Growing appreciation of existing climate risks

Increasingly, climate change is being assessed and addressed according to the risks it poses to security. This is in part due to better and more data on the links between climate change and other indicators of human and national security, and the ability to monitor and predict future trends. For example, in 2008, the U.S. Intelligence Community produced a National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030, ³ and the UK Ministry of Defence produced a Global Strategic Trends report, ⁴ which included robust sections on climate risks and likely future scenarios.

In addition to assessing the future risks of climate change to security, there is an increasing amount of work evaluating the current risks. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, in its 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, noted that climate was “an immediate risk to national security.” ⁵ A chapter on the observed intersection of climate change and human security was included in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report. ⁶ This growing evidence of current human and national security risks associated with climate change is coupled with a gradual shift from addressing climate change as a “tolerable” risk primarily to infrastructure, to a possibly “strategically-significant risk” to national security. ⁷ This gradual up-scaling and incorporation of climate risks into broader risk assessments and policies is part of an ongoing need to better prepare for and mitigate the security risks amplified by a changing climate. While a considerable amount of progress has been made over the last several decades, there remains a gap between the risks nations and peoples face, and the capacity and political will to respond to these risks. This chapter explores both what has been done, and what remains to be addressed.

How security establishments view the climate change threat

Security establishments, including the U.S. military and intelligence community, and in over 70 countries around the world, have identified climate change as a national security threat. ⁸ This is reflected in a range of strategic documents, assessments, actions and statements made by national security, military and intelligence institutions across the globe – including important outputs from the United States such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Intelligence Council’s “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” ⁹ and from the UK Ministry of Defence ¹⁰ among others. The reasons for this appreciation are clear. Observations of existing climate change impacts on security have increased in the past decade, and projections regarding the influence of climate change on future security are consistently dire. Generally speaking, security practitioners have described climate change as a “threat multiplier.” ¹¹ This essentially means that it has the potential to exacerbate other drivers of insecurity. This includes factors such as water, food and energy insecurity, which are drivers that can contribute to significant infrastructure risk, state fragility, and even conflict. ¹²

Infrastructure and geostrategic threats

In this context, security establishments in the United States, and globally, generally acknowledge two broad types of risks presented by the “threat multiplication” of a changing climate: “infrastructure” threats and “geostrategic” threats. Though this is an imperfect categorization – as there are indeed connections between the two, and nuances that the categories cannot fully capture – it is a helpful guide to understanding how security communities approach this threat.

Geostrategic threats

On a broader and more diffuse level, climate change also presents a geostrategic threat by exacerbating stresses on the critical resources underpinning national security, including water, food and energy. These stresses, at their most acute, can degrade a nation’s capacity to govern, which can have implications for national, regional and international security. Decreases in water, food and energy availability can devastate livelihoods, and contribute to a broad range of destabilizing trends, including mass population displacement, migration, and political unrest. These pressures in turn can contribute to state fragility, internal conflict, and potentially, state collapse. ²¹ Climate change can also indirectly change or disrupt existing international security dynamics in geostrategically-significant environments, such as the South China Sea and the Arctic. ²² Cumulatively, these threats can place significant strains on a world order built on an international system of cooperating sovereign states. As state sovereignty is built on a legitimacy founded on a state’s ability to both provide basic resources and/or prosperity – what one may call “output legitimacy” – and/or to offer a voice to its publics – “input legitimacy” – the effect of climate change, particularly on the output legitimacy of states, can have a profound influence on international security, and more broadly, world order. ²³ Here is a look at four broad categories for how climate change interacts with and multiplies geostrategic threats:

• increased state fragility;
• heightened globalization of hazards;
• added risks to key geostrategic environments;
• direct threats to state sovereignty.

Increased state fragility

Climate change may increase the fragility of states. This impact is perhaps most acute on already fragile states. The populations of nations that are poorly-governed and resource-stressed are likely to be on the front lines of a changing climate. Fragile states such as Sudan, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic in Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh in South Asia, and fragile states in the Middle East and North Africa such as Yemen and Syria, ²⁴ are projected to experience some of the most dramatic effects of climate change in terms of rainfall variability and sea level rise. ²⁵ According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment, climate change will stress already stressed global food supplies, presenting a particularly acute problem in “Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.” ²⁶ The following are two short case studies to further illustrate this point.

