted about the outcome of committee discussions. However, Cross has demonstrated that CIVCOM representatives nevertheless succeed, just like their EUMC counterparts, in focusing on the achievement of consensus rather than on the defence of national red lines (Cross, 2010). The socialization processes work in a variety of ways. First, CIVCOM members (like the initial cohort of PSC ambassadors) are conscious that they are breaking important new politico-diplomatic ground. This helps considerably in the forging of an *esprit de corps*. Second, there is 'a common desire to move the EU forward' which contributes in important ways to the generation of a shared mindset. Third, representatives on CIVCOM tend to be younger than those on the other committees and consider it an exciting opportunity to create something new together. All in all, despite the obstacles to socialization outlined above, the workings of CIVCOM also tend to gravitate towards consensus-seeking rather than red-line defending.

One final post-1999 innovation which has become a regular institutional feature although technically still with informal status is the *Council of Defence Ministers*. In February 2002, it had been agreed that defence ministers would be authorized to meet under the aegis of the General Affairs Council (the monthly meeting of the EU foreign ministers) to discuss 'certain agenda items, limited to … military capabilities'. The very fact that member states recognized the necessity for such top-down meetings constituted a major step forward. In democratic systems, defence ministers are generally kept strictly subordinate to foreign ministers and, of course, prior to Saint-Malo there had never been any prospect of the Council of Ministers meeting in defence-minister format. Since February 2002, they have tended to meet several times a year to oversee the development of military capabilities, and they have gradually become significant security policy-shapers. They were instrumental in helping move the debate on capacity away from the raw numbers of the Headline Goal and towards a clear set of qualitative criteria. This development was taken to a new and qualitatively different level by the informal meeting of the defence ministers in Ghent in September 2010, followed by the formal meeting in December, at which firm decisions were taken on cooperative projects for the development of European military capacity (Gros-Verheyde, 2010). The defence ministers also meet regularly in another format – as the Steering Board of the *European Defence Agency* (see below).

The Lisbon institutional framework

CSDP is at the heart of the Lisbon Treaty. Of the 62 amendments to the previous treaties introduced by Lisbon no fewer than 25 concern CFSP/CSDP. Moreover, with the exception of the confusion in Ireland over that country's traditional neutrality, the national debates over these foreign and security aspects of the Treaty gave rise in no member state to any particular issues of concern. Opinion polls across Europe consistently suggest that

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there is considerable popular support for the view that foreign and security policy ought logically to be conducted at European level rather than exclusively at national level.[5] There were four major institutional innovations introduced by Lisbon and a number of minor institutional adjustments.

The European Defence Agency

The existence of this institution, first called for in the aborted 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, was formally confirmed by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. By that time, it had already been in operation for five years. Its formal title is the *European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency* (EARMCA), but it has long been referred to for short as the EDA. Prior to its launch, armaments cooperation had taken place rigorously outside the EU framework. Two main reasons lay behind the decision to bring the business inside the EU institutions. The first was the relative failure of previous attempts to coordinate procurement and armaments cooperation. The second was the accelerating reality of ESDP and the concurrent perceived need to link capabilities to armaments production. The urgency of these drivers was reflected in the fact that, at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, it was agreed not to await ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in order to launch the EDA, which was to be created immediately. Its objectives and role were narrowed down to four basic purposes:

- to work for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to defining and meeting ESDP's *capability* needs;
- to promote *equipment collaboration*, both to contribute to defence capabilities and to foster further restructuring of European defence industries;
- to encourage the widening and deepening of regulatory approaches and the achievement of a European defence *equipment market*;
- to promote defence-relevant *research and technology* (R&T), 'pursuing collaborative use of national defence R&T funds' and 'leveraging other funding sources, including those for dual use or security-related research'.

