The Denial of Moral Knowledge

Authored by: Richard Joyce

The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology

Print publication date:  November  2018
Online publication date:  November  2018

Print ISBN: 9781138816121
eBook ISBN: 9781315719696
Adobe ISBN:

10.4324/9781315719696-15

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Abstract

If moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge and we understand knowledge as justified true belief, then there are three forms of moral skepticism. First, the noncognitivist denies that moral judgments express beliefs; second, the error theorist holds that moral judgments do express beliefs but they are never true; third, the justification skeptic agrees that moral judgments express beliefs but denies that we are ever justified in holding these beliefs. This chapter clarifies these three positions and sketches considerations for and against each view.

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