Heightened globalization of hazards

Climate change-related weather events also have the capacity to disrupt global markets that are critical for the resource security of states. Due to the global nature of these markets, climatic events in one part of the world can have dramatic impact on locations sometimes thousands of miles away. This phenomenon can be described as “the globalization of hazards.” ³⁶ Take, for example, the global wheat market and the case of Egypt. Egypt, like many of its neighbors, is one of the world’s most highly dependent on the global wheat market. ³⁷ In 2010, major drought and heat wave events in China and Russia – the latter explicitly connected to climate change by two separate studies, ³⁸ devastated local wheat harvests, which drove China to make extraordinarily large purchases of wheat on the global food market. ³⁹ This was a major factor in driving up the price of wheat in Egypt by about 300% in 2010–2011. ⁴⁰ Egyptian “bread subsidy” policies were unable to bring the price down in many rural areas. ⁴¹ While urban protests were occurring in Cairo and other cities, the appeal of the revolutionary movement in Egypt broadened to the countryside, which saw at least three major food riots in 2011. ⁴² In this way, a climatic hazard in China and Russia contributed in a significant way to food insecurity in Egypt, due to the latter’s dependence on the global food market. Such “globalized hazards” are likely to increase, as extreme weather events become more frequent, and more intense.

Added risks to key geostrategic environments

Climate change also places pressure on shared geostrategic, and often geographically ill-defined, environments, which may exacerbate existing international tensions, or create new ones. Two of the clearest examples of this nexus between climate change and key geostrategic environments are the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

The South China Sea is a critical geostrategic choke point. According to a report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), ocean-going vessels carry $1.2 billion in U.S. trade annually through its waters. On top of this, sovereignty over parts of the Sea is bitterly contested by adjacent countries, and the U.S. and China have perennially competed over its control (with the U.S. viewing Chinese expansionism in the sea as a threat to international security, and the security of key allies and partners in the region). ⁴³ On top of this dynamic, a warming ocean coupled with over-fishing is driving fish stocks northward into contested waters. ⁴⁴ As nations bordering the sea, such as Vietnam, are heavily dependent on fish stocks in the South China Sea as a source of protein for their populations (30% of protein intake in Vietnam, for example), Vietnamese fishing fleets are likely to venture further north into waters that are subject to competing claims between China, its neighbors, and the United States. ⁴⁵ These dynamics could lead to an increasing number of regional security disputes. Such disputes can quickly escalate into international security incidents when the United States becomes involved in support of a claimant. ⁴⁶

In the Arctic, by contrast, there has been extraordinary cooperation between nations in what might otherwise be a “Wild West” of ice and water. This may be due to the existence of successful cooperative forums, such as the Arctic Council, but there are other dynamics at play as well. Some scholars argue that as climate change contributes to increasing economic activity in the Arctic, greater cooperation between Arctic nations may become more common due to a perception that “stability is good for business.” ⁴⁷ However, it would be unwise to ignore the possible international security consequences of diplomatic tensions elsewhere in the world (such as disputes between Russia and the United States in Eastern Ukraine and Syria) on the security landscape in the Arctic. ⁴⁸ Since the outbreak of violence in Ukraine, for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requested that all members suspend military cooperation with Russia (including in the Arctic), and Russia has withdrawn from a major forum for military cooperation in the Arctic, the Arctic Security Force Roundtable. ⁴⁹ A future of an even more open Arctic, coupled with disagreements over security dynamics elsewhere in the world, could provide additional opportunities for tension, and even conflict, between major powers, and this has possible negative consequences for the maintenance of world order. While the current probability of conflict in the Arctic is low, ⁵⁰ this will be an important space to watch in the future. ⁵¹

Direct threats to state sovereignty

Climate change may also contribute to the disappearance of certain low-lying states through its contribution to sea level rise, as well as the loss of significant territory for other states. This includes small island states such as the Maldives, ⁵² and large swaths of countries, such as the low-lying coastal zones of Bangladesh. ⁵³ Essentially, climate change presents an existential threat for some countries – a potentially total loss of sovereignty. The international community has no experience in managing the disappearance of nations as a result of environmental processes. ⁵⁴ In fact, there are no international legal norms designed to account for such an eventuality, including no formal recognition of “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees.” ⁵⁵ The loss of entire states, or large zones within states, may contribute to a mass increase in stateless people in the international system, which could present both a humanitarian and international political and security crisis of the highest order. ⁵⁶ The full nature of the consequences of such an event is not broadly understood, and that uncertainty presents a unique and unprecedented challenge to international security.