The EDA is guided by a Steering Board meeting at the level of defence ministers, nominally headed by the High Representative and managed by a Chief Executive, most recently Claude-France Arnould. However, it enjoys only a tiny budget (€25 million in 2005, rising to €30 million in 2010), a sign that governments remain uncertain about how far they can trust their own political instincts.

In a pioneering study written at the time the agency was being established, Martin Trybus (2006) contrasted the supra-national aspirations of the European Defence Community's 1950s approach to weapons procurement, with the determinedly inter-governmental approaches adopted ever since – including in the case of the EDA. Noting that defence procurement is recognized by member states as a policy area where European cooperation is essential if the EU is to avoid sub-contractor status to the US industry, and stressing that the European Commission has in recent years introduced a number of measures to facilitate Europeanization of the defence equipment market, Trybus concludes that the resolutely inter-governmental terms of reference of the EDA are likely to clash fairly constantly with the requirements of procurement rationalization. In a more recent assessment of the 'clash of institutional logics' involved in the EDA's existence and work, Jozef Bátora (2009) detects three additional clashes of institutional or functional logic within the EDA: between the

logic of defence sovereignty and the logic of pooled resources; between the Europeanist and the Euro-Atlanticist logics; and between the logics of liberalization and of Europeanization of the defence market. He detects clear evidence that the EDA has been making significant efforts to transcend the logic of defence sovereignty by introducing a raft of procedures and rules into the *Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement* which will, in effect, facilitate cooperation and even integration in the procurement process. Where the appropriateness of partners is concerned, the Agency has found itself unable to resolve the tensions between the Europeanist and the Atlanticist proclivities of its member states. On the liberalization versus Europeanization conflict, the EDA has made a robust pitch to break down national monopolies and to introduce mechanisms for cross-border tendering. Yet, the logic of liberalization runs up immediately against the logic of European preference, and here the EDA has to date been unable to resolve the contradiction.

The Presidency of the European Council

Article 9B of the Lisbon Treaty introduces a long overdue and major modification by creating the position of *President of the European Council*. The six-monthly rotating presidency of the EU had long been seen as counterproductive, particularly in the area of foreign and security policy. Initially intended to give all six member states experience in ‘steering the EU ship’, the practice had become a symbol of internal incoherence, generalized confusion, erratic policy shifts and external incomprehension. The position of President of the Council involves a two-and-a-half-year mandate, renewable once. The President’s main functions are to ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus’ within the Council, and to ‘ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy’. It is, potentially, a very powerful position. However, there was always considerable speculation as to how much turf jostling would be involved between the Presidency position and the other major institutional innovation, the post of High Representative.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Throughout the decade-long process of Treaty review, most commentators were agreed that the key institutional innovation of what eventually became Lisbon would be the introduction of the double-hatted post of *High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission* (HR-VP). There were three main reasons for this. The first was political: the need for ever greater coordination and integration of the foreign and security policies of the EU’s 27 member states. The second was operational: the need for synergies, on the ground, between the main thrusts of CFSP/CSDP: trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance and crisis management. The third was institutional: the growing recognition by member states that effective international action on the part of the EU required the existence, in Brussels, of centralized decision-shaping agencies.

The Lisbon Treaty merged the posts of High Representative for CFSP (previously held by Javier Solana) and that of External Relations Commissioner. The aim was to generate far greater coordination between the two main thrusts of the EU’s international activities: development aid and crisis management. The appointee enjoys a five-year term. This is the first time in the history of the EU that a position has straddled the hitherto mutually impermeable institutions of the Council and the Commission. The post-holder also has powerful responsibilities as Chair of the EDA. The ramifications of this appointment are very considerable

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and the office is referred to no fewer than 52 times in the Treaty text. The post-holder also contributes both to the preparation of and to the implementation of CFSP/CSDP, represents the Union in international organizations and at international conferences, and conducts 'political dialogue' on the Union's behalf. The incumbent replaces the previous six-monthly rotating Presidency of the *General Affairs Council* (which dealt with external and security policy) and takes over as Chair of the newly created *Foreign Affairs Council* (FAC), which s/he can convene in emergency session within 48 hours. Moreover, the HR-VP presides over the new *European External Action Service* (see below). The position of HR-VP has long been seen as the key institutional position in the EU's foreign and security policy.