The 3 Ds of prevention and response

Addressing both the infrastructure and geostrategic risks of climate change means managing the unavoidable, and avoiding the unmanageable. ⁵⁷ First, governments and societies must commit the resources necessary to manage climate change impacts on critical infrastructure, on food, water and energy security, and on geopolitical dynamics in strategically-significant parts of the world. Second, governments and societies must take measures to avoid worst-case climate change scenarios which may be very difficult for nations and international institutions to manage effectively. These solutions involve applications across the so-called “3 Ds” of security: defense, diplomacy and development.

How does climate change compare to other security priorities?

Climate change is similar to other so-called “new security risks” or “transnational security risks,” in that it is widely recognized as a high probability, high consequence risk. ⁶⁷ This effectively means climate change is happening, and has potentially very significant, negative implications for international security. Despite this general consensus, the response to climate change from most governments, to date, has not yet been commensurate to the risk. The detonation of a weapon of mass destruction, for example, has been considered as a low probability, yet high consequence risk by experts. ⁶⁸ This suggests that though the probability of such a weapon being detonated by a state or a non-state actor is low, such an event would be unacceptably catastrophic. Further, low probability events happen all the time. Given the legitimate “low tolerance” for such an eventuality, a regime of international laws, and significant state resources, have been marshaled and deployed to track and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Though significant intolerable risks related to climate change have been identified, an approach comparable to non-proliferation efforts has not fully materialized in the climate change sphere of policy-making. The scale and comprehensive nature of recent international agreements on climate change suggest that this may be changing. However, it is worth noting that even the most recent and ambitious international climate agreement in Paris is not legally-binding, unlike most major agreements regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. ⁶⁹

Though comparisons between the probability and consequence of different transnational security risks are useful, placing climate change in a hierarchical “rank” of security risks can falsely separate it from other risks, and contribute to a fractured understanding of the risk landscape. Climate-driven water insecurity, for example, can increase the probability of state instability, which in turn could enhance the influence of non-state actors, who could help facilitate the proliferation of the fissile materials necessary for producing nuclear weapons, ⁷⁰ interconnections make the case that it may be less important to rank climate change next to other security risks, and more important to treat climate change as part of a comprehensive “risk” or “threat” matrix.

Securitization vs. militarization

There exists an academic dialogue regarding the “securitization” of climate change which involves analysis of the “climate and security” discourse. This dialogue, however, tends to artificially conflate the recognition of climate change as a security risk, with the concept of “militarizing” responses to climate change. ⁷¹ It is important to address this mischaracterization, as “securitization” does not imply “militarization.” The former suggests that climate change presents risks to security, while the latter implies that climate change is being primarily considered as a military problem, and that responses to it should therefore be led by military institutions.

In practice, evidence suggests that the treatment of climate change, and other transnational challenges, as a “security” problem has broadened the scope of responses to its risks, rather than narrowing that scope to military or security-oriented institutions. For example, intergovernmental security institutions and militaries, such as the UN Security Council and the U.S. Department of Defense, recognize the critical role of civilian agencies in combating “new security threats” such as poverty, health vulnerabilities, water and food insecurity, and a changing climate. The United Nations Security Council, for example, released a Presidential Statement on Climate Change which identifies a non-security intergovernmental organization, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as a “key instrument for addressing climate change.” ⁷² The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report includes a section on climate change which states that civilian agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Energy, should be leading actors in addressing the climate risk. ⁷³ In other words, rather than narrowing the field of action, the climate and security dialogue broadens the scope and scale of action to include a greater number of agencies with different competencies. This helps ensure that few stones are left unturned in the effort to address the high probability, high consequence threat of a changing climate.

Better understanding climate and security risks

In order for climate change to be addressed in a manner that is commensurate to the threat to international security it poses, its “risk profile” must first be elevated among security establishments across the globe. This will require the improvement of analytical tools aimed at assessing climate risks to security, as well as improved channels for delivering prognoses of climate and security risks to senior government officials with the authority and resources to act robustly, and to act early. For example, evidence suggests that the predictive tools and indices governments and analysts use to assess the fragility of states are outdated, and may not adequately account for climate and natural resource-related risks to state fragility. ⁷⁴ This has led analysts to miss vulnerabilities in seemingly stable states.

Underestimating and oversimplifying the connections between climate change and security

Popular commentary, often dependent on the drama of “two-sided” debate, tends to either oversimplify or underestimate climate change effects on security. ⁷⁸ This dynamic can have a deleterious effect on public policy, and should therefore be corrected as much as possible. Syria, for example, is not the first “climate war,” and climate change is not a proximate cause of the Syrian refugee crisis, despite the implications of some newspaper headlines to the contrary. If these kinds of simplistic claims are accepted at face value, commentators risk absolving governments, such as the al-Assad regime, of a responsibility to protect their publics. Similarly, the underestimation of climate change risks to security could lead governments and societies to miss critical vulnerabilities. In the case of Syria, there is evidence that climate change was a contributing factor to Syria’s fragility. ⁷⁹ Ignoring or underestimating this contribution could also risk leaving governments and populations unprepared.

A reasonable level of certainty

Though the future is not entirely predictable, evidence that climate change can contribute to state fragility, and other stresses on security, is growing. While additional research is critical for enhancing that certainty, policy-makers cannot wait for perfect certainty before making decisions, particularly in a complex and rapidly-changing environment, where delayed action could be implicated in state failure, conflict and humanitarian crisis.

Dr. Jay Gulledge notes that unlike academic scholars, governments are more concerned, by necessity, with false negatives than false positives. ⁸⁰ If a government fails to detect a risk, and that risk materializes, that government will be held accountable for failing to protect its public. In terms of climate change impacts on security issues such as state fragility, there is a sufficient degree of certainty to justify comprehensive action to mitigate climate risks. Demanding that governments rest policy decisions on near-perfect certainty about climate change impacts before acting is not sensible, and inconsistent with how governments treat a range of other critical security risks. As General Gordon Sullivan, USA (ret.) stated:

People are saying they want to be perfectly convinced about climate science projections … But speaking as a soldier, we never have 100% certainty. If you wait until you have 100% certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield. ⁸¹

Existing risks and black swans

While the medium and long-term risks of climate change are projected to be destabilizing, climate change is affecting international security already. NASA notes that the globe is warming at a faster rate than it ever has before. ⁸² The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap highlights that climate change presents “immediate risks to national security.” ⁸³ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration implicates climate change in the significant decline in winter precipitation across the Middle East and the Mediterranean from 1971–2010. ⁸⁴ Arctic ice melt is fundamentally changing the geopolitical landscape of the High North. The IPCC 5th Assessment Report’s Human Security chapter recognizes that climate change can indirectly increase the likelihood of violent conflict. ⁸⁵

Though climate impacts are already occurring, and likely to get worse, lower probability climate events, or “black swans,” must also be planned for. Abrupt climatic changes, and gradual changes that precipitate abrupt stresses to food, water and energy security, have the potential to be destabilizing. ⁸⁶ Changes in the jet stream, more rapid than expected sea level rise and glacial melt, and global disasters such as simultaneous shocks to major grain-producing nations, are a few potential abrupt consequences. While climate change models are strong in their predictive power, unknowns remain.

What to do: a few recommendations

Addressing climate change risks involves managing the unavoidable, and avoiding the unmanageable. Governments and international institutions must commit the necessary resources for managing climate change impacts on infrastructure, food, water and energy security, and geopolitical dynamics. These solutions involve applications across the so-called “3 Ds” of security: defense, diplomacy and development.

Conclusion

Populations are urbanizing and growing, sea levels are rising, and extreme weather events are developing more frequently and intensely. Such dynamics will place additional strains on the food and water resources that underwrite the security of nations and populations around the world, and this may increase the scale of mass migration. Despite this, policies designed to comprehensively address the full picture of climate risks are lacking, despite recent advancements among security institutions, and in international climate negotiations. Waiting for security and humanitarian crises to hit the front pages before acting has often proven a great failure of the international community. Whether or not the international community learns from that failure will be the measure of its resilience.

In this context, improving, augmenting, and possibly even creating new international, regional, national and sub-national structures for addressing climate change, may be critical for a secure future. This is a step that will require far more than technical or technological fixes. Rather, it will require that nations, and international institutions, place climate change at the top of the international security agenda, and find ways of collaborating on reducing those risks that present the greatest challenge to a functioning world order. Such an international climate and security imperative is both necessary, and achievable.