One imponderable throughout the protracted business of Treaty revision had been the extent to which the HR-VP position would clash with the new Presidency of the Council position. In designating 'external representation' as a function of the Presidency, the Treaty took care to specify that this would be 'at the appropriate level' (meetings with heads of state) and that it would be 'without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' (who would expect to interact with foreign ministers). An analogy occasionally deployed in the commentariat is that of the relationship between the US President and the Secretary of State. This is doubly misleading. Both those office-holders exercise clear lines of authority, whereas their new EU 'counterparts' still have to coexist with powerful heads of state and government and with influential foreign ministers. Moreover, between the US President and the Secretary of State there is a hierarchical relationship entirely missing from the new EU positions.

Analysts had always agreed that the actual job descriptions for these two key posts (which remain somewhat vague and aspirational in the Treaty text) would depend heavily on the personalities of the two post-holders. There was widespread astonishment when the European Council, in November 2009, appointed former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy to the post of European Council President and former Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton to that of HR-VP. Neither had any international name recognition and neither had any real experience of international or security affairs. Both appointments were greeted with generalized scepticism and not a little dismay, the general interpretation among the commentariat being that the leading heads of state and government had ensured the appointment of individuals that they would be able to micro-manage (Graw, 2009; Parker, 2009). As this volume goes to press, it is too soon to say what verdict history will record on the two initial incumbents. Van Rompuy has benefited from a relatively positive and generous media coverage, aided in large part by his dynamic *chef de cabinet* Frans van Daele, and by an agenda which has been less exhausting and less challenging than that of Ashton. He has been credited with being taken relatively seriously by his global interlocutors and with having succeeded to some degree in putting the position of EU President on the map. Ashton has had to rise above a great deal of small-minded sniping, largely to do with her lack of prior experience, her monolingualism and her choice of priorities. Her job, involving the accumulation of two major positions, has involved endless travel and a super-charged agenda, which she appears to have taken physically in her stride. Moreover, she succeeded relatively well in her first major priority: that of establishing the *European External Action Service*.

The European External Action Service (EEAS)

In effect an EU Diplomatic Service, this body, which was launched without fanfare on 1 December 2010, will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and comprises around 3,000 officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat

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of the Council and of the Commission,[6] as well as staff seconded from the national diplomatic services of the member states. It *should*, if it works as intended, help the EU to arrive at joined-up foreign policies (aid, trade, soldiers, policemen, crisis management, asylum, etc.); provide more high-quality and unified analysis to ministers; coordinate the work of member states' embassies in third countries; and eliminate the danger that a weak presidency (such as the Czech presidency in early 2009) can actually undermine EU foreign and security policy. This is, potentially, a major and highly significant development (Avery, 2007; Crowe, 2008). It reflects the well-established tendency for the EU member states to resist 'Brusselsization' for as long as possible, but eventually to recognize the inevitability and indeed the desirability of ever greater policy coordination and coherence. The service, in its initial guise, was the result of a year-long struggle between the HR-VP, the member states and the European Parliament. In a March 2010 proposal designed to attach the service directly to the Commission (rather than to the Council or to the member states), MEPs Elmar Brok and Guy Verhofstadt also proposed EP oversight over the EEAS budget, personnel, aid policy, ratification issues and hearings for top jobs. As a counterproposal, the HR-VP insisted that the service be an autonomous body under her direction, equally answerable to the Council, the Commission and the member states. She suggested a pyramidal-style hierarchy headed by a very powerful Secretary-General. While the MEPs, in response, threatened to veto the entire institution, the EU foreign ministers aligned themselves with the HR-VP. This led to an unseemly tug-o-war between the EP and the HR-VP which was resolved only by a compromise agreement in June 2010. The EEAS will indeed be an autonomous body, but will work in close coordination with the EP. The hierarchical structure was toned down by agreement on the appointment of several deputy Secretaries-General and Directors-General (Missiroli, 2010). Widely applauded were the appointments, in summer 2010, to the top positions: Secretary-General Pierre Vimont, Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan, Deputy Secretaries-General Maciej Popowski and Helga Schmidt, Head of Strategy Robert Cooper. Contrary to the fears of some, the leaders of the EEAS are exceptionally prominent diplomats.

Will appointment to the EEAS emerge as the most coveted career move for more junior EU diplomats? Will there continue to be a tug-o-war between the different actors over control of this service? What will be its impact on the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Quai d'Orsay or the Auswärtiges Amt? Will the new service succeed seamlessly in absorbing the 120-odd diplomatic representations previously attached to the Commission? The quasi-revolutionary implications of the EU per se having diplomatic representation around the world, with diplomats trained to speak on behalf of the Union rather than on behalf of its member states are almost impossible to double-guess. Once again, everything will hinge on the precise modalities of its implementation and on the degree of cooperation it enjoys from the member states. The bottom line, however, is that all member states actively want the EEAS to be a success. It would thus become a fundamental institutional underpinning of the entire CFSP/CSDP nexus.

Conclusion

It was clear to certain leaders, in the wake of World War II, that Europe, if it were ever to become a significant global actor in its own right, would need its own institutional framework, centrally located in a European capital city. In the immediate aftermath of the war, such a prospect seemed too daunting for some leading European member states and refuge was taken in the US-dominated Atlanticist structures of NATO. However, dissatisfaction

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with those structures, as well as the eventual end of the Cold War, reignited the quest for *internalized, Europeanist* security institutions. At every juncture in this process, a similar and powerful institutional logic imposed itself. This involved some form or another of 'Brusselsization'. Iterative policy coordination, among and between the national capitals, eventually proved to be inadequate or too messy (usually both) and led to calls for a new Brussels-based institution to rationalize inputs and coordinate policy. With the creation of the *Political and Security Committee* and its sub-committees, the *European Council Presidency* and the *HR-VP*, not to mention the *EEAS*, the general thrust has been uni-directional – towards ever greater delegation of authority and responsibility away from the member states and towards the central institutions of the EU. Even when many of these institutions were specifically devised as agencies of *intergovernmentalism*, forces of socialization and policy-urgency transformed them into quasi-supranational organisms whose overwhelming objective was the quest for consensus.

The security institutions of the EU are still in their first infancy and there remains a great deal to be sorted out, refined and bedded in. But the underlying belief in the need for (European) institutions which would be greater than the sum of the (member state) parts has driven the entire process. The Treaty of Lisbon, to paraphrase Churchill, was not the beginning of the end but it certainly constituted the end of the beginning of this lengthy historical process.

Notes

1 For the sake of consistency, I shall use the abbreviation CSDP throughout this chapter.
2 The post was created by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), but disagreements among the member states over the level and remit of the post-holder delayed its initiation until 1999.
3 The classic reference on this debate has long been the Hall and Taylor article. However, Vivien Schmidt's more recent piece massively updates the discussion and introduces a new perspective which has particular relevance in the context of the deliberations of the PSC – discursive institutionalism.
4 Note that in American English 'quite' normally denotes 'very'.
5 In a *Eurobarometer* poll (71, p. 147) published in September 2009, 81 per cent of citizens polled believed that foreign and security policy broadly understood (promotion of peace in the world and fight against terrorism) should be conducted at European rather than at national level.
6 The EEAS incorporates the former Commission DGs with responsibility for foreign and security policy which constituted RELEX. However, the Commission succeeded in retaining responsibility for enlargement, the EU neighborhood and some aspects of development aid.